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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this study is to assess the multi-disciplinary approach in the investigation 
of corruption in the South African public service. Data was collected by means of in-
depth interviews conducted with members of the Directorate for Priority Crime 
Investigation’s Anti-Corruption Task Team to gain a comprehensive understanding 
of their experiences regarding the effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Task Team 
in the investigation of corruption within the public service. In addition, the researcher 
conducted a comprehensive literature study of local and international legislation to 
curb corruption, supplemented with various multi-disciplinary approaches employed 
internationally. Furthermore, various global Anti-Corruption Agencies were studied 
to comprehend their functions and efficacy.  
 
The findings of the research identified and described various impediments facing 
the Anti-Corruption Task Team’s effectiveness in investigating corruption within the 
public service. As a result, this study recommends the need to establish a single 
Anti-Corruption Agency with a comprehensive mandate to prevent, investigate, and 
educate on corruption, to critically safeguard the independence of the Anti-
Corruption Task Team against political interference, as well as the allocation of 
adequate resources and budget for its effective operation.  
 
The research identified best practices globally to combat corruption, which can be 
used to amend the current anti-corruption practices to suit the South African public 
service. Consequently, this study contributes significantly towards effective anti-
corruption investigation in the South African public service.  
 
Key terms 
Corruption, fraud, Anti-Corruption Task Team, multi-disciplinary approach, 
procurement fraud, public service.  
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KAKARETŠO 
 
Maikemišetšo a dinyakišišo tše ke go lekola mokgwa wa go kopanya dikarolo tše 
mmalwa tša thuto go nyakišiša bomenetša ka ditirelong tša setšhaba tša Afrika 
Borwa. Data e kgobokeditšwe ka mokgwa wa dipoledišano tše di tletšego tšeo di 
dirilwego le maloko a Sehlophatšhomo sa Twantšho ya Bomenetša sa Ofisi ya 
Molaodimogolo wa Dinyakišišo tša Bosenyi bjo Bogolo go hwetša kwešišo ya 
maitemogelo a bona a go šoma ga Sehlophatšhomo sa Twantšho ya Bomenetša 
mo go nyakišišeng bomenetša mo ditirelong tša setšhaba. Go tlaleletše, 
monyakišiša o dirile dinyakišišo tše di tletšego tša dingwalwa tša peomolao ya gae 
le ya ditšhabatšhaba tšeo maikemišetšo a tšona e lego go fokotša bomenetša le 
mekgwa ya go kopanya dikarolo tše mmalwa tša thuto yeo e dirišwago 
ditšhabatšhabeng. Go tlaleletša, mekgatlo ya twantšho ya bomenetša bja lefase 
ya go fapana e nyakišišitšwe go kwešiša mešomo le mehola ya yona.  
 
Monyakišiši o utollotše le go hlaloša mapheko a go fapana go moholo wa 
dinyakišišo ka Sehlophatšhomo sa Twantšho ya Bomenetša mo bomenetšeng ka 
ditirelong tša mmušo. Ka lebaka leo, dinyakišišo di digela tlhokego ya go thoma 
mokgatlo o tee wa go lwantšha bomenetša wa taolela ye kgolo ya go thibela, go 
nyakišiša le go ruta ka ga bomenetša; go šireletša boikemelo bja sehlophatšhomo 
sa twantšho ya bomenetša le go thibela go tsenatsena ga dipolotiki; le go aba 
methopo yeo e lekanego le ditekanetšo gore e šome gabotse. 
 
Dinyakišišo di utollotše tirišo ye botse go feta ka moka lefaseng ka moka go 
lwantšha bomenetša, yeo e swanetšwego go mpshafatšwa go fihlelela dinyakwa 
tša ditirelo tša setšhaba tša Afrika Borwa. 
 
Mareo a motheo 
Bomenetša, bomenemene, sehlophatšhomo sa go lwantšha bomenetša, 
bomenemene bja go reka, ditirelo tša setšhaba. 
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ISIFINYEZO ESIQUKETHE UMONGO WOCWANINGO 
 
Inhloso yalolu cwaningo ukuhlola inqubo ebandakanya amadisiplini ehlukene 
ukuphenyisisa ngenkohlakalo kwezezimali kumkhakha wabasebenzi 
bakahulumeni eNingizimu Afrika. Idata iqoqwe ngokwenza ama-interview ajulile 
enziwe nabethimba elilwisana nezinkohlakalo kwezezimali, i-Anti-Corruption Task 
team lwabophiko lwabenza uphenyiso lobugebengu obukhulu lwe-Directorate of 
Priority Crime Investigation ukuthola ukuqondisisa okujulile ngezipiliyoni zabo 
ngokusebenza ngendlela enomphumela kwethimba le-Anti-Corruption Task Team 
ekuphenyisiseni ngenkohlakalo kwezezimali kumkhakha wabasebenzi 
bakahulumeni. Nangaphezu kwalokho, umcwaningi uye wafunda ngokujulile 
ngemibhalo yocwaningo imibhalo yemithetho yezwe kanye nemithetho yamazwe 
omhlaba enenhloso yokulwisana nenkohlakalo kwezezimali, kanye nezinqubo 
ezihlanganisa amadisiplini ehlukene ezisetshenziswa kumazwe omhlaba. 
Nangaphezu kwalokho, ama-ejensi omhlaba alwa nezinkohlakalo nawo 
kwafundwa ngawo ukuqondisisa imisebenzi yawo kanye nemiphumela 
yemisebenzi yawo.  
 
Umcwaningi waphawula kanye nokuchaza izihibe ezihlukene maqondana 
nokusebenza ngendlela enomphumela kophenyisiso olwenziwa ngabethimba le-
Anti-Corruption Task Team kwinkohlakalo kwezeziali emkhakheni wabasebenzi 
bakahulueni. Ngenxa yalokhu, ucwaningo luncoma isidingo sokuthi kusungulwe i-
ejensi eyodwa enamagunya ajulile okuvimbela, ukuphenyisisa kanye nokufundisa 
ngezindlela zokulwa nenkohlakalo kwezezimali; ukuvikela ukuzimela kwethimba 
lokulwa nenkohlakalo kanye nokuvimbela ukuthi ithimba lingaphazanyiswa 
ngabezepolitiki; kanye nokuhlinzeka ngemithombo eyenele kanye namabhajethi 
ukuze ithimba lisebenze kahle ngendlela enomphumela.  
 
Ucwaningo luphawule izindlela ezingcono kuwo wonke umhlaba zokulwa 
nenkohlakalo kwezezimali, kanti futhi lezi zinqubo kumele zichitshiyelwe noma 
zihlelwe kabusha ukuhlangabezana nezidingo zomkhakha wabasebenzi 
bakahulumeni eNingizimu Afrika. Kanti-ke futhi emuva kwalokho, lolu cwaningo 
luthela esivivaneni kuphenyisiso olunomphumela lokulwa nenkohlakalo 
vii 
kwezezimali okwenziwa kumkhakha wabasebenzi bakahulumeni eNingizimu 
Afrika.  
 
AMATHEMU ABALULEKILE 
Inkohlakalo kwezezimali, inkwabaniso, ithimba lokulwa nekonhlakalo kwezezimali, 
inqubo yamadisiplini ehlukene, inkwabaniso kwezokuthengwa kwamasevisi 
nezinye izidingo, umkhakha wabasebenzi bakahulumeni. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
GENERAL ORIENTATION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This research was conducted to assess the multi-disciplinary approach in the 
investigation of corruption in the South African Public Service. The problem 
statement, aim of the research, specific purpose of the research, research question, 
key theoretical concepts, value of the research, research design and approach, 
target population and sampling, data collection, qualitative data analysis, prevalent 
methods taken to ensure trustworthiness, and ethical considerations related to the 
research principles and specific topic are discussed in this chapter.  
 
The need to combat corruption is of the utmost importance, as it impacts on 
economic improvement in terms of monetary proficiency and development. 
Corruption in public service influences the fair dissemination of assets to the 
populace, expanding compensation imbalances, undermining the adequacy of 
social welfare programmes, and negatively influencing human advancement. In 
other words, corruption may undermine long-term viable advancement, monetary 
development, and equality (Chêne 2014). The question arises why South Africans 
view the government as lacking in this respect. Afrobarometer (2017), for instance, 
has found that all things considered, a little over half (56%) of all people on the 
African continent felt that their governments were making a less than impressive 
display with regards to their endeavours to battle corrupt activities. In any case, 
South Africa performed strikingly worse than most countries, with two out of three 
locals (66%) perceiving the government as performing inadequately in fighting 
corruption (Newham 2015). 
 
Corruption is not just a South African phenomenon, but a worldwide trend that must 
be addressed. 
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1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
The Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) (2016) states that multi-faceted 
corruption cases used to be investigated by the Directorate of Special Operations 
(DSO), previously referred to as the Scorpions. After the dissolution of the DSO by 
the South African Government, the unit was replaced by the Hawks. The Hawks 
were placed under the control of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
(DPCI) of the South African Police Service (SAPS), whereas the Scorpions operated 
independently under the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). The directorate has 
the specific task to prevent, combat, and investigate national priority crimes, 
including serious corruption, as well as to investigate multi-faceted corruption in the 
public service. The Anti-Corruption Task Team (ACTT) is an investigative unit within 
the DPCI. The ACTT was officially established by former President Jacob Zuma in 
2010 (The Presidency 2015). However, the unit has only been fully operational since 
2011.  
 
The ACTT is mandated to investigate corrupt public service officials. The DPCI was 
established in July 2009 as an independent division within the SAPS, according to 
section 17C of the SAPS Act 65 of 1995 (South Africa 1995) as amended by the 
South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008 (South Africa 2008). The 
DPCI is in charge of combatting, investigating, and preventing national priority 
crimes, for example, serious organised crime, serious commercial crime (including 
serious economic crimes, such as fraud, money laundering, and racketeering, 
committed by highly placed government officials), and serious corruption in terms of 
section 17B and 17D of the SAPS Act 65 of 1995 (South Africa 1995), as amended 
by the SAPS Amendment Act 57 of 2008 (South Africa 2008). 
 
The ACTT is a multi-disciplinary team that mainly comprise of governmental and 
external role players, including the NPA, Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU), South African 
Revenue Service (SARS), DPCI, Special Investigating Unit (SIU), Financial 
Intelligence Centre (FIC), and the National Treasury (NT), that each play a part in 
the day-to-day operations of the Team. Furthermore, the ACTT has a larger 
management structure which is commonly referred to as the Principals of the ACTT, 
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of which the head of the Hawks is the chairman. According to the PMG (2016), the 
task team comprises of:  
 NT 
 Development Bank of South Africa 
 State Security 
 SIU 
 SARS 
 FIC 
 NPA 
 DPCI 
 SAPS 
 Justice Department 
 Government Communication and Information System 
 National Intelligence Coordinating Committee 
 Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation 
 External forensic chartered accountants  
 External cyber forensic experts  
 
This task team was created to fast track investigations of high-priority and high-
profile corruption cases (Davies 2013). This multi-disciplinary team thus prioritises 
serious corruption and fraud investigations involving R5 million or more per 
government individual involved. The former President of South Africa stated: “We 
will have the capacity to have any kind of effect in eradicating corrupt activities which 
are what our populaces expect of us” (The Presidency 2015). In October 2009, the 
Minister of Finance established a Multi-Agency Working Group (MAWG) to manage 
procurement matters that correlate with corrupt activities and abnormalities inside 
the government’s procurement structures. In July 2010, the President of South 
Africa entrusted the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS) with the 
establishment of a task team (the MAWG) to speed up investigations and 
prosecution (The Presidency 2015). 
 
During June 2014, the Anti-Corruption Inter-Ministerial Committee (ACIMC) affirmed 
and concretised the function of the ACTT as the focal body mandated to offer impact 
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to the government’s anti-corruption activity plan, as collectively informed by the 
National Development Plan (NDP), Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), 
National Security Strategy (NSS), and the country’s international obligations. The 
Presidency confirmed that the ACTT has scored noticeable victories and the 
government admires its hard work in helping to root out corruption (The Presidency 
2015). South Africa was one of the signatories at the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC), which was endorsed in Mexico during 2003 (Schultz 
2007). The convention was ratified by South Africa in 2004 (United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime [sa]). This brought about the South African Government 
establishing the ACTT with the specific mandate to root out corrupt practices, as will 
be discussed in the next section. 
 
1.3 THE ACTT MANDATE  
 
The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) document (South Africa 2016) 
clarifies that the ACTT derived its initial mandate from the 2010 JCPS delivery 
agreement, which required the ACTT to take steps to eradicate corruption, including 
bribery by officials within the JCPS cluster, by convicting 170 JCPS officials by 2014 
and to ensure that investor perception, trust, and willingness to invest in South Africa 
is improved by convicting 100 persons who have assets of more than R5 million 
obtained through illicit means. 
 
In 2012 the agreement was revised and the new output referred to “reduced 
corruption” and it was decided that instead of convicting 100 persons by 2014 for 
corruption with assets exceeding R5 million, each conviction should involve R5 
million or more. For the 2014-2019 MTSF, the ACTT (2016) is mandated to ensure 
that:  
Corruption in the public and private sectors is reduced by building a 
resilient anti-corruption system to successfully detect and investigate 
cases of alleged corruption with a view to prosecution, conviction and 
incarceration of perpetrators. This will hopefully serve as deterrence and 
contribute to ensuring a corruption-free society.  
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This mandate requires ACTT to: 
a) reduce levels of corruption in the public and private sector, thus improving 
investor perception, trust in, and willingness to invest in South Africa by 
ensuring that 120 persons are convicted for corruption or related crimes where 
the amount is R5 million or above, by obtaining R1.38 billion in freezing orders 
and R180 million in recoveries; and 
b) ensure corruption amongst government officials is reduced to serve as a 
deterrent by convicting 1000 government officials for corruption or related 
crimes involving any amount. 
 
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Research problems are selected in view of the problems that are significant in the 
native setting and endeavours are launched to solidly decipher these problems 
unswervingly and to calculate the suitability of the results and the analytical 
understanding arrived at (Greenwood 2007). The research problem identified by the 
researcher specifically relates to corruption committed by South African Public 
Service officials and the approach utilised to address corruption within the South 
African Public Service. Corruption committed by public service officials is a pertinent 
problem in South Africa that needs to be addressed. A research problem, as 
Creswell (2013:20) argues:  
…originates from a void in the literature, and strife in research results 
about the literature, themes that have been dismissed in the literature; a 
need to lift up the voice of the disregarded participants and genuine 
problems found in the work environment, at home, the public et cetera.  
 
Corruption, with specific relation to corruption among public officials, is one of the 
major crimes that is prevalent in South Africa and thus a “real-life” problem. Creswell 
(2009:163) highlights that a research problem may be identified from different 
potential sources. It may spring from an experience the researcher has had in 
his/her own life in general or in the work environment, or it might originate from a 
general deliberation that showed up in the literature.  
 
It has come to the attention of the researcher that a number of corruption cases 
against public service officials reported to the ACTT in 2010 are still under 
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investigation, with no specific indication when these cases will be court ready. 
According to Transparency International (2015), corrupt activities translate into 
human misery, with poor families being coerced for bribes to see doctors or to gain 
access to clean drinking water. It hints to a let-down in the delivery of fundamental 
services like teaching and general healthcare.  
 
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) echoes the perspectives of observers from 
around the globe, including specialists living and working in the nations and 
territories evaluated. The CPI scores nations and territories on a scale from zero 
(exceptionally corrupt) to 100 (clean, no-corruption). As illustrated by Transparency 
International (2017) utilising the CPI, South Africa scored a total of 43 on the scale 
in 2012, 42 in 2013, 44 in 2014, 44 in 2015, 45 in 2016, and 43 in 2017. These 
scores demonstrate that there are multi-faceted corrupt activities inside the South 
African public service. A poor score is a likely indication of far-reaching corrupt 
activities, the absence of discipline for corrupt activities, and public institutions that 
don’t react to the populace’s needs. Corruption is threatening economic growth for 
all in South Africa in 2015.  
 
The tendency of corruption among South African Public Service officials is illustrated 
by a recent corruption scandal involving the Passenger Railway Agency of South 
Africa (PRASA), a South African state-claimed enterprise which is in charge of most 
passenger rail services in the nation. PRASA is a seriously troubled establishment 
that wants to spend R123 billion on restoring their fleet throughout the next 20 years. 
The PRASA board expelled Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Lucky Montana in the 
midst of corrupt activities, allegations, and counter-allegations – all played out in the 
public domain. The board was replaced in light of the allegations of 
maladministration against them, which prompted political parties as well as social 
groups to lay criminal charges against the board in relation to their contract with a 
train manufacturer in Spain (Msimang 2015). These criminal cases are currently 
under investigation with no clear indication when the board of PRASA will face their 
day in court. 
 
Nicolaides (2018) reported that a coal shortage at six of Eskom’s power stations is 
a direct result of their dealings with the Guptas. Eskom is a South African public 
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electric utility. The NT has also approved a request to obtain additional coal from 
elsewhere, as three of the affected stations were receiving stock from the Gupta-
owned company Tegeta, which has now filed for business rescue. In 2017 leaked 
emails revealed that Eskom allegedly paid Tegeta over half a billion Rand to buy the 
Optimum Coal mine in a calculated scheme, which lifted the lid on corruption at the 
power utility. Now it appears that Tegeta is battling to supply coal and Eskom is 
experiencing serious shortages, with concerns being raised about the possibility of 
load shedding. The Deputy Editor at Financial Mail, Sikonathi Mantshantsha (2018), 
says that corruption is at the centre of the current shortage: “Because of the 
corruption that allowed Eskom to kick out Glencore in the first place. Tegeta has a 
contract and that contract is to pick up coal and deliver it to Eskom and it has failed 
to do that.” The extent of corruption within the public sector was once again 
illustrated through Business Live (Deputy Editor at Financial Mail, Sikonathi 
Mantshantsha (2018)) arguing that Brian Molefe, who successively headed both 
Eskom and Transnet; Anoj Singh, who became finance chief of both; Matshela 
Koko, a former Eskom executive; and current Transnet CEO, Siyabonga Gama, are 
among those who feature most prominently in the corruption at Transnet and 
Eskom. Transnet is a South African rail, port, and pipeline company, majority-owned 
by the South African Government. Some politicians and their families and 
government officials, who had taken oaths of office swearing to uphold the law and 
everything that is in the best interests of the country, allegedly intervened on behalf 
of the corrupt individuals. The names Duduzane Zuma; Lynne Brown, and her 
personal assistant Kim Davids; and former public enterprises Director-General 
(DG), Richard Seleke, also feature numerous times in the news on the side of 
politicians and officials implicated in the corruption. The plot cannot, of course, be 
complete without the businessmen who, over many years, bought close proximity 
to influential politicians and officials for their own private benefit. 
 
These corruption allegations had widespread media exposure. For example, the 
Public Protector’s damning report, named “Derailed”, suggests axed PRASA boss 
Lucky Montana milked the parastatal’s coffers by taking joyrides on the Blue Train 
with female companions and signing off on dodgy tenders worth billions (Wa Afrika, 
Hofstatter & Rampedi 2015). This is yet another example of high-level corruption 
being kept under the covers. To this day, no one has been brought before the court 
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to answer for the irregularities in the procurement process at PRASA with the 
appointment of the Spanish train manufacturer. 
 
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (2013) issued a media 
statement on the trend of corruption committed by public service officials in South 
Africa. A total of 758 suspects employed in the public service were under scrutiny 
for corrupt activities during 2013 and freezing orders to the value of R1.07 billion 
have been gained. Another example is a R14.7 million asset forfeiture order, which 
was brought against the previous CEO of Land Bank, Mr Philemon Mohlahlane, and 
Gauteng agent Mr Dan Mofokeng. They allegedly defrauded Land Bank and 
transferred funds to a range of outside entities for their own gratification. 
 
The official SAPS statistical data on crime specifically related to corruption cannot 
be obtained in detail, as corruption falls under the category of commercial crimes 
which contains a whole spectrum of crimes, such as multi-faceted commercial theft, 
counterfeiting of currency, counterfeiting of goods, intellectual property rights 
crimes, and banking-related crimes. Crime statistics related to commercial crimes 
would thus be undependable. This categorisation of corruption by the SAPS upsets 
efforts to effectively screen and identify trends in certain cases of corrupt activities. 
Consequently, the researcher made use of statistical data specifically related to 
corruption as recorded by Corruption Watch and by the office of the Minister of 
Justice to substantiate the extent of corruption in South Africa.  
 
Corruption Watch is a non-profit association which was established in January 2012 
and relies on upon the general public to report corrupt activities to the association. 
The association investigates reports of corrupt activities, specifically those cases 
that will have the largest effect on society, for example corrupt activities by 
government officials. Corruption Watch additionally assembles and examines data 
to detect patterns and problem areas of corrupt activities, and prepares research 
reports on these problem areas to uncover and discover solutions to systemic 
corruption (Corruption Watch [sa]). Bruce (2014:50) is in agreement that there is a 
lack of detailed statistical data on corruption. Given the scourge of corrupt activities 
in South Africa, it is important that the SAPS report more detailed statistics on and 
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insights into the different violations that make up the catch-all "commercial crime" 
category.  
 
A global campaign was launched in June 2014 by Transparency International, 
according to the Corruption Watch annual report (Corruption Watch 2014), which 
encourages participants to unmask corruption. Corruption is vulnerable to exposure 
when the corrupt act occurs and when those who benefit from corruption attempt to 
hide their ill-gotten gains (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 2015). 
The South African Government vowed to name and disgrace officials involved in 
corrupt activities. Minister Radebe revealed that the names of culprits who have 
been convicted for their corrupt activities will be distributed, as well as the names of 
each and every one of those individuals whose assets have either been frozen or 
forfeited to the state (South Africa 2014):  
…so people, in general, will know are these spoiled apples of South 
African culture... Individuals need to guarantee the general population is 
aware of what has happened on the grounds that, for quite a while when 
individuals discuss corrupt activities, it's only a number. The government 
now need to do this in a meaningful way. 
 
The PMG (2016) explained that since 2010, great advancement has been made in 
the administration of anti-corruption undertakings, which has enabled the state to 
recoup the returns of corrupt activities. Since ACTT’s inception in October 2010, the 
total number of cases dealt with is 189 and the number of finalised cases is 68. The 
number of cases under investigation is 77 and serious corruption cases on the court 
roll number 44 in total. The total number of government officials convicted of 
corruption involving R5 million or more stands at 128: 63 officials for the years 2010 
to 2014, 23 officials for 2014 to 2015, 34 officials for 2015 to 2016, and 8 officials 
for 2016 to 2017. The cumulative figure for the MTSF 2014-2019 period to date for 
officials convicted of corruption involving R5 million or more is 65. To meet the MTSF 
target of 120 persons convicted by 2019, 55 persons still need to be convicted. The 
total number of government officials convicted of corruption involving any amount 
since 2014 to date is 399. To meet the conviction target of 1000 by 2019, 601 
government officials would still need to be convicted. A total number of 931 
government officials have been convicted since the inception of ACTT in 2010. 
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According to Atkinson (2007:68), the problems of corruption are often revealed in 
public petitions and there is a growing popular concern in South Africa about what 
is actually perceived as government corruption. A survey conducted in 2005 by the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) revealed that 24% of participants 
were under the impression that local governments and local chambers are involved 
in corrupt activities (Buhlungu, Daniel & Southall 2007:68). During the proceedings 
of the PMG, relating to the ACTT’s progress with regard to disciplinary cases being 
investigated against public officials in the Limpopo Province, various role players in 
the fight against corrupt public service officials provided some perspectives on 
inhibiting aspects relating to the effective investigation of such cases. Mr 
Motlashuping (ANC, North West) cautioned the ACTT not to dwell too much on the 
cases that were still pending, as this was likely to weaken the cases (ACTT 2016). 
Mr Dramat (the former National Head of the DPCI) added that the ACTT and the 
Department of Public Service and Administration (2015) revealed that they had 
identified the problem of officials in public service evading corruption charges, and 
others resigning from one department and then emerging at a municipal level. Mr 
Du Plooy (Group Leader, ACTT) responded that it was impossible to force a witness 
under oath to testify in court, and this was causing major delays in the investigation 
of some cases (PMG 2014). Mr Dramat also confirmed that even if the officials 
resigned, the criminal charges continued as long as they reside in the country (PMG 
2014). The ACTT performs its functions from its office in Pretoria and is responsible 
for investigating multi-faceted corruption cases in the public service nationally, as 
and when the cases are reported, and if a corruption case that involves public 
service officials meets the criteria of the unit. These criteria relate to the delivery 
agreement for the JCPS Cluster, with specific reference to the target for Output 5, 
to “successfully convict 100 people by 2014 that have assets of more than R5 million 
obtained through illicit means” (State Security Agency 2014). Turner (2014:137) 
states that for researchers, a vital step is to conduct controlled studies on the impact 
and effectiveness of strategies. Until a fair amount of such studies have been done, 
researchers must acknowledge that our guidelines for practices are somewhat 
tentative. It is important to understand and be able to investigate corruption cases 
in the public service effectively. This study will assess the effectiveness of the 
ACTT’s multi-disciplinary approach in investigating corruption cases involving public 
service officials. 
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All role players in the ACTT should have clearly defined roles in order to carry out 
their responsibilities effectively. An inter-agency protocol assists in establishing 
written guidelines for those who investigate cases of corruption in the public sector. 
A properly drafted agreement also provides a blueprint for each of the principal 
agencies involved at the ACTT. The team members should also invest their time in 
developing a long-term strategic plan that will ensure that the team is always able 
to respond to national priority cases or threats in the South African public sector. 
The goal should be the efficient coordination of services, with the chief objective 
being to address corrupt activities quickly and effectively to instil confidence in the 
team’s effectiveness. The multi-disciplinary approach allows for diverse types of 
expertise to be combined in a team to enhance the team’s efficiency and 
effectiveness. Role players sometime overextend themselves when team members 
do not have similar levels of expertise as the rest of the team. This inadvertently 
delays the investigation process, since the investigation duties are intertwined. In 
addition, another challenge experienced is that some members were appointed to 
the ACTT without having the necessary knowledge and experience of corruption 
investigations.  
 
The multi-disciplinary approach, in the form of the ACTT, to deal with corrupt 
government officials is a virtuous one, but one is dealing with human beings in this 
approach and this presents its own challenges. The idea of placing individuals from 
various government departments as well as non-governmental role players with 
specific expertise together in a specific team formulated to address a specific target 
is noble. The challenge is that someone needs to lead the multi-disciplinary team 
and in this scenario, it is the head of the Hawks. The problem arises when the team 
leader sets targets with specific deadlines. Some of the role players may feel inferior 
due to their position or role within the set team. On the other hand, some of the role 
players are of the view that due to their seniority within their departments or external 
organisations and higher salary brackets, they are superior and that they should 
lead the investigation. As a result, cooperation between team members and the 
execution of duties are neglected, which gives rise to internal conflict among team 
members that in turn leads to inefficient investigations. This internal conflict needs 
to be resolved at the beginning with a clear set of guidelines and a communication 
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channel to address any concerns before members manifest a negative attitude 
towards the investigation objectives. Thus, it is important to have a comprehensive 
investigation plan in place which clearly stipulates each role player’s responsibility 
and deadlines within the specific investigative team. 
 
1.5 AIM OF THE RESEARCH  
 
The work of Denscombe (2014:121) indicates that the research aim is to reach a 
decision about the state of knowledge on a subject in view of a thorough and fair 
review of the research that has been carried out. Holtzhausen and Auriacombe 
(2014:15) maintain that the purpose of a research aim is to give lucidity to the 
researcher’s own convictions of how social reality ought to be seen to gain the most 
honest outcomes. This will empower the researcher to have a reasonable 
comprehension of which research aim would be appropriate when designing his/her 
research in order to develop his/her own research aim. In addition, as Trochim, 
Donnelly and Arora (2015:125) point out, the aim of the research is to develop new 
knowledge and good practice in the field. As reflected by Joyner, Rouse and 
Glatthorn (2018:68), the following should be addressed in the research aim: 
 An intention or yearning; what you plan to accomplish. 
 Aims are statements of expectation, written in broad terms. 
 Aims set out what you hope to accomplish toward the end of the project. 
 
The aim of this study is to assess the multi-disciplinary approach in the investigation 
of corruption in the South African Public Service. 
 
1.6 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Holtzhausen and Auriacombe (2014:22) state that the purpose of research is to 
provide clarity to the researcher’s own convictions of how social reality ought to be 
seen to gain the most honest outcomes and in this way to build up his/her own 
philosophy. The work of Zikmund, Babin, Carr and Griffin (2012:118) indicates that 
research purposes are the deliverables of the researcher’s project. The researcher 
needs to achieve a consensus regarding the overall decision statement(s) and 
research objectives to show that the purpose of the research is pure. Jung (2007:54) 
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highlights that researchers frequently use the SMART acronym to guide the 
development of quality goals and purposes. The SMART acronym stands for: 
 Specific.  
 Measurable. 
 Attainable. 
 Relevant. 
 Timely. 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the multi-disciplinary approach in 
the investigation of corruption in the South African Public Service is achieving its 
proposed aims and objectives, as mentioned in Section 1.2 above. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
Bryman and Bell (2015:10) indicate that a research question addresses an 
unequivocal announcement of what the researcher needs to know. The question 
compels the researcher to be unequivocal about what is to be investigated. 
Denscombe (2010:69) provides a list of the possible types of research questions: 
 Predicting a result (does ‘y’ occur under conditions ‘a’ or ‘b’?). 
 Explaining the causes and consequences of a phenomenon (is ‘y’ influenced 
by ‘x’ generally, or is ‘y’ a consequence of ‘x’?). 
 Evaluating a phenomenon (does ‘y’ show the benefits that it ought to have?).  
 Describing a phenomenon (what is ‘y’ like or what forms does ‘y’ assume?). 
 Developing good practice (in what capacity can researchers enhance ‘y’?). 
 Empowerment (in what capacity can researchers improve the lives of those 
individuals by researching ‘y’?). 
 
Gilbert (2008:44) emphasises that the research question is integral to the design of 
a research project overall and a critical stride during the time spent completing a 
research project. It is, in this manner, fundamental in any social research that a 
research question should above all else be researchable. A research question 
should be: 
 interesting; 
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 relevant; 
 feasible; 
 ethical; 
 concise; and 
 answerable 
 
Based on the guidelines provided by the above-mentioned authors, the researcher 
will seek answers to the following identified research questions: 
 Is the current multi-disciplinary approach to investigate corruption in the South 
African Public Service effective? 
 Are there any factors experienced by DPCI investigators or external service 
providers/consultants who are attached to the ACTT that inhibit them from 
effectively investigating corruption within the public service? 
 
1.8 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
 
This study will be limited to DPCI investigators attached to the ACTT who investigate 
serious corruption cases perpetrated by public service officials, as well as a group 
of external/private service providers/consultants who are mandated to assist the 
ACTT with investigating corruption among public service employees. These ACTT 
members investigate corruption cases nationally from a central office in Pretoria. 
This study will exclude ACTT role players from the NPA, AFU, SARS, SIU, FIC and 
the NT as a result of these role players’ refusal to respond to the researcher’s 
request to conduct research within these departments.  
 
1.9 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
 
Every profession or discipline has its own specialised language and key concepts. 
For instance, most people in the legal fraternity use Latin terms, such as “nullum 
crimen sine lege” which means that there is no crime without a legal provision, whilst 
in the police environment, terms such as “modus operandi”, meaning a way of 
behaving or doing something that is typical of a person or group, are common. This 
implies that in order to participate or work effectively in a particular environment, one 
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needs to familiarise himself/herself with the language used in that environment 
(Maree 2007:15). 
 
Bryman and Bell (2015:9) state that concepts are the way that people make sense 
of the social world. They are important to how individuals organise and signal their 
research interests. Concepts may be something researchers start out with that 
speak to key areas around which data are gathered in an investigation. As indicated 
by Welman and Kruger (2001:23), concept formulation involves the control of the 
study focus, which directs the content before the data are gathered. 
 
It is important to state the meaning of the words or phrases that are going to be used 
often in the research study, in order to enable the reader to better understand the 
report. Conceptualisation is the process of specifying what societies mean by a term 
(Bachmann, Russel & Schutt 2003:64). The key concepts identified by the 
researcher as relevant to this study are discussed below. 
 
1.9.1 Fraud  
As defined by Cascarino (2013:2) and Snyman (2008:531), fraud is the unlawful and 
intentional misrepresentation of facts which causes actual or potential prejudice 
toward another. Doig (2012:7) mentions that it is a method for profiting illicitly 
through deception, regardless of whether that deception occurs person-to-person in 
actual space or in virtual space.  
 
Stansbury and Stansbury (2008) explain that “fraud” is any behaviour designed to 
trick or fool another person or entity for one’s own or a third party’s benefit. For 
example, in order to collect benefits from the government, a healthy man who is 
capable of working tells the government that he has an injury and cannot work. The 
public health department doctor writes a false medical report to support the man’s 
claim, in exchange for money. His patient can now collect benefits from the 
government for a disability he does not have. 
 
Stansbury and Stansbury (2008) clarify that “Fraudulent practice” implies any 
activity or omission, including misrepresentation, that purposely or recklessly 
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misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to get a financial benefit or to avoid an 
obligation.  
 
1.9.2 Procurement 
Doig (2012:189) defines the term procurement as the process of acquiring products, 
work, and services, covering both the acquisition from outsiders and from in-house 
suppliers. Armstrong, Adam, Denize and Kotler (2014:238) state that procurement 
is the act of obtaining or purchasing products or services. The procedure 
incorporates the arrangement and processing of a demand, including the end 
receipt and endorsement. 
 
1.9.3 Procurement Fraud  
The work of Vona (2011:179) shows that procurement fraud refers to the corrupting 
of the purchase decision-making process to ensure a specific vendor is awarded the 
contract. Coenen (2008:86) reveals that procurement fraud is a subject of bribery 
and corruption. Coenen (2008:86) adds that it is essentially the manipulation of the 
process of obtaining a contract for goods or services. 
 
1.9.4 Public Service  
In a study by Barkin and Cronin (1994:119), the authors describe a public service 
as a group that exercises sovereign authority over a country, state, society, or a 
group of individuals. Public services are for the most part in charge of making and 
enforcing laws, managing currency, and protecting the masses from external 
threats, and may have advanced obligations. Governments additionally commonly 
set assessment rates and may control investment practices.  
 
Bishop and Pagiola (2012:58) define public service as a service provided or 
sustained by a government or its departments. Ling (2006:631) makes it clear that 
public service is an office required in giving public service to or in the interest of a 
government. As Guy, Newman and Mastracci (2014:12) perceptively state, it is 
inherent to public service, it is the invisible but vital component in face-to-face, 
individual transactions. People’s impression of the nature of the public service they 
receive rest on this dynamic between citizen and state. According to Morgan, Green, 
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Shinn and Robinson (2013:159), the public service’s executive base is preoccupied 
with delivering services efficiently to masses of people. 
 
1.9.5 Corruption  
Altbach (2005:9) makes it clear that corruption is the impedes integrity, prudence, 
and general moral guidelines. It is the inducement to do wrong by improper or 
unlawful means (as bribery) and, in addition, Quah (2011:590) defines corruption as 
the abuse of public office with a corrupt intention, and may incorporate any crime. 
Moreover, corruption is a social phenomenon with a negative effect on any 
community. According to Jain (2012:22), corruption arises from the misuse of 
legislative powers by the government in power. Rose-Ackerman (2013:7) correctly 
argues that corruption is essentially equated with bribery, which includes nepotism 
and unlawful appropriation of public assets for private use, as a conduct which goes 
amiss from the ordinary obligations of a public role for financial or status gain.  
 
Quah (2011:602) defines corruption as an obliteration or ruining of everything, 
particularly by deterioration or corrosion along with its indecency. Rajivan and 
Gampat (2009:1) theorise that corrupt activities produce a feeling of unfairness and 
debilitation, raising an extra hindrance that intensifies the disproportion between the 
privileged and disadvantaged. Cavill and Sohail (2007:1) explain that corruption 
incorporates a few behavioural activities, for instance, fraud (theft by 
misrepresentation), money laundering of corporate or private assets, and bribery 
(payments to profit, by an activity or the aversion of private prejudice, from a given 
transaction). 
 
In addition, Makumbe (1999:1) elaborates that corruption is the abuse of power. 
Evans (1999:5) supports this standpoint and states that corruption occurs in both 
the democratic, deregulated and the regulated, dictatorial social orders. The UN 
(2004:24) defines corruption as the abuse of public office (public power, public 
intrigue, public authority) for private gratification (private advantage, individual gain, 
family or group benefit). This definition is utilised interchangeably with those of both 
Quah (2011:605), who accentuates the aspect of moral depravity accompanying 
and reflecting corrupt behaviour, and Rajivan and Gampat (2009:361-370), who 
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argue that the question of corruption is a conceivably part of human instinct, 
“rendering its destruction to his mind is near incomprehensible”. 
 
Virta (2007) makes references to the UN’s (2004) perspective on corruption as the 
abuse of power, attracting attention to the related forms of conduct, including bribery 
(a specific improper conduct to gain some gratification), blackmail (Public officials 
utilise their power to control the public to pay for a service they would not, for the 
most part, need to pay for) and misappropriation or theft, which is the unlawful self-
enrichment by an public official. Khan (1996:12) maintains that corruption in 
developing countries is the behaviour which deviates from the formal rules of 
governing; the activities of somebody in a position of public authority as a result of 
intentions for private gain, for example, riches, power or status. Everett (2012:226) 
asserts that corruption has numerous definitions and yet an even greater number of 
acts are dominated by it. The definitions are mostly similar in the policy arena, which 
relates to the misuses of public office for private gain or any gratification. Corruption 
also has “many faces”, which is to say the range of acts incorporated by the term is 
broad. For instance, the term includes fraud, smuggling, treason, conflict of interest, 
bribery, embezzlement, maladministration, and many other acts. Caiden, Dwivedi 
and Jabbra (2001:19) point out that in fact there are no less than 60 different 
recognised forms of corruption.  
 
For the purpose of this study, corruption refers to gratification obtained through illicit 
activities by South African public Service Officials to the value of R5 million or more 
recoverable per individual with specific reference to government funds. The most 
prevalent legislation currently in the fight against corruption is stipulated in the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA) 12 of 2004 (South 
Africa 2004). In chapter 2 (South Africa 2004) corruption is defined as: “any person 
who gives or accepts or offers to give or accept any gratification amounting to an 
unauthorised or improper inducement to act or not to act in a particular manner is 
guilty of a crime.” Corruption is mainly defined in terms of section 3 of the PRECCA 
(South Africa 2004) as follows:  
Any person who, directly or indirectly (a) accepts or agrees or offers to 
accept any gratification from any other person, whether for the benefit of 
himself or herself or for the benefit of another person; or (b) gives or 
agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification, whether for 
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the benefit of that other person or for the benefit of another person, in 
order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a 
manner (i) that amounts to the (aa) illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, 
incomplete, or biased; or (bb) misuse or selling of information or material 
acquired in the course of the exercise, carrying out or performance of any 
powers, duties or functions arising out of a constitutional, statutory, 
contractual or any other legal duty; (ii) that amounts to (aa) the abuse of 
a position of authority; (bb) a breach of trust; or (cc) the violation of a legal 
duty or a set of rules, (iii) designed to achieve an unjustified result; or (iv) 
that amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do or 
not to do anything, is guilty of the crime of corruption.  
 
1.9.6 Serious Corruption  
The term “serious corruption” is not defined by the PRECCA (South Africa 2004). 
The Act only defines the term corruption and no differentiation is made between 
serious or petty corruption. Lebeya (2012:366) clarifies that the term “serious 
corruption” ought to be revoked. A definition has started to appear now in the SAPS 
when an officer of the DPCI describes serious corruption cases as those cases in 
which a considerable amount of money or highly regarded products are involved, or 
where a couple of SAPS representatives or employees from more than one station, 
region, division, or national office are involved. Newham and Faull (2011b) support 
that the term “serious corruption” is used by members of the DPCI to differentiate 
between corruption cases that will be investigated by units at the provincial or 
national level. 
 
The researcher’s view is that reference to “serious corruption” should be avoided 
and it should only be referred to as “corruption”. The rationale, therefore, is that 
there is no crime such as “petty corruption” or “serious corruption”, and thus only the 
term “corruption” is defined in PRECCA. The significance of the crime of corruption 
is in itself serious, not only when taking into account the monetary value or the 
complexity of the crime. It stands to reason that a multi-faceted corruption 
investigation is relevant for cases involving the United States Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, hereinafter referred to as the FCPA, and individuals in a 
position of power – the so-called “elite”.  
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1.9.7 Multi-Disciplinary Approach 
Reference to Berkman, Kawachi and Glymour (2014:530) reveals that a multi-
disciplinary approach to problem-solving includes drawing appropriately from 
different disciplines to reclassify problems outside of ordinary limits and achieve 
solutions in view of another comprehension of complex circumstances. Graham 
(2014:14) asserts that the multi-disciplinary approach does two things for the Judge. 
It instructs them on corrupt activities and displays the possibility of using a multi-
disciplinary approach to deal with the case. It shows that the case was investigated 
by professionals from various disciplines, every one of whom arrived at the same 
conclusion. For the purpose of this study, a multi-disciplinary approach refers to the 
DPCI as well as external service providers/consultants who form part of the ACTT.  
 
1.9.8 Criminal Investigation 
A study by Van Rooyen (2008:13) shows that criminal investigation is a systematic, 
organised search for truth. It includes observation and enquiry with the end goal of 
gathering objective and subjective evidence around a specific crime or incident.  
 
As indicated by Palmiotto (2012:11), a realistic concept of a criminal investigation is 
that criminal investigators dig up evidence all by themselves, spending hours 
identifying criminals and tracking them down. 
 
Hess, Orthmann and Cho (2016:35) define a criminal investigation as the way 
toward finding, preparing, identifying, and presenting evidence to determine what 
had occurred and who is responsible. Bergsmo and Wiley (2008:3) clarify that 
personnel members assigned to a criminal investigation have to collect sufficient 
incriminating and exonerating evidence to determine whether there are grounds for 
a criminal prosecution. Criminal investigators collect information on criminal 
incidents that are later used to prosecute a suspect in court. The investigation 
process is subjected to broad legal scrutiny by the defence. Fruitful prosecutions 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect committed the crime. In 
corroborating the above, according to Lyman (2013:10), when people choose to 
violate laws the perpetrators must be identified and brought before a court of law. 
Criminal investigations involve the task of identifying such suspects by responding 
to a criminal occurrence, gathering evidence, detecting and interviewing witnesses, 
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and recognising and arresting an assumed suspect. This manner not only involves 
the basic understanding of techniques relating to the collection and preservation of 
evidence, but also that of criminalistics and forensic science. 
 
1.10 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN THE STUDY 
 
As Mungiu-Pippidi (2015:177) explains, a major objective of the corruption 
prevention policy is involving civil society in the actions of corruption prevention and 
informing the public on the costs, causes, and consequences of corruption. 
Development of inter-institutional cooperation and relations between civil society 
and government structures will be focused on: 
 facilitating the cooperation between the institutions vested with duties in the 
field of corruption prevention, as well as between these and the civil society; 
 coordinating the efforts of these institutions through facilitating the exchange 
of information, encouraging the joint execution of some actions, obtaining 
human or technical resources necessary to substantial actions, identifying and 
solving the main obstructions which appear; and 
 offering a complete and coherent image of the efforts of authorities in this field. 
 
The challenges that were beyond the researcher’s control and were encountered 
during this study will now be discussed. 
 
Given the sensitive nature of corruption within government, participants were 
initially sceptical about the decision to record the interview. However, the 
researcher reassured the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants and 
explained that the recordings were only for transcription purposes to assist with 
data analysis. The majority of the in-depth interviews were conducted after hours, 
as a result of the demanding schedules of the participants.  
 
Obtaining approval from the various role players in the ACTT environment was 
challenging. Various government departments did not respond to the researcher’s 
request for approval to participate in this study, while others openly refused. The 
researcher approached the various gatekeepers of each of the government 
departments who form part of the ACTT to seek approval for this study. The NPA, 
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AFU, SARS, SIU, FIC and the NT did not react to the researcher’s request, and after 
many months of waiting in vain for a response, the researcher excluded them from 
this study. Only the DPCI reacted to the researcher’s request, though only after the 
researcher constantly followed up for almost a year after the initial request. The 
DPCI initially did not approve the researcher’s request to conduct research within 
the Directorate, without providing any reasons for this refusal. However, after 
consultation with the Directorate, the application was approved. The lack of 
communication from the relevant government departments’ gatekeepers regarding 
the researcher’s request for approval led to valuable time being lost.  
 
In order to alleviate this challenge, the researcher relied on the extensive knowledge 
and expertise of external service providers/consultants who form part of the ACTT 
in addition to participants from the DPCI. These service providers have been 
appointed to assist the ACTT with its investigations into corruption by public service 
officials, since the Hawks officials allocated to the ACTT do not have their specific 
knowledge, expertise or capacity, such as forensic accounting and cyber forensics. 
In addition, these external service providers/consultants were previously employed 
at the AFU, SIU and NPA and thus have extensive experience and knowledge in 
the investigation of corruption. 
 
1.11 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Bless, Higson-Smith and Sithole (2013:16) reveal that scientific research has the 
ability to generate accurate information, which is an important resource. 
Consequently, social research is a wellspring of power, which can be utilised for the 
social benefit or abused for individual gain. According to Bless et al (2013:16), the 
following problems are of relevance to the value of research: 
 Highest quality practice: It is important that social researchers are properly 
trained, supported, and supervised while they are still inexperienced. 
 Building capacity of all sectors of the community: It is important that a wider 
range of people learn how to conduct useful research so that they can benefit 
directly from it. 
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 Relevance: Since resources needed to support social research are somewhat 
scarce, it is safe to say that researchers should aim to make a useful 
contribution to society. 
 Promulgation of results: It is part of the researcher’s responsibility to make the 
results available in a form that is usable by the people who can benefit from 
them. 
 
Bouma and Ling (2006:3) reveal that the value of scientific research is to discover 
methods for comprehending, portraying, making more predictable, and generally 
controlling some aspects of the universe. The research might be utilised to create 
solutions for problems, techniques for projects, and plans for action. Based on the 
suggested value of the results from research studies, as identified by Bouma and 
Ling (2006), this study and its results may be used to: 
 develop appropriate remedies related to challenges experienced in the multi-
disciplinary approach to the investigation of corruption in the public service; 
and 
 identify and develop strategies for the multi-disciplinary team to enhance the 
investigative capabilities of this team.  
 
Rossman and Rallis (2011:19) argue that one finds that accumulated knowledge 
likewise serves to enhance practice by improving one’s comprehension of that 
practice. Accumulated knowledge can incorporate practitioners’ understanding with 
the principles behind the procedures. The results of this study will benefit the 
following sectors: 
 
 Academic community 
This study could benefit the academic community, since the results could be 
used in academic material and could be accessed by local and international 
scholars as a source. 
 South African society 
 The results of this study could facilitate an enhancement of the investigative 
capabilities of the multi-disciplinary team that in turn could lead to an increase 
in arrests and convictions of corrupt public service officials. 
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 Investigative Industry 
This study will identify challenges experienced by the multi-disciplinary 
approach in the investigation of corruption in the public service. Strategies to 
enhance the investigative capabilities of this team will be developed that could 
lead to a more effective multi-disciplinary approach.  
 
Marshall and Rossman (2011:70) state that persuading the reader that the review 
is probably going to be critical and ought to be conducted involves building an 
argument that influences the research to involve imperative theoretical 
perspectives, policy problems, concerns, or social problems that influence people’s 
regular, day-to-day existences. The researcher is currently a lead investigator at the 
ACTT – a unit within the DPCI which investigates cases relating to multi-faceted 
corruption, money laundering, fraud, and racketeering committed by highly placed 
government employees. The research could improve the way in which multi-faceted 
corruption is investigated to enable the ACTT to have an enhanced impact on multi-
faceted corruption in the public sector. 
 
1.12 RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN  
 
Bouma and Ling (2006:40) demonstrate that the first choice in selecting a research 
design is to choose between the qualitative and quantitative research approaches. 
Bless et al (2013:184) indicate that qualitative research is research conducted by 
utilising a scope of techniques, which use qualifying words and a wide scope of 
records to investigate parts of a social reality. Ragin and Schneider (2011:153) 
argue that by following a qualitative approach, researchers trust that in order to 
represent subjects appropriately, they should be examined inside and out to reveal 
subtleties and nuances.  
 
The researcher followed a qualitative research approach, since the phenomenon 
under investigation, namely assessing the multi-disciplinary approach in the 
investigation of corruption within the public service, was explored by means of 
obtaining a human perspective of this phenomenon. Rich descriptions were used to 
record how participants experience this phenomenon. 
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Hagan (2000:33) describes the research design as the plan or blueprint for a study 
that includes the who, what, where, when, why and how of an investigation. It should 
flow from the identified research problem and the critical problems that were 
identified. Bless et al (2013:185) support this definition and state that a research 
design is an arrangement of methods that guides the researcher during the time 
spent confirming a specific clarification and barring all further conceivable 
clarifications. Bryman and Bell (2015:48) observe that the research design is a 
structure for the generation of evidence that is suited both to a specific order of 
criteria and the research question in which the researcher is interested.  
 
The researcher followed a qualitative case study design. Mills and Birks (2014:145) 
are of the opinion that most qualitative studies are case studies, since qualitative 
research is usually used in cases where an in-depth study of a phenomenon is 
required. Gray (2014:163) illustrates that the following aspects need to be 
addressed during the design stage of case studies: 
 What is the ‘unit of analysis’ for the case, e.g. people, associations, local 
communities, groups, etc.? 
 What criteria are to be utilised as a part of choosing cases for the study? 
 Who are the key participants? 
 What is the quantifier of cases and the number of participants within each 
case?  
 
The participants for this study included DPCI investigators, as well as a group of 
external consultants who form part of the ACTT in the investigation of corruption 
among public service employees. These external consultants provide investigative 
expertise, legal opinions, forensic auditing, cyber forensic analysis, and advisory 
competency. This study aimed to assess the effectiveness of the multi-disciplinary 
approach of the ACTT in the investigation of corrupt activities in the South African 
Public Service. As a result, the criteria used for selecting this case are based on the 
exclusive mandate of the ACTT to investigate corruption among public service 
officials.  
 
This study was limited to a single instrumental case study involving the ACTT. The 
team investigates corruption cases nationally from a central office in Pretoria. 
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Currently, there are temporary offices in KwaZulu-Natal, the Northern Cape, the 
Western Cape, and Limpopo, and this may change as the need arises. In a single 
instrumental case study, the researcher concentrates on a problem or a concern 
and after that chooses one confined case to demonstrate these problems (Creswell 
2013:99). Stake (in Creswell 2013:97) states a case study is a choice of what is to 
be studied (i.e. a case within a bounded system, bounded by time and place). The 
identified case (involving the ACTT) investigated in this study was bounded to the 
following time and place parameters: 
 In terms of time, this parameter for the case study starts at the establishment 
of the ACTT in 2010 and continues up to its activities in 2018.  
 In terms of place, this case study will be bounded to the ACTT in Pretoria.  
 
1.13 POPULATION AND SAMPLING  
 
Rossman and Rallis (2011:137) clarify that the first global decision – choosing the 
setting, population, and a phenomenon of interest – is fundamental to the entire 
study. The population in this study included the ACTT, consisting of the various 
government departments and non-governmental role players as illustrated in 
Section 1.2 of this thesis.  
 
Bless et al (2013:98) argue that since it is not possible to study the whole population, 
the researcher may need to sample the population. In qualitative research, the 
fundamental aim is to comprehend the phenomenon under investigation and 
accordingly, illustrative specimens are not a prerequisite as in quantitative studies. 
The researcher thus needs to find a sample of participants that carries most of the 
characteristics associated with the phenomenon under investigation. The 
researcher made use of non-probability sampling in the form of purposive sampling. 
Creswell (2013:100) asserts that when choosing which case to study, a vast array 
of possibilities is available for purposive sampling. Braun and Clarke (2013:56) 
describe that purposive sampling involves selecting participants on the basis that 
they will be able to provide information-rich data to analyse. Based on the views of 
Braun and Clarke (2013), the researcher included the following participants of the 
ACTT as a sample for this study, since they have the necessary knowledge and 
experience to provide information-rich data: 
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 Eight DPCI investigators attached to the ACTT who investigate corruption 
cases allocated to the unit. 
 Two advocates who provide legal guidance at the commencement of 
investigations, as well as legal opinions on legislation.  
 Three forensic investigators with Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) accreditation who assist during witness consultation, drafting of 
affidavits, and the identifying of witnesses and evidence. 
 Two external forensic chartered accountants who analyse specific banking 
records of suspects and/or their respective companies, to assist in identifying 
possible money laundering, corruption, and racketeering through these 
records. 
 Two external cyber forensic experts that specialise in utilising electronic data 
to confirm the authenticity of electronic documents and the verification of hash 
values MD5 and the SHA-1 value system in an algorithm. They assist in 
identifying the author and/or version of a specific document under 
investigation, as well as identifying Internet Protocol (IP) addresses linked to 
specific emails. 
 
1.14 DATA COLLECTION 
 
Bouma and Ling (2006:241) indicate that the evidence collected in the research 
process is called data; facts produced by research. Data are usually collected using 
participant observation; in-depth interviews; a general scrutiny of factual data which 
might occur prior the official research process, having been gathered for 
supplementary purposes; or personal records, such as letters, journals, and opening 
documents with financial intuitions for an account or loan (Curtis & Curtis 2011:82). 
Kumar (2011:127) emphasises that the utilisation of numerous strategies to collect 
data is a critical part of a case study and can incorporate in-depth interviewing and 
attaining information from secondary records, observation, and focus groups. The 
data collection methods utilised by the researcher to obtain data during the research 
project are discussed below. 
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1.14.1 In-Depth Interviews 
Lewis and Stenning (2014:14) state that in-depth interviews are conducted to 
comprehend complex procedures and problems, e.g. decisions, impacts and 
results, and furthermore to explore subjects, including delicate problems. The 
purpose of the data generated from conducting in-depth interviews is: 
 to generate in-depth personal accounts; 
 to comprehend the individual’s perspective of the setting; and 
 to explore problems in detail. 
 
In addition, McNabb (2004:99) states that the in-depth interview is a conversation 
between two or more individuals. It usually lasts about two hours, but may take 
longer. The interviewer begins the interview with some introductory comments about 
the research and asks permission to record the session. The session should start 
with some straightforward, interesting, and non-threatening questions. The 
researcher should always try to end the session on a positive note.  
 
In-depth interviews were conducted with DPCI investigators, as well as external 
experts. All these role players form part of the ACTT, as indicated in Section 1.2. 
Data were collected by performing in-depth interviews with these participants. The 
in-depth interviews were semi-structured and open-ended questions were asked to 
attain a deep understanding of the participants’ experiences. A digital audio recorder 
was used to strengthen the data collection process and to record the exact words 
spoken by the participants. 
 
A pilot test was done prior to commencing with the interviews and consisted of 
carrying out all aspects of the interviews on a smaller scale. After conducting the 
pilot study, the chosen research method was confirmed and determined as the most 
suitable method. The performance of the researcher was evaluated by the promoter 
and additional training was done at a meeting session immediately after the 
interview. After completion of the pilot study, the researcher and the promoter were 
satisfied with the skills and techniques used by the researcher during interviewing.  
 
1.15 DATA ANALYSIS 
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Creswell (2013:185) asserts that qualitative researchers typically collect data 
themselves through scrutinising documents, observing behaviour, and interviewing 
participants. Data collected from the in-depth interviews were transcribed and 
thereafter analysed by means of the qualitative data analysis method. Themes and 
sub-themes were identified according to the spiral method of data analysis as 
described by Leedy and Ormrod (2001:161). McNabb (2004:36) states that the first 
activity in data analysis is to tabulate the participants’ responses to all items in the 
study. This could mean counting all the answers to each question or scheduled item. 
The in-depth interviews with the participants were recorded with a digital audio 
recorder. The recorded data of the in-depth interviews were consequently 
transcribed. The recordings were transcribed verbatim and a report of authenticity 
issued by the transcriber. The data were categorised into relevant themes and sub-
themes. A choice of the essence of five themes was generated and organised into 
categories. The final themes were presented to some participants a second time to 
validate the findings. No new data emerged from this interaction. The researcher 
gave the raw data in the form of transcriptions to an experienced, independent co-
coder for data analysis and verification. After a consensus discussion between the 
researcher and the co-coder, the analysed data were validated to ensure 
trustworthiness.  
 
1.16 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE STUDY 
 
O’Reilly and Kiyimba (2015:33) explain Lincoln and Guba’s argument that there was 
a need to convince the dominant scientific community that there are merits to 
qualitative research. One fundamental way of achieving this for a naturalistic inquiry 
was to translate the quantitative quality markers into appropriately applicable 
qualitative criteria. Consequently, Lincoln and Guba (1985:290) translated internal 
validity into credibility, external validity into transferability (applicability), reliability 
into dependability, and objectivity into confirmability. In support of Guba and 
Lincoln’s argument, Gray (2014:186) explains that a few researchers, especially 
those from the naturalistic tradition, argue that trustworthiness is more imperative 
than reservations over the validity or reliability of a study. Gray thus supports that 
rigour in qualitative studies includes building trustworthiness, credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability. In order to ensure trustworthiness 
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in this study, the researcher conformed to the following criteria, as will be discussed 
below: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.  
 
1.16.1 Credibility  
Credibility is achieved through member checks (where the accuracy of data 
gathered and the interpretation thereof are tested with research participants) (Gray 
2014:185). According to Liamputtong (2013:25), credibility is linked to authenticity 
and is used to establish whether the research is unpretentious, reliable, and 
authoritative. The researcher tested the accuracy of the interpreted data by means 
of providing the participants with an opportunity to certify the accuracy thereof 
(member checking). 
 
The principles of credibility were confirmed by conducting the research in such a 
way that the reasons for the effectiveness of the ACTT and the multi-disciplinary 
approach in investigating corruption were accurately described. Credibility refers to 
confidence in the truth of the data and its interpretation. This guideline was 
steadfastly adhered to and the researcher reported the interviews verbatim by 
means of a digital audio recorder. The other credibility strategies used in the study 
to strengthen the findings involved achieving a prolonged engagement in the field 
of research, persistent observation, triangulation of data by at least three sources, 
and verbatim quotes taken directly from the participants’ interviews. 
 
1.16.2 Transferability  
Carpenter and Suto (2008:149) clarified that transferability is applicable when the 
following question is addressed: To what exact degree can the study findings be 
generalised or applied to more people, groups, settings, or contexts? Chilisa 
(2012:98) argues that transferability can be highlighted through sampling strategies 
and a thick description of the research setting.  
 
In order to achieve transferability in this study, the researcher purposively selected 
the sample of participants and provided detailed narratives to communicate the 
research findings. Participants’ replies to the questions posed during the interviews 
were illustrated by verbatim quotations (thick description). These rich descriptions 
shifted readers to the situation as experienced by the researcher during interviews, 
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thus allowing readers to gain a sense of shared experiences. As a result, readers 
will be in a position to judge the transferability of the findings. 
 
1.16.3 Dependability 
Dependability is achieved through the use of audit trails through the data (Gray 
2014:185). In agreement with this, Gray (2014), Tobin and Begley (2004:392) assert 
that dependability is increased through an auditing procedure. Researchers have 
the obligation of guaranteeing that the procedure of research is coherent, traceable, 
and clearly documented.  
 
The researcher kept detailed transcripts of the interview guide that was used during 
interviews, the methodology that was followed, details of the sample that was 
included in the study, as well as records of the transcripts of the interviews 
conducted. 
 
1.16.4 Confirmability 
Confirmability endeavours to demonstrate that findings and the elucidations of those 
findings do not derive from the creative ability of the researcher, but rather that they 
are plainly connected to the data (Chilisa 2012:98). Lincoln and Guba (1985:290) 
clarify confirmability as the degree to which findings are determined by the 
participants and the state of the inquiry, and not by the inclinations, inspirations, 
interests, or perspectives of the inquirer.  
 
The researcher kept a detailed record of the interview guide and subsequent 
transcripts of the interviews conducted. As a result, the findings and interpretation 
of those findings can be readily connected to the data provided by the participants. 
Any biases, motivations, interests, or perspectives of the researcher were thus 
eliminated and confirmability was ensured. 
 
1.17 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The understanding and experience of the researcher supported the research 
questions and objectives related to the assessment of the multi-disciplinary 
approach in investigating corrupt activities in the South African Public Service. May 
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(2011:63) highlights that research planning needs to be comprehensive to ensure 
that the research can be securely conducted. Ethics is concerned with attempts to 
define codes and principles of good moral conduct. May (2011:63) additionally 
characterises ethical decisions in research as those which emerge when 
researchers attempt to decide between one course of action and another; the final 
decision should not be made because of convenience or for the sake of expediency, 
but by reference to standards of what is ethically right or wrong. Bryman and Bell 
(2015:XXXVI) state that it is imperative to bear in mind that researchers bear 
responsibilities to the people and organisations that are the subjects of their 
research activities. 
 
Ragin and Schneider (2011:443) state that attention is drawn to the fact that within 
the realm of social science research, ethical failures would include the following: 
deliberately publishing made-up data, plagiarising the work or ideas of others, taking 
credit for another’s work, giving undue credit to someone who did not contribute to 
the work, mistreating collaborators and research participants, and/or concealing 
known concerns about the research process and results. Rossman and Rallis 
(2011:145) explain the aim of researchers must be to get into the research sites and 
connect with the individuals they will interview. The objective of the research is to 
ensure freedom of integrity for both the researchers and the participants in their 
studies. The researcher has studied the Policy on Research Ethics of the University 
of South Africa (UNISA) (2016:7). Based on the ethical principles of this policy, as 
well as on the above-mentioned authors’ ethical guidelines, the researcher applied 
and adhered to the ethical considerations discussed below. 
 
1.17.1 Voluntary informed consent 
The work of Curtis and Curtis (2011:187) indicates that the most critical part of 
ethically appropriate research is voluntary informed consent. It is generally 
considered to be an essential requirement of ethical research in the context of 
minimising the risk of harm to participants (or as a sceptic may state, the risk of 
lawsuits). Participants were empowered with the necessary details of the research 
and their expected role in the study, which enabled them to make decisions and 
choices that promoted their self-interest. Participants were likewise given the 
chance to withdraw from the study at any time without having to explain their 
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reasons. As a result, participants were able to behave freely and autonomously. 
Participants were also informed that partaking in this study is voluntary and did not 
entitle them to any form of compensation, reimbursement, or gifts. 
 
1.17.2 Anonymity and confidentiality 
Tilley and Woodthorpe (2011:197) explain that reference to confidentiality is the 
administration of private data, while obscurity alludes to the removal of identifying 
information about the participants. The researcher informed participants that the 
results of the study, including verbatim quotations, will be represented and published 
in such a way that verbatim quotations of participants will not result in the possibility 
of linking a particular participant to any specific quotation. In addition, participants’ 
anonymity was ensured by conducting interviews in a nameless fashion, thus 
making these participants unrecognisable. 
 
1.17.3 Avoiding harm to participants 
When one is collecting information from participants, the researcher needs to 
investigate carefully whether their involvement is likely to harm them in any way 
(Kumar 2011:245). The researcher has, as far as possible, avoided exposing 
participants to factors that may cause any harm, such as discomfort, anxiety, 
harassment, invasion of privacy, or demeaning/dehumanising procedures. 
 
1.18 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Research methodology is a vital part of the research project. It serves as a guiding 
document which indicates the research approach. This qualitative study was 
conducted by means of the systematic process of a literature review. This process 
was used to gather information globally on the multi-disciplinary approach to 
investigate corruption in the public service. Following the discussed research 
methodology, the next chapter will provide a perspective on the term ‘corruption’, 
with some prevalent legislation as well as theories on corrupt activities. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
A CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION  
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
The more we know about the causes of corruption, the better equipped we will be 
to decide which policy, instruments, and legislation to use to combat corruption. In 
this chapter, the applicable legislation governing corruption in South Africa is 
presented and specific sections of these acts are briefly explained. The review of 
the legislation will depict the background to the functions of the SAPS, as well as 
the authority and powers vested in police officials to carry out their duties.  
 
An explanation of the correlation between corruption and fraud is additionally 
discussed in this chapter, followed by a brief discussion of some theories on the 
occurrence of corruption. This is complemented by a discussion on corruption in 
developing countries, as well as the initiatives by countries in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) to curb corrupt activities.  
 
2.2 LEGISLATION GOVERNING CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
The introduction of legislation brought about that all citizens of a country are 
accountable to the same set of laws. This is imperative to protect the fundamental 
rights of everyone. Legislation assists in the governing of a nation in that it prohibits 
certain conduct by or activities of the citizens. Recognition of the rule of law and the 
accountability and transparency of government are the founding principles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (South Africa 1996b), hereafter referred 
to as “the Constitution”, which also provides for the establishment of oversight 
bodies that play a role in supporting the accountability and transparency of the public 
and private sectors. Various pieces of legislation have been developed to give 
greater legal effect to the principles of accountability and transparency contained in 
the Constitution. Corruption is not a problem unique to South Africa, but it is one of 
the country’s major challenges.  
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2.2.1 The Criminal Procedure Act  
The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (South Africa 1977), hereinafter referred to 
as the CPA, was signed into law on 21 April 1977. It was introduced to “make 
provision for procedures and related matters in criminal proceedings”. The CPA is 
essential to enable SAPS officials to execute their functions. The CPA represents 
the conduct of police officials in dealing with criminal cases and procedures in 
courtrooms. Section 205 of the CPA (South Africa 1977) permits a judge or a 
magistrate to summons a person who is probably going to provide substantial or 
significant information regarding an alleged crime. This is usually used to obtain 
information from financial institutions, government departments, private enterprises, 
unwilling witnesses, and so on. 
 
The legislation which gives police the power to search a person or premises and/or 
seize articles is provided for in sections 19 to 36 of the CPA (South Africa 1977), 
which states that a search warrant issued under subsection (1) shall require a police 
officer to seize the article in question and shall, to that end, authorise such a police 
officer to search any person identified in the warrant and to search any person found 
on or at such premises. These are all essential actions that need to be taken during 
the investigation of corruption. The following sections of the CPA (South Africa 
1977) are important when investigating financial crimes and are available to 
investigators to present evidence in court: 
 
 Section 205 – Application for evidence (e.g. client information at a bank, 
corporate entity, trust, etc.)  
The SAPS may question a suspect without his/her consent, but the person still 
has the right to silence and may even refuse to answer. The only other option 
for the police in such circumstances is to use section 205 of the Act, where a 
magistrate, on request of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), may 
summon such person to appear before him/her for questioning by a 
prosecutor. This usually is issued to a person who is likely to give material or 
relevant information to an alleged crime. 
 Section 212 – Proof of certain facts by affidavits or certificates; 
(1) Did not happen (e.g. Department of Education). 
(2) Information was not supplied (SARS). 
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(3) The matter has been registered (Deeds Office). 
(4) Skills (Local Criminal Record Centre). 
 Section 213 – Proof of a written statement by consent: An affidavit made by a 
teller in respect of the receipt of a deposit or the identity of a person who 
presented a cheque for payment. In respect of any fact(s), this statement may 
be handed up in court as evidence, instead of oral evidence being required in 
respect of the fact(s). 
 Section 236 – Proof of entries in bankers’ books: An affidavit made by an 
official of a bank, who has examined the accounting records and original 
document(s) kept by that bank. Entries in the accounting records of that bank 
or documents kept by that bank, and to which copies of the relevant entries or 
documents are appended, may be handed up in court as evidence, instead of 
requiring oral evidence in this regard.  
 Section 252A – The authority to make use of traps and undercover operations, 
and the admissibility of evidence so obtained. 
 Section 204 – Incrimination evidence by a witness for the state. During the 
investigation process, an affidavit could be obtained from a witness who 
incriminates himself/herself in the commissioning of a crime. The appointed 
prosecutor will be involved during this process. 
 
2.2.2 The Public Service Act   
The Public Service Act 103 of 1994 (South Africa 1994b), hereinafter referred to as 
the PSA, was signed into law on 3 June 1994. The PSA was introduced to enable 
the government of the public service of South Africa and to regulate conditions of 
employment. This is predominantly used to obtain more information on public 
officials who are the object of an investigation. Documents which may be relevant 
to such an investigation include the official's application for deployment, 
dependents, financial declarations, his delegated authority, job description, and 
official travel arrangements. 
 
2.2.3 The South African Police Service Act 
The new South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (South Africa 1995), 
hereinafter referred to as the SAPS Act, was signed into law on 28 September 1995. 
It provided the legal basis for the establishment of the SAPS. The SAPS was thereby 
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established and it outlined the functions of the Service. The SAPS Act (South Africa 
1995) further stipulates: “To provide for the establishment, organisation, regulation 
and control of the SAPS and to provide for matters in connection therewith.” The 
SAPS Act (South Africa 1995) provides clear rules for all parts of the successful 
operation of the police service, from the government through to the conduct of 
conventional police officials.  
 
The South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008 (South Africa 2008), 
hereafter referred to as the SAPS Amendment Act, was passed and amended Act 
68 of 1995. The SAPS Amendment Act enhances the capacity of the SAPS to 
prevent, combat, and investigate national priority crimes by establishing the DPCI. 
The SAPS Amendment Act also made provisions for the DPCI to investigate 
national priority crimes through cooperation with other government departments. 
The DPCI is a statutory body responsible for preventing, combatting, and 
investigating national priority crimes, for instance serious organised crime, serious 
commercial crime, and serious corruption cases as stated in section 17 B(a) of the 
SAPS Amendment Act (South Africa 2008). It appears from this section that the 
DPCI will investigate only serious corruption, leaving a gap for which unit will choose 
to investigate police corruption. 
 
2.2.4 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
The Constitution (South Africa 1996b) was signed into law on 10 December 1996 
and is considered to be the supreme law of South Africa. The Constitution was 
formulated by an integration of ideas from ordinary citizens, civil society, and political 
parties and therefore represents the collective wisdom of the people of South Africa. 
In the discussion on the relevant legislation in the fight against corruption, it should 
be noted that for the purposes of this study the following legislative regulations are 
relevant, but the investigation of corrupt activities is not merely restricted to the 
legislation that will be discussed below. 
 
Currie and De Waal (2016) state that the constitutional supremacy decrees that the 
rules and the principles of the Constitution have priority over all departments of the 
state and other rules made by the government, the legislation, and the courts. As 
the highest law of the land, the Constitution provides the police and all other public 
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sector institutions with the necessary powers and authority to conduct their duties. 
In terms of section 205 of the Constitution (South Africa 1996b), the objectives of 
the SAPS are to prevent, combat, and investigate crime. Furthermore, the police 
have to maintain public order, and protect and secure the inhabitants of South Africa 
and their property.  
 
2.2.5 The Witness Protection Act 
The Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998 (South Africa 1998d) was signed into law 
19 November 1998 to provide for the establishment of an office for the protection of 
witnesses and make provisions to regulate their powers, functions, and duties. The 
Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998 (South Africa 1998d) furthermore provides for 
temporary protection and placement of witnesses under witness protection. 
Commonly used for the protection of whistle-blowers (employees) in the workplace, 
this is decisive in the fight against corrupt activities to protect witnesses and enable 
them to testify in court.  
 
2.2.6 The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (South Africa 1998b), hereafter 
referred to as the POCA, was signed into law on 24 November 1998. It presents 
legislation that works against organised crime and gang activities, with a special 
focus on money laundering and racketeering or unlawful corporate practices. The 
criminal activities identified with gangs, money laundering, or racketeering can be 
prosecuted in terms of the provisions as set out in the POCA, regardless of the 
possibility that the crime was committed before the POCA was signed into law, or 
on the off chance that a South African in another nation committed the crime. The 
POCA is typically utilised alongside the PRECCA, because multi-faceted corrupt 
activities are intermittently carried out as a once-off and these crimes embroil 
persons in positions of authority, who receive direct or indirect gratification from 
private entities that provide services to the state in an organised fashion.  
 
The three basic elements of organised crime comprise a pattern of racketeering 
activities, an enterprise, and an accused. These basic elements of organised crime 
can be briefly explained as follows: 
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 There must be at least two crimes which are classifiable as a pattern of 
racketeering activities. 
 The criminal group must be linked in some way to an enterprise which is an 
organising principle.  
 Because organised crime has to be committed by an organised criminal group, 
there must always be more than one accused.  
 
2.2.7 The Public Finance Management Act  
The Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (South Africa 1999), hereafter 
referred to as the PFMA, was signed into law on 2 March 1999. The PFMA requires 
public institutions to ensure and maintain proper financial management and effective 
internal control measures, which must be established by the management of those 
public institutions. De Waal and Serfontein (2015) clarify that the aim of the PFMA 
is to promote accountability, transparency, and sound financial management at 
institutions. The PFMA criminalises financial-related activities in government which 
are not administered efficiently and effectively by accounting officers. In the tender 
procedures routinely utilised by the government, multi-million Rand tenders are 
unjustifiably awarded or extended to service providers of the state.  
 
2.2.8 The Promotion of Access to Information Act  
The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (South Africa 2000b), 
hereinafter referred to as the PAIA, was signed into law on 2 February 2000. It was 
introduced to “give effect to, the Constitutional right of access to any information 
held by the State” (South Africa 2000b). The PAIA (South Africa 2000b) permits 
legitimate and appropriate access for the exercise of any rights. The PAIA (South 
Africa 2000b) provides the means of promoting good governance within the public 
sector. However, while the notions of transparency and accountability were catered 
for, the PAIA was deemed to be less effective than ideally preferred. It provides an 
indirect means for all citizens to take part in combatting corruption and 
maladministration within the public sector by granting the people means with which 
to hold the state to account. 
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2.2.9 The Protected Disclosures Act  
The Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 (South Africa 2000c), hereafter referred 
to as the PDA, was signed into law on 1 August 2000. The PDA originates from the 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution. It makes provision for procedures in terms of which 
employees in both the public and private sectors who disclose information of 
unlawful and corrupt conduct by their employers or fellow employees are protected 
from victimisation by corrupt police officials. Commonly used for the protection of 
whistle-blowers (employees) in the workplace, this is decisive in the fight against 
corrupt activities. The employees’ rights are legally protected when reporting corrupt 
activities, to protect the employee from persecution. 
 
2.2.10 The Financial Intelligence Centre Act  
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (South Africa 2001), hereafter 
referred to as the FICA, was signed into law on 28 November 2001. It was accented 
to combat financial crime, for example money laundering, tax avoidance, and 
terrorist financing activities. The FICA aligns South Africa with the comparable 
enactment in other countries intended to uncover the movement of money that forms 
part of the proceeds from unlawful activities and, in this way, kerb money laundering 
and other criminal practices. The FICA is predominantly used to obtain intelligence 
on individuals and entities within the country and abroad. The information provided 
contains a financial transaction involving specific individuals and entities as 
stipulated in the request to the FIC in terms of section 27 of the FICA. The 
intelligence received is followed up accordingly with a section 205 application in 
terms of the CPA (South Africa 1977) to enable the investigator to submit the 
evidence in a court of law. 
 
2.2.11 The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act  
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (South Africa 
2002a) hereafter referred to as the ECTA, was signed into law on 31 July 2002. It 
regulates the admissibility of documents from an electronic source, whether email, 
fax, text message or, more recently, social media post. When documents or other 
evidence in an electronic format are used as evidence in court proceedings, it is 
crucial to ascertain whether the document is authentic, i.e. an unaltered original 
version of the electronic document or data message. The aforesaid is in place to 
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address one important consideration – whether or not the evidence is admissible. If 
inadmissible, the court will not consider the evidence, which can have dire 
consequences for the party relying on it.  
 
2.2.12 The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provisions of 
Communication-Related Information Act  
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provisions of 
Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002 (South Africa 2002b), hereafter 
referred to as the RICA, commenced on 30 September 2005. This is one of the 
government’s fundamental crime prevention initiatives towards improving South 
Africa. All Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards, including data, contract and 
prepaid, must be registered as per RICA legislation. All subscribers (MTN, Telkom 
and so forth) who do not comply with the Act will be placed in a RICA lock status. 
Although the network operators are able to operate as a service provider, their 
clients are unable to use social media, cell phones, the Internet, etc. This will result 
in their inability to conduct business, which will ultimately lead to the closure of the 
business. The compliance with the RICA is imperative for business and individuals 
who need to utilise the services of network operators. The RICA was accented to: 
 regulate interception of communication; 
 monitor certain signal frequencies; 
 regulate the application for interception;  
 assist postal and Telkom service providers, including the decryption key 
holders;  
 prohibit the possession, assembly, purchase, manufacture, advertising, and 
selling of certain equipment; and 
 define crimes and penalties. 
 
Consequently, the investigator could make a reference from what the RICA governs 
and the information that he/she is able to obtain by making use of the Act during an 
investigation. This might be valuable as a tool to acquire covert intelligence on a 
subject. The term “serious crimes” is defined by the RICA (South Africa 2002b) as 
follows:  
 crime mentioned in the schedule to the Act; 
- 42 - 
 
 the crime allegedly has been, is being, or will be committed by an 
individual, group of individuals, or syndicate; 
 who act in an organised fashion, contributing to or engaging in no less 
than two activities of criminal or unlawful conduct;  
 in the execution or advancement of a common purpose or conspiracy;  
 which could achieve considerable monetary profit for the individual, 
group of individuals, or syndicate committing the crime; and 
 including any conspiracy, instigating or attempting to commit any of the 
already said crimes.  
 
2.2.13 The Municipal Finance Management Act  
The Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (South Africa 2003), hereafter 
referred to as the MFMA, was ratified on 1 July 2004 and applies to all municipalities 
and municipal entities. It was introduced to “secure sound and sustainable 
management of the financial affairs of municipalities and other institutions in the 
local sphere of government” (South Africa 2003). The MFMA is predominately used 
in cases of maladministration in municipalities when complaints of service delivery 
are endemic. 
 
2.2.14 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act  
The PRECCA (South Africa 2004) was signed into law on 27 April 2004. This Act 
served to reflect and coordinate relevant previous legislation and international 
conventions and forms the central point of the overall legal framework in South 
Africa. 
 
The PRECCA was introduced to “provide for the strengthening of measures to 
prevent and combat corruption and corrupt activities” (South Africa 2004). It is 
indispensable in the battle against corruption and the different structures thereof; it 
is utilised as a part of all corruption-related investigations, including important 
supplementary legislation. It criminalises distinctive acts in a corrupt relationship and 
unmistakably portrays their parts and, in addition, criminalises any type of 
gratification as a result thereof. The PRECCA was legislated to bring South Africa’s 
legislative framework in line with the UN and African Union (AU) conventions against 
corruption. It encompasses the general crime of corrupt activities, including 
particular crimes, and moreover accommodates investigative measures, alongside 
preventative measures in the battle against corrupt activities. It has a powerful 
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pedigree and is well placed to play a pivotal role in future anti-corruption efforts in 
the country, should the will exist. Corruption is illegal in relation to the PRECCA 
(South Africa 2004). The PRECCA has repealed the Corruption Act 94 of 1992 
(South Africa 1992), which is the first statutory law that repealed the common law 
crime of bribery. In addition to the general crime of corruption, sections 4 to 21 of 
the PRECCA made provisions that specific persons can be charged for their specific 
conduct during the commission of the crime of corruption. An overview of the 
PRECCA (South Africa 2004) follows for discussion in order to illustrate how this 
Act defines and regulates corrupt activities. This Act also clarifies that preventing 
and combatting corruption and related corrupt activities requires mutual 
cooperation, with the support and involvement of individuals and groups outside the 
public sector, such as organs of civil society and non-governmental and community-
based organisations.  
 
The PRECCA provides a detailed definition of corruption and consists of a number 
of clauses and sub-clauses, making the understanding of corrupt acts and 
corruption easier (Newham & Faull 2011a). Basdeo (2010:390) indicates that strict 
penalties, such as life imprisonment, should be meted out by the courts for 
individuals found guilty of corrupt crimes.  
 
2.3 CRIMES IN RELATION TO CORRUPTION  
 
By assenting to the PRECCA (South Africa 2004), the legislature prohibits certain 
conduct by citizens. This was done to serve as a deterrent, as well as to explain 
precisely which conduct is prohibited. In Table 2.1 below a summary was compiled 
to serve as a quick reference to enable the investigating teams to identify certain 
section(s) which might be relevant to a corruption investigation as set out in the 
PRECCA (South Africa 2004). These sections may also be chosen when compiling 
an investigation plan or to formulate criminal crimes that may also include the targets 
of the PRECCA (South Africa 2004).  
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Table 2.1: Summary of criminal offences of the Act 
Section 
number 
Sections of the PRECCA (South Africa 2004) 
3 A general overview of corruption. 
4 Public officials’ involvement in corrupt activities. 
5 Foreign public officials’ involvement in corrupt activities.  
6 Agents’ involvement in corrupt activities.  
7 Members of legislative authority’s involvement in corrupt activities. 
8 Judicial officers’ involvement in relation to corrupt activities. 
9 Members of the prosecuting authority’s involvement in relation to 
corrupt activities. 
10 Employment relationship receiving or offering unauthorised 
gratification.  
11 Witnesses and evidential material in relation to corrupt activities. 
12 Contracts in relation to corrupt activities. 
13 The procurement and withdrawal of tenders in relation to corrupt 
activities. 
14 Auctions in relation to corrupt activities. 
15 Sporting events in relation to corrupt activities. 
16 Gambling games or games of chance in relation to corrupt activities. 
17 Agreement or investment of public bodies in relation to corrupt 
activities. 
18 Unacceptable conduct of witnesses in relation to corrupt activities. 
19 Intentional interference with, hindrance, or obstruction of the 
investigation of corrupt activities.  
20 Accessory to or after a crime. 
21 The attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit, and inducing another 
person to commit a crime. 
 
The PRECCA (South Africa 2004) has an all-encompassing definition on the 
‘gratification’ aspect, which is an essential part of the general conduct of parties in 
a corrupt relationship. An essential element in corrupt activities is gratification. The 
definition of gratification includes any service, favour, or advantage of any 
description. Gratification defined in terms of the PRECCA (South Africa 2004) 
includes the following:  
 
(a) money, whether in cash or otherwise; (b) any donation, gift, loan, fee, 
reward, valuable security, property or interest in property of any 
description, whether movable or immovable, or any other similar 
advantage; (c) the avoidance of a loss, liability, penalty, forfeiture, 
punishment or other disadvantage; (d) any office, status, honour, 
employment, contract of employment or services, any agreement to give 
employment or render services in any capacity and residential or holiday 
accommodation; (e) any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any 
loan, duty or other liability, whether in whole or in part; (f) any forbearance 
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to demand any money or money's worth or valuable thing; (g) any other 
service or favour or advantage of any description, including protection 
from any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action 
or proceedings of a disciplinary, civil or criminal nature, whether or not 
already instituted, and includes the exercise or the forbearance from the 
exercise of any right or any official power or duty; (h) any right or privilege; 
(i) any real or pretended aid, vote, consent, power or abstention from 
voting; or (j) any valuable consideration or benefit of any kind, including 
any discount, commission, rebate, bonus, deduction or percentage. 
 
Lebeya (2012:366) cautions that corruption may not just be slippery and brutal, but 
also cancerous and destructive. Thus, it necessitates an immediate response after 
being identified. It should be handled head-on wherever it rises with its revolting 
tentacles; generally, it institutionalises itself until nobody does anything, which 
brings about injustice if it is not dealt with swiftly and decisively. 
 
2.4 CORRELATION BETWEEN FRAUD AND CORRUPTION 
 
The terms of fraud and corruption are misunderstood by some investigators. Hence 
the imperative that all investigators dealing with fraud and corruption on a regular 
basis are able to distinguish between these terms. Fraud and corruption are hidden 
and are usually orchestrated in secrecy. When detection is lacking, an entity could 
fall victim to fraud or corruption and be looted of its essential capital resources, 
reputation, competitiveness, and employee morale. Fraud and corruption are two 
words that we hear repeatedly. Both are on the increase around the world, and their 
strategies are advancing to adjust to the improvement of technology. The World 
Bank (2017) defines a fraudulent practice as any act or omission, including a 
misrepresentation, that intentionally or carelessly misdirects or endeavours to 
misdirect a party to get a monetary or another benefit, or in order to stay away from 
a commitment. For instance, in the event that you utilise a fake ID, you are 
committing fraud by misrepresenting yourself as another person. 
 
The World Bank (2017) defines corruption as a corrupt practice offering, giving, 
receiving, or requesting, directly or indirectly, anything of worth to improperly induce 
the activities of another party. Corruption is a comprehensive term that can be 
connected to fraud and other deceitful acts, for example bribery, extortion, or 
misappropriation. The two terms can be utilised as a part of a wide cluster of 
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examples, yet apply mostly to business. Corporate pioneers, as well as political 
leaders, are regularly prosecuted for different fraudulent and corrupt acts. Fraud and 
corruption cannot be overlooked. The loss from even one incident of fraud or 
corruption can have disastrous consequences for any government or agency. Not 
only is financial loss brought on by the incident, but also indirect damages, for 
example damage to a company’s reputation and loss of public and shareholder 
confidence. 
 
Murray and Dainty (2013:165) explain that corrupt activities regularly include a level 
of fraud. The money paid to win a contract will typically be concealed by some 
fraudulent act with the aim that the contract seems to have been won in a forthright 
manner on a free and open public market basis. Fraud does not necessarily involve 
corrupt activities. Nevertheless, many acts of fraud may require an act of corruption 
to complete the fraud. For instance, a worker may present a false invoice to a 
superior (which is fraud) and may then induce the supervisor to approve the invoice 
(which is a corrupt activity). On the other hand, a supervisor may wish to fraudulently 
withhold payment from a service provider and may entice the service provider to 
certify falsely that liquidated damages or expenses for the correction of defects are 
payable by the service provider. 
 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
shows that in most corruption and fraud cases, a mix of direct and circumstantial 
evidence is generally the most persuasive. For instance, for a case in which a 
witness concedes paying a bribe to a public official, for which there is no other direct 
evidence, the means of verification may incorporate circumstantial evidence to act 
as direct evidence. For instance, the investigator could: 
 record in detail (when, where, how, why, and so forth) the statement of the 
witness that he/she paid the public official in cash (this is the direct evidence);  
 prove that the public official spent or saved a significant amount of money not 
long after he supposedly received the cash bribe;  
 eliminate all other potential sources of income for the official's expenses or 
deposits, to a conceivable degree; and 
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 interview the suspect formally, and make it evident that the public official is not 
able to justify the source of the expenses or deposits, or lied about it (the last 
three focuses are the circumstantial evidence).  
 
Such evidence, if accepted by the court, would be lawfully adequate to convict an 
accused in most courts. 
 
2.4.1 Parties Involved in a Corrupt Relationship 
According to the PRECCA (South Africa 2004), there are at least two parties in any 
corrupt relationship: 
 The corrupter: any person who gives, agrees to give, or offers to give any 
gratification to any other person.  
 The corruptee: any person who accepts, agrees to accept, or offers to accept 
any gratification. 
 
These concepts are supported by Kaur (2014:53), who states that corruption is 
always a transaction process between two persons: the corrupter, having economic 
resources at his/her disposal, and the corruptee, having power resources at his/her 
disposal. Kaur (2014:53) clarified that the cycle of corrupt activities involves the 
corrupter (the individual offering the reward) needing an unusual situation (an order, 
licence, or position) which the corruptee (the individual to be bribed) can relegate. 
The latter gets a further inducement (cash or payment in kind) for the service above 
the normal price. The corruptee accordingly abuses generally accepted moral 
standards and harms the interests of a third party or contender, as well as the public 
interest. Along these lines, corrupt activities are covered up and concealed. Queiroz 
(2015:6) shares the point of view that corruption always involves two parties/groups; 
the corruptor(s) and the corruptee(s). Corruptors are modern-day money raiders; 
individuals who are out to make/maximise their gains through any means, including 
bribery. Corruptees are usually characterised by incompetence and lack of talent 
and are as such insecure. The question always arises: who is worse, the corrupter 
the corruptee? Budiono, Berdimuratova and Azahari (2013:12) agree that numerous 
prospects exist for corruptors which form part of the corrupt existence of 
extravagance, while many destitute individuals endure on the grounds that they do 
not enjoy economic development physically. 
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Abraham and Berline (2015:135) emphasise that corrupt activities are a 
phenomenon rooted in the social, political, and financial conditions of those 
involved. Budiono et al (2013:11) assert that corrupt activities are rampant; 
numerous corrupt activities occur in a Capitalist State as individuals compete to be 
wealthier and more prosperous than others, even by unlawful means. In the study 
by Gottschalk (2013:21), research shows that corrupt activities can be characterised 
as the giving, requesting, receiving, or accepting of an uncalled-for gratification 
which is identified with a position, office, or duty. Finanstilsynet (2008) maintains 
that the unwarranted favourable position does not need to be associated with a 
particular activity or with not doing this activity. It will be adequate if the favourable 
position can be connected to a man's position, office, or duty.  
 
Ksenia (2008:225) insists that a person or group is liable for corrupt activities in the 
event that he, she, or they accept cash or anything of monetary worth for achieving 
something that he, she, or they are under an obligation to do or not do. He points 
out that those corrupt activities destroy or distort the integrity or devotion of an 
individual in the execution of his/her duty, and induce him/her to act unduly or 
unfaithfully to make him/her susceptible to offering or receiving bribes. 
 
Gottschalk (2013:20) maintains that financial crime consists of fraud, theft, 
manipulation, and corruption. It is essential to discuss the relationship between fraud 
and corruption; these two crimes frequently go hand-in-hand in the investigation of 
corruption cases. Henning (2009:295) reveals that fraud can be characterised as 
the intention to misrepresent facts with the resolve of inciting another in dependence 
upon these facts to part with some significant thing belonging to him/her or to 
surrender a legitimate right. The work of Yip, Wong and Ernst (2008:13) clarifies that 
the term nexus comes from the Latin word “nectere”, which means to bind or refers 
to a connection point or bond; a point at which two things are interlinked. The Nexus 
needs to be proven between the parties. It is of the utmost importance to determine 
what links them together. The relation between a corrupt act and the receiving of a 
gratification must be proven in a corrupt relationship. 
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2.4.2 Establishing Corrupt Relationships between the Corruptee and 
Corruptor  
It is important to establish the relationship between the corruptee and the corruptor. 
The following information should be included in the relevant affidavit: 
 What happened between the corruptor and the corruptee? 
 What is the relationship between the corruptor and the corruptee?  
 Particulars of the gratification (full description). 
 The implications and consequences of the crime. 
 The corruptee must be in a position to give evidence: 
o regarding the corruptor; 
o the corruptor’s employer; and 
o the beneficiary (third party). 
 
Della Porta and Vannucci (1999:21) explain the relationship between the corruptee 
and the corrupter may sometimes be made easier by the intervention of a 
middleman. The repetitive use of a middleman helps the development of trust 
between the parties over time. In cases where corruption is prevalent, it often 
involves groups of administrators and businessmen, who among themselves 
negotiate the size of the bribe. 
 
2.4.3  Equating Corruption 
In distinguishing between highly corrupted activities and to a great extent corruption-
free social order, Huther and Shah (2000) consider the conditions that urge public 
officials to search out or acknowledge corruption:  
 The expected gains exceed the expected expenses of undertaking the corrupt 
behaviour.  
 Little consideration is given to what the corrupt act will cost someone else. 
 
The main perspective will be in light of unadulterated self-interest: corruption will 
happen when officials anticipate deriving net positive from those gains. Huther and 
Shah (2000) reveal that effective anti-corruption projects will bring down those 
anticipated gains and raise the expected punishments of the corrupt. That is, anti-
- 50 - 
 
corruption ventures must change those cost-benefit estimations of public officials 
who have the certainty that the net gains of corrupt activities are empowering.  
 
A self-interested individual will pursue or accept being part of a corrupt activity if the 
expected gains exceed the expenses, i.e. at the point when a self-interested person 
will pursue or accept corruption if the expected proceeds or gains outweigh the costs 
(Huther & Shah 2000): 
 
E[B] = nxE[G] - prob [P] x [P] > 0 
where  E is the expectations of the operator 
n is the number of corrupt transactions  
G is the gain from the corrupt transaction 
prob [P] is the probability of paying a penalty 
P is the penalty for the corrupt activity 
 
In their constructed formula on cost-benefit deliberations, Huther and Shah (2000) 
further explain that anti-corruption programmes can discourage individuals from 
taking part in corrupt activities through four arrangements – reducing the recurrence 
of transactions with public officials, lessening the opportunity for gratification from 
every last transaction, escalating the possibility of paying a penalty, or escalating 
the penalty for corrupt activities. 
 
Kaur (2014:52) clarifies that the term “corruption” comes from the Latin word 
“corruptio” which means “moral decay, wicked behaviour, or rottenness”. Vast 
amounts of literature dedicated to corruption define it differently. Klitgaard, Abaroa 
and Parris (2000:51) refer to a corruption equation namely:  
 
Corruption = Monopoly Power + Discretion – Accountability 
 
Corruption is contrary to good governance. The term ‘governance’ refers to the way 
government carries out its work through decision making and implementation. Good 
governance is governance without abuse and corruption. When there is no 
accountability, responsiveness, transparency and efficiency, policies are not 
effectively implemented, and public services are ineffective or unavailable, there is 
corruption. Thus, corruption is linked to ‘bad’ governance (Kaur 2014:52). 
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2.4.4 Payment of Gratification to Corruptors  
Stansbury and Stansbury (2008) clarify that the payment of gratification may be 
made directly by the company who was awarded the bid to the public official who is 
to complete the corrupt activity. Nevertheless, it is rudimentary for the gratification 
to be paid through intermediaries. This is done to make it harder to identify the 
gratification which has been provided. Below are some methods used to disguise a 
bribe through the utilisation of intermediaries:  
 
 An agent is an individual who acts for the benefit of someone else or a group. 
The individual has no obvious direct association to the company to whom the 
contract is awarded. The person is utilised to receive payments from the 
company who was awarded the winning bid and facilitates the payments to 
specific officials who played a role in the awarding of the contract to a specific 
company. Thus, payment to the identified officials hides the company's 
involvement. 
 Joint ventures are business endeavours embraced by at least two groups, 
which generally hold their distinct identities. In general, a joint venture consists 
of several companies which tender as a group for a specific tender. A 
resolution is usually agreed upon before the tender is awarded, making 
specific references to the conditions that would apply after the tender is 
awarded to the joint venture. This agreement usually conceals the corrupt 
arrangements for gratifications to be transferred to certain trust accounts, 
closed corporations, investments, etc.  
 Subsidiaries or other groups of companies are indicative of the level of 
proprietorship that a parent company holds in another company. A subsidiary, 
on the other hand, is a company whose parent company is the overriding 
shareholder. Therefore, in an entirely co-owned subsidiary, the parent 
company retains 100% of the subsidiary company. A company which is part of 
a group of companies with a similar board of directors as the main company in 
that group, which also includes shares in the company, is a subsidiary of that 
company. Arrangements might be made by the group of companies for a 
corrupt agency agreement to be entered into, or for a corrupt payment 
(gratification) to be made, by a subsidiary or other group company where the 
corrupt activities are less likely to be detected or penalised. The subsidiary or 
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other group company will then be refunded by the company to whom the tender 
was awarded through inter-company charges for false invoices, services of 
inflated value, or loan agreements.  
 A sub-contractor is a company or individual that does work for a company as 
part of a larger project. The company who was awarded the tender may 
channel the gratification through a corrupt sub-contract arrangement. For 
instance, a sub-contractor may fraudulently state that specific services are to 
be provided to the contractor in return for specific payments. In the real world, 
the sub-contractor does not actually provide the perceived services or will 
provide perceived services of a considerable lesser value than the price 
agreed upon. The balance of the inflated payment will then be passed on by 
the sub-contractor to the relevant public officials or company as gratification. 
 
2.5 THEORIES OF CORRUPTION WITHIN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
According to Charnoz, Pedregal and Kolata (2015:68), in many ways corrupt 
activities are continuous with older traditions of tipping, gifting, worshipping, and 
related modes of dealing with kings, gods, and other kinds of superiors. Velez 
(2006:67) indicates that the presence of corrupt activities in the police is a multi-
faceted condition that is not effectively clarified. While exploring the literature on 
corrupt activities, there are two fundamental reoccurring theories explaining why 
police corruption occurs: 
 the individual is a corrupt example of the rotten apple theory; or  
 the organisation is a corrupt example of the rotten barrel theory.  
 
2.5.1 The Rotten Apple  
According to Alston (2010), the rotten apple theory was described decades ago by 
August Vollmer. Reese (2003:88), and Bannish and Ruiz (2003:5) elaborate that 
this theory claims that the reason for police taking part corrupt activities is basically 
because of a single rogue officer, and after the identified officer is removed the 
situation of corruption is resolved.  
 
Cohen (2016:10) states that the “bad apples were morally corrupt individuals, rotten 
on the inside and hiding under their skin of respectability, and who were only out for 
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themselves.” Police Crimes (2005) points out that the rotten apple theory is that one 
bad cop destroys the whole division. A single officer is not able to cause 
management to initiate investigations over the whole division or unit, however, that 
one corrupt officer can bring the division or unit to the edge of total catastrophe as 
far as public relations are concerned. Society takes a gander at that one bad cop 
and assumes, sometimes accurately (particularly in a situation where several 
officers were detected committing a similar crime), that the entire division is involved 
in corrupt activities or even more regrettable acts. 
 
Ivković (2009:777) clarifies that even though a social researcher occasionally 
utilises the rotten apple hypothesis as a reason for an individual’s involvement in 
corrupt activities, police management routinely offers the explanation to account for 
the existence of corrupt activities within law enforcement. Such an explanation is 
reasonable, as it is far less demanding for the law enforcement head to accuse one 
bad officer of his/her involvement in corrupt activities than to concede that a 
systemic problem exists within the division. 
 
2.5.2 The Rotten Barrel  
Gottschalk (2012:170) expresses that the rotten barrel theory takes into 
consideration the person while also emphasising the social setting where the corrupt 
activities exist. Velez (2006:70) maintains that this hypothesis asserts that police 
involvement in corrupt activities is a systemic disease passed on to generations of 
cops through actions of in-group socialisation. The corrupt activity is not created by 
a single corrupt officer; it is brought on by the system itself. Corruption flourishes, 
since corrupt activities develop to be institutionalised into law enforcement conduct 
and corrupt officers are sustained by the law enforcement culture, group loyalty, and 
the code of silence. 
 
2.5.3 Additional Theories on Police Corruption 
Velez (2006:70) states that several scholars have combined parts of the individual 
and group approaches to generate their own hypothesis of what brought about the 
police involvement in the corrupt actions. Notwithstanding the rotten apple and the 
rotten barrel theories, Delattre (2002) estimated that police involvement in corrupt 
activities was partly brought on by the impact of society through the practice of small 
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bribes. For example, in the public eye, it has become distinctly typical to offer an 
officer a small bribe to ignore a few minor violations. Moreover, many people receive 
gratuities and gifts, for example, porters, escorts, and cab drivers. In any case, small 
gratuities soon have to be distinctly bigger and transform into large gifts in return for 
large favours.  
 
A few of the most common theories will briefly be discussed below. 
 
2.5.4 Slippery Slope 
Velez (2006:71) elaborates that as small bribes become bigger, officers find 
themselves travelling down a slippery slope of corruption. Delattre (2002:72) states 
that the slippery slope of corruption “begins with apparently harmless and well-
intentioned practices and leads over time either in individual or in departments as a 
whole to all manner of crimes-for-profit.” Prenzler and Mackay (1995) clarify that 
gratuities are especially dangerous and slippery for officers.  
 
2.5.5 Human Weakness  
Velez (2006:71) mentions the James Madison theory on human weakness, which 
explains police corruption in terms of human weaknesses. Police officers are only 
human and are susceptible to temptation. When police officers lack integrity, they 
are more likely to act in an inappropriate manner. Those officers who have a low 
value of public interest and a high desire to accept favours for personal gain are 
especially susceptible. 
 
2.5.6 Extraordinary Temptation 
Velez (2006:72) describes the Lincoln Steffens theory of extraordinary temptation. 
In this theory, police officers are ordinary people facing extraordinary temptations. 
Police officers, whether it is the first-year rookie officer or the veteran narcotics 
officer, are often confronted with large sums of money, large quantities of drugs, 
sexual temptations, and physical property for simply looking the other way. When 
the payoff gets high enough, the officer engages in corruption.  
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2.5.7 Administrative Hygiene  
Velez (2006:73) expounds on the Herzberg Theory on administrative hygiene. This 
theory assumes that workers are in general motivated by hygiene factors and 
motivating factors. Hygiene factors maintain the officer’s status while the motivating 
factors motivate the officer to work harder. If the work environment is such that the 
officers are treated like children and not respected, it causes them to become weak 
and dependent on gratification and, in the end, more susceptible to unethical 
behaviour. 
 
2.5.8 The Convenience of Flirtation 
Velez (2006:73) clarifies the theory of Zorba on the convenience of flirtation. This 
theory relates to the effect the presence of corruption has on the frustration and 
cynicism of many officers. It is not uncommon for officers to receive little thanks, 
little gratitude, and little praise. In the long term, this creates a lack of identification 
with other officers and when the opportunity arises, officers are more likely to 
participate in corrupt activities in order to develop a new sense of identity. 
 
2.6 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2030 
 
According to Brand South Africa (2012), the National Planning Commission (NPC) 
created the NDP which was presented to the public during November of 2011. The 
core of this design is to concentrate on capabilities; the capabilities of individuals, of 
our nation, and of generating opportunities for both. In Chapter 14 of the NDP, 
reference is made to promoting accountability and fighting corruption (Brand South 
Africa 2012). The vision for 2030 according to the NDP is as follows:  
 In 2030, South Africa will have no leniency for corrupt activities.  
 The leaders will hold themselves to high ethical principles and act with 
righteousness.  
 South Africa will have a robust anti-corruption structure in which the agencies 
fighting against corrupt activities have the resources, trustworthiness, and 
power to investigate corrupt activities, as well as to prosecute. 
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2005) states that the 
sophistication of corruption implies that conventional law enforcement agencies do 
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not always have the technical expertise or capacity to detect, investigate, and 
prosecute complex corruption cases. One of the major arguments supporting the 
creation of specialised anti-corruption bodies is that the growing complexity of 
corruption cases and related financial transactions require a high level of expertise 
and a specialisation of knowledge that can be best achieved through recruitment, 
training, and centralisation of expertise in a single-issue agency. The NACS (South 
Africa 2016) pronounces that policy proposals for reducing corruption and improving 
the accountability and transparency of the public and private sectors are articulated 
in the NDP. The plan contains proposals for building a resilient anti-corruption 
system through strengthening the protection of whistle-blowers; developing greater 
central oversight over the awarding of large tenders or tenders with long duration; 
and empowering the tender compliance monitoring office (now the Chief 
Procurement Officer) to investigate corruption and the monetary value of tenders. It 
also outlines proposals for strengthening the accountability and responsibility of 
public servants, as well as judicial governance and the rule of law. 
 
2.7 CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Everett (2012:225) explains the role of accounting in relation to corruption in 
developing countries as firstly the dominant “private use” or “orthodox” view of 
corruption; a view that offers both a diagnosis of the problem and a set of universally 
applicable, “one-size-fits-all” solutions. According to this view, corruption is seen as 
a function of self-interest of the public official. Armed with the belief that the invisible 
hand of the market harnesses the social actor’s natural greed, market or "exit" 
solutions are proposed for dealing with the problem. In this view, and in keeping with 
the positivist methodology of its adherents, there is also a focus on the most obvious 
manifestations of corruption. A study by Johnson (2015:216) shows that the type of 
corruption often found in the developing world is similar to a scientist in a laboratory; 
those posting the solutions see themselves as detached, objective observers of the 
problem. It can be argued that the government is aware of the causes of corruption, 
but seems not to be interested in addressing the problem.  
 
Bukovansky (2006:182) states that the important consequences of this are that 
corruption is seen primarily as a problem found in the developing world. Everett 
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(2012:224) has expressed a similar view, in that the rest of the world is viewed as 
at best separated and detached from, and at worst hopelessly reliant upon, those in 
the affluent West.  
 
Everett’s (2012:225) second consideration is given to an alternative way of thinking 
about corruption. This has us focus on the role of the individual’s self-interest, but 
instead, power is being suggested as a market solution to corruption. The human 
actor’s natural proclivity to greed must be harnessed, the benignity of the 
neoclassical economist’s free market must be challenged, and the accountability of 
private actors viewed with scepticism. The (liberal humanist) view that the individual 
social actor is a locus of consciousness, freedom, and subjective preferences is also 
challenged and the possibility raised that the individual actors are shaped by and 
are part of a much larger set of social relations and moral duties. These duties 
concern justice, equity, and fairness; virtues to be afforded "equal" status (not 
inferior status) alongside liberty, choice, and the respect of the individual (including 
property and privacy). In addition, this alternative view of corruption is not beholden 
to commitments of the traditional scientific method and logical positivism, but is 
instead born of the insights into different ways of knowing and understanding, such 
as a critical theory. 
 
2.8 SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COUNTRIES AND 
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES  
 
The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) (2017) states that the SADC 
region consists of the Republic of Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, the Republic of Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. At the South African level, the SADC adopted its own anti-
corruption instrument, namely the Southern African Development Community Anti-
Corruption Protocol. The purpose of the protocol, as provided under article 2, is to 
(Carr 2009:149): 
a) promote and strengthen the development, by each of the state 
parties, of mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, punish, and 
eradicate corruption in the public and private sector; 
b) promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the state parties 
to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, 
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detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the public and private 
sectors; and 
c) foster the development and coordination of policies and domestic 
legislation of the state parties relating to the prevention, detection, 
punishment and eradication of corruption in the public and private 
sectors. 
 
In order to ensure a level of transparency and accountability, most countries create 
a number of independent commissions supporting democracy, such as the Public 
Service Commission (PSC) (2011), a public prosecutor, an ombudsman/public 
protector, an electoral commission, a human rights commission, a media 
commission, and a cohesion commission. In addition to their respective specific 
mandates, one of the general objectives of these commissions is to promote 
transparency and accountability in public institutions. The principal agents against 
corruption under most constitutions are however the anti-corruption agencies 
(ACAs). 
 
2.8.1 Republic of Botswana 
According to the OSISA (2017), the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime 
(DCEC) was founded in 1994 with the promulgation of the Corruption and Economic 
Crime Act of 1994 (CECA) (Republic of Botswana 1994). Modelled on the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong, the DCEC also 
adopted the three-pronged strategy used by the ICAC and is internationally 
accepted as best practice on the prevention and investigation of corruption and 
public education. 
 
2.8.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo 
The OSISA (2017) states that several efforts have been undertaken to combat 
corruption in the DRC and started during the transition period (2003 to 2006). An 
anti-corruption legal framework and institutional and non-institutional arrangements 
do exist and could help to combat corruption. The specialised Congolese anti-
corruption body joined hands with other stakeholders in the fight against corruption, 
which includes the media, civil society organisations (CSOs), human rights activists, 
and all DRC citizens. However, whistle-blowers are not protected and many 
journalists, reporters, and human rights activists have been silenced, intimidated, or 
prosecuted for defamation. 
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2.8.3 Lesotho 
The OSISA (2017) clarifies that since its establishment in 2003, the growth of the 
staff complement of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offence (DCEO) 
has been extremely sluggish, from five to 62, thereby leading to serious overload of 
work, a backlog of cases, and low conviction rates. The staff of the DCEO undergo 
regular specialised training under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat 
Unit in the Republic of Botswana. This unit serves all Commonwealth countries in 
Africa. The directorate has on occasion made very brave and unprecedented moves 
in recent years by investigating cases involving very high-profile individuals, some 
of whom while still in public office. 
 
2.8.4 Malawi 
The OSISA (2017) expounded that the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) was not 
directly established by their Constitution, but rather by an Act of parliament, the 
Corrupt Practices Act Cap.7:04, enacted into law in 1995. Recent reforms, including 
ongoing changes to the state’s public financial management system, indicate that 
some progress is being made to improve transparency. However, many observers 
contend that the government has been slow to push through the necessary reforms. 
 
2.8.5 Republic of Mozambique 
The OSISA (2017) illuminates that Chapter II, article 8 of Decree 22/2005 provides 
that the Central Office for Combating Corruption (COCC) is an Organic Unit of the 
Attorney-General of the Republic of Mozambique, responsible for investigating 
crimes of corruption and illicit economic participation, and acting on the instruction 
of the respective processes. 
 
2.8.6 South Africa 
The OSISA (2017) states that South Africa is experiencing a significant rise in 
corruption, particularly in the public sector. In 2014, the Transparency International 
CPI ranked South Africa 67 out of 175 countries when it comes to corruption. It has 
been stated that in the last 20 years, South Africa has lost R700 billion to corruption. 
That is equivalent to more than half of the annual budget of the country. South 
Africa’s institutions have evolved into a complex, effective anti-corruption machine 
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in a decentralised manner. The evolution of these institutions is because of the 
notion of separation of powers and the general mechanism of constitutional 
democracy. However, these institutions would not be effective in their attempts to 
address corruption had South Africa not acceded to international and regional anti-
corruption instruments. According to the OSISA (2017), the DPCI, NPA and the 
SAPS have consistently been influenced by politicians for ascending to or retaining 
power, or to avoid or limit accountability. This has at times entailed the appointment 
or removal of key figures in the institutions, thereby compromising their efficacy. The 
ACTT was introduced in 2010 after the DSO was dissolved to combat serious 
corruption in the public and private sectors. According to the OSISA (2017:223) the 
previous public protector, Advocate Thuli Madonsela, stated that corruption in South 
Africa is becoming “aggressive”. 
 
2.8.7 Swaziland 
The OSISA (2017) explains that since the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is not 
a constitutional body, it has been very unstable. In 2002 the High Court declared the 
1993 Act that established the ACC unconstitutional and accordingly set it aside. The 
operations of the ACC came to a halt as a result of the invalidation of the law that 
created it. In 2005, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and 
accordingly reactivated the ACC and its operations. In 2006, parliament passed the 
Prevention of Corruption Act and established an ACC dedicated to fighting 
corruption through the prevention and investigation of corruption, as well as 
educating the public and raising awareness about the need to fight corruption. The 
Prevention of Corruption Act re-established the ACC as an independent body and 
provided for matters incidental to the prevention of corruption. The Constitution of 
Swaziland was passed in 2005, before the Prevention of Corruption Act in 2006. 
Consequently, the ACC is not a constitutional body.  
 
2.8.8 Zambia 
The OSISA (2017) elucidates that the ACC in Zambia is not a constitutional 
institution, and thus its stability is not guaranteed. The reports also confirmed that 
the ACC lacked a presence at district level due to resource constraints. 
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2.8.9 Zimbabwe 
The OSISA (2017) explains that the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) 
was introduced in 2009 under Constitutional Amendment No. 19 and is, therefore, 
a constitutional body. However, the agency’s stability is often affected by political 
interference. Section 254 of their Constitution specifies that the ZACC should 
comprise a chairperson and eight other members. The members of the commission 
are to hold office for a five-year term, which is renewable only once. The 
commission’s employees do not form part of the civil service and are employed as 
provided for in section 234 of their Constitution. Effectively, their terms and 
conditions are determined by the commission subject to the country’s protective 
labour laws. 
 
2.9 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES  
 
The ACFE (2016) states that parties to the UN Convention agree to cooperate with 
one another in the fight against corruption, including the prevention, investigation, 
and prosecution of any offence. Their cooperation is mandatory in criminal matters. 
Countries must assist one another in gathering and sharing evidence, as well as by 
returning the proceeds of illicit activities and extraditing offenders for effective 
prosecution. Olaniyan (2014:121) states that, similar to other countries in the world, 
countries in Africa have developed constitutions which, in one form or another, 
prohibit corruption and set ethical standards for public officials. Pop and Herlea 
(2015:1) emphasise the importance of having a way to discover resources or assets 
abroad and having the legitimate steps established to obtain the cooperation of 
foreign law enforcement, courts, and governments in a programme of mutual 
assistance. The enactment is vital and agreements might be required for 
international support with criminal incidents, namely: 
 obtaining evidence; 
 searches and seizures; 
 production of material; 
 property freezing and enforcement of confiscation orders; and 
 service of documents. 
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It ought to be noted that all across the globe, there are shell corporations, secrecy 
laws, offshore jurisdictions, haven jurisdictions, trusts, and so forth. This may bring 
about legitimate boundaries to the attainment of pertinent information which is being 
sought to conduct an effective investigation. Radu and Paul (2016:242) highlight 
that organised crime organisations would rather utilise private foundations in Austria 
or in the United States of America (USA) than companies in the British Virgin Islands 
(BVI), the Isle of Man, Aruba, or Liberia. The second group of places has been 
connected with money laundering and dodgy transactions as perpetrated by the 
media and law enforcement for so long that even the mention of a company in the 
BVI places a “red flag” on the business deal, which is then subsequently scrutinised 
by international law enforcement. Corruption has a damaging effect on any country’s 
image and the devious acts of corruptors can affect economic, political, and social 
growth and development. Corruption is not restricted within the borders of South 
Africa; it is an international problem. Anti-corruption plans have been developed in 
all international cooperative bodies, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa (BRICS), the UN, the AU, and the International Criminal Police Organisation 
(Interpol). This section will describe the strategies and steps taken by the UN, the 
AU, Interpol, and the BRICS convention on ways to deal with corruption. South 
Africa, as a member state of the UN, has to abide by the intervention measures that 
exist to curb corruption and full cooperation has to be given to those countries that 
are aligned to the UN. 
 
2.9.1 The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998 
The OSISA (2017) clarifies that the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition 
Act of 1998 is a United States (US) federal law that amends the US FCPA by 
implementing the provisions of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development's (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions.  
 
2.9.2 United Nations Convention against Corruption of 2003 
The OSISA (2017) explains that the UNCAC of 2003 addresses corruption locally 
and abroad with specific references to the private sector. It calls for all countries to 
create agencies to prevent corruption and to pass anti-corruption legislation. In 
addition, the UNCAC of 2003 makes certain recommendations and suggestions in 
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formalising anti-corruption legislation. The UNCAC of 2003 does not merely suggest 
utilising an anti-corruption approach; it requires public and private sector 
involvement for the fight against corrupt activities. 
 
2.9.3 United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010 
Schuchter (2012) reveals that the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in the United Kingdom 
(UK) (2012) has enacted significant anti-corruption legislation in the UK, such as the 
Bribery Act of 2010 and the introduction of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
(DPA) by the Crime and Court Act 2013. In addition, the OSISA (2017) agrees that 
the UK Bribery Act of 2010 makes provision for additional crimes, which can be 
committed by corporate associations that neglect to prevent people connected to 
them from committing bribery for their sake.  
 
2.9.4 The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
The OSISA (2017) elucidates that the US FCPA is the main tool in the fight against 
corruption. The FCPA has been in existence for 40 years. It is a well-established US 
law which impacts every US company that works with businesses outside the USA. 
The Obama Government set an objective to multiply US export from 2017, and 
therefore FCPA compliance will be imperative to numerous small- and medium-
sized US companies. 
 
2.9.5 United Nations Convention against Corruption 
The UN (2004) points out that an international anti-corruption programme will be 
embarked upon by member countries to adopt effective measures in the fight 
against corruption. Some of the initiatives to prevent corruption include: founding 
ACAs to prevent corruption in the public and private sectors; providing guiding 
principles for law enforcement to curb corrupt practices; and encouraging member 
countries to endorse ethical principles and accountability between public officials in 
relation to their legislative principles. The UN (2004) reports that the convention 
furthermore accentuates the call for stringent methods ensure international 
cooperation. It is imperative that member countries cooperate, share information 
and assist with the extradition of the offenders, and also provide mutual and legal 
assistance when required. An Assets Recovery Plan was created to streamline the 
return of assets from the country where the embezzlement took place as a 
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“fundamental principle”. Singh (2016:74) confirms that South Africa is a member 
country of the UN. Thus, South African courts deliberate on international legislation 
with the enactment of anti-corruption legislation. South Africa is obligated to 
cooperate with the investigation, detention, and extradition of criminals involved in 
corrupt practices. In their study, Luiz and Stewart (2014) found that corruption in 
rural communities will escalate when the on-going cycle of corruption is left 
unmonitored. Corruption is often justified by previously disadvantages individuals 
who have lost faith in a country’s ability to improve their way of life.  
 
2.9.6 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
Muna (2004) states that the AU created an ideal platform for African countries to 
unite in the fight against corrupt practices. These countries intended to prevent 
and punish corruption, cooperate and educate member states, and enhance or 
enact anti-corruption legislation as required in an African context. Mutual assistance 
and cooperation between countries are imperative to rid African countries of corrupt 
practices. Often, ordinary citizens endure the burden as a consequence of 
corruption. In addition, Olaniyan (2014:125) notes that defenceless communities 
often pay the price for corruption.  
 
Udombana (2003) reports that the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption necessitates cooperation amongst member countries. These countries 
are continuously reminded of the evils of corruption. They are furthermore required 
to implement the endorsements given by AU member countries. 
 
2.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Once a strong understanding of the term corruption is found, it is possible to 
understand the implication thereof. It became clear that corruption is a global 
phenomenon and is not just related to South Africa or developing countries. The 
following chapter provides an overview of the investigation of this phenomenon in 
the public service sector. This serves as one of the techniques available to stem the 
growth of corruption.  
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CHAPTER 3:  
THE INVESTIGATION OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
SECTOR  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter provides the basic principles of investigation and evidence with which 
corruption investigators should be familiar. An attempt is made to provide a 
description of the investigation process in corruption cases with some practical 
examples. The corruption process is discussed with specific reference to the 
relevant evidence which needs to be obtained for the successful prosecution of such 
cases.  
 
This chapter further discusses the various steps during the investigation process, 
along with the nature of the evidence to be obtained, supplemented by the handling 
procedures of such exhibits and the importance thereof. This is complemented by a 
discussion on the presentation of evidence in corruption cases. Special investigative 
techniques of corruption are also discussed.  
 
3.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF INVESTIGATING PUBLIC SERVICE 
CORRUPTION 
 
The ICAC ([sa]) confirms that when corrupt activities are hidden and unrestricted in 
the public sector, it may be the basis for serious destruction, as well as undermining 
the community’s trust in government; deteriorating public resources and money; 
triggering injustice through advantaging some at the expense of others; causing 
operations to be ineffective; and causing reputational damage, which makes it 
difficult to recruit and retain quality employees or obtain value for money in tender 
procedures. Olaniyan (2014:252) observes that corrupt activities excessively affect 
the most vulnerable individuals in the public sector. Prevalent corrupt activities deter 
investment and deteriorate budgetary development, which undermines the rule of 
law in a country. When the investigation process in corruption-related situations are 
expedited, it sends a clear message to the public servants and SAPS officials that 
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corruption will not be tolerated. The effect actually diminishes when the investigation 
process is unduly prolonged.  
 
Boucher, Durch, Midyette, Rose and Terry (2007) observe that a corrupt justice 
sector promotes discretion in the enforcement of the law and has a corrosive impact 
on state legitimacy. Combatting this may involve strengthening the legal anti-
corruption framework and building an effective criminal system, including an 
independent judiciary and effective law institutions. Bolongoita (2005) reports that 
the focus should be on making corruption a high-risk, low-reward activity through 
measures aimed at increasing the risks of effective detection, investigation, and 
prosecution. Boucher et al (2007) agree that the criminalisation of corruption can be 
an effective approach for countries where enforcement is a feasible and realistic 
option. When this is not the case, some authors argue that in developing countries, 
such an approach can be counter-productive and result in inflating the returns of 
criminal acts, which could create financial incentives for corruption. For example, a 
ban imposed on poppy cultivation in the post-Taliban Afghanistan was not initially 
enforced and had the unintended effect of raising poppy prices and increasing 
financial incentives for its cultivation.  
 
The Chief Minister, Treasury and Economic Development Directorate (CMTEDD) 
(2004), observes that the activities are multi-faceted in an investigation with serious 
fraud or serious corruption, and those investigations must either be conducted by 
an officer of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) or an investigator who possesses 
a Certificate IV in Government (Fraud Control Investigations). The use of external 
service providers is permitted under specific conditions. The responsibilities of each 
role player in the investigative team should be detailed with benchmarks. The United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) (2012) suggests that the 
rules which should be taken into account are as follows: best practices of other 
organisations and specialised agencies in the UN System, as well as the generally 
accepted investigation standards in the “Uniform Guidelines for Investigations” 
(UGI). The Internal Oversight Services (IOS) has, as a result, formally adopted these 
guidelines for its work as of January 2012. Schuchter (2012) concludes that anti-
corruption measures take a three-pronged approach: prevention, enforcement, and 
education. The three measures are all important, however, enforcement (to detect, 
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prosecute, and punish corruption) is the most powerful measure to combat 
corruption. Furthermore, enforcement has great preventive and educational 
impacts. The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects 
([sa]-b) analyses the available data to create a hypothesis, which is then tested 
against the available facts presented in the complaint. 
 
3.3  UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF CORRUPTION 
 
Dussich (2006:142) highlights that it will be useful for the investigators to 
comprehend the typical practice of corrupt activities, as it will enable them to know 
where to obtain evidence of corrupt activities. 
 
3.3.1 Softening Up Process 
Dussich (2006:142) insists that it is very unlikely that a public official would be 
involved in a corrupt activity from the day he/she begins working. Therefore, it is 
likewise improbable that any potential corruptor would approach any public official 
to offer an opportunity for corrupt conduct without making an effort to have a good 
association with him/her first. Hence, there is a “softening up process” in which the 
corruptor builds up a social association with the public official, for instance, 
extending an invitation to a sporting event or lunch, etc. Therefore, the investigator 
ought to endeavour to discover evidence that indicates the public official had 
accepted such invitations from the corruptor. This could indicate the intention of the 
corruptor before the commencement of the actual corrupt activities. 
 
3.3.2 Requesting/Offering of Corruption  
Dussich (2006:142) suggests that sometime in the future, after the softening up 
process, the corruptor will put forward the need for some assistance from the public 
official and subsequently offer a payment for the corrupt activity to the official. The 
investigating officer ought to endeavour to show when and where the first corrupt 
activity occurred. 
 
3.3.3 Source of Corruption  
Dussich (2006:142) suggests that when there is an arrangement for the corruption, 
the corruptor needs to withdraw funds from a financial institution to compensate the 
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corruptee. The investigating officer has a duty to discover the origin of the funds and 
whether there was any outsider who encouraged or facilitated the funds for the 
corrupt activity. 
 
3.3.4 Payment of Corruption 
Dussich (2006:142) agrees that payment for the corrupt activity would subsequently 
be made. The investigating officer should attempt to ascertain where, when, and 
how the compensation for the corrupt activity transpired. 
 
3.3.5 Transfer of Corruption  
Dussich (2006:142) clarifies that upon receiving payment for the corrupt activity, the 
collector would need to dispose of the funds in an attempt to avoid detection. The 
investigating officer ought to be determined in ascertaining how the payment was 
discarded, either by being spent or kept in a financial institution. 
 
3.3.6 Abuse of Power 
Dussich (2006:142) states that to prove a case of corruption the investigating officer 
must demonstrate a corrupt activity or the abuse of a position of power as a 
derivative of the corruption. The investigating officer has a duty to detect the 
documentation or various resources used by the public official to ensure that the 
transaction has occurred and displays his abuse of power in such an event.  
 
3.4 EVIDENCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF CORRUPTION  
 
The ACFE (2016) shares that, in general, the evidence in the investigation of 
corruption consists of anything that can be used to prove something. In a legal 
sense, evidence means an assertion of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge, whether 
material or not, and whether admissible or not. In order to be a successful 
investigator, it is essential to know the crime under investigation. This is achieved 
by having a clear understanding of the elements of the crime and how to analyse 
the elements and obtain evidence during the investigation process. Thus, it is 
necessary for an investigator to know not only the crime, but also what evidence is 
necessary to prove the commission of the crime. This is prescribed in the CPA 
(South Africa 1977). Supplementary to this, the investigator needs to comply with 
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the provisions of section 35(5) of the Constitution (South Africa 1996b). Section 
35(5) provides that evidence which was obtained in a manner that violates any right 
in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render 
the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. When an 
investigator’s conduct is in conflict with these provisions, it will be regarded as a 
violation of an individual’s right to privacy and the official would be risking the 
admissibility of the evidence so obtained. The courts will not tolerate the abuse of 
powers of entering, seizure, and forfeiture, neither will the courts overlook the 
unlawful infringement of an individual’s rights. The investigator needs to understand 
the elements of proof for each of the suspected offences, based on his/her theory 
of the case, and use them to organise the investigation and test the sufficiency of 
the evidence. An investigator should know at every stage of the case what evidence 
he/she needs to obtain to prove an offence. Some investigators neglect this 
fundamental rule, with the result that too little (or too much irrelevant) evidence is 
collected. 
 
3.4.1 Collection and Organisation of Evidence 
The ACFE (2016) states that it is important to “maintain a chronology of events” from 
commencing with the investigation process. The purpose of maintaining a 
chronology is to establish the chain of events leading to the corrupt activity. The 
chronology can be used for analysis of the case under investigation and placed in a 
working file. The chronology should be kept brief and only include information 
relevant to proving the case. When the chronology is too comprehensive, the 
investigator defeats its purpose. The chronology should be viewed as a working 
document which should be revised if necessary. Amendments should be made to 
the chronology by supplementing new information and removing irrelevant 
information. It is essential that the evidence is carefully collected and organised in 
a logical manner to maintain the chain of evidence. The investigator should make 
sure that all evidence is properly logged in, secured, and accounted for, including 
electronic evidence, and that the source of the evidence is recorded accordingly. By 
making use of Excel spreadsheets and flow diagrams, complex data can be 
organised and analysed effectively when the data are captured correctly. Thus, 
professional support is important. An investigator should be cautious not to overcook 
this exercise, and should not allocate insufficient time to pursue investigative leads. 
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The evidence should be recorded chronologically by following a systematic 
approach to the sequence of activities during the investigation process, which is 
always helpful, particularly in proving knowledge and intent and to see how a case 
unfolds. The date, event, or document should be concisely recorded, along with the 
source of the information, in separate columns. Important meetings, telephone calls, 
email communications, travel records, key documents, and other potentially 
important events should be included. The chronology must be kept simple and 
focused on potentially relevant evidence, as too much extraneous information will 
reduce its effectiveness. It must also be reviewed and updated regularly. New 
information should be added as the investigation proceeds and information that 
proves to be irrelevant should be removed. A timeline of the actual sequence of 
events can be constructed out of such a spreadsheet. This will assist in explaining 
what occurred during specific periods and the importance thereof. Prosecutors often 
prefer to present complex cases in court by following the sequence of events, which 
is seldom the same as the collection of evidence. The ACFE (2016) proposes that 
evidence be “organised”. Keeping track of the amount of paper generated is one of 
the biggest problems during the investigation of multi-faceted corruption cases. 
Therefore, it is paramount that any documents obtained are organised from the 
onset. The investigator needs to keep in mind that it is difficult to determine the 
relevance of evidence from the onset. Therefore it is necessary to organise all 
documents and exhibits systematically, for ease of reference at a later stage. 
 
3.4.2 Impediments to Investigating Corruption 
Newham (2015) observes that the investigation into corruption is somewhat 
perplexing. The investigators commonly do not have the benefit of a crime scene, 
fingerprints, or eyewitnesses to generate investigative leads. The reason for this is 
that corruption is by nature a very secret crime and is usually orchestrated by two 
parties, although one of the parties might be part of a criminal enterprise that sent 
them to facilitate the corruption process. There is clearly no enticement to divulge 
the truth when witnesses present themselves, as they are part of the corruption 
process, and therefore their credibility is in question.  
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These suspects are sophisticated and know how to conceal the facts, but 
investigators are equally sophisticated and know how to uncover and present these 
facts. They are aware of the evidence needed to uncover their dealings and are 
often ahead of the criminal investigation process, removing, manipulating, or 
destroying evidence. These suspects are often operating from a position of power 
or have access to an individual in such a position. This makes them very powerful 
and ruthless in enforcing a code of silence amongst related individuals by making 
use of intimidation and/or violence to terminate an investigation. Recently these 
sophisticated corrupt offenders have started to exploit loopholes in cross-
jurisdictions and make use of expert professionals, such as lawyers, auditors, and 
cyber forensic experts to conceal their activities and assist them with their money 
laundering of illegally gained proceeds.  
 
3.5 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE FOR CORRUPTION 
INVESTIGATORS 
 
According to the ACFE (2016), evidence is anything that is perceptible by our five 
senses, which is invoked during the presentation of the criminal case. Some 
examples of potential evidence are: documents, spoken recollection, data of various 
kinds, and physical objects. In other words, the evidence is simply anything that 
corroborates or refutes a fact during criminal proceedings. The Guide to Combating 
Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) sets out the basis of 
evidence for fraud and corruption investigators during a criminal investigation. Four 
important principles of evidence for the investigating officers are discussed below.  
 
3.5.1 Relevance of Evidence 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
insists that relevance is almost certainly the utmost fundamental rule of evidence 
and expresses that, with a couple of exceptions, evidence which is relevant is 
admissible and evidence which is irrelevant is not admissible. The evidence is 
believed to be relevant in the event that it “tends to prove, or disprove, a fact in 
issue.” In instances of fraud or corruption investigations, this implies that a piece of 
evidence is possibly relevant (and ideally, convincing and persuading) when the 
evidence is likely to prove or disprove an element of evidence of a crime, as well as 
- 72 - 
 
evidence of knowledge and intent. The ACFE (2016) states that the admissibility of 
evidence depends, to a large extent, upon the discretion of the presiding magistrate 
or judge. A basic requirement of admissibility is that evidence must be relevant to 
the case presented in court. The evidence is relevant when it makes an event more 
or less likely than it would have been without the evidence. It contributes towards 
the criminal case being presented in court. This differs from case to case and, in 
general, it is evidence that tends to prove an essential element of the crime and 
related matters, for instance: motive, opportunity, the identity of a guilty party, or 
credibility. Relevant evidence can either be inculpatory or exculpatory. The 
inculpatory evidence is evidence that contributes to determining the guilt of an 
individual, whereas exculpatory evidence contributes to determining the innocence 
of an individual. Therefore, evidence that is neither inculpatory nor exculpatory is 
probably irrelevant. The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development 
Projects ([sa]-d) proposes that fraud and corruption investigators need to 
understand the following: 
 The crime/charge and the elements that need to be proven. 
 The sort of evidence, for instance direct, indirect or circumstantial, that would 
be relevant, as well as when to use that knowledge with every phase of the 
investigation, comprising: 
a) case planning, to ensure that all potentially relevant evidence is identified, 
collected, and preserved; 
b) conducting the investigation, to make sure that the necessary questions 
are asked, and that all of the relevant documents and data are gathered, 
to the fullest extent conceivable; and  
c) report writing, to guarantee that all the relevant evidence is incorporated 
and that the irrelevant evidence is excluded, as indicated by the elements 
in the crime/charge. 
 
3.5.2 Weight of Evidence 
The ACFE (2016) explains that when possible, evidence should be presented in the 
courtroom to enable the magistrate or judge to determine the weight of each piece 
of evidence being presented. Holes in the chain of custody or the outright 
mishandling of evidence can dishevel a case, but not wreck it outright. For example, 
courts have ruled in some cases that even though there were mistakes with the 
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chain of custody of the evidence, the mistakes affect the “weight” and not the 
admissibility of the evidence. The evidence will still be placed on record, but with 
descriptions of the mistakes that occurred in the chain of custody. The magistrate 
or judge will have to consider the type of mistakes in his/her deliberation, “weighing” 
the facts when passing a verdict. The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in 
Development Projects ([sa]-d) insists that “weight” has numerous aspects of the 
burden of the evidence, including the dependability and the persuading power of the 
evidence. The aspects that influence the “weight” include:  
 The source or origin of the evidence (does a witness grasp what he/she is 
giving evidence about?).  
 Whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.  
 The credibility of the witness presenting the evidence.  
 
It is fundamental that the criminal investigator of multi-faceted corrupt activities 
comprehends the manner in which evidence is presented in a court of law. Evidence 
ought to be prohibited if the prejudicial value exceeds the probative value. Evidence 
must be relevant to be admissible. The relevance of evidence is determined by 
having any tendency to make the existence of any event more or less probable. The 
evidence needs to have some probative value to be admissible. The weight of 
evidence is the measure of the trustworthiness of the evidence on the one side of 
an argument as weighed against presented evidence on the other. The actual facts 
presented in court have significant weight and assist in convincing the 
magistrate/judge that a certain event occurred.  
 
3.5.3 Authenticity of Evidence 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
explains that during the investigation process, the persistent search for evidence 
that corroborates the statements of witnesses is imperative. This is essential in 
instances where the credibility of a witness is in question. The ACFE (2016) states 
that the purpose of authentication is to ensure that evidence is what it purports to 
be and is genuine, not a forgery. For example, if a witness admits that he/she paid 
a bribe, the investigator should ask for copies of the withdrawal slips, the wire 
transfer receipts, or any other records of the payment. If the witness claims he/she 
met with the official to discuss the bribe, the investigator should find out when and 
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where they met, determine the identity of anyone else who was present, and request 
copies of all documents, such as travel records or credit card receipts, that would 
confirm the meeting. The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development 
Projects ([sa]-d) clarifies that there are various methods to authenticate a document. 
One such method involves a witness who is able to state, based on their direct, 
personal knowledge, that the document is in fact what it purports to be, i.e. that it is 
an accurate original or copy, not a forgery or an altered version, etc. This might be 
stated by the author of the document, the typist, the custodian of records, the 
recipient, or someone else, depending on the circumstances and who handled the 
document. 
 
The ACFE (2016) also explains that the authenticity of evidence is an argumentative 
process; evidence will not be admissible in court unless the authenticity is 
established. Therefore, when an investigator is not able to authenticate a piece of 
evidence, it will not be admitted even if it is relevant. The admissibility of exhibits is 
determined by the magistrate or judge during the criminal proceedings. It is 
important to take note that evidence other than testimonial evidence must be 
properly authenticated. During the criminal proceedings, the party that offers the 
item must produce some evidence (e.g. testimony from a person with first-hand 
knowledge) to prove the authenticity of the aforementioned item by showing that it 
is in the same condition as when it was seized. When an item or exhibit cannot be 
authenticated, it will not be admitted even if it is plainly relevant. The Guide to 
Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) elucidates that 
although testimonial evidence does not have to be authenticated to be admissible, 
the courts have a credibility test for witnesses. The witness must be able to 
demonstrate that the knowledge he/she is communicating is believable and was 
gained by his/her personal experience. Circumstantial evidence can be used 
effectively to corroborate direct evidence and vice versa.  
 
3.5.4 Rebuttal of Potential Defences 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
states that in the majority of most corruption cases circumstantial evidence should 
be included to prove that a certain event occurred. For example, as a typical defence 
to corruption, the receiver of the corruption often creates a “legitimate source” for 
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the money in his/her account or for his/her disproportionate expenses. Investigators 
must be in a position to confirm or refute these defences. The ACFE (2016) states 
that a rebuttal of potential defences is a contention normally made by an accused 
person during the criminal proceedings in which they seek to explain away their 
guilt. An accused formulates a defence relevant to a specific crime and the relevant 
jurisdiction. Some common defences used by an accused is as follows: 
 Alibi 
 Consent 
 Duress 
 Entrapment 
 Ignorance of facts 
 Mistake 
 Necessity of the act 
 Protection of others 
 Court’s lack of jurisdiction 
 
Furthermore, the Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development 
Projects ([sa]-d) explains that confirming or refuting these defences often requires 
the investigator to conduct in-depth interviews with the suspect. During this process, 
the suspect will be afforded the opportunity to comprehensively describe what 
actually occurred. The investigator must be in a position to either confirm or refute 
these claims by the suspect before a decision is made to prosecute the suspect.  
 
3.6 TYPES OF EVIDENCE IN CORRUPTION CASES 
 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
illustrates the essential types of evidence in corruption and fraud cases, which are: 
witness statements, documentary evidence, “real” evidence, use of 
duplicates/copies as evidence, chain of custody in documents, presentation of 
evidence, and electronic evidence. The following types of evidence will be briefly 
illustrated and discussed below: 
 Testimonial evidence 
 Documentary evidence 
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 “Real” evidence 
 Demonstrative evidence 
 Use of duplicates/copies as evidence 
 Chain of custody in documents 
 Presentation of evidence  
 Handling of documents 
 Electronic evidence 
 Establishment of a Database 
 Circumstantial evidence 
 The absence of entries in business or official records 
 Key document file 
 Keep a checklist 
 
3.6.1 Testimonial Evidence  
The ACFE (2016) states that testimonial evidence refers to an oral statement which 
is made by a witness under oath (i.e. a witness statement). The Guide to Combating 
Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) further explains that a 
witness may normally only give evidence to facts based on his/her direct, personal 
knowledge, and not on his/her theory or presumption, or information received from 
a third party generally referred to as “hearsay”. This evidence is conveyed by a 
witness in a criminal case, the witness should testify directly to his/her personal 
knowledge of a crime, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof 
of a series of facts which tends to show whether the suspect is guilty or not guilty. 
An exception is an expert witness, who may testify as to his/her opinion on certain 
issues. An oral statement is made by a witness under oath. The ACFE (2016) states 
that testimonial evidence is generally divided into two categories, namely a “lay 
witness” and an “expert witness”. A lay witness is a person who testifies from facts 
surrounding his/her personal knowledge of a particular matter. On the other hand, 
an expert witness is a person who testifies by reason of education, training, skill, or 
experience. This witness is qualified to give an expert opinion or testify in areas to 
the resolution of a legal dispute.  
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3.6.2 Documentary Evidence 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
explains that documentary evidence refers to physical objects that played a part in 
the investigation. This evidence is more dependable and has more weight than 
witness statements and, as with direct and circumstantial evidence, a mix of the two, 
with one supporting the other, is, for the most part, the best and usually the most 
effective. A document can be authenticated by any witness who is able to state, 
taking into account his/her direct, personal knowledge, that the document is what it 
purports to be and is an original or exact duplicate, not an imitation or a modified 
variant, and so on. This may be the author of the document, the typist, the custodian 
of records, the recipient or another person, contingent upon the conditions. 
 
To be persuasive (and admissible in court), documentary evidence must: 
 be relevant; 
 contain admissible, direct or circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue (as 
opposed to written hearsay, that is, information recorded in the document that 
came from other parties) and; 
 be authenticated.  
 
The following serve as examples of documentary evidence: 
 Private documents, such as letters, a will, and contracts. 
 Official documents, such as birth certificates, identity documents (IDs), and 
passports. 
 Public documents, such as deeds registrations and company registration 
documents. 
 
Some business records, such as computer printouts, might be difficult for any 
witness to authenticate. In such circumstances, a person familiar with the business 
record system must state that the relevant records were kept in the regular course 
of business or are accurate copies of such records to authenticate them. The ACFE 
(2016) states that documentary evidence, including digital evidence, will not be 
admitted during criminal proceedings, or it will not be given much weight unless it is 
established as authentic. The evidence should be corroborated from various 
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sources to prove its authenticity. For example, investigators conducting criminal 
investigations into multi-faceted corruption cases will usually obtain volumes of 
documentary evidence. Thus, it is essential for the investigators to understand the 
relevance of the evidence and how it should be preserved and presented during 
criminal proceedings. Investigators should be mindful that documents can either 
help or hurt a case. This depends on which documents are presented, as well as 
the manner in which they are presented. All irrelevant documents should be 
eliminated, even though documents are important in giving the witnesses and the 
case credibility. Witnesses who spend too much time focussing on the details in the 
documents will often confuse or bore the magistrate or judge. Proof must be 
provided that the evidence is relevant, material, and authentic. The relevance of 
certain documentary evidence cannot be easily determined from the onset of a case. 
Therefore, all the possible relevant documents should be obtained. When it is 
determined that they are not needed, they can be returned. Below are a few general 
rules regarding the collection of documentary evidence: 
 Always obtain original documents where feasible. Make working copies for the 
review of the documents and keep the originals segregated. 
 Do not touch the originals any more than necessary, as they might later have 
to undergo forensic analysis. 
 Maintain a dependable filing system for the documents. This is especially 
critical when volumes of documents are obtained. Losing a key document is 
very problematic and can damage the case. Documents can be stamped 
sequentially for ease of reference.  
 
Other documents, such as public records under seal, are said to be “self-
authenticating”, that is, they do not need to be authenticated by a witness with 
personal knowledge of the document. When in doubt, a statement should be 
obtained from the custodian of records from whom the document was obtained that 
it is an accurate copy of an official government record in terms of section 212 of the 
CPA (South Africa 1977). The ACFE (2016) advises that documents are 
“segregated” in the following manner:  
 In general, documents should be segregated according to the witness or 
specific transactions.  
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 When segregating documents relevant to the witness, the investigator may use 
the list of names, whether employee, associate, or witness, and start 
assembling the collected documents relevant to a particular witness.  
 The investigator might find it easier to organise the information by grouping 
evidence of the same or similar transactions together. However, it is not 
recommended that the documents be organised chronologically during the 
evidence gathering stage of the investigation, as this will make it more difficult 
to search for relevant information. It is generally better to organise documents 
relevant to specific transactions or relevant to certain witnesses.  
 The investigation plan compiled by the investigator often follows a 
chronological timeline to give a narrative of the pattern of the corrupt activities, 
in which displaying key documents chronologically often makes sense. 
However, in the organisation phase, there is usually too much clutter for the 
chronological organisation of the collected documents to be effective. 
 
3.6.3 Real Evidence 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
explains that “real” evidence is material, tangible evidence, for example, an object, 
a tape recording, a computer printout, or a photo. For instance, a weapon used in 
the commission of a crime would be classified as real evidence upon being 
presented to the court. The ACFE (2016) further states that real evidence refers to 
physical objects which are used during criminal proceedings. The term includes 
documentary evidence, e.g. invoices, ledgers, and letters, as well as other types of 
physical evidence. For example, if a forged SARS Tax Clearance Certificate was 
used in the submission of tender documents, the printer with which the forged 
certificate was printed is clearly real evidence, as are audio recordings of a tender 
committee with the awarding of a bid to a specific service provider. This will enable 
the court to experience the discussions first-hand. 
 
3.6.4 Demonstrative Evidence  
The ACFE (2016) clarifies that demonstrative evidence is a tangible item that 
illustrates some material proposition (e.g. a map, a chart, a flow diagram, a 
summary, etc.). It differs from real evidence in the sense that it was not part of the 
underlying event; it is evidence that was specifically created for the criminal 
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proceedings. Therefore the purpose is to provide a visual aid for the magistrate or 
judge to illustrate complex cases. This evidence may be considered by the court in 
reaching a verdict.  
 
3.6.5 Use of duplicates/copies as evidence 
The ACFE (2016) explains that a photocopy is a copy of a document or other visual 
image. Photocopies are increasingly being retained as “original” records of 
documents (particularly in outgoing correspondence files) and photocopies might be 
the only evidence of a document if the original cannot be located or in some cases 
cannot be released. The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development 
Projects ([sa]-d) explains that original documents ought to be acquired if accessible, 
especially if the substance of the document is in dispute (for instance, if the 
document is claimed to be a fabrication). However, precise duplicates are normally 
adequate. When duplicates are utilised, the investigator should be able to explain 
the loss of the original documents.  
 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
further states that when the authenticity of a document or signature needs to be 
established, for example, if a party claims that a signature or other writing on the 
document is a forgery, then the original should be obtained if at all possible to 
address the party’s claims. The ACFE (2016) clarifies that when documents are 
voluntarily provided, the investigator should leave the original in place and work with 
the copies. If the original document is later lost, stolen, or misplaced, the copies can 
normally be presented in court under the “best evidence” rule, which states that in 
order to prove the authenticity of a document, a fair copy of the original must at the 
very least be available for inspection.  
 
3.6.6 Electronic Evidence 
The ACFE (2016) clarifies that digital evidence is presented in various forms, for 
example: emails, texts, instant messages, website data, and digital photographs. 
The various forms of electronic evidence may require different authentication 
approaches. Below are some of the ways in which electronic evidence may be 
authenticated: 
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 Witness with personal knowledge (i.e. a witness testifies that he/she 
recognises the copy of the document/message/photograph that he/she 
received, sent, drafted, or compiled).  
 Comparison with authenticated examples (i.e. when an electronic document 
was authenticated a second electronic document could be authenticated by 
comparing it to the first document). 
 Circumstantial evidence of distinctive characteristics (i.e. the presence of an 
individual’s name and email address, the subject matter of the document, or 
the presence of corroborating metadata). 
 Trade inscriptions that were affixed during the course of regular business and 
indicating ownership, control, or origin (i.e. an automatic business signature at 
the end of the document). 
 Certified copies of business records (i.e. a document is accompanied by a 
written certification by its custodian). 
 
Social networking sites such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, 
WeChat, etc. may contain evidence that might be used in a criminal case. Users 
seldom give thought to what they post online and they do not realise that when 
information gets posted online, the information becomes a permanent record 
somewhere on social networking sites. This has become a handy tool for 
investigators, attorneys, and employers, who mine these sites for information, 
photos, and videos that can become evidence in civil or criminal processes. The 
authenticity of social networking sites is similar to other types of electronic evidence. 
There must, therefore, be sufficient evidence to support the finding that the evidence 
is what the proponent claims.  
 
3.6.7 Establishment of a Database  
The ACFE (2016) endorses the “establishment of a database” to be utilised from the 
commencement of the investigation process. It is recommended that the 
investigating officer code all documents when there is a large number of documents 
to be processed. The database can be manual or computerised and accessed by 
keywords or Bates Numbering. The coding system should provide meaningful and 
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comparable data, therefore the database should, at a minimum, include following 
fields of information:  
 the date the document was created;  
 the individual from whom the document was obtained; 
 the date obtained; 
 a brief description of its contents; and 
 the subject or theme of the document.  
 
3.6.8 Chain of custody in documents  
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
elucidates that all documents acquired must be safeguarded and a proper chain of 
custody must be ensured (by initialling and methodically filing the documents), with 
the objective that they can be traced back to their origin and effectively 
authenticated. The ACFE (2016) advises that a chain of custody should be followed 
for all documents and exhibits collected during the investigation process. From the 
moment that evidence is obtained, its chain of custody must be maintained for it to 
be accepted by the court. The chain of custody is both a process and a document 
that memorialises who has had possession of an object and what they have done 
with it. Essentially, the chain of custody is a record-keeping procedure similar to 
physical inventory procedures. Establishing the chain of custody for a document 
establishes authenticity (i.e. the document is in fact what the party offering the 
document says it is). However, it also ensures that evidence has not been altered 
or changed from the time it was collected until it is presented in court. In general, to 
establish the chain of custody, the investigator must make a record when he/she 
receives an item or when it leaves his/her care, custody, or control. This is best 
handled by a memorandum from the custodian of the records when the evidence is 
received. The memorandum should state the following:  
 what items were received; 
 when they were received; 
 from whom they were received; and  
 where they are being kept. 
 
- 83 - 
 
If the item is later turned over to someone else, a record of this should be made, 
preferably in memorandum form. All evidence received should be uniquely marked 
so that it can be identified later. The preferable way is to initial and date the item, 
however, this can pose a problem in the case of original business records provided 
voluntarily. For such records, a small tick mark or another nondescript identifier can 
be used. If it is not practical to mark the original document, it should be placed in an 
acid-free, sealed envelope, which should then be initialled and dated. The Guide to 
Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) states that all 
documents obtained must be carefully preserved and a chain of custody must be 
established (by initialling and systematically filing the documents), so that 
documents can be traced to their source and easily authenticated. Supplementary 
to the initialling of the affidavit and annexures thereto, all evidence obtained should 
be scanned and paginated to ensure authenticity as well as the chain of custody.  
 
3.6.9 Presentation of evidence 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
explains that all evidence gathered (when conceivable) ought to be presented during 
the court proceedings by making use of for example photos, charts, graphs, and so 
forth. This is especially advantageous when presenting the real, demonstrative, or 
physical evidence (e.g. a spent cartridge, forensic science laboratory link, the exhibit 
to a specific firearm, and so on) in a criminal case. 
 
3.6.10 Handling of Documents 
The ACFE (2016) instructs that documents should be treated as any other physical 
evidence would. A document can be a piece of physical evidence and not just a 
source of information. As a piece of evidence, it should be handled and stored 
properly in a sealed, initialled, and dated paper folder or envelope to avoid damage 
or contamination. When necessary, a working copy should be made and the original 
document preserved for analysis or court proceedings. Forensic science 
laboratories conducting analysis on documents will require the original document, 
not a copy of the document, because most photocopies do not reproduce original 
writing, typescript, or other features with sufficient clarity or detail to allow for 
adequate analysis. All evidence obtained should be marked so that it can later be 
identified. The most common way to mark evidence is with the date and initials of 
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the person that obtained it. If it is not practical to mark the document, or if marking 
it would damage the document, then it should be placed in an acid-free envelope 
that has been marked and sealed. To avoid creating indentations on the original 
document, no marks or writing should be made on the envelope after the document 
has been placed inside of it. Initialling the document for future identification can be 
done on a non-critical area and a writing implement that is different from the one 
used on the document, a different colour, for example, may be used to make the 
initials. Other than making unobtrusive initials for identification, the original 
documents should not be marked or written on. No staples or paper clips should be 
used on the document, and it should not be crumpled, folded, or manipulated in any 
other way that would change its original condition. Photocopies and laser-printed 
documents should be stored in paper folders or envelopes, not transparent plastic 
envelopes. The reason for this is that such envelopes can cause the copies to stick 
to the plastic and in the process destroy some document features.  
 
3.6.11 Circumstantial Evidence  
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) 
points out that evidence that proves knowledge and/or intent needs to show that the 
suspect was aware that a document was fake and submitted it with the intent to 
defraud another party. This is an essential element in all fraud and corruption cases. 
There are no unintended bribes or accidental frauds. Circumstantial evidence of 
knowledge and intent during the investigation process might include proving that the 
subject, or someone acting on his/her behalf, acted intentionally in doing the 
following: 
 presenting an altered or forged relevant document, for example supporting 
documents submitted with a bid or invoice; 
 purposefully destroying a pertinent document, or improperly withholding it from 
the investigators; 
 giving false information to investigators or to another party concerning the 
source to hide their own guilt, for instance, if the subject in a bribery case lies 
about the source of mysterious new wealth (such lies are known in court as a 
“false exculpatory”); 
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 obstructing the investigation process, for instance by instructing or intimidating 
a potential witness not to meet with or cooperate with the investigators of a 
particular case; and/or 
 recording prior related acts, which show that the acts currently under 
investigation were done knowingly and deliberately, and not unintentionally or 
innocently (otherwise called “pattern evidence”). 
 
The basis for the above methods of proof is often referred to as the “badges of 
fraud”. These acts betray certain wilfulness by the subject and are inconsistent with 
a defence of accident or mistake. 
 
3.6.12 The Absence of Entries in Business or Official Records 
The ACFE (2016) explains that evidence in a matter which is not recorded in the 
regular course of business may be admissible to prove that a certain event did not 
occur. However, this does not hold true if the source of information or the 
circumstances indicates a lack of trustworthiness. The Guide to Combating 
Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) states that the absence of 
entries into regularly kept business or official records, or the absence of a document 
in regularly kept business or official files, can often be used as evidence that an 
event did not occur, or that the document does not exist or was not received. The 
investigator needs to determine whether this was a habit or practice of the entity 
during their processes of recordkeeping. While the investigator conducts interviews 
with witnesses or suspects, he/she must always seek corroborating evidence to a 
statement (e.g. notes, emails, memorandums) including all documents in relation to 
specific transactions.  
 
3.6.13 Key Document File 
The ACFE (2016) recommends that investigators make a “key document file” to 
utilise during the investigation process. This is a separate file that contains copies 
of certain key documents and information for fast and easy access. It should be 
reviewed periodically, and less important documents should be replaced with the 
most relevant documents in the main file.  
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3.6.14 Keep a Checklist 
The ACFE (2016) recommends that a checklist of the activities and evidence 
obtained be kept, as well as what still needs to be obtained or established. This is 
yet another indispensable aid to be utilised during the investigation process. The 
checklist should be updated regularly and kept in a permanent file to allow 
cumulative records of activities. During multi-faceted corruption cases, the list can 
be broken into short- and long-term objectives which still need to be accomplished 
to prove the elements of particular charges. In addition, a checklist of imperative 
tasks which must be completed without delay is needed to prioritise the activities on 
such checklists (e.g. conduct an interview or draft a subpoena). However organised, 
some sort of list must be kept, otherwise essential points will be overlooked during 
the investigation of a multi-faceted case. 
 
3.7 METHODS OF INVESTIGATING CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR  
 
Turner (2015:9) shows that in most corruption investigations, the processes used 
by the investigators to discover official records, photographs, fingerprints, and so 
on, are outdated techniques, as opposed to every day, head-on interactions with the 
public. An investigation officer is usually a mature person who has substantial 
knowledge of criminal investigations. 
 
Turner (2015:17) elucidates that for the majority of investigations, the preliminary 
investigation process is the basis of the investigation process. During this stage, the 
visible policing officials arrive at the scene, before the investigator is called to the 
scene, and conclude some significant tasks. These tasks include securing the crime 
scene, affecting arrests on any suspects, and identifying and splitting up the 
eyewitnesses. Normally, the official executing the preliminary investigation will take 
some notes and turn over all of the collected information to the criminal investigators 
upon their arrival at the scene. Turner (2015:12) clarifies that the success of a 
criminal investigation is illustrated in the clues collected which will probably assist in 
determining a successful outcome for the investigation. Some examples of clues 
are the availability of witnesses, information concerning the suspect, physical 
evidence recovered, as well as determining whether there is enough information to 
continue with an investigation. 
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The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-c) 
suggests that the use of special investigative techniques is mostly required during 
the investigation of multi-faceted corruption and complex fraud cases (such as 
corruption within the public service sector). Some of the most common special 
investigative techniques are highlighted below: 
 Surveillance and technical recording of broadcasts or telecommunications. 
 Access to computer frameworks and computerised data processing. 
 Surveillance and technical recording of premises. 
 Covert following and technical recording of persons and objects. 
 Use of covert investigators and informants. 
 Replicated purchases of specific objects (e.g. drugs, firearms, and so forth) 
and replicated bribery. 
 Controlled transport and delivery of objects of criminal investigation. 
 
The mentioned specialised investigative engagements vary from country to country, 
as each country has its own set of legislation, treaties, and guidelines within which 
they are allowed to execute their respective mandates. It is important that 
investigators be resourceful within the ambit of the law when conducting corruption 
investigations, as it is not a constant, but a variable that evolves with new 
developments around the globe.  
 
3.7.1 Investigating Past Crimes 
Dussich (2006:143) elucidates that the criminal investigation process usually 
commences with a report or statement under oath that a crime or alleged crime was 
committed or will be committed followed by the traditional investigation process. 
During this phase, witnesses with corroborating evidence for or against the crime 
bear weight. During the investigation process, direct, corroborative, and 
circumstantial evidence directly related to the case under investigation should be 
obtained. The value of an effective investigation mostly hinges on meticulous 
evidence collection by the investigator who is investigating the crime to ensure that 
no stone is left unturned during the process. Parts of the investigative process could 
comprise the meticulous examination of all the relevant bank accounts and company 
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ledgers. During such a process, information from numerous witnesses and various 
supplementary sources is used to corroborate the allegation of the corrupt 
transactions.  
 
With the initiation of the criminal investigation, the investigation should be kept 
confidential. The normal progression of the investigation should continue if evidence 
has not yet been discovered, but the suspect interview should be postponed until 
evidence is uncovered of his/her involvement. This might protect the suspects, 
which might be public service officials, from unjustifiable persecution. In cases 
where reasonable doubt is exhibited or uncovered during the clandestine phase, the 
investigative procedures followed should indicate the initiation of the normal 
investigation phase. Interviewing the suspect can now be considered to pursue their 
clarification and, when fitting, the suspect’s residence and workplace can be 
searched for supplementary evidence. It is common to conduct a follow-up 
investigation, including the essential check to verify the suspect’s clarifications and 
determine the flow of funds which will consequently be derived from exhibits 
discovered at searches. This type of exploration is ordinarily laborious (Dussich 
2006:143). 
 
3.7.2 Exploring Present Corruption Crimes 
Dussich (2006:143) explains that current corruption cases will necessitate a higher 
level of creativity during the investigation. Besides the conventional methods of 
investigation, a proactive approach should at all times be preferred, with the aim to 
apprehend the suspect in the act. The interception of communication and 
surveillance of the suspect should only be used with approval from the proper 
authorities. Information could be obtained about who attended what meeting and 
the discussion that occurred during such meetings. 
 
An accommodating individual can be positioned near the suspect to arrange a 
meeting with the agenda to entrap the suspect. This type of covert investigation may 
perhaps be deliberated on to penetrate the corrupt group. Some ground rules for 
the pre-emptive investigation procedures remain proficient education and sufficient 
operational support, including all-inclusive regulatory structures which safeguard the 
effectiveness of the established laws. Corruption is at all times interconnected and 
- 89 - 
 
is usually conducted by a syndicate. The investigative team should always 
determine whether a suspect is an instigator or a co-conspirator during the 
investigation. Hong Kong (2018), for example, uses a jurisdictional instruction which 
stipulates that only a third of the sentence is served by co-conspirators in corruption 
crimes who are willing to make a full disclosure of a particular crime to ICAC and 
who are willing to give evidence in court against the co-conspirators. These 
individuals are detained in special facilities which serve a dual purpose for the ICAC; 
to enable investigators to interview these co-conspirators and to ensure their safety. 
This local informer arrangement has proven to have the intended result in 
addressing syndicate or multi-faceted corrupt activities. 
 
3.8 COVERT INVESTIGATIONS AS A METHOD TO INVESTIGATE 
CORRUPTION  
 
The heading of section 252 A of the CPA (South Africa 1977) reads as follows: 
“Authority to make use of traps and undercover operations and admissibility of 
evidence so obtained.” The following must be taken into consideration before the 
commencement of an undercover operation in terms of the Act mentioned: 
 Before conducting an undercover operation, authorisation for it is acquired, 
which can be procured from the DPP. 
 Any other factor which, in the judgement of the court, has to bear on the 
application to conduct the undercover operation. 
 The level of persistence and number of attempts made by the public official or 
his/her informer/agent before the accused committed the crime. 
 Availability of other techniques for the detection, investigation, or revealing of 
the commission of the crime. 
 Type of inducement utilised; deception or reward. 
 Proportionality between the participation of the public official or his/her 
informer/agent in comparison to the accused. 
 Nature of the crime: 
a) security of the state; 
b) public order, the safety of the public; 
c) whether the national economy is seriously threatened thereby; 
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d) prevalence of the crime; and 
e) the seriousness of such a crime.  
 Whether an average individual, who was in the same position as the accused, 
would have been inducted into the commission of a crime. 
 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-b) 
suggests that before the trap is set or an undercover operation utilised, a suspicion 
should exist that the accused had committed a similar crime to that which the 
charges relate: 
 Has the official or his/her informer/agent acted in good or bad faith? 
 Has the official or his/her informant/agent exploited a specific weakness of the 
accused? 
 Was any threat made or posed by the public official or his/her informer/agent 
against the accused? 
 The timing of the conduct – whether the public official or his/her informer/agent 
instigated or became involved in a current unlawful activity.  
 Did the conduct involve an exploitation of human characteristics, such as 
emotions, sympathy, personal, professional, or economic circumstances? 
 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2005) points out 
that prior to the execution of an operation to obtain evidence, the main story to be 
utilised ought to provide a truthful scenario. The investigator's office should 
prosecute in light of the consequences of the plan of action, and the investigators’ 
part ought to reasonably reflect what individuals do when dealing with such criminal 
elements. The plan should sound sensible to the judge. The investigative plan ought 
to reflect the investigators’ attitudes. For instance, excessively intricate, 
complicated, covert operations that require acting like a covert doctor or pilot might 
be so hard to complete that additional time is spent finalising the operation (police 
action). Challenges may come to the fore while planning the covert operation, this 
plan must be broken down in detail to distinguish the threats that may apply. These 
threats ought to be balanced against the anticipated evidentiary advances, and a 
final decision is made regarding whether the undercover operation ought to go 
ahead. These threats may include any one or a combination of the following: 
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 Harm to private individuals or undercover employees. 
 The financial loss to private individuals or businesses. 
 Harm to reputation. 
 Harm to privileged or confidential relationships. 
 Invasion of privacy. 
 Entrapment. 
 Unsuitability of those employees or private people partaking in the undercover 
operation. Once a threat is recognised, the plan ought to be altered in 
accordance to limit the threats during the planned operation. 
 
3.9  INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT FOR INVESTIGATORS COMBATTING 
CORRUPT ACTIVITIES 
 
Dussich (2006:144) points out that with a precise objective, there is a guarantee that 
a sophisticated and professional investigation can be conducted and large portions 
of the investigation activities can be accomplished by a dedicated unit. Such a unit 
should encompass the fundamentals that will be discussed in this section, in order 
to be an effective and efficient agency in the fight against the individuals or entities 
who contribute to dealings of corrupt activities. 
 
3.9.1 Intelligence-led Investigation 
Dussich (2006:144) claims that the intelligence section is the focal point to gather, 
examine, dissect, and disperse all insight and investigation information, or else there 
might be a significant collapse in communication and operations. 
 
3.9.2 Surveillance Operations 
Dussich (2006:144) illuminates that the surveillance section is an essential source 
to acquire intelligence and evidence. The Hong Kong ICAC has a devoted 
reconnaissance unit of more than 120 observation specialists, which made a 
substantial contribution to the success of several major cases (Dussich 2006:144). 
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3.9.3 Information Technology 
Dussich (2006:144) elucidates that swiftly evolving communication methods have 
generated a risk to the investigation of corrupt activities. A corrupt activity can occur 
without individual contact. It could transpire through email, cell phone, or fax, all 
without a trace. These corrupt activities by means of e-banking can, with the press 
of a button, send money to accounts abroad. Paper documentation is frequently 
substituted by computer-generated documents, which are protected with the use of 
robust passwords. In extreme cases, professional hackers are utilised to break into 
the computer networks of the ACAs to ascertain their progress in certain 
investigations. 
 
3.9.4 Technical Services 
Dussich (2006:144) clarifies that this area gives essential technical support to 
surveillance in covert and overt operations conducted. This is an essential part of 
any effective investigation process.  
 
3.9.5 Counter Surveillance 
Dussich (2006:144) illuminates that counter-surveillance and counter-interception 
skills are frequently used to nullify the efforts of criminal investigations. 
Nevertheless, fresh information plus communications expertise are innovations 
which can be a substantial asset in the investigation of corrupt activities.  
 
The following examples might be beneficial to such investigations: 
 Communications and other technical equipment used in surveillance. 
 Capability to intercept all types of telecommunication, including mobile phones, 
the Internet, faxes, etc. 
 Speaker identification techniques for the production of intercepted evidence. 
 Mobile, internet, and closed-circuit television (CCTV) records. 
 Computer forensics. 
 Computer intelligence analysis techniques.  
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3.9.6 Financial Investigation  
Dussich (2006:144) expounds that the investigation of corrupt activities frequently 
necessitates that the investigators trace complex money trails which are a 
consequence of proceeds from corrupt activities. The money can go through a web 
of offshore businesses and financial institutions, assets, etc. It is imperative to make 
use of professionally qualified accountants, i.e. chartered accountants, to assist in 
such complex investigations along with the presentation of the evidence in a 
proficient manner in court. 
 
3.9.7 Witness Protection 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-b) 
comments that witnesses are not as protected in a witness protection programme 
as they might think. These measures can be manipulated and access gained to 
pressure a particular witness to change his/her testimony or to convince him/her not 
to testify. Some of these measures will require legislative support to safeguard 
against third-party manipulation: 
 
 The USAID (2005) supports Dussich’s (2006:141) viewpoint and clarifies that 
when handling informers and eyewitnesses, an all-inclusive questioning 
approach ought to be established. The USAID (2015) emphasises that the 
succeeding ought to resonate with the newly developed strategy. 
 Provisions ought to be set up for the protection of witnesses. Witnesses’ 
identities ought to stay confidential for as long as conceivable. Witness 
relocation, protection programmes, or “new identity” programmes might be 
accessible. On the off chance that the witness is in the penitentiary, 
arrangements for a sheltered location must be set up. The appropriate plans 
should be implemented as promptly as time permits in order to be available 
when necessary. 
 It is sensible to lessen the chances that the defence attorney can dispute the 
credibility of the witnesses (by ensuring that the recorded statements are 
transcribed and signed or initialled by the respective witnesses). 
 Procedures ought to be set up to interact with defence attorneys who are either 
linked to the eyewitnesses or to the suspects.  
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 When an eyewitness has a criminal record, it is imperative that they disclose it 
before the institution of criminal proceedings (especially when involving the 
accused).  
 Well-informed eyewitnesses concerning the criminal proceedings will inspire 
trust in them and relieve fear and anxiety. 
 
The following section presents theories of corrupt activities in police organisations. 
The researcher submits that these theories are not only applicable to corruption 
within police organisations, but are of relevance to all public service organisations. 
 
3.10 CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION STANDARDS  
 
Boucher et al (2007) observe that corruption in the legislature would encourage 
discretion in the enforcement of the law and destructively affect state legitimateness. 
This may incorporate fortifying the lawfulness against a corrupted structure and 
building a successful criminal framework, which incorporates autonomous legal and 
powerful law establishments. 
 
Bolongoita (2005) reports that the emphasis should be on constructing corruption 
as a high-risk, low-reward action through measures aimed at accumulating the risks 
of effective exposure, investigation, and prosecution. 
 
Boucher et al (2007) agree that in a nation-state where prosecution is an achievable 
choice, the criminalisation of corrupt activities can be a successful approach. When 
this is not achievable, such an approach can be counter-productive. The 
consequence may lead to ballooning the proceeds of criminal activities, which could 
produce monetary inducements for corruption.  
 
The CMTEDD (2004) observes that investigative activities in investigations 
concerning serious fraud or serious corruption (such as corruption within the public 
service sector) are multi-faceted. These investigations should be conducted by 
specifically trained investigators. External service providers are allowed to conduct 
the investigation in particular situations. The duties of each team member in the 
investigative team should be clearly defined with detailed, predetermined targets.  
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The UNIDO (2012) suggests that lessons learned from a variety of organisations 
should be examined to discover the best possible solutions, as well as the generally 
accepted investigation standards in the UGI. The IOS has consequently officially 
implemented these guidelines for its work since January 2012.  
 
Dussich (2006:141) points out that it is essential to make use of a covert and 
confidential approach in the investigation of corruption cases until the investigators 
are ready to affect an arrest, in order to minimise the chances of compromising the 
investigation’s objectives or unjustifiable meddling from superiors. Alternatively, 
some of the subjects of the investigations may have a reasonable explanation, 
therefore, it is not out of the question to save their reputation before there is 
supporting evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of their corrupt activities. 
Therefore, in Hong Kong, the ICAC has legislation prohibiting anybody, including 
the mass media, from divulging any information about an investigation up to the 
point when the overt approach commences, for instance after arresting the subjects 
or when search and seizure operations have been conducted. It is also commonly 
referred to by the mass media as a “press gag law”, but they eventually realised that 
it is the right balance between press autonomy and viable law implementation. 
Schuchter (2012) concludes that anti-corruption methods make use of a three-
pronged methodology, namely: prevention, enforcement, and education. All these 
methods are crucial to kerb corruption, however, enforcement (to detect, prosecute, 
and punish corruption) is probably the best method to fight corruption. 
Supplementary enforcement has countless preventive and educational effects.  
 
3.10.1 Ensuring Adequate Resources 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (2014) suggests that before 
commencing an investigation, it is imperative to accurately evaluate the required 
resources that will be needed to conduct the investigation. The investigator must 
compile an all-inclusive list of human, physical, financial, and material resources that 
will be required before commencing with the investigation. The difficulty experienced 
while investigating complex corruption is one of magnitude; these cases have a 
tendency to be extremely time-consuming and costly. The investigation must be 
organised from the start. The well-organised use of allocated resources and 
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investigative tools in conjunction with proficient team members is precarious. Needs 
assessments must be done periodically and the goals clearly articulated by creating 
an investigative plan for every case individually. The roles of the investigating team 
should focus exclusively on specific parts of the case in a complex investigation 
according to individual goals. The OECD (2011) suggests that when commencing 
with the criminal investigation into corruption, the investigative team must act 
promptly and in a coordinated method. Usually, obtaining physical evidence and the 
relevant information from witnesses should be combined. 
 
Risktec (2008:6) elucidates that planning ensures that the investigation is organised 
and thorough. During this phase, the investigators need to determine the type of 
resources they will need, the experts that would be required, and the estimated 
timeframe of the investigation. In complex investigations, an investigative team will 
be more effective than a single investigator. Investigating corruption can be 
extremely laborious and resource demanding, especially in cross-jurisdiction cases. 
The investigation of corruption and the expenses incurred are a small price to pay 
for a worthwhile investment in an uncontaminated society. The primary task of an 
investigator is to gather adequate evidence of a corrupt activity. He/she is required 
to prove the “when”, “where”, “who”, “what”, “how” and “why” of every single activity, 
if possible. Nevertheless, this should not be the conclusion of the investigation. It is 
very seldom that a corrupt activity is a single event. A corrupt government official 
would probably engage in corruption on multiple occasions. A corruptor would 
probably offer corruption (bribes) on numerous occasions and to more than one 
corrupt official. Thus, it is essential that the examiner ought to try to investigate the 
origin of the case, to reveal all the guilty parties associated with the case. 
 
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International 
IDEA) (2014) simplifies that the creation of an effective ACA is costly, however, 
when corrupt activities are unrestrained the cost is even higher. A broad mandate 
of an ACA may result in resource restrictions if the resources are not allocated 
appropriately to address the broad mandate. For example, in Uganda in 1995 the 
mandate of the Inspectorate of Government was expanded to include investigation, 
arrest, and prosecution, including the obligation to execute an ethical code of 
conduct. The Inspectorate of Government’s budget was not congruently revised, 
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which resulted in insufficient resources and below average production. Doig, Watt 
and Williams (2006:166) elaborate that sufficient resources are essential to attract 
and preserve proficient and adequate employees in methodical investigations and 
prosecutions. The compensation of employees needs to be substantial and 
adequate for them not to be interested in participating in corrupt activities or turning 
a blind eye to corruption. The ACA head should have the ability to hire and dismiss 
employees independently and not have employees imposed on them. The Kingdom 
of Thailand (2007:10) clarified that during 2007, the Constitution of Thailand 
revealed the best practice in this respect. The ACA has independence in the 
management of its personnel, budget, and other related activities. 
 
3.10.2 Investigative Team 
The USAID (2005) elucidates that a well-thought-out method to the investigation 
must be implemented. The foundation of a thorough investigation is reason and 
logic, which are based on supportable evidence. The method needs to be 
meticulous during the investigation to ensure that the investigation is built on 
physical evidence. A house is similarly constructed with a solid foundation on which 
the house is then built. This house must be as solid as possible so that nothing can 
shake it apart. When the case is based on solid evidence, then we have a thoroughly 
investigated case. An effective investigative team is not work-shy or complacent. 
The investigators need to trace evidence using the various means available to them. 
Evidence does not sit up and bark like a dog to point itself out; it must be uncovered 
by the investigator. Investigators and government prosecutors must first develop the 
aptitude to discover evidence before they investigate large-scale corruption cases. 
It frequently emanates from experience and the unconscious recognition of facts 
which is impossible to articulate. The good judgment or hunch of an investigator 
should not be dismissed immediately, but should be followed up in the same manner 
as other evidence would be. It is nevertheless vital that the investigator does not 
lose focus by just concentrating on his/her hunches, as it can blind him/her to the 
facts of the investigation. The assertiveness and instinct of an investigator cannot 
be taught.  
 
The APEC (2014) confirms that members of an ACA must possess particular 
investigative skills to be effective. The investigation of large-scale corruption cases 
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is mostly multi-faceted. The investigators need to have the ability to examine 
intelligence. The integrity of the investigative team must be secure and it must be 
preserved. All training needs to be consistent in all of the main disciplines: financial 
intelligence, evidence gathering and asset tracking/freezing, and the skill of report 
writing. The investigative team should be kept well-informed of new developments 
to ensure that they are up to date with new developments and typologies by 
conducting information meetings. 
 
Dussich (2006:142) advocates that all team members must be appropriately 
competent and proficient in their respective investigation responsibilities. The 
interviewing of all suspects should occur under video surveillance by using 
professional interview techniques and needs to protect the integrity of the interview 
as evidence, as this is crucial in any successful corruption investigation. The 
investigative team must comprise individuals with a high level of integrity. The team 
members are obligated to comply with the necessary confidentiality and should 
perform their responsibilities impartially and righteously, which includes respecting 
their constitutional rights as well as those of others, and never misusing their 
authority. The investigation of corruption is not an ordinary process; the members 
need to be attentive, innovative, and be willing to work long and unusual hours to 
finalise their investigation responsibilities. The members should be proud of their 
work, as this is one of the most important ingredients of a successful investigative 
team. The competency of corruption investigators is crucial, as they should know 
various investigation techniques and possess various skills to be successful in the 
execution of their responsibilities. Some of the indispensable techniques are 
emphasised by Dussich (2006:142) as follows: 
 the ability to identify and trace persons, companies, and properties; 
 interview technique; 
 document examination; 
 financial investigation; 
 conducting a search and arrest operation; 
 physical and technical surveillance; 
 acting as an undercover agent; and 
 handling informers. 
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3.10.3 Expert Witnesses  
Pedneault, Silverstone, Rudewicz and Sheetz (2012:134) illuminate that the 
forensic auditor must perform all of the actions in unity with the investigation plan, 
and gather all of the evidence required for a successful investigation. There are 
mainly two tasks the forensic auditor performs: taking affidavits and gathering and 
interpreting documentary evidence. In South Africa the forensic auditors should only 
be utilised for the latter; this will ensure their independence and that they remain 
within the scope of their respective mandates for the specific investigation being 
conducted. The compiling of a case docket and the upkeep of an investigation diary 
are also essential fundamentals of all investigations. The APEC (2014) clarifies that 
refined techniques needed to deal with the complexities of large-scale corruption 
cases and the utilisation of specialised experts are vital in the effective investigation 
of these cases. Forensic experts in electronic evidence are supplementary to the 
investigative team and will assist in tracking and analysing data, as well as 
discovering the metadata of a particular document and the author thereof. Forensic 
accountants are able to support the investigative team by providing them with 
money flows, identifying unexplained transactions, matching employees’ lifestyles 
with their predicted income, and establishing links between related parties. The lead 
investigator should always guard against possible risks during the investigation 
which may compromise the trustworthiness of the expert witness’s report.  
 
The CMTEDD (2004) suggests that expert witnesses should be acquired as soon 
as the investigators have identified that they require an expert witness and the 
selection of such an expert should only be done on the recommendation of the lead 
investigator. The expert witness must be a person in good standing with the relevant 
qualifications, capabilities, and experience which will guarantee he/she has the 
necessary authority in a court of law. Where an expert witness is required to give 
evidence, it is essential to determine the said person’s expertise to the satisfaction 
of the court. The expert witness’s statement should provide a detailed list of their 
formal qualifications and a summary of their relevant experience which qualifies 
them as an expert witness.  
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The OECD (2011) suggests that the assessment of expert witnesses should at all 
times be conducted to ensure that the selected expert has the necessary skills to 
add value to a specific investigation. It would be beneficial to provide the expert with 
some preliminary findings of the conducted investigation to obtain the opinions of 
expert witnesses so that the entire investigation would be on the right track from the 
onset. Multi-faceted investigations should have authorised officials participating in 
the investigation who are experts in the field of the economy (tax administration 
inspectors, budget inspectors, and so on). Their knowledge and experience should 
as far as practicable be exploited to the maximum extent in the initial review of 
documentation, analytical records, etc. in order to save on costs in the criminal 
proceedings. Expert witnesses also include document examiners, fingerprint 
experts, and experts in DNA testing. It ought to be noted that it is frequently valuable 
for the forensic auditor to join forces with the police. All evidence gathered during 
the investigation process under the CPA (South Africa 1977) is to be used during 
the criminal proceedings in court. Certain exemptions and authorisation might be 
acquired from the Director of Public Prosecution to use information in a police case 
docket, for example, disciplinary hearings and so forth. A forensic auditor's mandate 
always incorporates helping the police with the examination so as to set up the 
matter for submission to the prosecutor. 
 
3.10.4 Identifying Potential Targets  
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-c) 
suggests that conducting due diligence background checks to identify potential 
suspects could be to the advantage of the investigative team. This can be done by 
validating information online with relevant databases and open source documents 
freely accessible to the investigator. This might include records on the suspect’s 
companies and properties, as well as persons against whom the allegation was 
made. The investigator should obtain evidence of fraud or corruption to validate the 
rationale for the investigation, which may include the presence of shell companies 
as subcontractors, prior debarments of a contractor, or evidence that a project 
official is living beyond his/her means.  
 
The APEC (2014) states that the investigative team is required to establish beyond 
a reasonable doubt who profited from the corrupt act. They may utilise the “follow 
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the money” principle to accomplish this goal. The team may be able to establish 
who received a gratification by reviewing tax returns, financial disclosure forms, 
immediate superiors, and fellow employees. Persons with whom they (the suspects) 
have close relationships should also be screened, especially with reference to bank 
accounts, as suspects will often open bank accounts in friends’ or family members’ 
names to avoid detection by investigators. 
 
3.10.5 Developing an Investigative Strategy 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-c) 
clarifies that when dealing with preliminary cases, they utilise the “Case Theory” 
approach in an investigation. It is fundamental that each investigator or prosecutor 
create and follow a “hypothesis of the case” when investigating multi-faceted 
corruption crimes. The Case Theory approach to multi-faceted investigations is 
second nature to most investigators, the fruitful ones in any event, yet is misjudged 
or disregarded by others with horrendous consequences. The internal stage of the 
investigation will be regarded as finalised upon the collection of documents, data, 
and interviews within the organisation. It is highly recommended that the investigator 
reviews the bid documents for possible evidence of a corrupt encouragement 
through the manipulation of the “SPQQD” elements – Selection, Pricing, Quantity, 
Quality, and Delivery. According to the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework 
Act (South Africa 2000a), tenders should be evaluated on fair, equitable, 
transparent, competitive, and cost-effective principles as in European countries. The 
investigator should include all the electronic information available through the 
applicable authority to assess all relevant e-mails and computer hard drive 
information of the suspects in relation to the investigation. After this phase, an 
assessment may be done to establish whether the suspects relevant to the 
investigation should be interviewed.  
 
Schuchter (2012) details that corruption cases are frequently committed by 
individuals in a position of power, for instance, powerful politicians or high-ranking 
public officials, which can become an impediment to investigators in securing the 
cooperation of witnesses and suspects. To be effective in the investigation of large-
scale corruption cases, the following are indispensable: perseverance, knowledge, 
experience, expertise, and organisational strength. 
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Koldertsova (2011:223) gave details that in the Arab region, the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) and the OECD worked together to enhance corporate 
governance in the region. The initiative on corporate governance and investment for 
development in the MENA region is likewise supported by the UNDP. This was 
planned to encourage comprehensive improvements to the investment climate, as 
well as modernise governance structures and operations by reinforcing regional and 
international corporations, and promote maintainable economic growth throughout 
the Arab region.  
 
The OECD (2011) explains that when conducting an investigation, planning needs 
to be one of the first tasks at hand. This will enable the investigator to conduct the 
investigation in a specific sequence to ensure the effectiveness thereof. The 
vigorous and dialectical process of planning the investigation includes the 
amendments that need to be made as new circumstances and developments come 
up in the investigation. It is essential for a methodological approach to the effective 
and successful investigation of complex corruption cases. The multi-disciplinary 
activity plays a crucial part in the planning of the investigation and its efficiency when 
specific goals are set with clear objectives for each member of the team. The 
effectiveness of the investigation will be based upon the investigative actions to be 
taken to conclude the case. The APEC (2014) explains that an investigation with 
high-level officials generally attracts extensive media attention. Senior officials are 
in a position to interfere with investigations. Some suspects often maintain their 
foreign residences and are able to escape there once an investigation gets to be 
distinctly clear. Transnational or multinational investigations involve a great deal of 
similar coordination as expected during the investigation of major domestic cases. 
Specialisation is then required in extradition applications, mutual legal assistance, 
and international money laundering investigations. 
 
The UNIDO (2012) states that upon receipt of a complaint, the investigators 
evaluate the complaint to enable them to determine the value of the allegation and 
the credibility thereof. The complainant might be contacted during this phase for 
supplementary circumstantial information or an explanation which will enable the 
investigator to determine the opening of an official case. The necessity of obtaining 
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basic information about the alleged crime and readily available evidence is secured 
during this phase. An assessment must be made on whether the complaint has 
adequate evidence available to warrant an investigation. The investigation feasibility 
is built on:  
a) the length of time that has elapsed since the alleged crime occurred;  
b) the specificity of the information received; and 
c) the availability of the necessary records, evidence, and witnesses. 
 
Dussich (2006:141) explains that several corruption cases are currently cross-
jurisdictional. Thus, it is important to have good international cooperation, for 
example finding witnesses and suspects; discovering cash trails; making 
observations; sharing knowledge; effecting capture, search, and extradition; as well 
as conducting joint investigations and operations to succeed in fighting corruption 
across jurisdictions. 
 
3.10.6 Choosing Investigative Methods and Techniques  
The USAID (2005) explains that it is important for the investigating officer to think 
like a judge selected to decide on a case. The USAID has observed that utilising 
this approach is beneficial to the investigative team when presenting the evidence 
in court. Once a piece of evidence is collected, one needs to determine the 
relevance and admissibility of the evidence. The investigative team has certain tasks 
to perform, which should be addressed during the investigative phase, namely: 
discovering the motive for perpetrating the crime, knowledge of the crime, 
opportunity to perpetrate the crime, identity of the perpetrators and victims, intent to 
perpetrate the crime, the absence of mistakes or accidents during the perpetrating 
of the crime, preparation to perpetrate a crime, and plan to perpetrate the crime. 
The consent to or absence of the plan to perpetrate the crime also needs to be 
established in some cases. The UNIDO (2012) points out that when cases are 
prioritised, it is important that certain elements be considered, such as the gravity of 
the investigation to be conducted, the risks in a timeous response to the 
investigation, from who the complaint originates, or any other applicable influences. 
The relevant resources should be readily available and the investigations should be 
conducted in the most efficient and effective manner and completed in the shortest 
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possible time. Then a decision can be made regarding the priority of an investigation 
before the initiation phase. 
 
Schuchter (2012) states that it is the responsibility of the investigative team to 
conduct thorough searches and seizures on the perpetrators and their respective 
businesses, after which all the physical evidence should be analysed and well-
documented. Evidence which is seized should be analysed immediately after the 
items were seized. Interviews of witnesses and suspects have a significant role to 
play during the investigation of corruption cases. The APEC (2014) suggests that 
standardised investigative techniques are applied when interviewing witnesses and 
perpetrators. Physical surveillance is a good starting point when collecting evidence 
of unknown suspects which might include trash runs and official searches to obtain 
the requisite evidence.  
 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-c) 
points out that responding to the complaint should be the first step. The complainant 
will undergo a full debriefing with the intention to acquire as much detail as possible 
for the investigation to be followed. When a red flag is detected with the laying of 
the complaint, the red flag should be matched to potential patterns and then other 
red flags with similar suspicious patterns should be identified. This will enable the 
investigator to determine the nature of the complaint. The OECD (2011) elucidates 
that interviewing of witnesses should as far as possible be carried out once certain 
information has already been obtained. This will then, in turn, be presented 
straightforwardly to the witness in order to avoid his/her possible collusion and 
taking sides with the suspect. During these kinds of circumstances, the witness 
gains an impression that a great deal of information is already available to the 
investigative team. Collusion with a suspect then implicates him/her in the 
commissioning of the crime. This may result in more reliable and detailed 
information obtained from the witness that can be used in the investigation.  
 
3.10.7 Special Investigative Techniques  
The APEC (2014) makes use of the following special investigative techniques during 
the investigation of corruption cases: intercepting communications, controlled 
delivery, cross-border observation, and undercover operations. Schuchter (2012) 
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enlightens that covert operations are mostly conducted based on information which 
was received from the public. He elaborates that investigators should be more 
frequently involved with proactive investigations, such as developing intelligence 
sources, telephone interception, covert surveillance, physical surveillance, and 
undercover operations.  
 
The OECD (2011) elaborates that special investigative actions are generally 
performed with a great deal of secrecy. The different types of special investigative 
actions include: observation and specialised recording of broadcast 
communications; access to personal computer (PC) frameworks and automated 
information handling; surveillance and specialised recording of premises; covert 
following and specialised recording of people and objects; the use of covert agents 
and sources; replicated purchase of specific objects and imitated payoffs; and 
controlled transport and conveyance of objects in criminal offenses. 
 
3.10.8 Planning and Reconstructing Events 
The USAID (2005) specifies that the investigating officer is obligated to reconstruct 
actions, support witnesses’ accounts, and revive what could be viewed as dead 
evidence. The investigative team is obligated to bring the facts of the case to life 
when presenting the evidence in court. The purpose is not to reconstruct the whole 
event, which would be impossible, but to illustrate the sequence of the events as 
they unfolded in a logical way. This would be to the advantage of the investigative 
team. The case should be regarded as a puzzle and seen from that perspective. 
The UNIDO (2012) points out that the investigative process is categorised into three 
parts: allegation intake, investigative activities, and reporting. The intake phase can 
also be fragmented into three sub-activities: receiving of complaints or crime reports, 
preliminary evaluation, and case prioritisation. Allegations may be received in 
person, by physical mail, by email (hotline email address), by telephone (dedicated 
telephone number), by fax, or through a dedicated, web-based reporting instrument 
(http://www.unido.org/wrongdoing). All allegations and reports are registered upon 
receipt.  
 
The APEC (2014) suggests that in an effective investigation process, planning 
should be the first activity the investigator commences with. The investigator should 
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identify the criteria, rules, and procedures that govern the circumstances of the 
information already available. The investigator also needs to determine the 
jurisdiction from the commencement of the investigation. Using prioritisation of 
cases, the seriousness and prevalence of the alleged crime, including past related 
cases, will assist to establish a precedent. The viability or probability of the 
investigation along with the prospect of a satisfactory outcome could play a role in 
case selection, including the availability of financial, human, and/or technical 
resources to adequately investigate and prosecute the case.  
 
The USAID (2005) reveals that in a corruption investigation, the aptitude to recreate 
the evidence is imperative and vital to establish the risk involved. Investigators 
should aim to finalise an investigation within six months, subject the intricacy of the 
case. Risktec (2008:6) elaborates that the investigation process should commence 
instantly after the crime was reported, by securing the crime scene, safeguarding 
evidence, and alerting the applicable role players. Through collecting perishable 
evidence at an early stage, the integrity of the evidence is safeguarded, for example, 
a video of a certain crime. The OECD (2011) clarifies that in South-Eastern Europe, 
after receiving an order to conduct an investigation, the appointed prosecutor 
determines whether there are grounds for suspicion and issues a decision by means 
of an order to pursue further investigation. The OECD (2011) clarifies that the order 
for conducting an investigation and criminal prosecution is of an exceptionally great 
significance in the fight against corruption. The order represents grounds for 
suspicion by the prosecutor, as well as a detailed plan for investigation at the 
preliminary phase and the explanation of the investigative approach and strategies 
that will ensure efficient criminal prosecution. The prosecutor determines the 
circumstances that should be investigated, as well as which investigative processes 
are to be taken.  
 
The International IDEA (2014) clarifies that when a complaint is received and a 
broad investigation approach is warranted, the investigators are required to continue 
confidentially and to gather evidence in a proficient manner by utilising various lawful 
methods, which include scrutinising financial records, customs documents, and tax 
records, while engaging with forensic accountants during the process.  
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The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-c) 
clarifies that all complaints received are assessed to decide whether the complaint 
is adequately suspicious and serious enough to validate an investigation. This 
process needs to be followed during the preliminary investigative phase to 
determine the accurateness of the information received. The investigators need to 
familiarise themselves with the information and arrange follow-up interviews. This is 
done to determine the actual evidence available to make a decision to commence 
with a full-scale investigation. Dussich (2006:141) illuminates that the ACA cannot 
ascertain every corrupt transaction which occurs by themselves. Thus, an effective 
means of receiving complaints is essential to the agency’s effectiveness. The 
structure must have the ability to urge quality complaints from public and private 
sectors, including preventing pointless or malicious complaints. It ought to provide 
a guarantee that complainants’ identities will be kept secret and that protection can 
be provided if necessary. A 24-hour hotline needs to be formed, as well as a rapid 
response system to deal with complaints that need a swift response, providing that 
the complaint is credible and needs to be investigated, regardless of the value of 
the corrupt act that occurred. What may seem too minor in the perspective of the 
agency might seem very serious in the eyes of the general public. 
 
3.10.9 Gathering Evidence 
The USAID (2005) indicates that the proverbial pieces of the puzzle are put together 
until a picture emerges. The investigative team might not have the whole face and 
body of the picture, but enough may emerge to declare with assurance to the court 
that the picture is of a corrupt official by showing that not only was a crime 
committed, but that the defendant’s face is also the one that emerges from the 
puzzle. The CMTEDD (2004) suggests that in complex investigations the 
investigators should pay specific attention to the following: obtaining witness 
statements, the inclusion of expert witnesses, the formal interview of suspects, 
handling of physical evidence (including exhibits), and the preparation of 
prosecution reports. Risktec (2008:6) explains that data collection is as important as 
witness statements. The information about the incident is combined with available 
sources or persons involved, including witnesses to the event, as well as equipment, 
documents, and the scene of the incident. 
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Schuchter (2012) states that during an intelligence-based investigation, the 
investigator assists in the investigation and collection of information in a discreet 
manner by utilising technical aids such as recording equipment, interception, and 
wiretapping. Investigators are utilising various methods to investigate current and 
potential crimes, such as sting operations, integrity testing, electronic surveillance 
(covert or overt), interception, the use of undercover officers, undercover agents, 
and so forth. The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development 
Projects ([sa]-c) explains that the source of the information will include interviews 
with witnesses. The investigative team should proceed with the cooperative 
witnesses, “facilitators”, and co-conspirators to obtain the relevant information on 
the subjects under investigation. The investigative team should be able to 
demonstrate illegal payments to the suspects. The best methodology to 
demonstrate illegal payments is by: 
 inspecting the contractor's financial records; or  
 the suspected worker's financial records.  
 
In the event that it is unrealistic to demonstrate the corrupt payments 
straightforwardly, the team must attempt to demonstrate them incidentally by 
demonstrating that the suspect displayed unexplained sudden wealth or 
expenditures which he/she cannot account for. This should be conducted by using 
documents such as the tax returns and financial disclosures of the subject. 
 
The UNIDO (2012) elucidates that the purpose of an investigation is to discover, 
collect, record, and analyse relevant evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory. 
The investigative activities which are crucial are highlighted as follows: conducting 
interviews; collecting and analysing documents, electronic data, and other evidential 
material; reviewing the assets and premises of the organisation; engaging with 
qualified external experts to assist in the investigation; and obtaining complete 
access to all relevant information, records, personnel, property, and electronic 
records, including official email accounts. The OECD (2011) suggests that evidential 
material ought to be acquired before hearing any potential witnesses. Once a search 
or seizure warrant has been obtained from the relevant legislative authority, the 
execution of the warrants should be carried out on the various premises 
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simultaneously. When conducting the search simultaneously, the investigator is 
safeguarded against the concealment and destruction of evidence. 
 
The CMTEDD (2004) suggests that witness statements should be obtained by 
keeping the following in mind: the contamination of the witness’s memory through 
discourse with other individuals, or from media reports, bits of gossip, and so on, 
should be prevented. An affidavit ought to be taken and signed at the time of the 
meeting. Particular terms, slang, and language utilised by the witness ought to be 
recorded as stated and then an additional explanation added to the affidavit to 
guarantee that there is a distinctive comprehension of its significance. When taking 
affidavits from people under 18 years of age, the parent/guardian or a responsible 
grown-up must be present at the meeting. The parent/guardian ought to co-sign the 
affidavit. Witnesses who have limited comprehension of English ought to be offered 
the administrations of a certified interpreter. Affidavits ought to incorporate all 
pertinent permissible and exculpatory proof. The investigator taking the affidavit 
ought to appreciate the standards concerning gossip and the arrangements of any 
pertinent evidence or significant laws. Where a witness wishes to change some 
portion of his/her affidavit in the wake of signing it or wishes to include additional 
information, a supplementary affidavit ought to be compiled. Original affidavits ought 
not to be changed or pulverised. Witness affidavits ought to be taken in a manner 
that is adequate to a court of law. 
 
Schuchter (2012) indicates that key corruption indicators include abnormal cash 
payments, abnormally high commission payments, payments routed through 
offshore accounts with no apparent business links, agents with little or no subject 
knowledge, and little evidence of due diligence. Alongside the normal investigative 
powers, the Criminal Justice Act 1987 bestowed the SFO in the UK with special 
powers to summon any person to answer questions, disclose specified documents, 
etc. (Schuchter 2012). This is a similar method that is currently being used the SIU 
in South Africa. Dussich (2006:141) states that since corrupt activities are so hard 
to investigate, the investigator requires acceptable investigative power. Aside from 
the typical ability of police to search, arrest, and detain, the ICAC has the authority 
to check financial records, intercept phone communications, oblige suspects to 
announce their assets, oblige witnesses to answer inquiries under oath, restrain 
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properties suspected to be gotten from criminal activities, and confiscate the 
suspects’ travel documents to keep them from escaping the jurisdiction. The ICAC 
is not only enabled to investigate corrupt activities in the government and private 
sectors, but it is also allowed to investigate all violations which are associated with 
corrupt activities. 
 
The International IDEA (2014) explains that to be effective, ACAs require broad 
powers. When all is said in done, an ACA must be assured the institutional powers 
or abilities that are essential to performing assigned tasks in-line with their 
constitution and legislation. In particular, an ACA must have the power to demand 
documentation and direct inspections, summon and interrogate individuals, and 
bring charges or ensure the prosecution of offenders. Since the activities of 
corruption include the illegal and undercover exchange of assets, ACAs must have 
the ability to follow the money flow by sifting through private financial records and 
assembling information on people, including high-level government employees, 
without their insight. On the off chance that the office is to be created again, at the 
phase of constitutionalisation, these powers ought to be conceded in the ACAs’ 
constitution, to prevent simple jurisdiction-stripping.  
 
3.10.10 Government Agency Databases 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-c) 
states that the evidence that is needed to prove a case in court should be obtained 
with a request and documents should be secured from third parties, including the 
suspect contractors, through either negotiated agreements, the exercise of contract 
audit rights, or enforcing their assistance by means of subpoenas or search 
warrants. The OECD (2011) clarifies that prior to the conduct of any search, the 
pertinent business documentation that is generally held by national authorities and 
banks ought to be acquired. In this approach, the information is gained without the 
suspect realising that the investigation is being mounted against him, so as to 
prevent any data spill while information is being demanded from the state authorities 
and financial institutions. This will enable the investigator to ask all the conceivable 
questions. This should be compiled in a “package” with relevant information required 
from the same person, in order to maintain a strategic distance from the suspect, as 
much as practicably possible, to avoid alerting the suspect to the investigation. 
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3.10.11 Electronic Digital Cyber Evidence 
The USAID (2005) indicates that when the investigator believes that he/she is 
responsible for the outcome, he/she will take the extra steps necessary to create 
the best possible presentation for a case to be trialled. Therefore, all relevant 
statements will be obtained and filed accordingly. Risktec (2008:6) clarifies that data 
analysis of the information obtained can play a decisive role during the investigation 
process. Usually, an incident is not a solitary event, but rather a chain of events. 
The arrangement of events should be understood before distinguishing why the 
incident happened. When inquiring why it occurred, we have to recognise the root 
and immediate causes, as well as the hidden causes. Any investigation which 
embarks only to find someone to blame is deluded. The Guide to Combating 
Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) maintains that one should 
take care not to change electronic information in any way when gathering it and be 
careful not to gather it in a way that would allow the suspect to state that it was 
tainted or corrupted. Moreover, one should ensure that the information was obtained 
from the most trustworthy source, not secondary sources, which would escalate the 
threat that the information could contain programming errors or added blunders. 
Emails, information from hard drives, and other electronic evidence should be 
verified by using the standard approaches, for example, a statement from a witness 
with personal knowledge that the electronic evidence contained in the report is 
authentic; this can be the person who gathered, created, received, or stored it. 
 
The APEC (2014) explains that the first step in the forensic process begins with the 
collection of electronic data, seizing a computer, and creating a forensic copy. This 
process will enable the expert witness to establish the chain of custody and create 
hash values, determine metadata, and track the relevant emails. The CMTEDD 
(2004) explains that when an investigator chooses that material held by the office is 
important and relevant to the investigation, this material ought to be dealt with as 
evidence until no longer required for the investigation or prosecution. Physical 
evidence comprises documentary and electronic evidence. Physical proof can be 
acquired in diverse ways: 
 it may be voluntarily offered by witnesses or suspects; 
 officially held by the ACA; or  
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 obtained by the utilisation of coercive power. 
 
3.10.12 Human Intelligence and Interviews 
The UNIDO (2012) states that the relevant interview procedures need to be followed 
during the course of an investigation. Various individuals are interviewed including 
complainants, informants, subjects, and witnesses. These individuals are referred 
to as interviewees. The objective of an interview is to give the interviewee an 
opportunity to be heard, to elicit information relevant to the matter under 
investigation, and to record the interviewee’s statement as evidence. The 
interviewee is invited to present his/her best recollection and understanding of a 
situation and to provide any relevant documents and evidence. Interviews differ from 
other forms of conversation in that they are meant to be recorded as evidence. In 
the event that an interviewee declines to interact or to respond to particular 
questions, this fact will be recorded together with the reason for the refusal, if given. 
The relevance and importance of the evidence provided by interviewees is 
examined before the prosecution is approached to determine the prosecution 
strategy. Interviews are conducted face-to-face, to the extent possible. In some 
cases, it may be more appropriate and feasible to conduct the interview by 
telephone or other electronic means. Investigators may also send a written query to 
the interviewee, as an alternative or a complementary step to the interview. 
 
Schuchter (2012) maintains that while conducting the investigation, the correct 
interview techniques are important to ensure accurate and complete information. 
The PEACE Model for interviewing cooperative witnesses and suspects is a 
respectable model to follow. The PEACE model has its roots in the “four phases of 
interview” method, which was developed in 1992: rapport, free narrative account, 
questioning, and closing. PEACE is a simplified acronym for PPEEACCCE: Plan 
and Preparation; Engage and Explain; Account, Clarify and Challenge; Closure; and 
Evaluation. The introduction of the seven principles of investigative interviews 
assists with the following steps: to obtain accurate and reliable information to 
discover the truth; investigators must approach the suspect with an open mind and 
information obtained must be tested; the police officer must act fairly; investigators 
are not bound to accept the first answer; the suspect possesses the right of 
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silence/right to question; investigators should ask questions to establish the truth; 
and vulnerable people must be treated with consideration at all times. 
 
3.10.13 Interview the Primary Subject 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-b) 
suggests that in a corruption case the primary subject should be interviewed 
thoroughly; usually, it is the suspected bribe recipient. The investigator should ask 
about his/her role in the awarding of the contract. The relevant financial information 
of the subject, including his/her sources of income and expenditures, should be 
corroborated. It should be ascertained whether there is adequate evidence to 
acquire a confession and if not, an attempt should be made to get supportive 
admissions and discover conceivable defences (diverse objects require distinctive 
strategies). The interview ought to be recorded, if conceivable. In a corruption case, 
the individual most involved and in charge of the presumed criminal activities must 
be met with. The CMTEDD (2004) suggests that the investigators conduct formal 
interviews with the suspect. The investigators need to be fully aware of all of the 
requirements of the law and all relevant rules which apply to such an interview.  
 
Schuchter (2012) explains that an interview technique such as the Reid Technique 
to interrogate uncooperative suspects is used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) in the USA. The purpose of the interrogation technique is to extract full 
confessions from suspects. It should be emphasised that the purpose of the Reid 
Technique is not to extract false confessions or confessions at any cost. The 
credibility of confessions and any statements extracted by the interrogation 
technique must be carefully analysed and corroborated by other evidence. 
Schuchter (2012) briefly illustrates the nine steps of the Reid Technique for 
interrogation: 
 Step 1: The investigator directly and positively confronts the suspect.  
 Step 2: The investigator introduces an interrogation theme.  
 Step 3: The investigator handles the initial denials of guilt.  
 Step 4: The investigator overcomes the suspect’s objections.  
 Step 5: The investigator gets and retains the suspect’s attention and clearly 
displays sincerity in everything he/she says.  
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 Step 6: The investigator recognises the suspect’s passive mood. 
 Step 7: The investigator uses an alternative question, giving two choices for 
what happened; one more socially acceptable than the other. The suspect is 
expected to choose the easier option, but whichever alternative the suspect 
chooses, guilt is admitted. 
 Step 8: The investigator has the suspect orally relate the various details of the 
crime that will ultimately serve to establish legal guilt.  
 Step 9: The verbal confession is converted into a written or recorded 
statement. 
 
3.10.14 Informants and Suspects  
The APEC (2014) suggests making use of confidential informants, confidential 
sources, and cooperating witnesses. These sources and witnesses must be 
protected during and after the investigation until the specific threat disappears. The 
Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-c) 
expounds that many complex corruption and fraud cases cannot be solved without 
the cooperation of an inside witness. This could be an honest inside eyewitness or 
a minor participant in the crime with reference to the middleman or the smaller of 
several bribe payers. The investigative team should decide the best strategy to 
obtain the witness’s cooperation. The APEC (2014) suggests analysing the 
information available on the suspects’ personal residence, cash flow analysis, 
university education, and vehicle ownership. This will indicate whether he/she 
financed his/her own lifestyle or made use of undisclosed funds.  
 
3.10.15 Reviewing Evidence  
The USAID (2005) indicates that it is important to also think like a defence attorney 
or devil’s advocate. The defence attorney has the responsibility to defend his/her 
client which is the suspect of the investigator. This implies abusing any gaps or 
inadequacies in the prosecution in order to create doubt in the mind of the sitting 
judge that an accused has carried out the crime, or at least create the perception in 
the mind of the judge that a lesser crime has been carried out by the accused. 
Playing devil’s advocate can assist the investigator to ascertain any deficiencies in 
the investigation. Elements of the case must be precisely analysed, keeping in mind 
the end goal to form the right sentiment or perception. The main question one could 
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ask is, is this really conceivable? Assuming this is the case, are there any conditions 
that render it unthinkable or highly unlikely? The Guide to Combating Corruption 
and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-d) suggests that a final report be prepared 
by the lead investigator. The investigative team should review the report and decide 
together what action to recommend on the basis of the investigation conducted.  
 
The UNIDO (2012) clarifies that upon completion of an investigation, the investigator 
compiles the findings of the investigation in a draft report, which typically includes 
the introduction, methodology and scope, investigative details, findings, conclusions 
and recommendations. The Director of the IOS reviews the draft investigation report 
and determines whether the finding has sufficient information and evidence to 
substantiate the complaint. Risktec (2008:6) suggests that corrective actions take 
place before the investigation is finalised. Many investigations make the mistake of 
raising actions which deal only with the direct causes – a quick fix, putting the last 
lines of defence back into place. By overlooking the root and hidden causes, not 
only do they miss a chance to decrease the risk of the activity being repeated, but 
they increase the likelihood that other activities may likewise occur, emerging from 
the same root cause. 
 
The International IDEA (2014) suggests that after the completion of an investigation, 
if wrongdoing is found, the ACA must have the assets and power to prosecute 
employees involved with corrupt activities itself or to guide the applicable 
prosecution to institute criminal procedures. The International IDEA (2014) clarifies 
that the revealing stage could be viewed as the most critical period of a forensic 
audit. Despite how well the work was done, if the report is not composed legitimately, 
the impression of the reader will be that the audit was not a success. The report 
must mirror the nature and quality of an investigation. Dussich (2006:140) states 
that corrupt activities stand out amongst the most troublesome crimes to investigate. 
There is regularly no scene of the crime, no DNA, and no eyewitness to follow up in 
crimes of corruption or fraud. It is by nature an extremely shrouded crime and can 
include only two fulfilled parties, so there is no impetus to reveal the facts. 
Regardless of the possibility that there are witnesses, they are regular parties to the 
corrupt activities themselves, thus contaminated with dubious validity when they 
become prosecution witnesses in court. The guilty parties can be similarly as 
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knowledgeable as the investigators and know how to cover their tracks or divert 
attention away from themselves. The guilty parties can likewise be powerful and 
savage in enforcing a code of silence among related individuals through fear and 
violence to prematurely end any investigation. In this cutting-edge age, the guilty 
parties will take full advantage of the provisos in cross-jurisdictions and secure the 
help of different experts, for example, legal counsellors, bookkeepers, and computer 
specialists, in their secretive operations and to help them launder their proceeds 
obtained from corrupt activities. 
 
3.10.16 Appointed Prosecutor 
Schuchter (2012) elaborates that the public prosecutor’s independence during 
investigations is critical. Independence should be secured in the investigation of 
corruption cases. Prosecutors should be able to conduct financial investigations 
through inquiries to financial institutions without requiring warrants or subpoenas. 
The prosecutors identify suspicious expenditures, trace the flow of funds, identify 
the true ownership of pseudonymous bank accounts, find out where the funds were 
held, and identify secret funds for the corruption. The International IDEA (2014) 
clarifies that autonomy from undue impedance is fundamental if an ACA is to 
execute its mandate effectively. Autonomy implies an adequate measure of 
operational self-sufficiency, which shields the ACA from undue influence or direct 
political obstruction. An ACA’s independence can likewise be successfully expelled 
by mandate stripping or jurisdiction stripping, whereby enabling legislation is 
changed to decrease the extent of an organisation’s operational mandate or 
authority. Likewise, the adequacy of an ACA can be traded off on the off chance 
that it depends on financing from the same organs of government that mandated it 
to investigate corrupt activities or improper behaviour. Financial sovereignty is 
critical to an ACA’s political autonomy and independence. Autonomy is further 
influenced by the core of the agency, including pecking orders and reporting 
rudiments and methodology for the appointment and dismissal of staff.  
 
Dussich (2006:141) expounds that the investigation of corrupt activities can be 
politically delicate and humiliating to the government. The investigation must be 
viable on the off chance that it is truly independent and free from undue impedance. 
This depends particularly on whether there is a high-level political will to battle 
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corrupt activities in the country and whether the head of the ACA has the ethical 
courage to remain standing against any impedance. The CMTEDD (2004) suggests 
that the preparation of prosecution reports be conducted by the investigator. It is the 
responsibility of the investigator to liaise with the prosecution on the form of the 
report that is required by the prosecutor. A report is an arrangement of papers 
containing: a charge and reference to the pertinent legislation; a chronological 
sequence of events that actually occurred; and the evidence that demonstrates the 
elements of the conceivable crime. Reports must be in a precise and reasonable 
arrangement so that the prosecutor can, without much of a stretch, comprehend the 
charges and confirm the existence of evidence against the charges; decide what 
evidence is available and against whom charges ought to be laid; separate 
additional evidence the investigator ought to obtain; make a full disclosure of the 
evidence available in the criminal case to the defence; and prosecute the case in 
court. 
 
3.10.17 Reporting the Outcome  
The USAID (2005) makes it clear that persuading a judge that a public official has 
perpetrated a crime relating to his/her involvement in corrupt activities is a daunting 
task. Contradictory to other criminals, the corrupt public official won't show to the 
court the same aura of criminality as a gangster or drug lord. Rather, the 
complainant in a corruption case carries to court the plausibility incorporated with 
the office he/she holds. Risktec (2008:6) states that reporting the outcome of an 
investigation should only commence after its completion. The investigation is 
completed when every single outstanding issue has been explored and the 
unearthing has been communicated to the complainant along with the goal, so that 
lessons can be shared. Correspondence instruments incorporate formal 
investigation reports, alerts, and presentations, including meeting topics. The 
UNIDO (2012) states that investigation reports are confidential documents and 
should not be released to third parties.  
 
3.10.18 Independence of Agency 
The independence of an ACA is imperative to be successful in fulfilling its mandate. 
Once the independence of an ACA is in question, public trust will fade away. Its 
efficacy will likewise diminish, as the ACA is no longer objective in its approach to 
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combatting corruption. Camerer (2008) suggests that the way to achieve acceptable 
standards is through better, more formal coordination. Coordination does not 
suggest combination, centralisation, or even consolidation, as some supporters of 
rationalisation would suggest. Rather, it recognises the reality of independent and 
complementary institutions, each of which has an important and unique role to play 
in effectively fighting corruption. This point has been made vividly clear by Judge 
Heath, the head of SIU (2006):  
We are dealing with a multi-headed dragon and various different kinds of 
swords are required to attack the different types of heads of this dragon. 
The Unit is therefore of the view that the various organisations all have a 
role to play in the fight against corruption and maladministration. 
 
Hussmann and Hechler (2008) report that political will and broad national anti-
corruption strategies are often a long-term endeavour, particularly if they involve 
reforms in different spheres and areas of government. Based on the cases analysed 
in the U4 report, it can be inferred that a high level of political will is very difficult to 
maintain throughout the whole strategy or implementation plan cycle. Moreover, 
political will can also be hindered by changes in government. It goes without saying 
that the most important element of an effective anti-corruption strategy is political 
will. Without the political will or buy-in from the highest level of government, the fight 
against corruption will remain a fallacy.  
 
Transparency International (2014) accentuates that the lack of autonomy and 
coordination between various agencies resulted in the inefficiency of formed ACAs. 
Many countries have established a dedicated agency to coordinate and monitor the 
implementation of the anti-corruption strategy. However, these agencies often lack 
the necessary power and authority to compel high-ranking officials to deliver on their 
responsibilities or the autonomy to report on any progress achieved. Fatima 
(2017:65) states that ACAs require political will to be effective: the government 
involved has to allocate adequate budgets to the ACAs, ensure the enactment of 
anti-corruption laws, and provide support to the investigation of corruption cases, 
especially high-profile corruption cases.  
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3.11 RECORDKEEPING OF CORRUPT ACTIVITIES 
 
The importance of keeping records is well-documented. Without records, the ability 
to predict or plan for the future becomes almost impossible. Records are often used 
during an assessment to determine the efficacy of an ACA. A study by Singh 
(2016:74) shows that investors’ concerns could be assuaged not only by a show of 
force on the part of the state, but also by other, more indirect measures, such as the 
provision of accurate crime data. The implicit view was partly that investors draw 
conclusions about the security of their investments on the basis of statistical 
measures, such as the crime rate. The crime rate of serious corruption and serious 
fraud in government would thus be an important measurement, which could attract 
investors in South Africa’s economy, which could have a positive impact on it. The 
study of Shrivastava and Bhattacherjee (2014:7) reveal that a significant test in 
studies about involvement in corrupt activities is to acquire a dependable measure 
of connected theories. Essential data collection can be a hard-hitting task in 
politically fragile and poor countries. Singh (2016:74) argues again that the 
availability of appropriate, up-to-date statistics could go a long way toward altering 
the “perceptions of existing and potential investors” regarding the negative 
phenomena of serious corruption in government. This points to the importance of 
numericized information in the management of the corruption problem. Statistics are 
vital to the development, implementation, and evaluation of state anti-corruption 
policies.  
 
The PMG (2016) states that the ACTT provided a status report on 23 May 2017 on 
its operations in fighting corruption and cases of fraud involving government 
departments, while leaving out information on state-owned entities. Since its 
inception in October 2010, the total number of cases dealt with is 189 and the 
number of finalised cases is 68. The number of cases under investigation is 77 and 
serious corruption cases on the court roll number 44. The total number of people 
convicted of corruption involving R5 million or more now stands at 128, comprising 
63 people for the years 2010 to 2014, 23 people for 2014 to 2015, 34 for 2015 to 
2016, and 8 persons for 2016 to 2017. Government officials convicted of corruption 
(not necessarily involving R5 million or more) since 2010 total 931 (399 of those 
since 2014). The case spread shows that local government (39 cases) and the 
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Department of Public Works (28 cases) had the highest number of corruption cases. 
The total amount of cases involving public and private entities is 37, while foreign 
bribery cases number 11. A breakdown of the number of convicted officials, as well 
as the amount involved, showed the total amount to be R10.6 billion, with the 
Gauteng Province topping the list at 125 officials involved; the Free State second 
with 78 people, involving R873 million; and the Eastern Cape third with 76 people, 
involving R143 million. Mpumalanga had the lowest number of convicted officials 
(14 people, involving R154 million). The total number of people involved in provincial 
cases is 462 (PMG 2016). 
 
The PMG (2016) indicates that the ACTT derived its initial mandate from the 2010 
JCPS delivery agreement, which required the ACTT to take steps to eradicate 
corruption, including bribery by officials within the JCPS cluster, by convicting 170 
JCPS officials by 2014 and to ensure that investor perception, trust, and willingness 
to invest in South Africa is improved by convicting 100 persons who have assets of 
more than R5 million obtained through illicit means. In 2012 the agreement was 
revised and the new output referred to “reduced corruption” and the conviction of 
100 persons by 2014 for corruption where the amount involved is more than R5 
million, instead of having assets of more than R5 million. For the MTSF 2014-2019, 
the ACTT is mandated to ensure that:  
Corruption in the public and private sectors is reduced by building a 
resilient anticorruption system to successfully detect and investigate 
cases of alleged corruption with a view to prosecution, conviction and 
incarceration of perpetrators. This will hopefully serve as deterrence and 
contribute to ensuring a corruption-free society.  
 
This mandate required the ACTT to accomplish the following: 
 Reduce the levels of corruption in the public and private sector, thus improving 
investors’ perception, trust in, and willingness to invest in South Africa by 
ensuring that 120 persons are convicted of corruption or related crimes where 
the amount is R5 million or more, by obtaining R1.38 billion in freezing orders 
and R180 million in recoveries. 
 Ensure that corruption amongst government officials is reduced to serve as a 
deterrent by convicting 1000 government officials for corruption or related 
crimes involving any amount. 
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3.12 THE ELEMENTS OF PROOF OF CORRUPTION 
 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-a) 
insists that all corruption cases need to be prosecuted, irrespective of the value of 
the gratification involved. This would most probably deter public officials from taking 
part in corrupt practices. To prove the charge of corruption, it is essential that the 
investigator is familiar with the definition of corruption, along with the elements 
he/she needs to prove in a court of law. The investigator needs to ensure that the 
investigation process entails all the elements in relation to the charge of corruption.  
 
3.12.1 The Elements of Corruption 
The elements of a crime refers to the facts that must be established in order to prove 
criminal liability. Snyman (2014:404) states that the elements of corruption in a 
South African context are when a person:  
 directly or indirectly accepts, offers, gives, receives, or solicits (the act),  
 a gratification (anything of value);  
 unlawfulness (the PRECCA prohibits corrupt activities); 
 to improperly influence (inducement) the actions of another person (intention).  
 
3.12.2 Directly or Indirectly Offering, Giving, Receiving or Soliciting 
The work of Snyman (2014:404) points out that acceptance is the act of the recipient 
accepting a gratification from the giver. The meaning of accepting is broadened in 
two ways by the legislature: 
 Firstly, according to Snyman (2014:404), an agreement or an offer by the 
recipient to accept a gratification fulfils the requirement of the acceptance in 
terms of the PRECCA (South Africa 2004: section 3(a)(b)). 
 Secondly, Snyman (2014:404) reveals that the words or terms “accept”, 
“agree to accept”, and “offer to accept” are used interchangeably in the 
PRECCA (South Africa 2004: section 2(3)(a)).  
 
Reference to the Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development 
Projects ([sa]-a) reveals that an offer of or demand for a bribe, even if not paid, can 
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be an offence if the other elements of proof are present. The Guide to Combating 
Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-a) simplifies that “indirectly” 
refers to bribes offered, demanded, or paid through a middleman or other 
intermediaries, such as an agent, a subcontractor, or family member of a project 
official. A common example is payments by contractors to the children of 
government officials studying abroad. 
 
3.12.3 Gratification or Anything of Value 
Snyman (2014:406) clarifies that gratification is given a broad meaning in the 
PRECCA (South Africa 2004) and it not only refers to money, but also includes 
benefits as indicated by the words “any service or favour or advantage of any 
description”. The description is also wide enough to include information, sexual 
gratification, gifts, entertainment, loans, employment, or any other benefit. The 
Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-a) 
elucidates that the “thing of value” need not be money, and often is not. Any tangible 
benefit given or received with corrupt intent can be a bribe. “Things of value” that 
have been offered and paid as bribes include: 
 expensive gifts, paid travel, and lavish entertainment provided by contractors 
to government officials; 
 employment of children and spouses of government officials by contractors, 
often in “no show” positions;  
 gifts by contractors of their inventory or services, e.g. building or equipping a 
second house for a government official; 
 prostitutes provided by contractors to government officials and site inspectors; 
 free use of an apartment or free use of a leased car, provided by contractors 
to government officials; 
 “donations” by contractors to social funds, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), or political parties; 
 payments by contractors to government officials and site inspectors, directly 
or through subcontractors or other middlemen, disguised as legitimate fees 
and commissions; and 
 hidden ownership interest in the corrupt contractor or vendor. 
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3.12.4 Unlawfulness 
As Snyman (2014:407) observes, unlawfulness is not expressly provided for by the 
PRECCA (South Africa 2004), however, it must be read into the definition of the 
crime of corruption. Unlawfulness forms part of the elements which are required to 
constitute a crime. This, in turn, means that the recipient is not protected by grounds 
of justification. For example, if the recipient or the giver acted under compulsion, 
then they would be able to rely on necessity as grounds of justification.  
 
3.12.5 Intention to Improperly Influence the Actions of another Party 
Snyman (2014:410) states that intention is not expressly provided for by the 
PRECCA (South Africa 2004); it must be read into the definition of the crime of 
corruption. The legislature did not intend to establish a crime in strict liability, that is, 
one in which no form of culpability is required. The recipient must not only have the 
intention of accepting the gratification, but must also have the intention act in a 
specific manner in the future to obtain such gratification. Thus, corruption is a crime 
of double intent. 
 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-a) 
rightly points out that the payment of a thing of value alone does not constitute a 
bribe without proof that it improperly influenced the recipient, or was intended to. 
The “actions of another party” most commonly include the approval of contract 
awards by procurement officials, the acceptance of substandard work by site 
supervisors, or the processing of invoices by project financial staff. A “party” can be 
a public official or private party. Snyman (2014:407) has indicated that in order to 
act in a certain way (inducement) to act on not to act. In other words, the recipient 
must accept the gratification with a certain move or aim. The PRECCA (South Africa 
2004) provides a wide definition of the aims of the crime of corruption.  
 
3.13 HOW TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION 
 
A common occurrence after the completion of an investigation is that the 
investigators and prosecutors will determine the relevance of the evidence to be 
presented during criminal proceedings. The manner and sequence of the evidence 
being presented is essential to illustrate the criminal activities which occurred. The 
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magistrate must be placed in a position to make a ruling beyond reasonable doubt 
that a certain event occurred. Below some methods that assist during this process 
will be discussed. The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development 
Projects ([sa]-a) insists that in practice the first indication of possible corruption will 
often be evidence of corrupt influence, e.g. abuse of the procurement rules by a 
government official to ensure the selection of particular contractor, with the evidence 
of the payment of thing of value coming next, depending on the strength of the 
evidence. Therefore, the investigator might begin with the following steps to obtain 
evidence: 
 First, prove that the subject offered, gave, solicited, or received a “thing of 
value”. 
 Second, prove that the thing of value was intended to or did in fact improperly 
influence the actions of another party (e.g. a government official or inspector). 
 
3.13.1 Proof of Corrupt Payments by Direct Evidence 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-a) 
asserts that the payment of a thing of value is usually proven by direct evidence, 
such as cancelled checks, wire transfer receipts, or the admission of the bribe payer, 
collected (1) through the exercise of contract audit rights, (2) a corruption 
investigation, (3) the service of a subpoena in a civil or criminal court case, or (4) 
the cooperation of an inside witness. A corrupt payment can occasionally be proven 
by circumstantial evidence. For example, proof can be sought that the suspected 
bribe payer: 
 paid an agent, consultant, or subcontractor a grossly excessive fee compared 
to the services rendered; 
 made cash withdrawals or disbursements without correctly recording the 
transactions or without adequate supporting documentation; 
 recorded substantial expenditures as “business development”, “marketing”, or 
other similar expenses without adequate supporting documentation; 
 made payments to agents or other parties supported by false documentation, 
e.g. an invoice from an agent for services that were never performed; or 
 improperly inflated reimbursable expenses in an amount equal to the required 
bribe payments, and falsified the supporting documentation. 
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The above evidence can be strengthened by proving that the subject: 
 destroyed, altered, concealed, or withheld relevant records; 
 lied about the purpose of the payment; or 
 attempted to obstruct the investigation by, for example, threatening or 
intimidating potential witnesses, etc. 
 
From the suspected recipient’s side, circumstantial evidence can include proof that 
the suspected recipient: 
 displayed “sudden unexplained wealth” at or about the time of alleged or 
suspected bribe payments;  
 had cash expenditures for which there was no legitimate source of funds; or 
 lied about the source of his/her funds or attempted to conceal his/her 
expenditures. 
 
3.13.2 Circumstantial Evidence of Corrupt Payments 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-a) 
maintains that circumstantial evidence of corrupt payments is most effective when 
used to corroborate other, direct evidence of such misconduct, as illustrated in the 
example of the circumstantial proof of the cash bribe above. Circumstantial proof of 
the receipt of corrupt payments usually requires an in-depth financial interview of 
the suspected recipient to rebut (or confirm) claims that the unexplained funds came 
from legitimate sources. If the subject identifies alleged sources of funds to explain 
his/her excess expenditures, the investigator should obtain all details of the alleged 
funds (e.g. sources, amounts, documentation, etc.) and then independently confirm 
or rebut the crime.  
 
3.13.3 Prove Gratification  
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-a) 
upholds that the onus of proof rests on the state. The investigator must be in a 
position to prove to the court the type of gratification that was provided, requested, 
or promised to the official (e.g. a Chief Financial Officer or DG) to actually 
“improperly” influence his/her actions. The actual gratification needs to be identified 
during this process by the investigator.  
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3.13.4 Circumstantial Evidence of Improper Influence 
The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-a) 
clarifies that the improper influence is usually shown by circumstantial evidence. In 
the case of a corrupt contract award, for example, it must be shown that the alleged 
bribe recipient took steps to unfairly favour the bribe payer by, for example: 
 approving improper sole source contract awards; 
 rigging the selection criteria to favour a certain bidder; 
 leaking inside information to the favoured bidder; 
 manipulating the scoring of bids; or 
 disqualifying a bidder for invented or trivial reasons. 
 
3.13.5 Remember to Identify and Rebut Defences 
During the investigation process, it is imperative to continuously play “devil’s 
advocate” to ensure that all the bases are covered. This is done by, for example, 
taking a different point of view about the manner in which evidence was collected, 
or to challenge the authenticity of certain evidence. In doing this, the investigator is 
preparing for the possible questions that may be raised by the defence during the 
trial. The investigator is also in a position to identify possible shortcomings and 
rectify them before commencing with the trial. The Guide to Combating Corruption 
and Fraud in Development Projects ([sa]-a) elucidates that when a corrupt official 
claims that there is a legitimate reason for what appears to be instances of improper 
influence exerted upon him/her to act or not to act in a particular manner, for which 
he/she received a gratification as a direct result, the nexus needs to be proven by 
the investigating officer before the court will be in a position to convict the official on 
a charge of corruption. The official might state, for example, that the awarding of a 
tender to a service provider was improper, but that it was justified by time 
constraints, an emergency situation, or the absence of any qualified competitors. 
The investigator must be in a position to confirm or refute all probable defences as 
part of a comprehensive investigation into corrupt activities.  
 
3.13.6 Direct Evidence of Improper Influence 
The investigator should always be in a position to illustrate during criminal 
proceedings exactly in what way the improper influence was orchestrated by the 
suspects. There are various ways to prove this with direct evidence and some of the 
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methods are briefly discussed below. The Guide to Combating Corruption and Fraud 
in Development Projects ([sa]-a) illuminates that the improper influence can be 
proven directly with the following approaches: 
 Documentary evidence, such as indiscreet emails that set out the corrupt 
agreement (the discovery of which is not an uncommon occurrence). 
 A statement by a third-party witness describing the improper influence. 
 The admission of the bribe payer usually made as part of an agreement to 
cooperate against the bribe recipients. 
 
3.14 INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS  
 
Interpol ([sa]) underlines that there is a need to review some successful corruption 
investigations around the globe to keep abreast with the latest international trends 
and techniques used. Training is fundamental to boosting the knowledge and skills 
of investigators in the use of the latest tools and techniques in the investigation 
process and to share international best practices. 
 
3.14.1 Case Study 1: Effective Preventive Measures  
Kwok Man-wai (2003) elucidates that the Hong Kong ICAC is universally regarded 
as one of the most successful models in fighting corruption, turning an old, very 
corrupt colony into one of the relatively corruption-free places in the world. One of 
the success factors is its three-pronged strategy – fighting corruption through 
deterrence, prevention, and education. All three are important, but in the 
researcher’s view deterrence is the most important. Hong Kong (2018) illuminates 
that the ICAC preventative measures could play a critical role in funding improved 
external monitoring. The exercise would be transparent, with full disclosure of 
conclusions to the public. This concept has not yet been tested in South Africa, but 
Case Study 2 below shows how effective preventative measures have been 
elsewhere. The Hong Kong International Airport, also known as Chek Lap Kok 
Airport, was built on land reclaimed from the sea during the 1990s. This was the 
world’s largest infrastructure project. Aware that the contract would be particularly 
vulnerable to corruption, the airport authority called in the Hong Kong ICAC and 
involved the Commission in the design of the contracts and other aspects of the 
tendering processes as a preventive measure. The cost of the involvement of the 
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Hong Kong ICAC was built into the contract. This equipped the ICAC with the ability 
to devote significant resources to its preventive role without undermining its ability 
to discharge other functions provided for in its ordinary budget. It was justified by 
the realisation that the involvement of the ICAC would be significantly cost-effective, 
driving down costs by eliminating the costs of corruption. Upon completion of the 
project, it was judged to have been virtually free of corruption. The exercise 
demonstrated how effective preventive measures can be.  
 
3.14.2 Case Study 2: Corruption Investigation of a State Governor  
The World Bank (2017) clarifies that they have evolved into five institutions from the 
time of their inauguration in 1944. The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development was responsible for creating their mission. They evolved from a war, 
rebuilding as well as improving themselves to the present mandate of worldwide 
poverty alleviation with their associates: the International Development Association, 
the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Guarantee Agency, and the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. The World Bank was 
initially only established in Washington, D.C., with engineers and financial analysts. 
The World Bank is presently a multi-disciplinary institution with various skilled 
professionals that include economists, public policy experts, sector experts, and 
social scientists. Almost two-thirds of their skilled professionals are situated in 
Washington, D.C, while the rest are based in country workplaces. 
 
The World Bank (2016) shares how an appropriate investigation of alleged 
corruption and money laundering should be addressed by referring to an example 
in the UK. In the UK, investigators started to take note of the former Plateau State 
Governor in Nigeria, namely Joshua Dariye (suspect). In addition to the allegations 
of corruption and money laundering, there was a strong suspicion that the suspect’s 
assets could be located in the UK. By utilising numerous investigative techniques, 
the investigators were able to locate the resources and establish their relationship 
with the resources with respect to an alleged crime committed by the suspect. The 
following are some pointers used by the investigators to conduct their investigation 
efficiently: 
 Public records were examined to obtain evidence on Dariye (the suspect) in 
the UK (e.g. property, vehicle, and corporate registries). They tracked 
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intelligence from various governmental agencies on Dariye, as well as the 
Financial Intelligence Unit. Outcome: no records related to Dariye could be 
found in the UK. 
 Family members and acquaintances of Dariye were identified, including a 
search for relatives in the UK. Outcome: it was established that Dariye’s 
children were in an private school in the UK. 
 Investigations into the financial institutions (legitimate authority). Outcome: it 
was established that Dariye activated a Barclaycard account and that the same 
account was serviced monthly through a bank account owned by Joyce 
Oyebanjo. Further examinations revealed that Oyebanjo was actually Dariye’s 
banker in the UK. She funded the charges and general expenses on behalf of 
Dariye, as well as paying for his two children to attend a private school. 
 A court order was obtained to allow the investigating officer access to the 
children’s school files. Outcome: it was affirmed that the school fees were 
funded by Joyce Oyebanjo. 
 Public information, including the records of other governmental agencies, was 
searched to find a link with Oyebanjo. An application was made for a court 
order on the bank accounts of Oyebanjo. Outcome: Oyebanjo, working as a 
housing officer in the UK, was found to have 15 bank accounts with funds 
totalling roughly £1.5 million, and real estate to the value of £2 million. 
Additionally, Oyebanjo was managing one of Dariye’s properties in Regents 
Park Plaza, a property acquired in the name of “Joseph Dagwan”, and paid for 
by the Plateau State Ecological Fund through various companies. 
 The credit references of the suspects and relatives were checked which 
revealed the bank accounts used by the suspects. Assets were then located 
from the bank accounts of the suspects and their direct family members to 
other bank accounts, properties, and vehicles. Court orders including search 
and seizure orders were used to obtain supplementary evidence and locate 
assets. Outcome: it was revealed that Dariye had a bank account registered 
to a detailed address in London. An investigation into Dariye and Oyebanjo’s 
bank accounts exposed hefty electronic funds transfers (EFTs) from various 
financial institutions in Nigeria. 
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 Court orders were acquired to find the conveyancing attorney’s file for the 
London address. Outcome: the property deed showed that the property had 
been procured by registering the property in a fake name and funds were 
transferred from Nigerian companies to a London-based bank account.  
 The mutual legal assistance application was directed to the Nigerian 
Government and they were requested to establish the money trail of the funds 
received by the suspects. Outcome: it was determined that an Ecological Grant 
acquired by Dariye had been side-tracked and concealed into his own 
company bank account with the backing of bank employees. This money was 
side-tracked to a company and a connected bank account in Nigeria (set up 
by Dariye) and consequently moved to London for personal purposes. The 
Nigerian company which procured the London property was also connected to 
the Ecological Grant theft as they received £100 million of the stolen money. 
The company had paid £400,000 for the London property after Dariye had 
approved a Plateau State Government contract for the installation of £37 
million worth of television equipment in the Plateau State. 
 
3.14.3 Case Study 3: Tender Manipulation to Facilitate Corruption  
The World Bank (2014) enlightens that corruption is a burden on business and can 
generate extra costs equivalent to those arising from tariffs. Transparency 
International (2018a) urges that countries need to do more. A total of 43 countries 
have signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, yet the UK is assessed to be one 
of only four active enforcers of it. Macnamara (2009) indicates that over 100 
construction firms were fined a total of £129.5 million for bid-rigging on 199 tenders 
in the period 2000 – 2006, following a Competition Act (1998) investigation by the 
Office of Fair Trading (predecessor of the Competition and Markets Authority). 
Some of the bid-rigging took the form of ‘cover pricing’ agreeing with competitors to 
submit artificially high bids that are not intended to be successful. The projects 
affected included schools, hospitals, and universities. The investigation was 
sparked by a complaint from a National Housing Federation auditor in Nottingham. 
The auditor uncovered evidence of cover pricing in more than 4000 tenders 
involving more than 1000 companies. In six instances the successful bidder had 
paid an agreed sum of money to the unsuccessful bidder (known as a 
“compensation payment”). This was done by producing false invoices. Allowing 
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companies, including UK businesses, to compete on even terms helps generate 
sustainable economic growth. Trading with integrity is crucial, not only because it 
underpins growth at home and abroad, but also because it helps to reduce the 
negative effects of globalisation, including inequality. Integrity is essential in 
underpinning the UK’s reputation as a fair, rules-based society that attracts 
investment and allows people to trade freely. 
 
3.14.4 Case Study 4: Modern Slavery and Corruption  
According to the Anti-Corruption Summit (Transparency International 2018b), 
modern slavery has an obvious link with corruption across the globe. On any given 
day, there are an estimated 40 million people in slavery worldwide who have been 
trafficked, coerced, or otherwise forced into labour, sexual exploitation, or domestic 
servitude. People in these vulnerable groups, including children, are too often 
treated as commodities and exploited for financial gain. Corruption facilitates slavery 
and other forms of exploitation. Bribes are paid to local law enforcement and 
immigration officers and business owners or managers to move people or maintain 
the conditions for exploitation. Businesses face the risk of unwittingly supporting 
slavery and exploitation when they enter into contracts with suppliers. Eliminating 
corruption from business relationships and transactions is vital to reduce modern 
slavery and businesses have a crucial role to play. The UK is acting at home and 
abroad to rid the world of modern slavery.  
 
Many of the solutions are similar to those for tackling corruption: better business 
practices, effective law enforcement, and concerted international action. Businesses 
need practices that ensure high standards at all stages of the value chain or life 
cycle of business transactions, domestically and internationally. The UK’s Modern 
Slavery Act of 2015 (UK 2015) focuses on the prevention and prosecution of modern 
slavery and the protection of victims. The Act also requires any large business 
operating in the UK to publish an annual statement setting out the steps it has taken 
to ensure that slavery is not taking place in its business and supply chains. This 
approach reflects that of the Bribery Act 2010 (UK 2010), which incentivises 
businesses to implement adequate procedures to prevent bribery by those acting 
on their behalf. Progressive businesses are considering modern slavery and anti-
corruption requirements together. 
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3.14.5 Case Study 5: United Kingdom Anti-Corruption Strategy 
The Government of the UK (2017) stipulates that the Anti-Corruption Summit, which 
galvanised a number of important commitments from governments and multilateral 
organisations, resulted in the following goals:  
 Goal 1: Enhanced international transparency, especially in beneficial 
ownership, extractives, public finance, and contracting. Actions taken by the 
UK will make more information available and encourage the strategy’s use, so 
that law enforcement, working with partners, can identify, track, and prosecute 
corruption and citizens can hold governments and companies to account. 
 Goal 2: Reduced levels of corruption in partner countries, promoting stability 
and prosperity. Strengthened UK action will provide political elites with greater 
incentives to tackle corruption and to strengthen their institutions. Countries 
that are committed to tackling corruption will have greater access to the 
support they need to take action, including to implement commitments made 
at the Anti-Corruption Summit in London. 
 
Transparency International (2018b) revealed that commitments were made by 
various countries at the Anti-Corruption Summit, as indicated below: 
 Following an ambitious set of commitments by President Ghani at the Summit, 
Afghanistan has established its flagship Anti-Corruption Justice Centre. This 
brings together key elements of Afghanistan’s police, prosecutors, and judges 
to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate serious high-level corruption cases 
in an environment insulated from political and other interference. The Anti-
Corruption Justice Centre has already prosecuted over 20 major corruption 
cases since its formation and is sending a strong message to the Afghan 
people that high-level corruption will no longer be tolerated. 
 In October 2017 the President of Afghanistan approved the NACS and 
inaugurated the Open Government Partnership Afghanistan Secretariat. This 
will launch and implement the country’s ACAs and was developed by the Open 
Government Partnership on how to draft a National Action Plan. 
 In 2016, Ghana amended its Companies Act to make provision for the 
disclosure of beneficial ownership of companies and is working to strengthen 
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these provisions in the new Companies Bill, which they hope to have passed 
by the end of 2017. The government announced in September 2017, that it will 
work with OpenOwnership to build a public, open data register of beneficial 
ownership information in preparation for the new law. The government elected 
in December 2016 remains committed to the commitments Ghana made at the 
London Anti-Corruption Summit and is looking to establish a Special 
Prosecutor’s Office to reform anti-corruption legislation to increase the 
sentence for corruption, as well as to improve transparency in public 
procurement and in the commodity market.  
 In 2017, Mexico strengthened its anti-corruption enforcement with the creation 
of a new National Anti-Corruption System, underpinned by legislation which 
drew on the UK’s Bribery Act of 2010. In parallel, legal action has been taken 
against a number of former state governors accused of corruption. Mexico is 
also taking forward the commitments it made at the London Anti-Corruption 
Summit on beneficial ownership, the open contracting data standard, new anti-
fraud and asset recovery mechanisms, and the use of digital platforms to tackle 
corruption. The UK has been working with Mexico on anti-corruption and 
criminal justice through the Prosperity Fund.  
 At the summit, Nigeria committed to joining the Open Government Partnership 
and has since established a secretariat and set up a Civil Society Steering 
Committee which has developed a costed National Action Plan. This includes 
measures to enhance fiscal transparency and citizen’s engagement in the fight 
against corruption.  
 
3.15 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
It is abundantly clear that the effective investigation of corruption in the public 
service is essential for the development of a country. After a discussion on some of 
the most prevalent principles in evidence and investigation, an investigator should 
be able to circumvent common blunders during the investigation process. After the 
review of the investigation conducted in the international arena, it became clear that 
an investigator needs to be able to think outside of the box. This is, however, a 
paradigm shift for most criminal investigators dealing with multi-faceted corruption 
cases, as it is not just a manner of ticking the boxes during the investigation process.  
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A clear description of the term corruption, as well as the investigation process 
involved during multi-faceted corruption cases in the public sector, was provided. 
The need arises to have a discussion on the various roles of individual team 
members during such an investigation process. These roles and responsibilities will 
be expounded in the succeeding chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
AN OVERVIEW OF MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE  
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
ACAs are specialised organisations established by governments to minimise 
corruption in their countries. An overview of the efficacy of and impediments to ACAs 
in utilising multi-disciplinary approaches to investigate corruption will be provided in 
this chapter. These multi-disciplinary approaches are studied to comprehend their 
value or lack of value in rooting out corruption in the public service. This chapter will 
deal with the rationale for establishing multi-disciplinary approaches to address 
challenges facing a community, region, or country. The various approaches by local 
and international ACAs are discussed and are complemented by examples of best 
practices and weaknesses for ACAs across the globe. Approaches of various 
countries will be discussed, as well as the rationale behind ACAs. 
 
The NPA (2014) indicated that South Africa has adopted a multi-agency approach 
towards fighting corruption. The effective implementation and application of the anti-
corruption framework relies on having strong investigative institutions to implement 
and apply the various anti-corruption legislative frameworks.  
 
4.2 THE EFFICACY OF MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES  
 
A multi-disciplinary approach involves drawing appropriately from multiple 
disciplines to redefine problems outside of normal boundaries and reach solutions. 
During this process, the competencies of the various disciplines are drawn upon. 
Therefore when a specific discipline is not on the same level of competence as the 
team, they might be ineffective. Hence, it is paramount that all disciplines are 
proficient in their respective areas, as this will enhance the efficacy of the multi-
disciplinary approach applied. A study by Gillinson (2004:25) shows that 
dependability oils social life. It implies that where social capacity and trust are, 
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societies prosper, and prospects for free-riding and corrupt activities are lessened. 
Thick, closed systems produce standards of shared commitment and duty, and 
preclude the requirement for expensive coercion or inducement contracts. Tang and 
Hsiao (2013) clarify that the principal reason for the ACA’s existence is to 
comprehend the focal points and hindrances of a multi-disciplinary group effort. The 
benefits of multi-disciplinary group effort are:  
 improve communication ability; 
 get familiar with the collaborative process of the investigation; 
 foster cooperation skills; 
 positively gainful for future career development; 
 different professions supplement each other;  
 improve the sense of achievement and expert aptitudes; 
 collective action; and 
 cooperation. 
 
As Taylor (2015:2) points out, theories of crime and criminality have been 
forthcoming from many academic disciplines, which is why a multi-disciplinary 
approach would provide a profound understanding of the area. Each of the benefits 
of a multi-disciplinary group effort as listed above will now be discussed individually. 
 
4.2.1 Improve Communication Ability 
Tang and Hsiao (2013) explain that one of the most significant advantages of multi-
disciplinary cooperation is that all associates are compelled to communicate. This 
was replicated in the replies of some of the individuals, which were interviewees 
(Tang & Hsiao 2013): 
 “I have learned interview aptitudes and communication way and so forth.”  
 “The procedure showed me the significance of influence.” 
 
4.2.2 The Collaborative Process of Investigation 
In the study of Tang and Hsiao (2013) the authors clarify the procedure of multi-
disciplinary group work is difficult to learn without genuine experience. The upside 
of having such coordinated effort in disciplining is that one becomes distinctly 
familiar with the perplexing procedure in the industry. The following is a reflection of 
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some responses of the interviewees of the study conducted by Tang and Hsiao 
(2013):  
 The process helped the interviewees to realise what work brings to 
mind.  
 Through this involvement, the interviewees realise that when they 
investigate, similar cases, that it could be completed quickly.  
 The encounter set the interviewees up for future investigations. 
 The interviewees are able to comprehend the reason for each stage 
and acknowledge what to do next. 
 
4.2.3 Foster Collaboration Skills 
The work of Tang and Hsiao (2013) revealed that the absence of shared normal 
dialect and information requires better collaboration skills and being amicable and 
adaptable, as well as the sharing of thoughts in an amicable way. The succeeding 
responses are an echo of some replies of the interviewees (Tang & Hsiao 2013): 
 The collaboration between role players was comparable; role players who 
work together will learn from each other during their interactions. 
 The participant would ask for opinions and as a result find the best way to 
cooperate. 
 During the initial investigation plan, the plan would be changed and adjusted. 
It is acceptable as long as the underlying investigation objective remains the 
same.  
 Learn to appreciate the difficulties of multi-faceted investigations.  
 
As the Government of the Netherlands (2016) points out, from a study conducted in 
the Netherlands, there is a high level of participation with group work and 
discussions that utilised the combined competence of the group. The multi-
disciplinary approach furthered the understanding of the roles that police officers 
and team members can play in combatting corrupt practices and of the opportunities 
inherent in multi-agency and international cooperation. Case studies and sharing of 
operational experiences increased knowledge of methods for prevention and 
detection.  
 
Interpol ([sa]) states that for a successful corruption investigation it is necessary to 
be well-informed of the newest international trends and techniques used. Training 
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and the competency levels of members are paramount to be effective during 
investigations.  
 
4.2.4 Future Career Development 
Tang and Hsiao (2013) expound that executing the design project from motivation 
through ideation to enactment gives students a feeling of reality and sets them up 
for design practice in the industry where each project is actualised for real. In the 
meantime, the procedure gives them the self-assurance to adapt to their future 
profession. The ensuing is a reverberation of some responses of the interviewees 
(Tang & Hsiao 2013):  
 From multi-disciplinary group work, responders found out about numerous 
things. In addition, responders made numerous friends from various 
disciplines. 
 The capacity to commence with multi-disciplinary group work could not be 
enhanced by individual endeavours though through collective learning. 
 Responders trust the experience of multi-disciplinary group work and it is a 
major addition to their skill set. 
 Although responders did not have prior involvement in multi-faceted 
investigations, in an interview a responder could state that he was involved 
from the commencement of such an investigation. 
 
4.2.5 Different Professions Supplement Each Other 
Tang and Hsiao (2013) note that every one of the responders took in things from 
alternate participants with various backgrounds. In a multi-disciplinary approach, it 
is not common to work in a heterogeneous group for a prolonged period. 
Nonetheless, this experience gives everybody a chance to observe diverse methods 
for improvement and to figure out how to compensate for any shortcomings in the 
group by supplementing each other. This was supported as follows by the 
interviewees (Tang & Hsiao 2013):  
 The participant indicated that this was the first time they had cooperated with 
an external forensic expert. 
 The participant indicated that according to his view, a forensic expert has more 
knowledge about how suspects work. 
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 The multi-disciplinary collaboration was good, as it helped to increase the 
participants’ knowledge. 
 There are too many issues in a multi-faceted investigation. When the 
participants engage in all the activities, they felt that they might lose their focus 
and this is where the multi-disciplinary collaboration helped them to improve. 
 
4.2.6 Sense of Achievement  
Tang and Hsiao (2013) establish that this sensible design project takes a colossal 
amount of time and work to wrap up. In any case, for a student to have the capacity 
to see his/her own design realised usually results in an exceptionally strong feeling 
of accomplishment. Since the vast majority of the student’s design work is based on 
practical experiments or computerised models, the students are able to see and 
touch what they have accomplished (Tang & Hsiao 2013): 
 The investigation was handed over to the prosecution for court proceedings. 
 The participants felt a strong sensation of accomplishment. The participants 
additionally acquired more understanding of investigative strategies, including 
an enhancement of their own abilities in relation to their professions. 
 As far as the team members are concerned, their communication, group work, 
and professional abilities made strides. Amid the procedure, they got to be 
distinctly familiar with the cooperative procedure of investigation planning.  
 What is astonishing is that various professions complemented each other.  
 The multi-disciplinary group had a heightened sense of accomplishment. 
 
4.2.7 Collective Action 
Richardson (1993:47) reveals that in human science it was the ‘Group Theorists’, 
driven by Arthur Bentley, who controlled the field from the start of the 20th century. 
The theory pronounces that where individuals have a common goal and feel that 
they will profit from the collective action, a group will form to participate for the 
shared objective. In the 1960s, this was turned on its head by Mancur Olson's 
unique work, “The Logic of Collective Action” (Olson 1965). His model of the 
“rational” individuals raises the question about our willingness to coordinate. Olson 
proposes that where we believe we can acquire the benefits of coordinated effort 
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without adding to the cost, we will free-ride and leave the collaboration efforts to 
others. 
 
The theorists Schlozman, Verba and Brady (1995:25) have engaged the middle 
ground. They propose that we are frequently propelled to act in a group by our 
emotions or passion for a cause and that Olson’s definition of reasonableness is too 
thin. In a study by Newburn, Williamson, and Wright (2012:216), they found that the 
move towards genuine multi-agency crime reduction approaches was frustrated by 
the absence of a formal decision-making structure to support those initiatives. The 
advantages offered by such a structure, and in particular as a means of prioritising 
resources, remained largely confined to the police. In this context, two policy drives 
were undertaken, namely: the intelligence-led policing approach and the partnership 
policing approach. In the original approach of “problem-oriented policing” the 
concern was to reduce the degree of what was called “means over ends” policing, 
whereby a lot of time was spent in reacting to individual incidents as they emerged, 
as opposed to receiving techniques to eliminate the underlining cause(s) of those 
incidents. 
 
4.2.8 Cooperation 
Gillinson (2004:8) illustrates that individuals ought to collaborate in light of the fact 
that it is socially ideal to do so. As individuals from society, it is in our individual 
“enlightened” self-interest to collaborate. The popular “prisoner’s dilemma” 
represents this as follows (Gillinson 2004:8):  
 Two culprits have been detained on suspicion of a crime and are hurled into 
prison and detained in two separate cells. The prisoners can pick either to take 
part (deny everything) or defect (admit to the crime and entangle the other 
man). The officials cannot arrest them without the confession of one or both 
men and so endeavour to cut a deal. 
 When just a single detainee confesses, the confessor will be set free for 
teaming up and will be absolved. The individual who remained silent will be 
hurled into jail with the harshest possible punishment for both the crime and 
for withholding evidence.  
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 When both detainees admit to the crime, they will both be sent to confinement, 
however, they will receive commuted sentences as a reward for their 
collaboration.  
 Both prisoners know for sure that without a confession from them, the police 
will be compelled to release them. 
 
4.3 IMPEDIMENTS TO MULTI-DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATIVE 
APPROACHES  
 
As a result of employing the multi-disciplinary approach, some obstacles will come 
to the fore which must be overcome to be effective. Change is not always embraced 
by everyone, even when the benefits far outweigh the weaknesses. Therefore, the 
team needs to take cognisance of the impediments to the multi-disciplinary 
approach to enable them to prepare effectively to overcome these hindrances. The 
objective in utilising the approach is to bring swift justice and root out corruption. 
The work of Gillinson (2004:9) indicates that the key issue of collective action is that 
natural competitiveness between individuals inspire us to work harder to be 
recognised. He believes individuals will be able to achieve more when society 
acknowledges their good work. What is best for society or the group is best for us 
as a part of it. In a large group, collective action will never happen unless particular 
conditions exist. Gillinson (2004:10) illuminates that criticisers neglect to assess the 
qualities which they see as making us human; feelings, excitement, and a 
constrained capacity to weigh up the advantages and drawbacks of a situation. 
Gillinson (2004:27) has drawn attention to the fact that we ought to participate in 
group efforts, because it gives people the feeling that social capital is the idealistic 
answer to all of society's issues. This is certainly not the case. Bridging social capital 
is different from bonding social capital, which is within social groups and is 
characterised by dense networks with people feeling a sense of shared identity and 
belonging. The bonding/bridging distinction can be made in relation to a range of 
relationship and network characteristics. The aspects that have been identified as 
the disadvantages of multi-disciplinary approaches will be discussed below. 
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4.3.1 Time Pressure 
Tang and Hsiao (2013) reveal that one of the inadequacies of multi-disciplinary 
approaches is the time requirement. Members of a multi-disciplinary group have to 
complete their own individual tasks, as well as spend time communicating and 
reacting to the challenges of the investigation.  
 
4.3.2 Differences in Backgrounds 
Tang and Hsiao (2013) explain that the other inadequacy is brought about by the 
differences in the backgrounds of the teammates. The primary contrast was at the 
level of their vocations. To sum up the inadequacy of multi-disciplinary coordinated 
effort, the findings were about the troubles brought on by time constraints and the 
distinction in backgrounds. 
 
4.3.3 Costs of Coercion 
As Gillinson (2004:5) perceptively states, a government is expected to arrange and 
implement coerced participation. That central authority will always be at an 
informational insufficiency. Information expenses are the real expenses of observing 
and policing coerced participation and they reduce its worth. The expenses linked 
to corrupt activities may be the cost of distorted information on the other hand. What 
is going on with the government and how would we know? Where there is not 
complete transparency, which is especially probable, the government is vulnerable 
to corrupt activities from the “failures” of participation. The conspicuous illustration 
is of a murky ‘competition commission’, which disregards conspiracy in the 
marketplace for a little compensation. Participation is diluted and gets to be 
insufficient.  
 
4.3.4 Specialisation/Concentration of Anti-Corruption Expertise 
De Sousa (2008; 2009) argues that it may be difficult for a single agency to embrace 
all fields of knowledge and special attention should be given to avoid 
compartmentalising fields of specialisation to the detriment of the desirable multi-
disciplinary approach to combatting corruption that should govern the agency’s 
work.  
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4.4 INTERNATIONAL MULTI-DISCIPLINARY MODELS 
 
Several multi-disciplinary approaches are currently being utilised internationally. 
These various approaches are not perfect, but could be utilised to develop an 
appropriate approach for a specific country’s needs. An overview of these models 
is discussed below. The International IDEA (2014) identifies three universal models 
utilised by ACAs: 
 Multi-Purpose Model. 
 Law Enforcement Model.  
 Court Proceedings Model. 
 
The decision of which model to implement relies upon local conditions, history, 
assets, the role played by existing ACAs, and political will.  
 
4.4.1 Multi-Purpose Model  
According to the International IDEA (2014), the Multi-Purpose Model is the most 
prevalent. It consolidates each of the three abilities depicted, namely: 
 investigation; 
 prevention; and 
 public educational outreach. 
 
Prominent illustrations are Hong Kong's ICAC; the ICAC in New South Wales, 
Australia; and the Republic of Botswana's DCEC. 
 
Klemenčič and Stusek (2008:30) elaborate that the Special Investigation Service in 
Lithuania and other foundations in Latvia, Poland, Uganda, South Korea, Thailand, 
Argentina, and Ecuador are additional examples of the Multi-Purpose Model. The 
International IDEA (2014) explains that most multi-purpose models take their 
motivation from Hong Kong. The Hong Kong mandate is exceptionally basic: 
 all allegations of corrupt activities would be investigated with a view to 
prosecute; 
 systems and strategies would be scrutinised with a specific end goal to 
eliminate from them any prospects for corrupt activities; and 
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 the public would be taught about the iniquities of corrupt activities and 
persuaded to support the battle. 
 
De Speville (2008) clarifies that the three anti-corruption activities are performed at 
the same time, as a major aspect of an all-inclusive approach. Singapore’s Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) is, moreover, seen as a multi-purpose 
foundation, yet is smaller than Hong Kong’s and participates in far fewer public 
outreaches. Meagher (2005:76) states that because the CPIB participates in fewer 
public outreaches, its financial plan is smaller (the Hong Kong ICAC paid out $16 
million for education and outreach), nonetheless, this risks decreased reputation 
and cuts down public support for its work. 
 
4.4.2 Law Enforcement Model 
The International IDEA (2014) states that the Law Enforcement Model, or the 
Investigative Model, conducts investigations concerning corrupt activities and role 
players. The Law Enforcement Model is the approach most widely adopted in the 
OECD nations, where a long-standing tradition of multi-party government and the 
separation of powers prompted the dispersal of anti-corruption activities to various 
different organisations. According to Klemenčič and Stusek (2008:40, 103–108, 
109–115, 121–32), the law enforcement model has been adopted in Norway, Spain, 
Croatia, Romania, Hungary, and Malta.  
 
Millie and Das (2016:230) explain that the Law Enforcement Model has various 
permutations, as indicated below: 
 it can incorporate detection, investigation, and prosecution bodies; or 
 merely investigation and prosecution. 
 
To comply with responsibilities allocated, these bodies are regularly given the ability 
to make use of the following in executing their mandates: 
 conduct covert surveillance; 
 intercept communications; 
 conduct covert investigations; 
 access individual financial information; and 
- 145 - 
 
 monitor financial dealings. 
 
Millie and Das (2016:230) found that to participate in such activities, a wide 
combination of aptitude is required, not all of which need to be similarly housed 
inside the ACA. In any case, an ACA may house the relevant specialities 
appropriately. Romania's National Anticorruption Directorate, housed in the National 
Prosecutor’s Office, contains various judicial police officers or investigators that 
spend a significant amount of time in various fields to be recognised as experts. 
These investigators are, basically, lent to the ACA for a spell of six years from 
different offices in the finance ministry and police force, among others.  
 
Larbi (2007:207) states that in-house investigators in financial matters, banking, 
auditing, information technology, and other fields complement them. Frequently the 
Law Enforcement Model incorporates components of prevention. Likewise, with the 
Multi-Purpose Model, assortments exist regarding jurisdictional mandates. A few 
bodies, for example, the non-operational South African DSO, investigated organised 
crime and human trafficking, notwithstanding political corrupt activities. Different 
organisations deal predominantly with economic and other crimes carried out by 
public officials in the execution of their official responsibilities, for example Spain’s 
Special Prosecutor’s Office against Corruption and Organized Crime (ACPO), a little 
unit with a staff complement of 30 housed inside the larger State Prosecution 
Service (Larbi 2007:207). Hatchard (2014:230) states that at the point when an anti-
corruption investigative unit is accommodated inside a more comprehensive 
prosecutorial agency, questions arise as to reporting hierarchy and the freedom to 
investigate and prosecute at their own discretion.  
 
4.4.3 Court Proceedings Model 
The International IDEA (2014) illuminates that individual nations position courts and 
prosecutors in different ways in the battle against corrupt activities. There are three 
basic models. The first is the universally handy Prosecutorial Model. Under this 
model, which is the most pervasive, a country prosecutes corrupt activities in its 
general legislative system and makes no novel institutional or procedural 
arrangements for cases in connection with corrupt activities. Given that the 
Prosecutorial Model offers no specific benefits over the general criminal justice 
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system in many nations, it remains the preferred model. The second institutional 
model is the Specialised Court Model and is concisely clarified as follows 
(International IDEA 2014): 
 A nation designates a particular court or; 
 special branch inside the judiciary; 
 to deal only with corruption cases; and 
 this is initiated by either an all-purpose prosecutor or a specialised prosecutor. 
This alludes to such courts as anti-corruption courts.  
 
In conclusion, under the specialised Prosecutorial Model, this might be merged with 
the Specialised Court Model. The Prosecutorial Model is described as follows 
(International IDEA 2014): 
 a nation vests special powers in an independent prosecutor;  
 a unit inside the general prosecutorial office with special responsibility 
regarding the prosecution of corrupt activity related crimes; or 
 specialised anti-corruption prosecutors are viewed as a kind of law 
enforcement. 
 
More commonly, the key difference between specialised prosecutors and ACAs is 
elementary investigative and prosecutorial powers.  
 
4.5 ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY 
 
Successful ACAs are an essential tool in the fight against corruption. The manner 
in which they are set up differs to address a country’s specific needs. Jennet (2007) 
indicates that anti-corruption institutions typically refer to independent publicly 
funded bodies with a specific mission to fight corruption by means of preventive and 
repressive strategies. Based on the successful examples of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and New South Wales (Australia), such specialised anti-corruption bodies are often 
regarded as a best practice and the ultimate institutional method to fight corruption. 
Consistent with this approach, most international instruments against corruption 
refer to the need to promote specialised and independent bodies and institutions in 
charge of fighting corruption.  
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Hussmann and Hechler (2008) perceptively state that Article 6 of the UNCAC 
explicitly calls state parties to establish an independent body to prevent corruption 
and provide adequate training, material resources, and specialised staff to ensure 
that it can fulfil its mandate effectively. In line with these recommendations, many 
countries have established a centralised independent commission or agency 
charged with the overall responsibility of combatting corruption. 
 
Jennet (2007) points out that within this framework, the institutional arrangements 
governing ACAs vary greatly across countries, including with regard to their level of 
specialisation and centralisation. Some countries have established a separate and 
centralised institution exclusively dealing with corruption, while others have opted 
for strengthening the anti-corruption capacity of a set of existing institutions or for a 
combination of both approaches. Some have also created several specialised 
bodies with complementary and sometimes overlapping mandates. 
 
4.5.1 Anti-Corruption Agency Design 
Transparency International (2013) draws attention to the fact that the anti-corruption 
design will depend on a variety of factors, including the following:  
 
 National ownership: national ownership in the design of the anti-corruption 
strategy is key to ensuring its effective implementation. In countries where anti-
corruption strategies have been adopted as an immediate response to 
corruption, scandals, or pressure from donors, rather than based on a genuine 
political commitment, their implementation has mostly failed. A successful 
implementation will depend to a great extent on a credible and committed 
leadership that demonstrates continued political will.  
 Participation: the involvement of political and social actors, including civil 
society groups, in the design as well as the implementation of anti-corruption 
policies is important, not only to ensure the buy-in and commitment of those 
involved, but also to guarantee that the most pressing issues are tackled and 
that the state has the necessary capacity to implement the agreed 
reforms/activities.  
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 Knowledgebase: a sound knowledge and information base can be particularly 
helpful in ensuring focused and practical action plans that are in line with the 
country’s main corruption problems. It also helps to ensure the correct 
prioritisation and sequencing of actions, as well as effective monitoring and 
evaluation of the progress made. This knowledge base can draw on corruption 
assessments, diagnostic tools, surveys, and feedback from citizens, among 
others. In practice, however, very few anti-corruption strategies are based on 
a concrete analysis of corruption challenges in a given country. 
 Content: the content of an anti-corruption strategy will vary according to the 
type of strategy chosen by a country (for instance, focus on prevention rather 
than enforcement, focus on regulations, or focus on internal control). 
McCusker (2006:260) reveals that an evaluation will help to define which kind 
of strategy would yield better results in the short- and long-term in that specific 
context. Reference to Hussmann and Hechler (2008) reveals that as 
previously mentioned, the great majority of countries have adopted a holistic 
approach, opting for national anti-corruption strategies that cover 
administrative and legal measures, as well as institutional strengthening.  
 
4.5.2 Anti-Corruption Agency Expertise  
The OECD (2013) indicates that expertise implies the availability of specialised staff 
with special skills and a specific mandate for fighting corruption. The nature of 
specialisation may differ from country to country, with anti-corruption skills either 
centralised in a separate body or built across existing institutions. As the OECD 
(2013) points out, specialisation tends to be ensured at the level of existing public 
agencies and law enforcement bodies in OECD countries. On the other hand, 
transition, emerging, and developing countries often establish separate specialised 
anti-corruption bodies due to the high level of corruption in other agencies, as well 
as in response to donor pressure. 
 
Jennet (2007) indicates that ACAs can also be specialised in terms of their 
competence. While some countries just give them a preventive, educational, and 
informative role, most ACAs have a three-pronged approach to fighting corruption 
(prevention, investigation, and prosecution) and are endowed with broad 
investigative and repressive powers. However, not all ACAs have prosecution 
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powers, which can also fall within the responsibility of the Judiciary. After an 
investigation, the matter is then referred to the general prosecutor, who exercises 
discretion on whether or not to bring criminal proceedings based on the evidence 
provided. 
 
4.6 SOUTH AFRICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES  
 
Although South Africa has several ACAs in the fight against corruption, they are still 
not as effective as countries with only one, e.g. Hong Kong. There is a growing 
tendency to prefer a single ACA, as long as the single agency approach is 
comprehensive in addressing prevention, investigation, and education in corruption. 
The NPC (2012) clarifies that alongside the complex framework of ethical codes, 
guidelines legislation, and in-house systems for the scrutiny of integrity, South Africa 
furthermore has an expansive extent of associations in a consolidated approach to 
the investigation of allegations of corrupt practices. These agencies are mentioned 
in the NDP 2030 as “the multi-agency anti-corruption system,” which include the 
following: 
 The SAPS and DPCI. 
 The SIU. 
 The Public Protector. 
 The AFU. 
 The NPA also needs to be understood as part of the anti-corruption 
architecture. The NPA of South Africa ([sa]) explains that the NPA houses not 
only the National Prosecuting Service, but also the AFU and other units such 
as the Specialised Commercial Crime Unit and Office of Witness Protection, 
which may also play a role in corruption cases. 
 The courts can also be seen as part of this enforcement machinery. 
 The Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), formerly the 
Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD).  
 The SARS. 
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4.7 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO INVESTIGATE CORRUPTION 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa is known for its ethnic diversity and, with 11 official languages, the 
country’s melting pot of cultures. The country is governed by the ruling party and 
has seven royal families with kings and queens. The traditional kings and senior 
leaders are symbolic figureheads in the country with little political power. It is 
customary to bring gifts upon visiting any of the kings, as a sign of respect. This is 
in most cases not permitted in business transactions and government, as it can be 
seen as corruption. With this broad cultural background, it is important to find 
common ground to effectively fight corruption. This section identifies some of South 
Africa’s approaches to curb corrupt practices. As the Amsterdam health & 
technology institute (Ahti) (2017) indicates that strategic planning also involves a 
number of broader considerations that are beyond the preservation of short-term 
capacity. Effective ACAs build upon public support and attain notable achievements 
to sustain momentum and shift the dynamics of the corruption environment. They 
promote societal norms against corruption and impunity. They foster political will for 
far-reaching reforms and form vital links in national anti-corruption systems. The 
ACIMC was established in June 2014 and is mandated to coordinate and oversee 
the work of state organs aimed at combatting corruption in the public and private 
sectors. The ACIMC (South Africa 2016) has indicated that they provide strategic 
direction for the operational activities of the multi-agency ACTT. A platform was 
created for state organs to work together in a multi-disciplinary approach to 
investigate multi-faceted corruption cases in the South African public service.  
 
Montesh (2009:72) explains that a multi-disciplinary group approach is needed to 
deal with investigations. This would yield better outcomes in the fight against corrupt 
activities. An effective multi-disciplinary approach by state organs in South Africa 
will only materialise if the outgoing and the incoming party have some sort of bi-
partisanship in the direction of a key governance policy. It is highly unlikely that this 
would be possible where such synergy does not exist between state organs, as is 
often the case. Some examples of multi-disciplinary approaches in the South African 
environment will be provided below.  
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4.7.1 The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation Approach 
The DPCI, which is also known as the Hawks, utilises the multi-disciplinary 
approach in the execution of its mandate.  
 
According to News24 (2009) at the launch of the Hawks in Johannesburg, 
Lieutenant-General Dramat (former Head of DPCI) said the battle against crime in 
South Africa required a combined, multi-disciplinary approach. Dramat stated that 
investigations previously conducted by the Scorpions will now resume at the newly 
established Hawks in coordination with the previous investigative teams. Dramat 
said we need to move far away from the “silo” approach that is pervasive in so many 
agencies entrusted with battling crime and corrupt activities (News24 2009). We 
have to surrender to a partnership and a multi-disciplinary approach that will benefit 
every South African. The Hawks have been mandated to deal with reporting under 
the PRECCA (South Africa 2004), section 34, which stipulates in the amendment 
legislation of the SAPS Amendment Act 10 of 2012 (South Africa 2012) that 
reporting ought to be made to any police officer. As far as the most recent alteration, 
all such crimes should now be reported to an individual from the DPCI. 
 
These diverse agencies that may be considered key role players in an integrated 
fight against corrupt activities are able to incorporate the National Intelligence 
Agency and the Office of the State Attorney (South African Government 2015). In 
his State of the Nation Address, former President Zuma (2013) alluded to the ACTT, 
which he purported to encompass the Hawks, the SIU, and the NPA. The AFU might 
be thought to be part of the ACTT by virtue of being situated inside the NPA. 
Furthermore, a few “hotlines” have been established by the government to 
encourage the exposure of assumed corrupt activities or additional problems. 
Makumbe (1999:8) believes that a rulebook should be used in the systematic 
intervention into activities concerning corruption in South Africa. He stipulated the 
succeeding rules: 
 effective coalition formation between governments, the private sector, and civil 
society; 
 effective information transaction networks; 
 annual evaluation conventions and strategic future planning; 
 a national database on corruption; 
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 transparency of the salaries of government officials, together with annual 
compulsory updating of a register of assets; and 
 arms trade transparency. 
 
4.7.2 The Directorate of Special Operations Approach  
The NPA (2006) indicates that the approach of the DSO was to draw in, develop, 
retain, and oversee individuals in a way that supports the multi-disciplinary approach 
of the DSO. The Scorpions’ justification for existing may have been best depicted 
when the then President Thabo Mbeki announced at the opening of Parliament 
(South African Government 1999) that a noteworthy and adequately staffed and 
equipped investigation unit would be built up accordingly to deal with all national 
priority crimes, as well as corruption within the police. The Directorate had 
fundamentally centred its endeavours around and set down particular guidelines for 
the admission of cases in the following major areas of crimes: 
 Organised criminal groups. 
 Multi-faceted and serious money-related crimes. 
 Corrupt activities in the public and private segment.  
 The crimes of racketeering and money laundering made as far as the 
provisions of POCA. 
 
The study of Berning and Montesh (2012:5) found that the DSO was a multi-
disciplinary agency that investigated and prosecuted organised crime and corrupt 
activities. The method utilised by the DSO depended on the troika principle, which 
coordinated intelligence, investigation, and prosecution. The DSO investigative 
group comprised: 
 investigators; 
 prosecutors; and 
 analysts who gathered intelligence data. 
 
After the completion of an investigation, the investigators would refer a case to court 
and the prosecutor who was included in the original phase of the investigation would 
lead the prosecution. Montesh (2009:130) states that the DSO used the troika 
principle. The methodology incorporates analysis/intelligence, investigation, and 
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prosecution. The NPA Annual Report (NPA 2006:50) describes the utilisation of the 
troika system by the DSO where the investigator sits with the prosecutor and 
intelligence ideally gathered from the initial stage of the investigation places them in 
an advantageous position. This infers that the prosecutor has inside knowledge of 
the case and part of the investigation process from the onset to secure a conviction, 
hence the claimed high conviction rate is achieved.  
 
4.7.3 The Special Investigating Unit Approach  
The SIU was established by the President of South Africa in terms of the Special 
Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996 (South Africa 1996a). Its 
primary mandate is to recover and prevent financial losses to the state caused by 
acts of corruption, fraud, and maladministration. 
 
The study of Berning and Montesh (2012:5) revealed that the Unit investigates 
matters from a civil perspective and institutes a civil action in the Special Tribunal. 
It does not investigate crimes, arrest criminals, or act through the criminal courts. 
On a cynical note, this may partly explain its phenomenal success. While the Unit 
does not institute criminal prosecutions, in terms of the relevant legislation, all 
matters of a criminal nature which come to its attention are referred to the relevant 
prosecutorial authorities in order to proceed with criminal prosecutions. In 
performing its functions, the Unit liaises closely with other bodies such as the 
Auditor-General, the Public Protector, the Attorney-General, and the SAPS, in order 
to coordinate investigations into matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Unit. 
The SIU assists departments with systemic improvements to enhance service 
delivery. When the commission of a crime by a department is uncovered through 
their processes, it is referred to the NPA. The SIU has selected personnel to 
complement the government’s initiative to combat corrupt activities. The SIU further 
assists in the civil recovery process of the illicit proceeds of crime. Montesh 
(2009:139) illuminates that the SIU, otherwise called the “Cobras”, utilises 
investigators, legal counsellors, forensic accountants, cyber experts, and analysts 
in multi-disciplinary investigations. As indicated by the PSC report (2011:73), the 
functions of the unit are intended to effectively combat maladministration, corrupt 
activities, and fraud, including the administration of state establishments, to secure 
resources and public funds and to institute civil litigation to remedy any crime. 
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4.7.4 South Africa’s National Anti-Corruption Forum Approach  
The NACS (South Africa 2016) explains that the National Anti-Corruption Forum 
(NACF) was launched in South Africa in Cape Town on 15 June 2001 to combat 
and prevent corrupt activities, build integrity, and raise the consciousness of the 
perils of corruption in the public sector. The NACF comprises three areas, namely 
civil society, business, and government, with each sector represented by 10 
members named by their electorates. According to the NACF, the Forum is 
dedicated to contributing towards the development of a national agreement through 
the coordination of each sector’s methodologies of anti-corruption; prompting 
government on national undertakings on the establishment of frameworks to fight 
corrupt activity; sharing data and best practice on anti-corruption activities; and 
educating sectors on the change with respect to sectoral anti-corruption strategies. 
 
The NACS (South Africa 2016) indicates that while the ‘legacy of apartheid’ is still 
blamed for many current corruption scandals, the South African Government has 
recognised the need to reform the systems that allowed corruption to flourish. To 
this end, it has established a strategic partnership approach that includes all sectors. 
Noteworthy is South Africa's National Anti-Corruption Forum, which involves key 
stakeholders that meet regularly to refine the vision of a corruption-free society in 
which each sector takes responsibility for its role. The NACF has a dedicated 
secretariat and a budget to develop cross-sectoral programmes that ensure different 
interest groups are aligned to a national anti-corruption agenda led by the 
government.  
 
4.7.5 The Asset Forfeiture Unit Approach 
The NPA (2014) revealed that the AFU enactment was to concentrate on Chapters 
5 and 6 of the POCA (South Africa 1998b); thus, to seize assets in relation to the 
illegal proceeds of crime, predominantly organised crime. The NACS (South Africa 
2016) reports that the AFU has set significant strategic aims. These include 
legislative enhancement with “test cases” and forming the legal precedents essential 
for the effective use of legislation; to build the capacity of the unit to ensure that 
asset forfeiture is used as widely as possible; to have an impact in fighting crime; 
and to have bearing on national priority crimes.  
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4.7.6 The National Prosecuting Authority Approach 
The NPA Act 32 of 1998 (South Africa 1998a) provides the NPA with the power to 
institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state and to carry out any necessary 
functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings. The NPA (2014) indicated 
that they have the power to institute and conduct criminal proceedings on behalf of 
the state, as well as carry out any necessary functions incidental to instituting and 
conducting such criminal proceedings (this includes investigation) and discontinue 
criminal proceedings. The Constitution (South Africa 1996b) allows for the creation 
of a single NPA in South Africa. 
 
4.7.7 The Independent Police Investigative Directorate Approach 
The IPID was enacted by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate Act 1 of 
2011 and it led to the replacement of the ICD (South Africa 2011). The ICD had to 
function according to Chapter 10, section 50 of the SAPS Act 68 of 1995 (South 
Africa 1995). With the amendment to this Act, the IPID replaced the ICD and has 
more powers. This is as a result of the IPID being an independent body promulgated 
according to section 208 of the Constitution (South Africa 1996b). With its improved 
powers, the IPID is tasked with investigating police officials’ involvement in corrupt 
crimes. The IPID commenced with inadequate resources, the most significant being 
a deficiency incompetent investigators. The NACS (South Africa 2016) reveals that 
currently, the IPID investigates deaths in police custody, deaths as a result of police 
action, and any complaint of the discharging an official firearm by a police officer. 
Their mandate has been expanded to include the investigation of rape cases 
committed by police officials. The aim of the IPID is the independent overseeing of 
the SAPS and the Municipal Police Service. The Directorate is tasked with 
conducting objective investigations of reported cases against members of the SAPS 
and the Municipal Police Service and to compile applicable recommendations. 
 
4.7.8 The South African Revenue Service Approach 
The SARS Act 34 of 1997 (South Africa 1997) was promulgated on 28 August 1997. 
The Act enabled the SARS to investigate people and entities for non-payment of 
income tax, customs, and excise duties. It made provisions for the efficient and 
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effective administration of revenue collecting in South Africa. The primary function 
of the SARS is to: 
 collect all revenues due; 
 ensure optimal compliance with tax and customs legislation; and 
 provide a customs service that will optimise revenue collection, protect South 
Africa’s borders, and facilitate legitimate trade. 
 
As Newham (2015) points out, the SARS has valuable information readily available 
on individuals or entities by fulfilling its mandate. True as this may be, the SARS Act 
34 of 1997 (South Africa 1997) has a clause preventing the SARS from sharing 
information directly with investigation agencies. One of the alternative avenues 
available is when a charge of money laundering is added, at which point section 73 
of the POCA (South Africa 1998b) can be used to obtain the relevant information 
from the SARS.  
 
4.7.9 The Public Protector Approach 
The Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 (South Africa 1994a) was amended by the 
Public Protector Amendment Act 113 of 1998 (South Africa 1998c) to create a more 
direct approach which was taken by the public protector in investigating public sector 
corruption and maladministration. The amendment to section 6 of the principal Act 
granted the public protector the discretion to resolve any dispute within its mandate 
or rectify an omission by means of mediation, conciliation, negotiation, advising the 
complainant, or by any other means, which may be expedient within the 
circumstances (South Africa 1998c). Furthermore, should the investigation reveal 
evidence with regard to the commission of a crime, the public protector must bring 
this to the attention of the relevant prosecuting authority within the Republic. 
Newham (2015) indicates that this approach goes beyond merely investigating 
corrupt activity, as was the status quo before the amendment. The office of the 
public protector would now have the ability to resolve matters of corruption within 
the public sector, and where the matter is of a criminal nature it can then be handled 
in terms of the criminal justice system. This effectively advances the fight against 
corruption in South Africa.  
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4.8 MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO INVESTIGATE CORRUPTION 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA  
 
Corruption is prevalent around the world and not just in developing countries. Hence 
there is a need to fight corruption globally as a collective and not in isolation. 
Therefore it is imperative to have a broad overview of these approaches in an 
attempt to not reinvent the wheel, but to enhance it. A study conducted by Newburn 
et al (2012:216) found that the move towards a genuine multi-agency crime 
reduction approach was frustrated by the absence of a formal decision-making 
structure to support those initiatives. The advantages offered by such a structure, 
and in particular as a means of prioritising resources, remained largely confined to 
the police. In this context, two policy drives were undertaken, namely: an 
intelligence-led policing approach and a partnership policing approach. The original 
approach of “problem-oriented policing” was to reduce the degree of what was 
called “means over ends” policing, whereby a lot of time was spent in reacting to 
individual incidents as they emerged, as opposed to adopting strategies to eradicate 
the underlining cause(s) of those incidents. 
 
Taylor (2015:24) makes it clear that the advantages of adopting a multi-disciplinary 
approach to understanding crime and criminality are numerous. One major 
advantage, however, of using a multi-disciplinary approach is the wide-ranging, 
multi-levelled, profound and in-depth analysis this enables. This further allows the 
ACA to engage in the speculation of nature, nurture, or nature-nurture interactive 
explanation of criminality and the purpose crime serves. A multi-disciplinary 
approach dealing with problem-solving includes drawing accurately from multiple 
disciplines to rethink problems outside of typical limits and achieve arrangements in 
view of an innovative comprehension of multi-faceted situations. Newburn et al 
(2012:290) revealed that the British criminal justice system has been commanded 
by a “partnership policing approach” and a “multi-agency policing approach” for over 
10 years, in an effort to root out corrupt activities, with some degree of success.  
 
4.8.1 The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Approach  
The APEC is a forum for 21 Pacific Rim member economies that promote free trade 
throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The APEC’s 21 member economies are the 
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USA; Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People’s Republic of China; 
Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New 
Guinea; Peru; the Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Republic of Korea; Chinese 
Taipei; Thailand; and Vietnam (APEC 2014). The APEC (2014) determines that the 
investigation of corruption cases is frequently multi-faceted since they, for the most 
part, include a multitude of pertinent role players and objectives, to assist in 
identifying the layers of the movement of assets, such as the movement of funds 
into various accounts, including placing assets in overseas jurisdictions in an effort 
to avoid detection from the authorities. Successful investigations of multi-faceted 
corruption cases are the after-effect of steadfast individual endeavours, as well as 
the outcome of some institutional prerequisites, which give a sufficient environment 
for such a triumph to transpire. The APEC (2014) reports that investigative groups 
might be relegated to a particular focus of people or concentrate only on specific 
aspects of the criminal case in multi-faceted investigations. For instance, one group 
may be occupied with tracing the proceeds of crime, while others consult with 
witnesses or sustain suspects’ surveillance. The primary objectives of an 
investigation are: 
 evidence group; 
 fact-finding, reconstruction; and 
 reporting to the applicable authorities.  
 
4.8.2 United Nations Convention against Corruption Approach  
During a UN General Assembly held on 31 October 2003, a resolution was passed 
which brought about the induction of the UNCAC on 14 December 2005. The UN 
(2004) reports that the UNCAC is a legally binding, universal anti-corruption 
instrument. The Convention covers five main areas: preventive measures, 
criminalisation and law enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, and 
technical assistance and information exchange. The UNCAC was set to address the 
scourge of corruption at a global level. The adoption of the UNCAC sends a clear 
message that the international community is determined to prevent and control 
corruption.  
 
Transparency International (2018a) reveals that the UNCAC requires that parties to 
the Convention ensure that they have a body responsible for corruption prevention, 
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and a body or persons responsible for combatting corruption through law 
enforcement. Good practice shows that anti-corruption specialisation in law-
enforcement bodies and in the prosecutorial service is the main mechanism in this 
field. The specialisation of anti-corruption bodies implies the availability of 
specialised staff with special skills and a specific mandate for fighting corruption. 
 
4.8.3 The Federal Bureau of Investigation Approach 
Comey (2014) explains that the FBI is a threat-focused, intelligence-driven 
organisation. Techniques incorporated in a multi-disciplinary approach through 
cooperation with law enforcement abroad and NGOs yielded positive results. This 
fills in as the model for the cooperation between governments, the state, and local 
law enforcement in attending to criminal behaviour. Through a multi-jurisdictional 
investigation that identifies emerging threats, the FBI focuses its endeavours on 
priority groups engaged in patterns of racketeering. This investigative model 
enables the FBI to target senior gang leadership and to initiate enterprise-based 
prosecutions. The FBI continues utilising techniques such as covert operations and 
interceptions to address criminal threats. Even though several of the FBI’s 
responsibilities are distinctive, its engagements in support of national security are 
comparable with the likes of the British MI5 and the Federal Security Service of the 
Russian Federation (FSB). In no way similar to the Central Intelligence Agency, 
which has no law enforcement functions and is focused on intelligence gathering 
abroad, the FBI is predominantly a domestic agency.  
 
4.8.4 Scotland Yard Approach 
Holden (2006:6) illuminates that the first organised crime detection took place as a 
result of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s novels about Sherlock Holmes. The unbelievable 
skill of the fictional detective to solve crimes from the smallest pieces of physical 
evidence inspired Scotland Yard to follow Holmes’ approach at a crime scene. The 
British incident impacted the improvement of a criminal investigation in the US, 
where large urban areas designed their police endeavours after the fruitful model in 
England. Doberkat, Hasselbring and Pahl (1996) explain that Scotland Yard’s goal 
is probably to implement and measure executable models of cooperative planning 
and intelligent algorithms. Numerous strategies have been implemented and 
measured. 
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4.8.5 The United Nations Approach  
Neyroud (2005:579) shares that the UN framework gives an arrangement of 
universal standards for good policing, in light of the fact that there is binding 
jurisdiction. These benchmarks are valuable in different settings, for example in 
police reform trajectories, post-conflict civil police missions, and subsequent 
preparation of the local law enforcement workforce, as well as global and cross-
border policing. 
 
4.8.6 The Asian Approach  
Den Boer and Pyo (2011:14) explain that in Asia, several states have no communal 
treaties, conventions, or codes shared by the police and organisations. It is not 
expected that in Asia, where political, ideological, religious, and border sensitivities 
exist throughout the entire region, an inter-governmental, regionally accommodating 
policing organisation will be created. The relative absence of police freedom from 
political powers in numerous Asian nations is likewise observed as a boundary to 
creating such a local policing body. In any case, different international and regional 
organisations add to the enhancement of Asian nations. Among these organisations 
that merit particular mention are: international inter-governmental organisations, for 
example the UN and the OECD; provincial cooperative bodies, for example the Asia-
Europe Meeting and the Organisation of Southeast Asian Nations; international 
financial organisations, for example the World Bank and Asian Development Bank; 
as well as international and regional civil rights NGOs, for example Amnesty 
International, Transparency International, and the Asian Human Rights 
Commission. 
 
4.8.7. The OECD Approach 
The OECD held a convention specifically designed for developing countries. The 
OECD (2012) points out that corruption constitutes a threat to freedom of trade and 
competition in international business transactions. It is intended to reduce corruption 
by imposing sanctions related to bribery and involving countries that are member 
states. Its aim is to create an economic environment that provides equal 
opportunities for everyone. Davids (2012:111) revealed that member states are also 
mandated to legislate against the bribing of foreign public officials, which aids the 
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fight against international corruption. Governments have responded to the problems 
of corruption in various ways, including campaigns to combat corruption, evaluation 
of the rules applying to public officials, and the adoption of service charters and 
codes of conduct. In this context, the OECD has been helping its member countries 
to review and reform the institutions, systems, and conditions used to promote ethics 
in the public sector. This OECD work on public sector ethics contributes to the global 
battle against corruption by addressing the “demand side” of the corruption 
equation.  
 
Additionally, Rose-Ackerman and Lagunes (2015:152) indicate that the OECD is an 
organisation that provides a meeting ground for nations that have confidence in the 
free market system. The OECD has the responsibility to talk about problems and 
achieve understandings, some of which are legitimately binding. The OECD 
adopted a multi-disciplinary approach to combat corrupt activities. This approach 
grasps work in various fields, for instance combatting corrupt activities of public 
officials abroad, financial policy, public sector governance, private sector integrity, 
development aid, and export credits. An all-embracing theme in contributors’ efforts 
to combat corrupt activities is policy coherence – assuring that strategies to 
accomplish one aim, similar to the recuperation of assets redirected from 
development purposes, are not undermined by different strategies, for instance, 
banking secrecy. The endorsement and enactment of international agreements, for 
instance, the UNCAC, are sound, coherent donor country approaches. 
 
4.8.8 Transparency International Approach 
Transparency International (2014) shares that they are an autonomous ACA which 
is properly funded and can be a strong weapon in the fight against corrupt activities. 
They require mutual corroboration between the government, judiciary, and law 
enforcement if they are to execute their mandate. Initially, the ACC was introduced 
in Singapore during 1952, followed by Malaysia and Hong Kong, which gave Asia 
the status of being the “cradle” of ACAs. At present, there are around 150 such 
offices all throughout the world. They are planned through expansive political accord 
and are seen by most role players as a definitive reaction in an attempt to limit 
corrupt activities. In any case, they can find themselves the focal point of political 
controversy on the off chance that they decide to investigate those in power. 
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Transparency International is an international NGO with the goal to combat global 
corruption. It publishes data in various forms, such as the CPI, and also publishes 
a Global Corruption Report, a Global Corruption Barometer, and a Bribe Payers 
Index. The CPI ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public 
sector is perceived to be, and also gives the views of observers from around the 
world.  
 
According to Transparency International (2017), South Africa scored 43 in the latest 
CPI assessment. The country’s position has fluctuated substantially in recent years; 
it tended to decrease from 2003 to 2017. The country has dropped 34 places on the 
CPI since 2001. It is clear that there is a propensity to decrease. From a global 
perspective, South Africa was ranked 71 out of 180 countries. 
 
4.8.9 Global Advances in Combatting Corruption 
The Government of the UK (2016) points out that understanding the UK and other 
global advances in legislation to combat corrupt activities and enforcement is an 
authoritative part of comprehension which requires the compliance of organisations 
by several enforcement authorities around the world. It also serves as a reminder of 
the high cost of neglecting to those requirements. Clear patterns have developed in 
the last few years with the establishment of a global fight against corrupt activities 
(Government of the UK 2016): 
 More jurisdictions have stepped up to implement legislation to combat corrupt 
activities, including Canada, Brazil, and Ukraine at present.  
 Companies now comply with an assortment of investigations. For example, 
China’s investigation relating to GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) has been shadowed 
by additional investigations in relation to GSK in Poland, the UK, and the USA. 
 The USA has continued with its aptitude to enforce colossal monetary 
sentences by negotiated settlement agreements.  
 In 2014 the UK’s SFO described investigations into corrupt activities in relation 
to Rolls Royce, as well as GSK, and instigated the prosecution of Alstom. 
 In the UK and the USA, there is an emphasis on the importance of an 
organisation’s methodology to combat corrupt activities and on its response to 
accusations of crime in relation to the sentences for involvement in corrupt 
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activities. Organisations, such as Credit Suisse, that have fumbled in their in-
house investigations relating to corrupt activities, have been confronted with 
bigger sentences. The Morgan Stanley story offers valuable insights to the 
commonly asked question: “What is enough when it comes to compliance?” It 
also shows that no matter how good a global company’s compliance 
programme is, no company is immune from rogue employees. The lesson here 
is that not every crisis needs to be front-page news or a scandal that brings a 
business to the brink of disaster. 
 Both the USA and the UK have shown that they will prosecute people for the 
role they played in their organisation’s conduct in corrupt activities, using 
evidence secured in the investigation of such an organisation.  
 The UK introduced the DPA prior to 2015, permitting a negotiation between 
organisations and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) under legal supervision to 
resolve corruption accusations by agreements which will impact on future 
conduct. 
 The effect of these patterns is to place more noticeable emphasis on the 
importance of organisations’ strategies against corrupt activities and on their 
respective responses to the accusation of their involvement in criminal 
conduct.  
 Organisations currently face a multitude of investigations. For example, GSK 
is Britain’s biggest drugmaker. Chinese authorities found GSK guilty of bribing 
both hospitals and doctors to help promote their products in China, using a 
network of nearly 700 travel agencies to pay medical professionals, health-
related organisations, and government officials. According to Chinese 
authorities, GSK funnelled about ¥3 billion, or US$482 million, through this 
network to recipients. 
 
4.9 INDEPENDENCY OF A MULTI-AGENCY APPROACH 
 
The UNDP (2005) states that the independence of the agency is a fundamental 
requirement for its effectiveness, and broadly refers to the ability of the institution to 
carry out its mission without interference from powerful individuals or the political 
elite. Hussmann and Hechler (2008) explain that the concept of independence can 
be understood in terms of organisational, financial, and functional independence 
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and the institutional setup for ensuring independence needs to be context-specific. 
When there is no coordination, the resources of government are not allocated to 
sufficiently address the needs of an ACA, preventing it from being effective in its 
activities. It is, therefore, important to consider potential jurisdictional conflicts with 
other agencies involved in the fight against corruption, provide institutional clarity, 
and make sure that the establishment of the specialised agency does not undermine 
other existing structures. Independent involvement in a multi-agency approach also 
avoids misunderstandings where the police have developed a particular approach 
that may exclude others from participating. Therefore, while independent advisers 
are an outward and visible sign of openness and accountability, they can also 
challenge police mindsets and assumptions. This helps to build confidence and trust 
in the police. The work of Lewis and Stenning (2014:11) assert that the DPCI is at 
a crossing point. The Constitutional Court judgment in Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 48/10) [2011] ZACC 6 has raised 
uncertainty about the Directorate’s continued existence within its present frame. An 
essential stance among the most rudimentary questions raised by the Constitutional 
Court judgment is whether the DPCI can be sufficiently independent while situated 
inside the SAPS. This article presents disputes in support of the view that detaching 
the unit from the SAPS is fundamental to building public trust in the unit and to meet 
the provisions of the judgment. 
 
4.9.1 The Role of Media Independence in Combatting Corruption 
Camerer (2008) shares that the independent media play a significant part in 
uncovering and reporting cases of corruption, including revealing the conduct of 
agencies in government that fight corrupt activities and following up on how these 
agencies manage the problem. The research-based NGOs, for example the Public 
Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC), Institute for Security Studies, and the IDASA, 
likewise play a vital role in advocating for legislative and strategic variations, for 
example in corruption legislation, access to information, and budgetary scrutiny of 
public bodies where funds are used in transactions for goods and services in 
government. An involved citizenry structured into NGOs that demand more 
accountability and responsiveness in government is part of an effective fight against 
corrupt activities. 
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4.10 THE IMPORTANCE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES  
 
ACAs have the mammoth task of ridding society of corruption and in return enable 
countries to prosper, as funds are then utilised for the purpose intended. Good 
governance is paramount for meeting the developmental goals of a state and in 
fighting corrupt practices. ACAs should build an awareness of the dangers of 
corruption by recommending changes to public service procedures that currently 
create opportunities for corruption in government agencies, and to spread anti-
corruption messages through public education and community outreach 
programmes. They should have a comprehensive mandate which includes 
prevention, education, and investigation of corruption to be effective. As Quah 
(2011:584) points out, when a country is well-governed (like Singapore), it is less 
likely to suffer from corruption, because the government impartially implements 
various anti-corruption measures. Conversely, if a country is poorly governed (like 
China or the Philippines), it is more likely to be afflicted by rampant corruption, 
because the government lacks the political will to impartially implement the anti-
corruption measures. De Speville (2008) has drawn attention to the fact that anti-
corruption agencies are usually created when corruption has spread so widely and 
the police are so corrupt that offences of bribery are no longer investigated or 
prosecuted. In a desperate attempt to stop the rot, the government establishes the 
ACA, half believing that the problem will then disappear. The passing of new 
legislation to combat corrupt activities along with additional penalties had no impact, 
as the problem keeps getting worse. Many of these agencies fail dismally to have 
any impact on corrupt practices, as collaboration amongst the various institutions is 
quite essential to be effective in the fight against corruption. An ACA should be 
entrusted with comprehensive authority, and be subjected to oversight themselves. 
The two main components of oversight should be:  
 firstly, the transparent administration of the ACA itself; and 
 secondly, its answerability to the various offices in government. 
 
De Sousa (2010:15) mentions that the rationale of ACAs is to have accountability in 
government by advancing forthright practices, however, rule of the law, human 
rights guidelines, and due processes must be followed. In general, society ought to 
have access to the work ACAs are conducting. The reports should be published 
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through accessible forums, for example, the Internet. There ought to be a code of 
ethics and disciplinary procedures that guard over their investigative duties. 
Although difficult, the ACA should be able to operate without undue political 
interference. An alternative is to subject the ACA to be reviewed by an outside board 
of trustees, which is staffed by delegates of various government organisations, for 
example, parliament and the legation, including the private segment.  
 
The Kingdom of Thailand (2007:4) clarifies that they have adopted an alternate 
strategy in the oversight of the ACA. The parliamentary frameworks require an ACA 
to answer to a parliamentary board of trustees made out of both the ruling party and 
secondary party from the governing body of the ACA. This practice has been 
applauded by the UN in that the practice appears to be transparent. Nino (2013) 
concludes that combatting corruption is vital to change the norm of unlawfulness 
that reaches out all over the country without many exceptions. Without a versatile 
message from justice institutions, individuals will keep assuming that some 
politicians are corrupt, because numerous public officials exploit their powerful 
positions.  
 
4.10.1 Governance and Corruption 
The work of Shah (2007:243) reveals that “corruption is itself a symptom of 
fundamental governance failure, developing countries can be classified into three 
broad categories – high, medium, and low – reflecting the incidence of corruption.” 
Turning to Quah (2015:145), one finds that “countries with high corruption have a 
low quality of governance, those with medium corruption have fair governance, and 
those with low corruption have good governance.” Kaufman, Kraay & Mastruzzi 
(2005:3) found that the quality of governance in a country can be assessed in terms 
of the following indicators: 
 
a) Voice and accountability:  
“The extent to which citizens can participate in the selection of their governments; 
and the independence of the media, which monitor those in authority and hold them 
accountable for their actions” (Kaufman et al 2005:5-12). As Quah (2015:156) 
states, a country’s policy should be conducive for curbing corruption.  
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b) Political stability and absence of violence:  
“Perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilised or 
overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic 
violence and terrorism” (Kaufman et al 2005:5-12). 
 
c) Government effectiveness: 
“The quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political 
pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies” (Kaufman 
et al 2005:5-12). 
 
d) Regulatory quality: 
“The incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate 
bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive 
regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development” (Kaufman et 
al 2005:5-12). 
 
e) Rule of law:  
Those indicators which “measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society”, namely: “perceptions of the incidence of crime, the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts” 
(Kaufman et al 2005:5-12). Graycar and Prenzler (2013:384) perceptively state that 
in addition to the fact that it undermines good governance, the corruption of the rule 
of law also decreases service quality and efficiency in the government and at the 
same time threatens the pillars of democracy, justice, and the economy. 
 
f) Control of corruption:  
“Perceptions of corruption are conventionally defined as the exercise of public power 
for private gain” (Kaufman et al 2005:5-12) amongst the various ACAs in Singapore, 
China, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan. Given their shape and functions, these 
corrupt associations have become pivotal in the decentralised control of corruption.  
 
The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs 
somewhat, ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done”, 
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to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring “grand 
corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in “state 
capture”. 
 
4.11 RATIONALE FOR INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES  
 
Marc, Verjee and Mogaka (2015:135) perceptively state that corrupt activities 
debilitate the steadiness and security of the general public and, in addition, corrupt 
activities undermine the foundations and values of a democratically elected 
government. Where corruption prevails, ethical values and justice are in peril, as 
well as the sustainable progression and the rule of law.  
 
Chêne (2014) clarified that Transparency International has defined corrupt activities 
as “the abuse of power for private gains”. Corrupt activities can transpire in quite a 
few structures, for instance, “administrative corruption”, or the utilisation of private 
payments to public officials to interfere with the prescribed implementation of official 
rules and policies. Lex Mundi (2014) supports the view of Chêne by expressing that 
by taking a strong position on promoting transparency and fighting corrupt activities, 
companies alleviate reputational risk, as well as carry out their duty as corporate 
citizens, and can take an active part in developing explanations for a slice of the 
biggest problems currently confronting the global arena. 
 
Quah (2009:590) explains that there are many expected benefits to the creation of 
centralised anti-corruption bodies and, although they can't be considered a silver 
bullet, they are largely perceived as having the potential to stimulate a more 
successful coordination of the local fight against corrupt practices by focusing 
powers in a self-contained agency and bringing specialisation, independence, and 
self-governance to the battle against corrupt practices. In particular, some authors 
consider that such interventions, among other advantages, can result in: 
 enhanced public profile;  
 the concentration of expertise; and  
 reduced uncertainty over jurisdictions by avoiding duplication of powers.  
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The OECD (2013) indicates that clear rules of engagement need to be designed for 
the ACA(s) to effectively interact and cooperate with other agencies and institutions 
involved in anti-corruption related activities. 
 
4.11.1 Historical Information of Anti-Corruption Agencies 
As stated by Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest (2016), agencies similar to ACAs are 
often called arm’s length bodies of government. These agencies are an essential 
part of successful operations of government administrations. They provide a 
comprehensive array of executive functions, such as giving professional advice, 
safeguarding the Constitution, and providing employment for most of the public 
service officials.  
 
In addition, Gash, Magee, Rutter and Smith (2010) and De Sousa (2009) reveal that 
more research needs to be conducted on the functions of ACAs. Preceding research 
has reduced concerns surrounding their autonomy, conviction, responsibility, 
representativeness and specific references to their legality. Therefore, it is important 
to first discuss the legality of an ACA, and then provide a summary of the aims and 
objectives of the ACA. This will accentuate the various anti-corruption functions 
assigned to a specific ACA.  
 
4.11.2 Impediments to Anti-Corruption Agencies  
The work of Quah (2015:152) found that there are various reasons why ACAs fail to 
fulfil their mandates. These impediments which ACAs should guard against is as 
follows:  
 Weak political will. 
 Deficiency of resources. 
 Political interference. 
 Fear of consequences. 
 Doubt in benefits. 
 Unrealistic aims and expectations. 
 Traditional reliance on enforcement alone. 
 Failure to understand the nature of corruption. 
 Lack of strategy. 
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 Inadequate legislation. 
 Lack of coordination. 
 Minimal community involvement. 
 Insufficient accountability. 
 Selectivity in investigations. 
 Failure to develop public trust. 
 The agency itself becoming corrupt. 
 
As pointed out in the Strategic Plan for Continuation Period 2018 – 2024 (Ahti 2017), 
the political climate brings about that commanders of ACAs continuously have to 
walk a thin line to determine which of the inadequate resources should be allocated 
to a specific investigation. They have to guard against allegations of prejudice and 
the abuse of power. They persistently need to find the equilibrium in the impartiality 
of investigations and what some may see as a “Witch Hunt” against certain 
department or individuals. De Speville (2008) points out that ACA leaders have to 
find their way in the dark when investigating all the reports on corrupt activities, 
whilst executing multi-faceted corruption investigations with inadequate resources 
and the execution of special investigation techniques to identify possible suspects. 
Level-headed commanders assess the pros and cons of the investigation by means 
of clear-headed and analytical thinking before blindly commencing with a particular 
strategy. Kuris (2013) reveals that high-visibility can unnecessarily place the 
spotlight on investigations, which could portray a prejudiced investigation process. 
In Slovenia, “there was a time when the prosecutor general and the police were 
heavily against me, and if we had made one mistake, they would have blown me 
away. You have to adhere to the law strictly” (Kuris 2013). The slightest slip-up 
would be blown out of proportion by the media. 
 
4.11.3 The Efficacy of Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Camerer (1999:2) reveals that the features of an effective ACA, as pointed out by 
renowned authors, include the following: integrity, political will, adequate resources, 
independence, and competency of manpower. Even with the allocation of relevant 
resources, there are still various key aspects that need to be addressed for an ACA 
to be effective. They need to have appropriate, competent manpower and adequate 
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resources, special legislative powers, advanced intelligence, coordination and, most 
importantly, operational independence. This is supplemented by Heilbrunn’s 
(2004:18) statement that the essential key features of an effective ACA consist of: 
independence, a pure reporting hierarchy, and political will to permit high-level 
investigations into government actions which may be politically testing.  
 
Stapenhurst and Langseth (1997:324-325) support that for an ACA to be effective, 
the following must be in place: political will, operational independence, adequate 
legislation, access to documentation, and the ability to question witnesses and 
commanders with high ethical standards. Transparency International (2014:41) 
indicates that as corrupt practices become even more sophisticated, conventional 
law enforcement agencies are not well-placed to detect and prosecute corruption 
cases. Therefore, it is recommended that ACAs must specialise in corruption and it 
is imperative to safeguard their independence. Along with these functions, they 
should also execute the functions of prevention and education of public officials on 
the red flags of corrupt activities. They need to have comprehensive intelligence 
gathering processes, receive reports on corruption, and be able to advise 
government and private agencies on corruption-related activities. Jennet and 
Hodges (2007:2) state that the selection criteria for ACA members must be 
transparent and clearly defined to ensure that no corrupt members are selected. 
The ACAs must have the necessary restraint in the employment of members with a 
political agenda. Pope and Vogl (2000:18) concur that the selection criteria must be 
transparent. They recommend procedures to ensure that only members with high 
ethical standards be employed at ACAs, and that the members of ACAs must 
safeguard against political interferences with the fulfilment of their duties. Jennet 
and Hodges (2007:2) reveal that comparative analysis of ACAs recommends that 
ACAs should employ competent members with high ethical standards with an 
aptitude to fight corruption in the public sector. This will either result in the success 
or failure of the ACA’s ability to combat corrupt practices along with the 
trustworthiness and efficiency of the agency. 
 
Transparency International (2014) indicates that in 2012 the criteria, principles, and 
functions of effective ACAs were agreed upon by the anti-corruption community.  
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Some of the prevalent key aspects recommended for effective ACAs is as follows:  
 They need to have a comprehensive and transparent mandate to combat 
corrupt activities with relevant legislation.  
 ACA heads and members must be independently appointed, with the 
assurance that they can only be dismissed through properly established 
processes by law.  
 The ACAs should hold themselves to high ethical standards in the execution 
of their duties and remain above reproach.  
 During any political predicaments (for example, Thailand) no side may “hijack” 
the agenda of the ACA and the work should be allowed to continue free from 
threats and intimidation.  
 
A study by Ahti (2017) shows that ACAs of Croatia, Indonesia, Latvia, and Slovenia 
followed a conscious decision to adopt a high-visibility approach in the fight against 
corrupt practices. They exclusively pursue “big fish” cases and commenced with 
criminal proceedings from the onset. Granting that such an approach will consume 
most of the ACAs’ limited resources and might provoke controversy, a successful 
criminal process often builds public support and sends a message that corruption 
does not pay. In Latvia, Ahti (2017) found that exposing judicial corruption gives rise 
to impartial rulings at corruption trials.  
 
4.11.4 Single Anti-Corruption Agency  
Meagher and Voland (2006:10) observe that Hong Kong, through the ICAC, has 
provided the standard for powerful, centralised ACAs. The issue of having one ACA 
in South Africa has been debated by a number of researchers, including Meagher 
and Voland (2006:14), Camerer (1999:8), and the PSC (2011:3), and there have 
been some conflicting opinions. The PSC (2011:5) indicates that the question is 
whether South Africa can afford a single agency approach to combat corrupt 
activities as recommended. Although it had some backing, the concept of 
establishing a single ACA in South Africa raised concerns regarding its location, 
budget, and mandate. The PSC (2011:5) states that it does not support a single 
ACA, since the current agencies are effective. The PSC highlighted the need to 
determine the viability of a single ACA and the disadvantages of forming a single 
ACA. The PSC (2011:5) elaborated that it would entail another layer of government 
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to the law enforcement sector which will result and the reallocation of scarce 
resources from other agencies and other government priorities. Through their reply, 
it is obvious that there is no political will to have a single ACA to combat corrupt 
activities.  
 
As Camerer (1999:11) perceptively states, the key aspects for an effective ACA can 
be determined by reviewing successes in the fight to curb corrupt practices in both 
Hong Kong and South Africa. The criminal investigation process is fundamental to 
the ICAC’s mandate; its functions are reinforced by an adequately resourced police 
force and criminal justice system. The ICAC functions with political will, whereas in 
South Africa tension exists when it comes to government resources to deal with 
corrupt activities and an ineffective criminal justice system to combat corruption 
makes the weaknesses in the system apparent. Heilbrunn (2004:15) explains that 
the primary function is to provide centralised leadership in the core areas of anti-
corruption activity, which include policy analysis and technical assistance, 
monitoring, investigation, and prosecution. It can be inferred that ACAs are intended 
to spearhead the fight against corrupt activities. Majila, Taylor and Raga (2018) 
found that there is evidence that ACAs are essential in the fight against corruption. 
From the literature studied it is evident that Hong Kong’s ICAC embodies a universal 
model for ACAs. The functions of this model are investigation, prevention, and 
communication. The New South Wales ICAC takes a similar approach to fight 
corruption as that of Hong Kong’s ICAC. However, the New South Wales ICAC 
reports to parliament and is independent of the executive and judicial branches of 
state. South Africa has adopted a multi-disciplinary approach that includes a number 
of state organs which are meant to be separate, but together weave a web of 
agencies to fight corruption. However, this is not happening. As exposed by the 
literature review, the model is riddled with problems. Thus, it is important to review 
successful ACAs as well as the operation of solo ACAs with a comprehensive 
mandate to prevent, investigate, and educate on corrupt activities.  
 
4.11.5 Countries without Specialised Bodies 
The OECD (2013) revealed that not all countries have specialised bodies to fight 
corruption. Some countries like Mongolia, Nicaragua, or Columbia, for example, 
have built their anti-corruption expertise within existing institutions in the form of 
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specialised units in the public prosecutor’s office. Countries like South Africa, 
Bulgaria, and Germany have also opted for strengthening existing institutions rather 
than creating a separate body. This approach is able to be as effective as ACAs, 
providing that such ACAs have independence, adequate resources, and competent 
members to fight corruption.  
 
4.11.6 Collective Anti-Corruption Agency  
Transparency International (2013) accentuates that there is no blueprint for 
designing and implementing an effective anti-corruption policy and, to be successful, 
it is fundamental that the strategy is tailored to the country’s context. Chêne (2012) 
points out that with the recommendations put forward by international organisations 
such as the World Bank, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and 
the UNDP, taking into account their experience with anti-corruption policies so far, 
it is possible to identify key features that are instrumental in the design and 
implementation of any anti-corruption strategy. 
 
4.12 OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES  
 
Merry, Davis and Kingsbury (2015:16) assert that several studies have been 
directed to better understand the rationale behind the occurrence of corrupt 
activities, with the objectives to discover strategies that would assist in efficiently 
addressing corruption in South Africa. Some of the strategies are revealed in this 
section.  
 
Numerous countries have opted to use a single anti-corruption strategy. However, 
policy-making has taken different forms and is being applied in diverse ways, with 
mixed results. While there is no single best practice for ACAs, experience has 
shown that anti-corruption strategies are highly likely to fail when the strategies are 
not in line with the country’s own specificities and characteristics. 
 
Evans (1999:18) expounds that international activities are strengthened and 
supported by Transparency International, the World Bank, the European Union, the 
Council of Europe, and the USA Law on Foreign Corruption Practices. Some 
Western countries have drawn up enactments on money laundering, and some 
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African countries, including South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania, and 
Kenya, have established anti-corruption units. Van Vuuren (2014:7) refers to the 
international agreements which were signed between 1999 and 2003, stating that 
their aim was to make the most of the legislation, which includes the following:  
 The SADC Protocol Against Corruption. 
 The AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
 The UN Convention against Corruption. 
 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
 
The PSC (2011) clarifies that two of the finest law enforcement agencies around the 
world, namely Scotland Yard and the FBI, were asked to help the former DSO in 
building up their investigative capacity. These agencies made a valuable 
contribution towards the DSO’s investigation capacity until they were 
unceremoniously disbanded in 2009.  
 
4.12.1 Australia: Anti-Corruption Agency  
The OSISA (2017) reveals that Australian law enforcement agencies see the bigger 
picture of organised and transnational crime. The bigger picture cannot be seen if 
information and intelligence remain separated in multiple agencies. Fusion is the 
process of integrating and analysing those multiple sources. So far, the project has 
informed the design of various initiatives, including the Counter-Terrorism Control 
Centre and the Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce. Plans are also underway to 
establish the Australian Cyber Security Centre. The Australian Criminal Intelligence 
Commission (ACIC) brings together specialists from different government agencies 
and different levels of government, with access to multiple information and 
intelligence holdings. The ACIC includes staff from the Australian intelligence 
community, the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Taxation Office, 
Australia’s financial intelligence unit (AUSTRAC), the national welfare agency 
(Centrelink), the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, and law enforcement 
agencies. Staff from these diverse agencies contribute their expertise to financial 
investigations, operational psychology, data-mining, statistical analysis, database 
management, and architecture.  
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The ACIC put the pieces together from different agencies to produce a more 
comprehensive picture of criminal targets, risks, threats, and vulnerabilities. 
Although only established in 2010, the benefits of the project are already apparent. 
For example, in early 2013, the ACIC detected a series of suspicious international 
transactions from Australia valued in excess of A$20 million. Intelligence also 
showed the use of false identities and credit cards. Following this detection, 
Australian law enforcement agencies located two significant methyl amphetamine 
laboratories. The ACIC has also paid dividends for the detection of international 
money laundering and the recovery of assets. For example, in late 2012, the ACIC 
identified likely proceeds of crime in excess of A$38 million being transferred to a 
foreign jurisdiction. In another investigation, significant money laundering involving 
professional facilitators was identified. These detections are now being investigated 
(OSISA 2017). 
 
4.12.2 Republic of Botswana: Anti-Corruption Agency  
The OSISA (2017) expounds that the DCEC in the Republic of Botswana was 
established in September 1994. It was placed under the CECA model and staffed 
by the former members of the Hong Kong agency as well as local personnel. The 
Directorate is an operationally autonomous law enforcement agency. The legal 
mandate of the DCEC is to combat corruption. It can investigate, prosecute 
suspects, and prepare strategies to combat corruption, as well as provide public 
education and training. The Botswanan CECA was enacted in 1994 to create the 
DCEC.  
 
The work of Kuris (2012:2) reveals that there was an urgent need for this 
arrangement, because the Republic of Botswana was witnessing a series of 
corruption scandals involving heads of government agencies and top government 
functionaries in the early 1990s. The DCEC had the mandate to investigate, prevent, 
and educate the public on corruption issues and took over the investigation of 
corruption cases in the Republic of Botswana. 
 
4.12.3 Federative Republic of Brazil: Anti-Corruption Agency  
The OSISA (2017) clarifies that the office of the Comptroller General (CGU) is an 
office of the government accountable for helping the President of the Federative 
- 177 - 
 
Republic of Brazil with issues inside the official branch that concern safeguarding 
public resources and improving the transparency of the administration through 
internal control exercises, open reviews, remedial and disciplinary measures, 
corruption prevention and combat, and the coordination of ombudsman's activities. 
The CGU is additionally responsible for overseeing all departments in government 
that make up the inside control framework, the disciplinary framework, and the 
ombudsman's units of the federal executive branch, providing direction as required. 
 
4.12.4 China: Anti-Corruption Agency  
Quah (2013:85) points out that indeed it will be difficult for China to minimise 
corruption as long as the Communist Party of China (CPC) is unwilling to introduce 
checks on its power. The work of Manion (2016:5) reveals that the lead ACA in 
China, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), can trace its roots 
to the establishment of the CPC’s disciplinary supervisory commission in 1927. The 
CCDI was re-established in 1978. As the CPC’s disciplinary organ, the CCDI, is 
responsible for enforcing internal discipline among party members. Quah 
(2015:155) has pointed out that it is difficult to implement political reforms in China, 
as China is the only Communist state among the five Asian countries and it would 
be extremely difficult and unlikely for the CPC to introduce the necessary political 
reforms to enhance the CCDI’s effectiveness in curbing corruption. The limitations 
faced by the CCDI result from the CPC’s preference for disciplining their corrupt 
members internally, and its reliance on using corruption as a weapon against its 
political opponents. This means that these two obstacles can only be removed with 
the CPC’s approval. However, in view of the CPC’s entrenched position in China’s 
political system, it is unrealistic to expect the CPC leaders to initiate fundamental 
political reforms to undermine their power for the foreseeable future. Reference to 
Quah (2015:147) reveals that the CCDI implements the CPC’s political order by 
investigating violations of its codes and complement China’s anti-corruption 
activities. The Agency Against Corruption (AAC) has indicated that the CCDI was 
inaugurated in 1978. The CCDI is the lead ACA in China, a task with the following 
ACA functions (OECD 2013):  
 upholding the Constitution and other important rules and regulations of the 
CPC; 
 assisting the respective party committees to rectify the party’s behaviour; and  
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 monitoring the implementation of the principles, policies, and decisions of the 
CPC. 
 
4.12.5 Georgia: Anti-Corruption Agency  
Di Puppo (2010:220) conceptualises the anti-corruption discourse of the Georgian 
Government after the Rose Revolution as a creative assemblage of diverse 
elements. Various elements are used depending on which constraints, national or 
international, the government is responding to. It is possible to distinguish between 
two official ways of fighting corruption in Georgia: one relying on law-enforcement 
agencies and domestically oriented, and one relying on economic liberalisation, 
inscribed in a modernisation programme, and more oriented towards the 
international community. These two approaches are unified rhetorically in a 
discourse emphasising the rupture with Soviet practices. The fight against 
corruption in Georgia is framed into a nation- and state-building project. While the 
economic liberalisation elements in the governmental discourse reflect the 
international anti-corruption discourse and its emphasis on the development of a 
market economy as a corrective to corruption, this discourse is also moralised 
through local references.  
 
Di Puppo (2010:231) points out that external anti-corruption standards were officially 
adopted to create Western-style institutions to have anti-bribery policies in place for 
both internal and external stakeholders. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili 
promoted this view in his inaugural speech (Di Puppo 2010:231): “We must root out 
corruption. As far as I am concerned, every corrupt official is a traitor who betrays 
the national interest.” In the discourse of the Saakashvili administration, “good guys” 
are not corrupt; they are self-disciplined. After the Rose Revolution, the government 
has engaged in a process of regaining its lost legitimacy. During Soviet times, the 
state had been perceived as an alien object in Georgia. As a result, corruption and 
the shadow economy were to some extent socially accepted as a form of national 
resistance. The post-revolutionary government wants to restore respect for the state 
and destroy parallel sources of legitimacy, such as those generated through criminal 
authorities. The main outcome of the governmental anti-corruption measures has 
thus been the reinforcement of the executive. These measures had the effect of 
strengthening power within a narrow circle of insiders. This approach to fighting 
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corruption was expressed by Saakashvili at the start of his presidency (Di Puppo 
2010:231): “We need to introduce in the parliament very drastic anti-corruption 
legislation that would give vast powers to a new elite, small, honest investigative 
unit that would really tackle high-level corruption.” This top-down approach relies 
heavily on law-enforcement agencies and the prosecutor’s office while neglecting 
independent control bodies, such as the judiciary and the Chamber of Control. 
 
4.12.6 Hong Kong: Anti-Corruption Agency  
As revealed by Scott (2013:77), Hong Kong is one of the few clean societies in the 
world. Its success in combatting corruption and, especially, the independent power 
and key role of the ICAC in Hong Kong has been admired by local governments and 
officials in Mainland China. In 2010, the leaders of Foshan City in the Guangdong 
Province discussed the possibility of forming an ICAC in their city that would, to a 
large extent, mirror the Hong Kong ICAC model. The OECD (2012) indicated that 
normally, ACAs focus on public sector corruption, but some, such as Hong Kong’s 
ICAC, have a broader focus and are also concerned with fighting corruption in the 
private sector. The practice is similarly followed in Singapore to combat corruption.  
 
Yet another innovative example is set by the ICAC in Hong Kong for the international 
community to take note of, namely “victims of corruption”. Fatima (2017:42) has 
drawn attention to the fact that it is important to involve the victims of corruption. 
Most donor-supported anti-corruption initiatives primarily involve only the people 
who are paid to fight corruption. Very few initiatives involve people suffering from 
the effects of corruption. It is therefore critical to do more of what the ICAC in Hong 
Kong has done over the past 25 years. For example, the ICAC interfaces directly 
(face-to-face in awareness raising workshops) with almost 1% of the population 
every year. 
 
4.12.7 Japan: Anti-Corruption Agency  
Quah (2015:156) reveals that Japan is reluctant to tackle organisational corruption. 
Even though Japan has a democratically elected parliament with a constitutional 
monarchy, the ACAs are unlikely to initiate the necessary anti-corruption measures 
to eradicate the “rotten triangle” of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats, and 
businessmen. This explains why the Japanese government has not ratified the 
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UNCAC after signing it more than a decade ago. Japan has continued to rely on the 
ineffective Special Investigation Departments and many anti-corruption laws to 
investigate various corruption scandals. As Van Wolferen (1993:197) points out, the 
Japanese Government should establish a single ACA and a comprehensive anti-
corruption law to tackle structural corruption. Japan’s continued reliance on their 
ineffective pattern of corruption control reflects its government’s lack of political will 
in combatting corruption. As mentioned above, there is no incentive for the 
Japanese Government to eradicate the existing system of structural corruption, 
which favours the “rotten triangle” of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats, and 
businessmen. Indeed, the status quo in Japan will remain unchanged unless and 
until the Japanese citizens elect political leaders who are genuinely committed to 
the elimination of their country’s structural corruption. The work of Quah (2015:149) 
indicates that the Special Investigation Departments of the public prosecutor’s 
offices in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya are the de facto ACAs in Japan. They are 
responsible for investigating bribery cases and other related offences. The ACAs’ 
functions are listed below: 
 investigation of cases of bribery, breach of trust, and tax evasion; 
 securities exchange violations, and non-compliance with laws; and 
 prohibiting private monopolies and maintenance of free trade. 
 
4.12.8 Kenya: Anti-Corruption Agency  
The OSISA (2017) states that the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) is a 
public body created by the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act in 2003. The 
KACC became fully operational in August 2005 and replaced previous agencies and 
units working on corruption-related issues. The KACC is responsible for 
investigating and preventing corruption and economic crimes, and educating the 
public on the dangers of corruption. The KACC does not have any prosecution 
powers, but forwards cases to the Attorney-General. The KACC receives regular 
funding and has full-time staff members which, according to Global Integrity 2009, 
are among the best-paid public officials in Kenya. 
 
4.12.9 Nigeria: Anti-Corruption Agency  
Fatima (2017:325) clarifies that one purpose of developing the NACS is to help 
generate and maintain the necessary leadership and broad support required to 
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effectively curb corruption and it is important to bear this in mind at the 
developmental stage of any strategy. Responding to a request by the Conference 
of the States Parties to UNCAC to identify and disseminate good practices among 
States Parties regarding the development of National Anticorruption Strategies, the 
UNODC (2004) came up with a guide. Millions of Nigerians feel the cruel effect of 
corruption. In recognition of this insurmountable task, one of the campaign promises 
of this administration during the 2015 elections was to aggressively clamp down on 
corruption by presenting a NACS. Indeed, on 5 July 2017, the Federal Executive 
Council approved the NACS for the first time in the history of Nigeria as a nation. 
The strategy is an insight into the government’s fight against corruption and a guide 
to all sectors and stakeholders in the fight against corruption. The NACS outlines 
clear objectives of changing the logic of corruption and anti-corruption in Nigeria, by 
adopting an approach based on the five pillars: prevention; public engagement; 
ethical re-orientation in the public and private sectors; enforcement and sanctions; 
and the recovery and management of proceeds of corruption. 
 
Bilefsky (2015) indicates that the identification and recovery of stolen assets are not 
enough. As much as $1 trillion in criminal proceeds is laundered through banks 
worldwide each year with about half flowing through American banks. In developing 
countries such as Nigeria, this can be translated into $100 billion stolen by corrupt 
regimes over the last 15 years. Even if Nigeria, for example, receives the necessary 
help to recover its stolen assets, reasonable people would be hard-pressed to 
advocate its return back into a systemically corrupt environment without trying to 
first increase the risk, cost, and uncertainty to corrupt politicians who would most 
likely again abuse their power to loot the NT.  
 
4.12.10 Namibia: Anti-Corruption Agency  
The OSISA (2017) explains that the Namibian ACC was established under the Anti-
Corruption Act 8 of 2003. In February 2006, the Namibian ACC began formally 
operating. It is an independent agency equipped with wide-ranging powers of 
investigation and refers its findings to the Prosecutor General. The Namibian ACC 
works closely with the Namibian Police Force, the Office of the Auditor-General, and 
the Namibian Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority. The Namibian ACC is 
accountable to the National Assembly and also submits its annual report to the 
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Prime Minister. Although dealing with corruption cases is the Constitutional mandate 
of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), the majority of cases it has dealt with were 
related to maladministration. 
 
4.12.11 Republic of the Philippines: Anti-Corruption Agency  
The work of Quah (2015:154) shows that the Philippines ACA (PACA) has the 
highest perceived level of corruption in Asia. This is a direct result of their continuing 
on the same downward spiralling path and their seeming inability to change. The 
main reasons for their impediment are a poorly staffed ACA along with 
uncoordinated multi-disciplinary approaches resulting in members’ roles 
overlapping. This results in unnecessary duplication which results in unnecessarily 
prolonged investigations. The ACA is reportedly underfunded as a direct result of 
political interference in its independent operation. The OMB is not a dedicated ACA 
and is inadequately staffed and funded. The rational solution appears to be obvious, 
but seems to be ignored repeatedly by both past and current political leaders. The 
OMB should focus on its primary functions of administrative adjudication and public 
assistance and relinquish its functions of corruption investigation and prevention to 
a new, dedicated, and adequately staffed and funded agency. The PACA could be 
such an agency, should they be allowed to perform the function of prosecuting 
corruption offenders. Effectiveness could be enhanced by increasing its budget and 
personnel to reduce the inordinate delay in completing cases. Needless to say, this 
suggestion of creating the PACA to replace the current ineffective ACAs is bold and 
requires tremendous political will for its realisation. However, it is unlikely that there 
will be the political will to implement this necessary anti-corruption initiative. This 
means that the ball will be in the court of the ruling party to exhibit the requisite 
political will to implement the long overdue replacement of the ineffective multiple 
ACAs with the PACA. 
 
Quah (2015:152) has drawn attention to the fact that the primary function of ACAs 
is the investigation of corruption cases. In the example of the Republic of the 
Philippines, the ACA has an elaborate and sophisticated anti-corruption framework 
and many anti-corruption laws, yet its performance is dismal. The impediments 
encountered during the enforcement of the anti-corruption laws are as follows: 
 public officials do not comply with these laws themselves; 
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 the ACAs lack the required capacity and resources to monitor and investigate 
corruption cases; 
 the justice system is slow and inefficient, with unnecessarily prolonged 
investigations; 
 the government has inefficient organisational systems and procedures; and 
 enforcement is “partial and selective”, and dependent on “political will” before 
a specific investigation is conducted. 
  
The OMB (2010:9) stated that the ACA was formed in 1989. The OMB in the 
Republic of the Philippines performs dual functions – that of an Ombudsman and of 
an ACA. Their dual functions are indicated below: 
 investigation of anomalies and inefficiency;  
 prosecution of graft cases; 
 administrative adjudication; 
 public assistance; and 
 graft prevention by analysing anti-corruption measures and increasing public 
awareness and cooperation. 
 
4.12.12 Republic of Poland: Anti-Corruption Agency  
Gradowski (2010:178) clarifies that pressure from international institutions for 
combatting corruption has influenced the Republic of Poland on the implementation 
of recommended anti-corruption solutions in the Polish legal system. However, 
success in fighting corruption is based largely on the effectiveness of the national 
institutions, which should realise the anti-corruption policies. NGOs also play a vital 
role in this process. Their activities, on the one hand, contribute to supervising state 
institutions. On the other, they assist in the development of social support for 
eliminating corruption, bringing about changes in social attitudes, and reducing 
social tolerance for this phenomenon. Although some of the old EU member states 
ratified the European Anti-Corruption Conventions in the following years, others 
such as Germany, Austria, Italy, and Spain, have never done so. 
  
The Republic of Poland’s efforts to prevent corruption were dominated by a series 
of uncoordinated ad hoc actions. There was also no clear conception as to how to 
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fight the problem. The new Act on Restricting the Pursuit of Business Activity of 
Persons Performing Public Functions was introduced on 21 August 1997 and has 
been in force ever since, despite numerous amendments (Gradowski 2010:178). 
The Polish Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) was established by the Central 
Anti-Corruption Bureau Act (CABA) of 2006 to combat corruption in public and 
private sectors and state and local government agencies, and also to combat 
activities that undermine the economic interests of the nation. The CBA’s functions 
are to recognise, prevent, and detect criminal crimes against public institutions and 
local governments, the administration of justice, elections, and referenda, and it is 
also responsible for overseeing public order issues, the credibility of documents, tax 
obligations, property, business transactions, the funding of political parties, the 
disclosure of cases of non-observance of procedures, acts of corruption, and 
activities detrimental to the economic interest of the state. The CBA’s functions also 
include conducting pre-trial proceedings against and prosecuting perpetrators of 
crimes within the above areas (Gradowski 2010:178). 
 
4.12.13 Romania: Anti-Corruption Agency  
The OSISA (2017) explains that the National Anti-Corruption Directorate was 
established in 2002 pursuant to the Strasbourg Criminal Convention on Corruption 
adopted on January 27, 1999. The National Anti-Corruption Directorate is an 
independent judicial structure and operates within the Prosecutor's Office attached 
to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. Its jurisdiction covers the whole of 
Romania with its head office in Bucharest and local offices in 15 territories. The 
National Anti-Corruption Directorate is headed by a chief prosecutor who is assisted 
by two deputy chief prosecutors. In addition, there are 145 prosecutors, 170 police 
officers, and 55 experts who specialise in economics, finance, banking, customs, 
and information technology working in the National Anti-Corruption Directorate. Law 
no. 78/2000 stipulates that the National Anti-Corruption Directorate has the duty to 
investigate suspected corruption committed by social, political, and public officials, 
including members of the Parliament and public employees. 
 
4.12.14 Russian Federation: Anti-Corruption Agency  
The OECD (2013) points out that in 1992, Federal Law No. 2202-I of 1992 on the 
Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation reorganised the Russian Prosecution 
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Service into a uniform system of centralised federal bodies. Consequently, the 
functions of the Prosecutor General’s Office were recognised in the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation in 1993. The functions of the Prosecutor General’s Office 
include: monitoring the activities of public and private organisations and personnel; 
initiating criminal prosecution against those suspected of corruption; supervising 
investigative agencies and state bodies; and pursuing charges in court. 
 
Rose and Mishler (2010:151) reveal that the transformation of Communist into post-
Communist regimes in the 1990s created many opportunities for corrupt behaviour 
through the privatisation of state-owned assets. Presidents Vladimir Putin and 
Dmitry Medvedev have frequently spoken of the need to ‘do something’ about 
corruption in the Russian government. Rose and Mishler (2010:158) expound that 
Russians tend to see their regime as corrupt, in itself, but that they do not reject its 
legitimacy. Even in badly governed countries, corruption can be positively valued as 
“providing immediate, specific and concrete benefits” (Rose & Mishler 2010:151). In 
such circumstances, “the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-
centralised dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralised honest 
bureaucracy” that cannot be circumvented by paying a bribe (Rose & Mishler 
2010:151). 
 
4.12.15 Singapore: Anti-Corruption Agency  
As indicated by Quah (2015:156), the transformations to enhance the CPIB’s 
effectiveness has yielded results. Singapore is recognised as the least corrupt 
country in Asia. The CPIB is also the most effective ACA with the highest staff to 
population ratio. Nonetheless, the arrest and detainment of a senior CPIB officer, 
Edwin Yeo, in February 2014 for misusing S$1.76 million during 2008 to 2012 shows 
that the efficiency of CPIB is not faultless and they need to enhance their internal 
measures and procurement processes. As illuminated in the article on the CPIB, the 
bureau needs to manage the aftermath from the Edwin Yeo humiliation by improving 
its public outreach to regain the public’s trust. It is likewise fundamental for the CPIB 
to enhance the external oversight of its activities by incorporating model citizens in 
its two present review committees, which consist entirely of only senior government 
employees.  
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Finally, the CPIB should also enhance its effectiveness by developing its in-house 
research capabilities further. The CPIB points out that Singapore established an 
ACA in 1952 (Ko & Choo 2015). The CPIB is tasked with the following functions: 
 investing complaints of corrupt practices; 
 investigating corruption cases by public officers; 
 preventing corruption by examining the practices; 
 procedures in the civil service to minimise opportunities for corruption; and 
 screening candidates for civil service positions to prevent those with criminal 
and corruption records from being appointed. 
 
The OSISA (2017) enlightens that the CPIB was established by the British Colonial 
Government in 1952 as an independent body responsible for the investigation and 
prevention of corruption in the public and private sectors. Prior to 1952, all 
corruption-related cases were investigated by a small unit in the Singapore Police 
Force known as the Anti-Corruption Branch. Situated within the Prime Minister's 
Office, the Bureau is headed by a director who reports directly to the Prime Minister. 
The Singaporean CPIB is one of the oldest ACAs in the world, having been 
established in 1952. The CPIB is designated to investigate and prevent corruption 
in the public and private sectors, to investigate allegations of corrupt practices and 
misconduct involving public officers, to prevent corruption by recommending 
changes to public service procedures that create opportunities for corruption in 
government agencies, and to spread anti-corruption messages through public 
education and community outreach programmes.  
 
Quah (2015:154) indicates why Singapore is more effective than the other four 
Asian countries in combatting corruption. The most important reason is the political 
will of the People’s Action Party Government, which has been in power in Singapore 
since June 1959 after being re-elected in the 13 subsequent general elections. The 
political will of the People’s Action Party in minimising corruption in Singapore is 
reflected in the provision of adequate budget and personnel to the CPIB after the 
enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act in June 1960. 
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4.12.16 Taiwan: Anti-Corruption Agency  
Quah (2015:154) explains that Taiwan established the AAC in July 2011 to appease 
public anger over the 2010 bribery scandal involving three High Court judges and a 
district prosecutor. The new AAC will also not be independent, as it would come 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. The AAC would not be “a carbon 
copy” of the ICAC in Hong Kong or the CPIB in Singapore (Quah 2015:154). The 
CPIB and ICAC are the most effective Asian ACAs and are providing examples of 
best practices for the international community to be implemented. Consequently, 
instead of resolving the difficulties encountered by the multiple ACAs in Taiwan, the 
President of Taiwan has unwittingly exacerbated the problem by creating another 
ACA to compete with the existing ACAs. The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau 
(MJIB) is ineffective in combatting corruption because of its three weaknesses. The 
MJIB is not a dedicated ACA, because of its extended mandate, which includes the 
following functions:  
 Counter any internal disorder. 
 Counter any disorder caused by foreigners. 
 Counter any leak of national classified material. 
 Anti-Corruption of any civil service. 
 Drug control. 
 Prevent any organised criminal organisation. 
 Counter any major economic crime. 
 Internal security investigation for the State. 
 Any delegated missions or assignments regarding national security and 
national interests. 
 
This means that the function of corruption control has to complete with these non-
corruption-related functions for limited resources. In other words, the MJIB’s second 
weakness is that its function of combatting corruption is usually given lower priority 
than the investigation of national security matters, which takes precedence.  
 
The work of Quah (2011:602) reveals that the MJIB’s third and most serious 
weakness is that it comes under the jurisdiction of both the Ministry of Justice and 
the National Security Bureau, because five of its functions are related to national 
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security. As the MJIB functions more like a national security agency than an ACA, it 
is irrational for the MJIB to continue to retain its fourth function of corruption control. 
Instead of resisting change and competing with the fledgeling AAC, the MJIB should 
focus instead on its national security functions and transfer its anti-corruption 
function to the AAC. The recommendation for the MJIB and AAC to cooperate and 
work more closely is unrealistic, as there is no incentive for the MJIB to enhance the 
AAC’s effectiveness in view of the competition and animosity between these two 
agencies. It is unlikely that the MJIB will contribute to strengthening the AAC’s 
capacity to curb corruption. As in the case of the Republic of the Philippines, it 
depends on whether the President’s successor will retain the status quo or whether 
he or she is sincerely committed to the goal of minimising corruption in Taiwan. If 
the successor is genuinely concerned with improving Taiwan’s effectiveness in 
combatting corruption, he or she has no alternative but to adopt the rational solution 
of reorganising the MJIB and strengthening the AAC’s anti-corruption capacity and 
budget. The AAC was established during 2011 in Taiwan, the functions of the AAC 
are as follows: 
 Formulation of national anti-corruption policies. 
 Interpretation of legislation and revisions on corruption prevention measures. 
 Implementation of anti-corruption measures. 
 Investigation of corruption or related crimes. 
 Supervision of government employee ethics units and personnel. 
 Dealing with ethics affairs in the Ministry of Justice.  
 Other matters related to anti-corruption. 
 
4.12.17 Ukraine: Anti-Corruption Agency  
The OSISA (2017) elucidates that the while the Presidency (1991–1994) focused 
on establishing Ukraine as an independent state, the succeeding President (1994–
2005) concentrated his efforts on building a viable economy and strengthening his 
personal control in the political sphere. As in most other post-Communist states, 
corruption in Ukraine had become endemic by the late 1990s. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the country experienced considerable international pressure to 
introduce anti-corruption reform. The first anti-corruption legislation dates back to 
1991, though most anti-corruption initiatives were introduced from 1995 onwards. 
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The development of a coherent legal framework for combatting corruption began 
that year and continued throughout the late 1990s, culminating with the “Anti-
Corruption Concept for 1998 –2005” (OSISA 2017). Ukraine joined OECD’s Anti-
Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2003. In December the 
same year, it signed the UNCAC. Despite these efforts, however, the OECD in its 
2004 assessment of Ukrainian anti-corruption policies, noted that while Ukraine has 
a rich array of legal instruments and broad strategic documents (for fighting 
corruption), efficient coordination, implementation and enforcement remain 
insufficient. 
 
4.12.18 United Kingdom: Anti-Corruption Agency  
As indicated in the UK Anti-Corruption Plan (Government of the UK 2014), the UK 
has four anti-corruption approaches. These approaches adopt the “4Ps” namely: 
Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare. The UK government uses these approaches 
to coordinate its work on counter-terrorism, serious and organised crime, and anti-
money laundering as follows: 
 Protect against corruption by building open and resilient organisations across 
the public and private sectors. 
 Prevent people from engaging in corruption, through strengthening 
professional integrity. 
 Pursue and punish the corrupt, and strengthen the ability of law enforcement, 
criminal justice, and oversight bodies to investigate, prosecute, and sanction 
wrongdoers.  
 Reduce the impact of corruption where it takes place, including redress from 
injustice caused by corruption. 
 
The OSISA (2017) enlightens that on 22 June 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
announced new measures to tackle international corruption, identified as one of the 
priorities at the Gleneagles G8 summit. Following the G8 announcement, the 
government established an Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit in the City of London 
Police that has a specific function of supporting overseas corruption investigations 
undertaken by the SFO. The Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit investigates 
international corruption, including money laundering in the UK by corrupt politicians 
from developing countries, and bribery by UK businesses overseas. The 
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Government of the UK (2016) reveals that the work in government departments is 
ongoing, with a range of partners to deliver the remaining actions in the plan to 
enhance the reaction to combat corruption in the UK and around the globe. Anti-
corruption strategies are updated as and when required to keep abreast with local 
and international tendencies.  
 
Transparency International (2017) has indicated that the UK has strengthened their 
law enforcement response by establishing the National Crime Agency in 2013 to 
disrupt and bring to justice those serious and organised criminals who present the 
highest risk to the UK. They have successfully concluded 14 foreign bribery-related 
cases since March 2012, including landmark SFO cases representing the first 
conviction of a company for foreign bribery after a contested trial, the first conviction 
of a company for failure to prevent bribery and, following their introduction in 2014, 
the UK’s first three DPAs. Transparency International has used enforcement action 
in the UK as an opportunity to return money for the benefit of the people ultimately 
harmed by corruption. The ambulances were purchased with money recovered from 
a UK company found guilty of bribery to get a Kenyan contract. 
 
4.13 LESSONS LEARNED 
 
Schuchter (2012) clarifies that the best practice against corrupt activities is the 
investigation of corruption cases. Surely there are other best practices in countries 
participating in good governance. ACAs should share their best practices on the 
successful detection, investigation, and prosecution of corruption cases, which will 
cultivate strong ties of international cooperation amongst all ACAs. In addition, the 
ACFE (2016) indicates that countries must assist one another in gathering and 
sharing evidence, returning the proceeds of illicit activity, and extraditing offenders 
for effective prosecution. The following are some of the reasons for their failure: a 
weak political will; lack of resources; and political interference and selectivity in 
investigations. In addition, the United Nations Anti-Corruption Toolkit (UNACT) 
(UNODC 2004) clarifies that the challenge of serious corruption is one of great 
volume. Serious corruption investigations, in particular, the investigations involving 
high-level corruption, are usually laborious, multi-faceted, and costly. Given the 
magnitude of corruption and the restrictions imposed by the physical and capital 
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constraints, it might be useful to prioritise corruption cases for investigation and 
prosecution. This is predominantly effective in guaranteeing that corruption cases 
receive the necessary attention. This is supplemented by Olaniyan (2014:30), who 
explains that for an effective multi-faceted corruption investigation process to occur 
the following basics should form part of such an investigative methodology:  
 impartiality and trustworthiness of detectives and prosecutors; 
 sufficient education and resources for investigative duties; 
 cooperation with other investigation organisations; 
 disclosure as well as reporting requirements; 
 audits and assessments; 
 undercover activities, including integrity testing; 
 electronic surveillance, search and seizures, and further probative methods; 
 management of investigations; 
 the protection of the investigative team, including their undertakings; 
 the supervision of international or multi-faceted corrupt activities; 
 feasibility of adequate results; 
 accessibility of monetary, human, and technical assets; 
 crime intelligence analysis; and 
 integrity-testing.  
 
4.14 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
It is paramount to attain a clear comprehension of the multi-disciplinary approach as 
the success thereof depends on it. Investigators should continuously be aware of 
the risks in duplicating tasks; this can be circumvented by ensuring each member is 
utilised according to their expertise. During the discussion on local and international 
multi-disciplinary approaches, a distinct understanding is gained on the working of 
the approach. It is abundantly clear that the advantages far outweigh the 
impediments associated with the multi-disciplinary approach. The multi-disciplinary 
approach to fight corruption in the South African public sector should be guided by 
a clear understanding of what enables corruption to thrive and equally on the best 
practices both locally and across the globe. The lessons learnt from successful 
departments and the globe offer a rich experience on the way forward for the ACTT. 
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It is evident that to improve governance and reduce corruption, the public sector 
should implement its anti-corruption strategies to the fullest.  
 
After studying the effectiveness of numerous local and international ACAs, including 
various multi-disciplinary approaches worldwide, to determine their efficacy during 
their investigative processes into multi-faceted corruption cases, it has come to light 
that ACAs need to work together to be effective in combatting corruption. The in-
depth interviews which were conducted with the participants will be discussed in the 
following chapter, along with specific exertions for the effective investigation of 
corruption in the public service sector.  
 
The findings of the analysed and coded data will be described in Chapter 5 and 
verbatim quotes will be utilised. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
PRESENTATION, DISCUSSION, AND INTERPRETATION OF 
FINDINGS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In this chapter, the researcher carefully outlines and discusses the interpretation of 
the findings of the research study. This chapter objectively evaluates the importance 
and value of the findings for a more adequate understanding of the effectiveness of 
the multi-disciplinary approach to investigate corruption in the South African Public 
Service. In-depth interviews were conducted, as discussed in Section 1.14.1 of this 
study. The rationale was to enhance the complex processes and challenges 
associated with investigating multi-faceted corruption cases. A constructive 
discussion on the emerging themes was conducted to identify familiar patterns and 
forthcoming trends that can be used or isolated in order to accurately indicate the 
valuable insight of the goal and objectives of this study, as mentioned in Section 
1.5. In order to realise these goals, in-depth interviews were conducted with the 
various participants from the ACTT. 
 
In order to promote the trustworthiness of the study, the research methodology, as 
discussed in Section 1.6, was implemented and adhered to in the collection and 
analysis of the data. During the process of data collection, the objectives and 
resultant questions were used as a guideline to structure this discussion. From the 
participants’ answers to the questions and the subsequent process of data analysis, 
themes emerged that will be discussed in this chapter. This is done to emphasise 
the participants’ views and understanding of the identified research questions, as 
discussed in Section 1.7. 
 
5.2  OUTCOMES OF INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS AND INTERPRETATION OF 
FINDINGS 
 
A purposeful sampling technique was employed to conduct interviews with the 
selected 17 participants. This purposeful sample was identified through their expert 
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knowledge and work experience in the ACTT environment. Permission was granted 
by the SAPS management and DPCI management to liaise directly with the relevant 
participants employed in the SAPS. The external experts gave permission prior to 
them being interviewed by the researcher.  
 
A discussion of the themes and sub-themes that emerged during interviews will 
commence in the following section. This is achieved through verbatim quotes from 
the interview transcriptions, explaining the theme, a summary of the range of 
responses, and how each specific theme was identified. This enabled the 
researcher to exemplify these responses of the participants and transfer the reader 
to the research setting. The findings are derived from the participants’ responses 
during the interviews conducted. These findings are incorporated into this 
discussion to complement the relevant selected literature sources. These are used 
to form a comprehensive interpretation of the presented findings. Finally, following 
the presentation of each theme, a critical interpretation is presented, which 
concludes the discussion of each theme. The first theme to be discussed explores 
the participants’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the ACTT during the 
investigation of corruption cases. The themes and sub-themes that emerged during 
the in-depth personal interviews with the participants are summarised in Table 5.1 
below.  
 
Table 5.1: Themes and sub-themes that emerged from the findings 
THEME 1: PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECTIVE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE ACTT 
1.1 Task team’s effectiveness  
1.2 Attaining objectives 
 
THEME 2: THE MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH AND CHALLENGES 
EXPERIENCED DURING INVESTIGATIONS 
2.1 Communication in the ACTT as a multi-disciplinary team  
2.2 High workloads and insufficient resources  
2.3 Competency levels of manpower  
2.4 Role of management  
 
THEME 3: CHALLENGES FOR INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE ACTT  
3.1 Political interference and political will  
3.2 Budget and logistical constraints of resources  
3.3 The need for independence/autonomy 
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THEME 4: SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS 
BASED ON LESSONS LEARNED  
4.1 A structure that accommodates expert multi-disciplinary team members  
4.2 Recruitment and integrity testing of team members  
4.3 Supportive staff, resources, and lessons learnt 
 
The first theme demonstrates the insights of ACTT members on the efficacy of the 
ACTT in fulfilling its mandate.  
 
5.3 THEME 1: PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECTIVE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE ACTT  
 
The first theme presents the participants’ perceptions and experiences of the 
effective functioning of the ACTT as a multi-disciplinary approach to attain its aims 
and objectives. The insights and impressions of the ACTT members were sought to 
understand their perspective on whether the team achieves the aims and objectives 
as set out by parliament.  
 
The answers to the following question gave rise to this theme and its sub-themes:  
 “From your experience, does the ACTT achieve its aims and objectives to 
investigate corruption in the South African public service?”  
 
This theme was divided into two sub-themes to provide a clear understanding of the 
insights of the ACTT members as deliberated below.  
 
5.3.1 Sub-Theme 1.1: Task Team’s Effectiveness  
As stated in Section 3.10.8, Dussich (2006:141) clarifies that an ACA cannot 
ascertain every corrupt transaction which occurs by themselves. Thus, an effective 
means of receiving complaints is essential to the agency’s effectiveness. In addition, 
the OECD (2011) clarifies that when conducting an investigation, planning needs to 
be one of the first tasks at hand, as noted in Section 3.10.5. This will enable the 
investigator to conduct the investigation in a specific sequence to ensure the 
effectiveness thereof. The multi-disciplinary approach is a crucial part of the 
planning of the investigation and its efficiency when specific goals are set with clear 
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objectives for each member of the team. The effectiveness of the investigation will 
be based upon the investigative actions to be taken to conclude the case. The work 
of Schuchter (2012) mentioned in Section 3.10.5 clearly indicates that corruption 
cases are frequently committed by individuals in a position of power, for instance, 
powerful politicians or high-ranking public officials, which can become an 
impediment to investigators in securing the cooperation of witnesses and suspects. 
To be effective in the investigation of large-scale corruption cases, the following are 
indispensable: perseverance, knowledge, experience, expertise, and organisational 
strength. It is the view of the UNACT (2009), as noted in Section 4.13, that serious 
corruption is one of volume. Serious corruption investigations, in particular, the 
investigations involving high-level corruption, are usually laborious, multi-faceted, 
and costly. Given the magnitude of corruption and the restrictions imposed by the 
physical and capital constraints, it might be useful to prioritise corruption cases for 
investigation and prosecution. This is predominantly effective in guaranteeing that 
corruption cases receive the necessary attention. 
 
The majority of the participants responded with mixed feelings about the 
effectiveness of the ACTT. Eleven of the 17 participants responded with a 
conditional “yes, but” or “no, but”, referring to a period during the ACTT’s inception 
that the goals set were attained, but then qualify their statements, as will be seen in 
the quotes below. Five of the participants reacted negatively and they also motivated 
their answers. One participant responded positively to all working aspects of the 
ACTT. The following excerpts from transcriptions illustrate and substantiate this sub-
theme: 
 
CS 1: “Yes, I will say that, but not as required, but they did address corruption.” 
CS 2: “It used to achieve the goals, but not currently. After some time, two years, 
our achievement of goals became less. Originally, yes. Currently and as I 
recall from my previous experiences with the ACTT, no.” 
CS 3: “ACTT has not achieved its aims and objectives in and has failed to address 
corruption effectively. When everyone does their bit to achieve their 
objectives in their mandates and so on, I think then the multi-disciplinary 
approach is a good approach, in my opinion, because everyone has got 
their role to play.” 
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CS 4: “ACTT was on the road to achieving some of its aims and objectives, but 
not currently.” 
CS 6: “In my opinion yes, the ACTT is achieving (but) the target has not been met, 
but there was enormous progress made in investigations.” 
CS 10: “To a certain extent I think they do achieve, but due to more external factors 
and reasons, they don’t achieve any longer.” 
CS 13: “Yes, to answer that briefly, during the inception of the ACTT, yes, the aims 
and objectives were achieved, but with time things change and yes, being 
involved directly within the ACTT, I realise that the objectives and aims of 
the ACTT were no longer achievable.” 
CS 14: “According to my view, the ACTT is no longer effective in the investigation 
of corruption in the South African Public Services.” 
CS 15: “It was, you know, when I look at the initial phase when the ACTT was 
established, that was in 2010 and I think until 2015 or so. Initially yes, I 
would say the ACTT achieved its aims and objectives, but not with the 
current operational structure of the unit.” 
CS 17: “At the beginning of the ACTT, around 2011, they did achieve, but at this 
moment things have changed. So the multi-disciplinary itself, it seems it has 
been dissolved by management.” 
 
The greater part of the participants said in no uncertain terms that the ACTT started 
off well, but they are no longer on the right path. The multi-disciplinary approach had 
faded away as the years went on and there was a change in management. This 
resulted in the ACTT not being as effective as it should be. The majority of the 
participants are of the view that the ACTT is not as effective as when it was formed 
in 2010. Thus, the need arose to determine why this once effective team got 
derailed.  
 
5.3.2 Sub-Theme 1.2: Attaining Objectives  
Dussich (2006:141) points out that it is essential to make use of a covert and 
confidential approach in the investigations of corruption cases, until the investigators 
are ready to affect an arrest, in order to minimise the chances of compromising the 
investigation objectives or face unjustifiable meddling from superiors (see Section 
3.10). In addition, as mentioned in Section 4.12, Merry et al (2015:16) assert in that 
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numerous empirical studies have been conducted to better comprehend corrupt 
activities with a specific end goal to discover strategies that would evolve to 
efficiently address and prevent corrupt activities in South Africa. The APEC (2014) 
concludes that the investigative team is required to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt who profited from the corrupt act (see Section 3.10.4). They may also utilise 
a “follow the money” principle to accomplish this goal. The latter might assist in 
establishing who received a gratification by reviewing the tax returns, financial 
disclosure forms, immediate superiors, and fellow employees. 
 
The participants’ views were sought on whether the ACTT is able to attain its 
objectives. This would contribute to determining the placement of the Unit within the 
criminal justice system to be effective. Responses from participants indicated 
negative experiences with reference to the ACTT attaining the set objectives. The 
following participants’ responses were in the negative: 
 
CS 7: “No, I don’t think we do. We need to be resourced effectively in order for us, 
the ACTT, to achieve its objectives.” 
CS 8: “If you look at the charter of the ACTT, definitely no ACTT was established 
under the JCPS [Justice, Crime Prevention and Security] Cluster. I would 
say currently the ACTT is not achieving its aims and objectives, which is a 
direct result of current management.” 
CS 10: “No, in my view, there are a few factors that contribute to my answer and 
from a holistic viewpoint, what I know personally, is that some of the factors 
that contribute to this is, for instance, members that resign do not get 
replaced in a manner that is effective to ensure that ACTT remains 
operational.”  
CS 11: “No, our targets are not achieved, this unit is not being prioritised in terms 
of resources, manpower… it’s more window dressing than investigation of 
corruption. We are here, but we can’t really show what we have 
accomplished in the last seven years we are not able to achieve it, with the 
current human and physical resources allocated to the unit.” 
CS 12: “At the beginning when the ACTT was established, the whole objective and 
the aims of the ACTT was very noble and the idea was a good idea and it 
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would have worked if all of the aims and goals that they planned on 
implementing was actually done.” 
CS 14: “My answer will be no, we do not achieve, the ACTT doesn’t achieve its 
aims and objectives to investigate corruption in the South African Police 
Service, because of political interference in the investigative duties at the 
unit.” 
CS 15: “No, the ACTT in my opinion, was not really effective in the first couple of 
years. Later it became partially effective, maybe with the winds of change, 
as it is blowing at the moment with the new head, maybe new political 
dispensation with the incoming ANC president, things might change a little 
bit for the better.” 
 
Only one participant gave an unconditionally positive response.  
 
CS 9: “I think yes, it is indeed so. The ACTT do achieve the aims and objectives 
set for them in the investigation of all cases. I think the ACTT is very effective 
in investigating it in a short time as possible.” 
 
All but one of the participants responded affirmatively to the inability of the ACTT to 
attain its set-out objectives. The common view is that the ACTT is not able to 
investigate corruption and attain its intended aims. Participants further felt that the 
change of management at the ACTT had brought about the negative change in the 
unit. The unit is severely lacking essential resources that are needed to be effective 
in the fight against corruption. The ACTT is currently not geared to achieve its 
objectives, which is a direct result of ineffective management at ACTT. The second 
theme entails the efficacy of the multi-disciplinary approach and the importance of 
communication during a corruption investigation. 
 
5.4 THEME 2: THE MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH AND CHALLENGES 
EXPERIENCED DURING INVESTIGATIONS  
 
The second theme discusses and interprets the multi-disciplinary approach of the 
ACTT and the communication between various role players at the ACTT. This is a 
remarkable approach to investigating corruption in South Africa. Communication 
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between team members is fundamental in the effective operationalisation of this 
approach. Keeping in mind that the role players are from different backgrounds, skill 
sets, salary brackets, and levels of education, this might be challenging as the 
Hawks members allocated to the ACTT are mandated to take the lead role in the 
criminal investigation process. 
 
The answers to the following questions gave rise to this theme and its sub-themes:  
 “In your opinion, is the ACTT an appropriate multi-disciplinary approach to 
investigate corruption in the South African public service?”  
 “From your experience, does the ACTT, comprising of governmental and non-
governmental role players, cooperate and communicate during corruption 
investigations?” 
 
To grasp the appropriateness of the multi-disciplinary approach used by the ACTT, 
the participants’ experiences were pursued. The multi-disciplinary model is 
potentially the most appropriate when a team of relevant specialised experts work 
together. The response was unanimously positive, indicating that a multi-disciplinary 
team is the most appropriate or potentially most appropriate for investigating 
corruption.  
 
The ACTT members’ insights and impressions were sought to understand their 
perspectives on whether the multi-disciplinary approach for the ACTT is an 
appropriate approach to investigate corruption. During the in-depth interviews, the 
participants’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the ACTT in investigating corruption 
were sought. This researcher also sought to determine their perceptions of the 
efficacy of communication at the ACTT, as well as the cooperation between the 
team members during the investigation process. The sub-themes that emerged will 
be discussed next. 
 
5.4.1 Sub-Theme 2.1: Communication in the ACTT as a multi-disciplinary 
team 
As presented in Section 4.2.1, Tang and Hsiao (2013) explain that one of the most 
significant advantages of multi-disciplinary cooperation is that all associates are 
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compelled to communicate. This was replicated in the replies of some of the 
interviewees (Tang & Hsiao 2013): 
 “I have learned interview aptitudes and communication way and so forth.”  
 “The procedure showed me the significance of influence.” 
  
The APEC (2014), as noted in Section 4.8.1, determines that the investigation of 
corruption cases is frequently multi-faceted since they, for the most part, include a 
multitude of pertinent role players and objectives to assist in identifying the layers of 
the movement of assets, such as the movement of funds into various accounts, 
including placing assets in overseas jurisdictions in an effort to avoid detection from 
the authorities. In addition, Pop and Herlea (2015:1) emphasise the importance of 
having a way to discover resources or assets abroad and having the legitimate steps 
established to obtain the cooperation of foreign law enforcement, courts, and 
governments in a programme of mutual assistance (see Section 2.9). Tang and 
Hsiao (2013) claim that team members have been able to make strides in respect 
of their communication skills and group work, and this contributed towards an 
enhanced professionalism at the ACA (see Section 4.2.6).  
 
Participants identified a lack of communication, and thus a lack of cooperation and 
coordination in the team, resulting in delays in investigations. The initial successful 
functioning of the multi-disciplinary team was contributed to cooperation and regular 
communication between team members. This enabled the team members to 
explicitly focus on their specific roles and they understood where they fit into the 
bigger picture. Participants indicated that the multi-disciplinary team started working 
as a team and communication between experts was facilitated for cooperation, but 
the majority of participants experienced that this model of teamwork did not last. The 
participants predominantly shared the view that there is insufficient cooperation 
between team members in the ACTT environment. The multi-disciplinary model is 
potentially the most appropriate when a team of relevant specialised experts work 
together to achieve specific aims and objectives. The following responses are put 
forth: 
 
CS 1: “Insufficient information sharing causes unnecessary delays and conclusion 
of the investigation and a loss of vital information, facts, and evidence 
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because if people are not talking to each other and if they’re not sharing, 
they will definitely not be successful in court. You have to share and share 
properly and put personal feelings, political affiliations, and other aspects 
that might arise to rest, that’s not related to the investigation. We all must 
push that aside and focus on the core function.” 
CS 2: “During my term of service, I had the experience of joining good, effective 
teams where all communications with all the team members and 
stakeholders were very effective.” 
CS 3: “Not anymore, now we are having, you know, one person working on all the 
dockets on his own, like you know, like at the detectives, like in commercial 
crime units and other, you know. Communication should be streamlined 
between the different team members, they all do the same investigation, 
and it is not streamlined to say X will do this, Y will do this, even if they’re 
from the different disciplines.”  
CS 4: “There was definitely a lack of communication and cooperation, but the SIU 
management seemed to be the biggest culprit in the non-cooperation, 
because they did not divulge the correct status during the management 
meetings. They made promises and then they turned around and just didn’t 
do what was promised and as a result, all the consultancy contracts were 
ended. They were an important part of the ACTT’s earlier successes.” 
CS 5: “On paper, it’s in the place, it’s nice, all the team members involved, which 
is good. Should that be enforced properly, it would be a good model, but it’s 
not happening. If it’s implemented as set down on paper, all the necessary 
team members are not together, they don’t talk to each other. There are 
more police members involved. The model is itself only working on paper, 
is basically every discipline on its own, performing its own work. So it’s very 
difficult to entwine the different roles they need to be performed during an 
investigation.” 
CS 6:  “Yes, cooperation within the team was perfect. There is… let me give an 
example, if there is a case that we’re dealing within government X, the way 
we’re doing things here is that a case is reported, then we pull all the team 
members that need to be part of this investigation, to draw up a plan and 
then conduct the investigation. So in the investigation of that particular case, 
if there’s a need for FIC to partake, they will get involved immediately and 
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the same goes for other departments. So there is a good cooperation within 
the team and amongst each other.”  
CS 7:  “If you don’t communicate properly with the various units, then it leads to 
duplication of work. For instance, if SAPS gathers bank statements, AFU 
gathers bank statements and they gather the same bank statements and 
they analyse the same bank statements, it’s a waste of time because if they 
can do it together, it shortens the investigative period.”  
CS 8:  “Now, communication meaning communication from the commander at the 
time to the senior managers, being colonels and then the half colonels and 
the captains and downward. They do, to a certain extent, but I believe that 
they can better the communication, better the cooperation, especially units 
like SARS do not want to share information with us, with ACTT. It leads to 
big gaps in the investigation. Insufficient communication leads to big gaps, 
which leads to justice not being served properly.” 
CS 9:   “Multi-disciplinary approach the investigators, the prosecuting authority, the 
prosecutors, the AFU, as well as the FIC are working closely together, 
sharing information with one objective.”  
CS 10: “There are also really positive signs in that cooperation that helps, especially 
like you can work with banks, they know about us, FIC, there are certain 
channels that just makes it easier with their cooperation. So let’s say yes 
and no. If you say, does the ACTT cooperate and communicate during 
corruption, yes, we do. We do sometimes get cooperation and sometimes 
not, so it’s not just negative, it is positive and negative.” 
CS 11: “Each needs to understand what the other one is doing. If you look at the 
way that AFU approaches a case, depending on which chapter they are 
going to use during the approached the case. If they go under Chapter 6, 
it’s going to be difficult for them not to get statements from the criminal 
case.” 
CS 12: “I think it was a very good approach, although, like the NPA, they weren’t 
really on board, SARS not really on board, which are very important, 
especially the NPA, they’re very important to the ACTT, and to this model. 
But we needed dedicated prosecutors at ACTT which wasn’t the case.”  
CS 13: “I will always refer back to during the inception of the ACTT, where all team 
members’ issues and whatever clarity seeking questions that had or needed 
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were attended to. An environment was created whereby the investigating 
officer and every respective role player can play his or her part in respect to 
the fight against corruption. Yes, to add on that, the cooperation, of course, 
every role player was represented and they received feedback of the 
meetings, held by management and the principals. We used to have a 
meeting where all team members were present. After the meeting, we as, 
you know, people on the ground will get feedback as to what was discussed 
and what is expected of us going forward…” 
CS 14: “Yes, in my opinion, the establishment of this multi-disciplinary approach at 
ACTT was a good one. It is a shame that with all the all the interference, it’s 
no longer effective.” 
CS 15: “Previously yes, with teams of about three, four, five to six members, you 
know, working on one docket, you know, government departments and 
other stakeholders being involved in the investigation. For example, if I need 
playouts made to a certain company, I would just contact the person within 
the ACTT from National Treasury who would give me that information, 
immediately, and this is no longer the case.”  
CS 16: “I requested assistance from SARS on my investigation, then the meeting 
was set up at our boardroom downstairs. Instead of telling me that they will 
help me, they lectured me how to complain, if you ever complain at… it took 
them almost an hour telling me the process how to complain and all that. 
Then I could see that none of these stakeholders who were part of ACTT is 
now prepared to work together to solve the corruption cases.”  
CS 17: “It’s a fact that SARS lack of playing an active part in ACTT is delaying our 
cases. People are not coming to help to make follow-ups, emails and all 
that, telephones or even if you say now you are going maybe to ask the 
magistrate for a Section 205 to get the information, then they come through 
with the short information, not what you wanted. Some of the information, it 
takes a year to get after you have served them with the relevant section 
205.” 
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Some participants indicated that the lack of communication relates to “professional 
jealousy” and the reflection of a good image of their respective departments during 
the investigation process. The following quotes illustrate this: 
 
CS 2:  “In principle, I believe yes, there’s supposed to be communication, however, 
in practices there was professional jealousy that I experienced, where one 
division did not want to totally share information, cooperate, maybe 
handover documentation and information and there was, from time to 
time…”  
CS 3: “What I’ve experienced so far, is that the cooperation and communication 
during these investigations are pathetic. Because I’m aware of a lot of 
investigations, but we’re not aware what’s going on with them, how far they 
are, what has happened to them, have any arrests been made on these 
cases… meetings are held on a high level, a lot of things are discussed 
there, but none of that information is shared through to the investigators that 
are working… besides now the SAPS that’s working at ACTT, but from the 
other agencies… some of them are very selective about sharing certain 
information from both sides… when you are a member of ACTT and you 
are involved in a certain investigation, you should at least once a week 
meets all the role players, whether you’re from SARS, SIU, or whoever. If 
that’s not viable then at least once in two weeks to tell everyone where you 
are, what is still outstanding.” 
CS 4: “The lack of cooperation from other team members that are within the ACTT 
and that ACTT’s sphere and the lack of cooperation from other agencies as 
well can be a problem in some investigations. ACTT takes too long to 
conclude their cases in an acceptable timeframe. Because of the lengthy 
investigation periods, this results in when the cases go to court the impact 
is already lost.” 
CS 5: “Not everybody is cooperating in this multi-disciplinary approach with ACTT. 
They can be effective, but not as such, currently. People do not cooperate 
in this ACTT multi-disciplinary approach because of a few factors that 
contribute to that and I think it’s mostly a lack of cooperation and 
communication. I don’t think their individual status plays a role. Nothing gets 
done, because of the lack of communication… because there are different 
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agencies that are involved in this and everyone has their own goals for their 
respective departments. Targets and KPAs [Key Performance Areas] as we 
call it, that they must achieve and because we’ve got… we fall under 
different acts as well. 
CS 6: “If we have people with different expertise and skills, pull those people 
together into one to fight the same common goal, is to be the most effective 
way and the ACTT is correctly situated to do this.”  
CS 10: “The ACTT is a good platform to have a multi-disciplinary approach to 
investigate multi-faceted corruption or serious corruption.” 
CS 11: “No, no, I think it’s because the government departments or government 
team members don’t want to look bad and therefore they don’t want to give 
you the relevant documentation required to prove your case… they know 
that the people that are working with the stuff don’t know what they’re doing, 
so they would rather keep back the documentation to still look good and just 
say that the documentation is lost or they don’t know anything about how 
the processes. They want to sit on their little tower and just do whatever.” 
CS 12: “It is indeed an appropriate multi-disciplinary approach that they do follow in 
all cases; with meetings, they do conduct very frequently. I think we had a 
lot of success with the assistance of external consultants.” 
CS 13: “I would say that the approach is the best way to investigate the corruption, 
because of the multi-disciplinary approach where the investigators, the 
Forfeiture Unit, the Financial Intelligence Centre, everybody sat in meetings 
and they plan together and that is the best way to approach it. The module 
that was initially introduced at the ACTT, I think is very good and could have 
worked. It’s just that interference didn’t make it easy for ACTT to continue 
on the set path.” 
CS 14: “Besides the law that’s applicable on the different agencies, it makes 
cooperation difficult because at the end of the day, everyone, because of 
their mandates, they want to create their own kingdoms, which I understand, 
because they also have to report back to Parliament and all that. But it 
causes unnecessary delay, on the ground level. This is a serious challenge 
that at the end of the day information is not shared to the extent that it should 
be due to building own empires and kingdoms for themselves or trying to 
take the credit for a case.” 
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CS 15: “From my experience, they do not cooperate and communicate. It seems 
that everyone wants to individually promote his unit or his own idea… 
SARS, usually we didn’t get any cooperation from them, and they actually 
want to conduct their investigations on their own. They want you to share 
information with them, but they won’t do the same. So yes, you get team 
members that don’t buy into the idea of a multi-disciplinary approach and to 
cooperate. So they will communicate one way and won’t share the 
information us…”  
CS 16: “The prosecutors that I worked with are really cooperative and we share 
ideas on how to promote the case or investigate it further and I would say 
there’s communication with the FIC, although we do struggle to get the 
information within a reasonable timeframe from them, they do assist with 
that and then we have good communication with the SIU from my 
perspective.” 
CS 17: “I think this is the right unit if the structure is good, that all the stakeholders 
participate positively in this and then it could achieve its purpose.” 
 
One participant responded with positive comments about cooperation: 
 
CS 9: “As I already mentioned, the Prosecuting Authority, the prosecutors, the 
investigators, the AFUs, well as FICA are in meetings and discuss any 
problems that can arise, and sort all problem areas out to enhance the 
investigation.” 
 
Most of the participants are of the view that communication should improve, which 
will in return result in a more effective investigative approach. Team members do 
not have a say with regards to items placed on the agenda at principal meetings, 
nor do they receive feedback from such meetings. There are suggestions that 
relevant DGs or Ministers should intervene when challenges occur within their 
departments, as challenges are seldom solved at principal meetings. 
Communication is key to ensuring that work is not duplicated and investigations 
prolonged unnecessarily. The common views are that communication and sharing 
of information are currently ineffective. The team members do not work from a 
central office. This makes it more difficult to arrange ad hoc meetings to address 
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pressing concerns promptly. It is not always practical to wait for the formal meetings 
to address such concerns, as it will impact negatively on the effectiveness of the 
investigation process. The greater part of the selected participants said in no 
uncertain terms that communication needs to improve, especially between the 
current management and the investigative teams.  
 
5.4.2 Sub-Theme 2.2: High Workloads and Insufficient Resources 
From the literature presented in Section 4.3.1, Tang and Hsiao (2013) state that one 
of the inadequacies for ACAs is the time requirement. The multi-disciplinary group 
requires sufficient time to complete a particular task, to avoid inadequacies during 
the investigation process. In addition, Hussmann and Hechler (2008) clarified that 
amongst the issues to be considered by ACAs is the allocation of sufficient 
resources for the successful operation of the agency (see Section 4.5). 
 
This sub-theme, namely the high workloads and insufficient resources, follows for 
discussion and interpretation.  
 
The ACTT members’ insights and impressions were sought to understand their 
perspectives on whether the high workloads due to insufficient resources hamper 
the investigation of corruption. In multi-faceted corruption investigations where 
highly-placed government officials or influential private individuals are involved, it 
takes time to investigate cases properly and formulate a comprehensive charge 
sheet. When an investigator is overwhelmed with multiple investigations, it will result 
in a delay in the investigation, as one person can only do so much. Thus, the 
importance of the multi-disciplinary approach. When these investigators experience 
additional shortcomings such as vehicles, cell phones, laptops, administrative 
support, etc., the investigation will be prolonged unnecessarily. Several participants 
referred to the high workload due to a lack of competent multi-disciplinary staff for 
quality investigations. The following verbatim quotations of participants and 
supporting literature illustrate this sub-theme: 
 
CS 2: “If a new unit is formed, yes, that’s my chance to get rid of the bad blood on 
my unit. I just send that worthless investigator to the new unit, he would feel 
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it’s an improvement for himself, but I would gain by getting rid of the guy 
without the necessary paperwork and personally, I felt that was happening.”  
CS 3: “Lack of human and capital resources are a serious concern. Investigations 
that take too long and also prosecutors that are linked to these 
investigations. They… well, they fall under the NPA, so the NPA essentially 
takes too long to conduct their part, which is to draft the charge sheets on 
an investigation conducted. It is true that the drafting of charge sheets take 
[sic] too long and I think there can be some factors that contribute to that. 
For instance, it might be a very complex case and sometimes they have 
more than one prosecutor on the case or it seems they lack the will to 
prosecute certain matters.”  
CS 4: “According to me, there is too little people and too many cases and for the 
investigators that are currently here. All the investigators are not necessarily 
on the same page with regards to investigative background. The 
prosecutors would rather charge people with stuff like theft and fraud than 
corruption. Which in return results in that we do not address the root causes 
during the investigation and the successes are superficial.”  
CS 5: “When we started off, we had everything. We had analysts, we had 
everything, you name it. There was plenty of cars for the members, there 
was stationery, Expert consultants, which I think was a very, very big 
mistake when they did away with the consultants. Because obviously what 
happened from the police point of view, if I may, because as an ex-
policeman and a commander I know exactly what the situation is.”  
CS 6: “I don’t think that the prosecutors appointed in the possessing have 
necessary skills to charge these criminals on these counts or it might be that 
they are lazy and not willing, due to political pressure because most of these 
investigations are highly sensitive. It’s organised crime with one big kingpin, 
in most of these cases.”  
CS 7: “The ACTT is under a very high investigation workload. There are [sic] too 
little investigative capacity, no proper case management support, no proper 
structure to remove blockages. The ACTT operates without proper oversight 
in steering. I mean political, NPA, AFU, SIU, FIC and SARS. It currently 
feels like we are just doing window dressing for the United Nations, to 
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comply with various international agreements. We do not address the issues 
at hand.” 
CS 8: “There were promotions and all these non-skilled policemen got promoted 
to higher ranks, coming to the ACTT without the necessary skills to perform 
investigations of white-collar crime. This occurred in the majority of cases. 
Because of all the cases on hand in the ACTT and the years I’ve been 
involved, I think if there were five sentences of all the matters, it’s a lot. We 
can’t just lay the problem in front of the police or the SIU or the rest of the 
team members, we must also look at the National Prosecuting Authority.”  
CS 10: “I don`t think that the ACTT conclude their investigations in an acceptable 
timeframe. Is it mainly due to the lack of investigation abilities by the 
investigating officer to collect evidence and the prosecutor’s lack to formally 
draft the charge sheets to take these cases to court. Firstly, as already 
discussed with the incompetent police on the unit, that obvious competence 
is a big issue.” 
CS 11: “There’s too little people, human resources, too few people to investigate 
personnel to conduct quality investigations. The people that are currently 
here has [sic] got too many dockets on hand. They don’t have people that 
can assist them and if they do have people that can assist in unnecessary 
investigations are prolonged.” 
CS 13: “If you move over to the other disciplines, Special Investigating Unit, not 
enough members at the ACTT and also they are tasked with investigation 
duties as well, so they can’t focus only on the ACTT. SARS is not on board, 
they are more concerned about their own pocket, so they are not involved 
and they don’t function, the same with Asset Forfeiture. There should be 
few dedicated advocates only dealing with ACTT matters.” 
CS 14: “Presently each and every investigator is dealing with his own cases… The 
workload is too much, there is a lot of workloads whereby if you have to go 
and gather your evidence or like your expert evidence, you have to leave 
your office and go and ask… approach the relevant people to assist you.” 
CS 15: “You know, recently, the standard has deteriorated and mainly it is because, 
you know, we’ve got a lack of resources in terms of manpower and vehicle, 
cell phones, laptops…” 
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CS 16: “But from my experience now, I could say it doesn’t achieve its aims and 
objectives because of the fact that we lack the manpower to investigate the 
cases allocated to us.” 
CS 17: “We lack many resources and support. Like I said previously, we don’t have 
any manpower. When the ACTT started, we were 80 people and now we’re 
down to less than 30, so it’s not effective. We need to keep in mind that the 
number of investigations increases and the investigation capacity 
decreased. Without manpower, the necessary resources, political will and 
support from our superiors, there’s no way that the ACTT can be effective… 
We’re supposed to work as a team, at the moment there’s only a single 
investigator on a case, which is really very complicated usually and takes a 
lot of time. So we don’t work within timeframes. Although on paper more 
than one investigator is allocated to an investigation, this is however only a 
paper exercise.” 
 
All participants unequivocally stated that they cannot cope with the current workload. 
This was discussed with members of management, who only responded by stating 
that cases and workloads should be prioritised. According to the participants, every 
time members resign or transfer and cases must be reallocated or new cases 
distributed throughout the unit, the managerial staff members just say “prioritise your 
work”. When team members complain about being overloaded with work, 
management tells them they just need to prioritise. This happens time and time 
again when work is distributed, which results in new priorities having to be prioritised 
and old work falling by the wayside. Added to the undue pressures as a result of the 
workload, the teams do not have the essential resources to conduct investigations. 
They provided examples such as broken-down vehicles, no access to landlines, 
limited access to emails, no internet connection, and lack of office space to conduct 
interviews. The participants indicated that they operate in one big, open plan office 
with managers each in their own office. They share the view that to conduct 
interviews in an open plan office, relaying sensitive information, is surely not wise. 
 
5.4.3 Sub-Theme 2.3: Competency Levels of Manpower  
Dussich (2006:141) clarifies that the investigation of corruption is not an ordinary 
process; the members need to be attentive, innovative, and be willing to work long 
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and unusual hours to finalise their investigation responsibilities (see Section 3.10.2). 
The members should be proud of their work, as this is one of the most important 
ingredients of a successful investigative team. The competency of corruption 
investigators is of crucial importance, as they should know various investigation 
techniques and possess various skills to be successful in the execution of their 
responsibilities. It seems that cases are merely allocated to the investigator to 
investigate, not taking into account the stress levels of the investigators at the unit. 
The predominant view of the participants is that they are overstretched with their 
investigations and are not able to cope with their workloads. This might also be the 
reason why so many have left the unit and will continue to leave the unit to find 
better work conditions. In addition, Interpol ([sa]) reports that there is a need to 
review some successful corruption investigations around the globe, to be abreast 
with the latest international trends and techniques (see Section 3.14). Training is 
fundamental to boosting the knowledge and skills of investigators in the use of the 
latest tools and techniques in the investigation process and to share international 
best practices. This is complemented by the OECD’s (2013) statement, as given in 
Section 4.5.2, that expertise implies the availability of specialised staff with special 
skills and a specific mandate for fighting corruption. The work of the APEC (2014) 
confirms that members of an ACA must possess particular investigative skills to be 
effective (see Section 3.10.2). The investigation of large-scale corruption cases is 
mostly multi-faceted. The investigators need to have the ability to examine 
intelligence and secure and preserve the integrity of the investigative team. As 
Transparency International (2018a) points out, specialisation of anti-corruption 
bodies implies the availability of specialised staff with special skills and a specific 
mandate for fighting corruption (Section 4.8.2). 
 
The participants were questioned about the competency level of human resources 
in the ACTT during the in-depth interviews. The ability of the investigator to function 
independently with the necessary skill set to investigate multi-faceted corruption 
cases might be a challenge for the ACTT. It is common knowledge that not all the 
investigators have been exposed to commercial type investigations prior to their 
deployment to the ACTT. The inability by ACTT management to ensure that current 
members meet the required level of competency is shocking. The current team 
members are mostly not afforded the opportunity to attend courses, which are 
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necessary to stay one step ahead of the perpetrators. This results in most of the 
team members not being abreast of the latest information on what is happening 
within the corruption environment. Although training is provided, practical 
experience in conducting complex investigations can only be achieved when one is 
exposed to such investigations. It is not fair to take a new individual and throw them 
into the deep end and try to train them on this level. The skills should be acquired 
prior to deployment to the ACTT. Since the ACTT deals with high-profile cases 
which end up in the media, the personnel need to be experts in the field and show 
that corrupt practices will be brought to book. A common view was shared by most 
participants that ACTT management was ineffective in communicating with team 
members; it is as if they operate in silos. The following quotations illustrate their 
views: 
 
CS 2: “I don’t think this is what is expected, at this stage, because we don’t have 
consultants to complement the teams. The consultants were an expert pool 
of individuals from their various institutions which complimented the ACTT 
teams in my time when they were here, they had the necessary knowledge, 
and it’s unbelievable that this valuable source was done away with. Their 
assistance in all the investigations made a positive impact.”  
CS 4: “They swop the investigating officers, that’s where your knowledge 
management comes in. The one that takes over the new case the new 
investigator, does not have the background knowledge that the old 
investigator had and thus leads to big gaps… Yes, just big gaps in the 
investigation for the defence to explore, this doesn’t make any sense.”  
CS 5: “There’s a lack of skills. To be quite honest I think some of the police officials 
involved at this stage, only 10% of them have the necessary skills to 
investigate white-collar crime. The SIU members are similarly lacking, they 
need the necessary skills.” 
CS 7: “You can’t put in a new prosecutor at the end of the investigation but to 
remove him and expect a new prosecutor to come to terms with the facts of 
the case within a certain period of time, say two, three months, where it took 
you three, four, five years to investigate, is almost impossible. Irrational 
redistribution or strategic reallocation of work is highly questionable and this 
is happening far too often.”  
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CS 8: “There were even instances where case dockets were found in a steel 
cabinet for an excess of six months. There was a matter that came to my 
attention, which I got involved with, where the whistle-blower provided an 
affidavit. That affidavit was sitting with a captain at the time, for more than a 
year and it pertained to the cross-border corruption that ended up in South 
Africa, funds of hundreds of millions ended up in Zambia where a 
commercial bank was involved. That was… for more than a year it received 
absolutely no attention.” 
CS 10: “When a case is with an experienced prosecutor and an experienced 
investigator, then ACTT is very effective in its mandate is met.” 
CS 11: “There is a lack of accountability with some of the individuals and obviously, 
in my personal opinion, they hide behind the fact that insufficient expertise 
is available to ensure a focussed investigation, they are all over the show 
with no clear direction. 
CS 12: “I would say, incompetent or inexperienced police officers. For some of the 
other reason, members are appointed without the required experienced. 
That did not happen at the time when the ACTT was formed, they had to fill 
the posts and posts were advertised, persons applied for the posts and they 
were successful. They were taken on board without having completed the 
basic investigative courses, advanced investigative courses or investigative 
courses pertaining to the investigation of white-collar crime, corruption, 
money laundering and etcetera. That’s one. The second one being the 
promotion factor. Investigating officers were sitting at units, for instance, I 
noticed that at the time, as warrant officers. They apply… then they would 
have applied for a captain’s post, they were successful, they were brought 
on board. They work there for a couple of months, they got a promotion and 
they went back to where they came from. So there was no continuity of 
experienced investigators, no coordination, no cooperation, and no proper 
management for your middle management level at the ACTT downwards to 
guide and to provide proper direction during investigations.” 
CS 13: “But currently you will work on a matter and you know, you’ll have to take it 
to the prosecuting authority, then they will allocate, you know, a prosecutor 
who does not even have an idea as to what is money laundering is. 
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Sometimes they even don’t agree on what corruption constitutes, we need 
dedicated experienced prosecutors.” 
CS 15: “During its inception, of course, we had the expertise and that’s now really 
needed in order for the ACTT to be effective. But because of the new 
leadership, those people with knowledge and the experience were not 
recognised, you know, they were disregarded.” 
CS 16: “The moment one important person, for instance, let’s say a prosecutor or 
investigator, doesn’t know what he is doing or even the auditor or the 
analyst, analyst in a lesser extent, but the main guys, especially investigator 
or prosecutor, you are buggered.” 
CS 17: “Surely incompetence and of course totally inexperienced police officer 
including members from other departments…” 
 
The participants share the view that there is a severe shortage of competent human 
resources in the unit. Although the current competency of the personnel is 
acceptable, the teams are not as effective as in the unit’s formative years. The 
participants indicated that there is a critical need for additional competent members 
to function more effectively. Management is aware of the challenges, but for some 
reason does not intervene other than reporting it again. From the responses of the 
participants, it became overwhelmingly clear that although management is aware 
that investigators are already overburdened, they continuously assign additional 
administrative duties to them. Failure to comply with administrative duties, reports, 
weekly plans, and monthly plans results in ACTT members being threatened with 
disciplinary action, according to the participants. There is a view that management 
is out of touch with what is happening at the unit. There is a limited focus from 
management on the investigative functions of the ACTT.  
 
The responses from participants clearly illustrate their need for additional capable 
members to function more efficiently. 
 
5.4.4 Sub-Theme 2.4: Role of Management 
Brand South Africa (2012) explains that the leaders hold themselves to high ethical 
principles and act with righteousness (see Section 2.6). As shared in Section 2.4, 
the World Bank (2017) illuminates that corporate pioneers are regularly prosecuted 
- 216 - 
 
for different acts of fraud and corruption, including political leaders. Fraud and 
corruption cannot be overlooked. The loss from even one incident of fraud and 
corruption can have disastrous consequences for any government or agency. It is 
not only the financial loss brought on by the incident, but indirect damages, for 
example, reputation damage and loss of public and shareholder confidence. 
Participants were outspoken about the need for competent management to 
coordinate cooperation and communication and that these elements are now 
lacking. The role of management is crucial and instils confidence in investigators 
when they know that they have the backing of management. It seems as if 
participants regarded the lack of an effective project manager to coordinate the work 
of the multi-disciplinary team as a major limitation to efficient communication and 
cooperation. Coordination, cooperation, and communication is a prerequisite for the 
effective management of the multi-disciplinary team. The following quotes illustrate 
and substantiate this finding: 
 
CS 1: “So managers should be able to take a whiteboard or blackboard or 
whatever and draw his pictures and basically consolidate the whole 
investigation, they should be able to explain the investigations currently 
under investigation clearly. The managers should ensure that weekly or 
every fortnight meetings are conducted with the teams.” 
CS 2: “The previous management was involved with the day-to-day operations at 
ACTT, the turnaround was very quick in getting banking records, there were 
meetings between our principals and the relevant banks frequently where 
our concerns were addressed. This needs to be implemented once more.”  
CS 3: “There are many obstacles that prevent us to be more effective. The 
obstacles include the current management…” 
CS 4: “I don’t think management as such is experienced enough, I also don’t think 
the management at this stage doesn’t really understand the cases 
themselves and can’t give proper guidance in investigations, which really is 
a big, big, big shortfall.” 
CS 5: “ACTT would have three or four senior commanders directing the 
investigations, one from each discipline with their own objectives to achieve. 
All the members of ACTT should work together at one office, take them out 
of their own environment, and place them with a commander at ACTT, 
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which will command all these members. We need one reporting structure. 
At this stage, it’s not happening so everyone is running like a headless 
chicken. They should actually form part of and work together on a specific 
project where after they can disburse after the investigation is finalised. 
There are not enough skills and expertise.” 
CS 6: “So timeframes become a challenge, because we are not reporting to the 
same boss and besides the work that we do for the ACTT we’ve got other 
outside work that we do outside the ACTT, hence we fail to reach the target 
by 2015 which led to the extension of the mandate. So I think that is one of 
the shortcomings, the fact that we are not reporting to the same boss, we’ve 
got work outside the ACTT environment that affects the speedy 
investigation of the cases.” 
CS 7: “It should be managed by the ethical experienced managers. Managers, 
they should understand the importance of ACTT, where ACTT fits in and 
they should communicate with their own people downwards and then get 
them to communicate with the various teams in ACTT.” 
CS 8: “No commander in control over the challenges facing during investigations 
or intervention from management, no proper inspections with guidance were 
conducted, no control over the number of cases that were actually booked 
out to investigative offices. This surely had a negative impact on the morale 
of the unit.”  
CS 10: “Looking at the concept of a multi-disciplinary model to combat corruption, 
national, international corruption as it’s sometimes referred to, the model is 
an excellent model and it’s been used successfully in a number of countries, 
especially in the United States, Britain, UK… So nothing wrong with the 
model per se, the manner in which the multi-disciplinary model was 
implemented in South Africa, it started off very good, it started off excellent, 
but was derailed when management changed.” 
CS 12: “I think it’s due to a change in management and the way things were done. 
You know, people were put in positions, you know, superior position or 
leadership position, having no idea as to what is expected of the ACTT 
because of their approach and the manner in which they were giving 
directives. It was confusing and then multi-disciplinary approach falls off.” 
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CS 13: “If I remember correct, you know, on a monthly basis, we need to meet and 
discuss whatever predicament, whatever is currently facing us, but we are 
in the dark. I, for one, I must say that I don’t how where I’m going or I have 
to stay where I am or I have to go back, because this is really confusing. No 
one know what is expected of him, you just hear things but without, you 
know, any proper communication.” 
CS 14: “When management changed, we were no longer successful. Why the 
change other than ACTT being too successful during their investigations?” 
CS 15: “With the new management, things started to change, you know. We saw a 
decline in the number of arrests, a decline in the number of prosecutions.  
CS 16: “The previous head of the department would interfere by taking a case from 
one specific investigator and give it to another very inexperienced 
investigator. This investigator who would actually not promote the case and 
with the effect that the investigations are dragged out for years. 
Investigators will get instructions to just leave certain aspects of the 
investigation or to exclude it from further investigation. And when answers 
are asked about that, it’s you are just told what to do and you are not going 
to investigate this further and that’s it, no discussion.” 
 
The common view of the participants is that the new management is not effective, 
but actually derails and interferes with current investigations in a dubious manner. 
There is a common view that the previous management, that was in charge when 
the ACTT was formed, was effective and supported the investigators. Referring to 
the non-effective management of the team and issues experienced with effective 
functioning, one participant summarised the effect as follows: 
 
CS 17: “Our ship is sinking. So maybe the captain is ready to go down with the 
ship…” 
 
The majority of the team members feel that they are not consulted regarding the 
directions of their investigations, as decision has already been made by 
management. Although challenges which arise are escalated to management, they 
seldom receive any feedback from management. Management rarely follows up on 
challenges raised by team members. This is an enormously ineffective manner to 
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handle corruption investigations. Management does not seem to be doing anything 
constructive to resolve the members’ challenges. All of the participants indicated 
that should there be a single command structure, goal-oriented investigations would 
be more attainable. It is vividly clear that the ACTT should be managed by one 
person, not a group of managers with their own targets to achieve relevant to their 
departments or organisations. Management is out of personal touch with what is 
happening on the ground and they do not seem too bothered about the situation. 
Management needs to be more involved, especially when team members request 
that they intervene in critical situations, but it seems that their requests fall on deaf 
ears. The third theme illustrates the independence or lack thereof in line with the 
efficacy of the unit. 
 
5.5 THEME 3: CHALLENGES FOR INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE ACTT  
 
The participants’ experienced challenges regarding the independence and effective 
functioning of the multi-disciplinary approach at the ACTT. The autonomous 
functioning of the ACTT is questionable during their corruption investigations. The 
answers to the following question gave rise to this theme and its sub-themes:  
 “From your point of view, should an anti-corruption agency, such as the ACTT, 
function autonomously to investigate corruption in the South African public 
service?” 
 
The ACTT members’ insights and impressions were sought to understand their 
perspectives on whether the ACTT functions autonomously in the investigation of 
corruption cases. The theme was divided into sub-themes to give a clear 
understanding of the insights of the ACTT members as deliberated below. According 
to the participants, there seems to be no political will to investigate certain cases, as 
these investigations lack resources and other priorities are frequently assigned to 
these members to prevent them from investigating certain individuals, without 
stating it directly. Participants identified several inhibiting factors that negatively 
influenced the attainment of the goals set by the ACTT. There seems to be 
agreement that political interference and lack of political will, the current high 
workload of investigators, together with insufficient supportive administrative and 
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logistic support, lack of cooperation amongst competent team members, and lack 
of coordination by an efficient managerial system were regarded as factors 
contributing to the ineffectiveness of the ACTT. The following sub-themes are 
substantiated by selected quotes from the participants. 
 
5.5.1 Sub-Theme 3.1: Political Interference and Political Will 
Abraham and Berline (2015:135) state, as emphasised in Section 2.4.1, that corrupt 
activities are a phenomenon rooted in the social, political, and financial conditions 
of those involved. As mentioned in Section 3.10.18, Fatima (2017:65) states that 
ACAs require political will to be effective; the government involved has to allocate 
adequate budgets to ACAs, ensure the enactment of anti-corruption laws, and 
provide support to the investigation of corruption cases, especially in high-profile 
corruption cases. In addition, Hussmann and Hechler (2008) clarify that the concept 
of independence can be understood in terms of organisational, financial, and 
functional independence and the institutional setup for ensuring independence 
needs to be context-specific (see Section 4.9). Issues to consider for ensuring the 
institution’s independence are lack of coordination and fierce competition over 
scarce resources. This is complemented by the UNDP (2005) in Section 4.9, 
reporting that the independence of the agency is a fundamental requirement for its 
effectiveness, and broadly refers to the ability of the institutions to carry its mission 
without interference from powerful individuals or the political elite. In addition, the 
International IDEA (2014) clarifies that autonomy from undue impedance is 
fundamental for an ACA to execute its mandate viably (see Section 3.10.16). 
Autonomy implies an adequate measure of operational self-sufficiency which 
shields the ACA from undue influence or direct political obstruction.  
 
In addition, Hussmann and Hechler (2008) conclude that political will and broad 
national anti-corruption strategies are often a long-term endeavour, particularly if 
they involve reforms in different spheres and areas of government (see Section 
3.10.18). Based on the cases analysed in the U4 report, it can be inferred that a 
high level of political will is very difficult to maintain throughout the whole strategy or 
implementation plan cycle. Moreover, political will can also be hindered by changes 
in government. It goes without saying that the most important element of an effective 
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anti-corruption strategy is “political will”. Without the political will or buy-in from the 
highest level of government, the fight against corruption will remain a fallacy.  
 
A strong theme that emerged was the lack of political will and uncalled-for political 
interference during investigations. This directly impacted the prerequisites for 
effectiveness, e.g. the availability of resources and the progress tempo at which 
complex cases were handled. Participants referred to the current lack of political will 
for attaining the goals of a multi-disciplinary team. The following excerpts illustrate 
the participants’ sentiments: 
 
CS 11: “The funds which were utilised to pay for consultants dried-up, no new 
resources were allocated to the unit since there was a change in 
management, why was the previous management removed? Surely this is 
not all just a coincidence. We need to connect the dots.” 
CS 14: “It’s because of all the political interferences we don’t achieve our objectives. 
If I may give an example, the investigators in the multi-disciplinary teams, 
they were all housed in one building, but if you look at it now, there’s only 
the Hawks left, all the other multi-disciplinary approaching teams, they are 
no longer within the building.” 
 
Other participants highlighted the negative effect of the lack of political will and 
political interference with resources had on investigations and provided examples 
of the perceived interference:  
 
CS 1:  “Political pressure is actually the main reason for the delay of investigations, 
where there’s interference in investigations, and that’s why the ACTT need 
to stand separate, independent, in order to address corruption effectively. 
CS 2:  “The ACTT, unfortunately, does not investigate and conclude corruption 
cases within the acceptable timeframes. And in my personal opinion, I 
believe it’s because of the interference and the fact that there’s a lack of 
political will to drive the matters properly through the court.” 
CS 4: “I would say the interference in the ACTT is the biggest factor to blame for 
the ineffectiveness of the ACTT. These high-level corruption cases are not 
investigated in an acceptable timeframe, these cases that we dealt with, 
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they never saw the day of the court as a result of interference. Investigators 
and prosecutors are removed with no clear reason if they don’t follow the 
instructions of the new management to focus on specific individuals for 
companies only.”  
CS 5: “Due to external influences, we were not able to achieve much, specifically 
taking into consideration the corruption and as one can see today in the 
media, the extent of the corruption. Unfortunately, it is my experience that 
due to interference we were not able to achieve the aims and objectives. 
But behind the scenes, there seems to be going on a lot more. All of a 
sudden, certain contracts for the consultants went missing and people 
weren't interested in doing the administration and we had to do a new set of 
contracts and that also did not materialise for the external experts to be 
appointed. So obviously there must have been influences other than the 
budget that has got nothing to do with the actual budget. But these types of 
investigations that we were involved in, we were pretty close to senior 
people in government and it was obvious that the corruption was so far 
spread that a lot of the people would have been or could have ended up in 
jail and that might have been why there was interference with ACTT.” 
CS 6: “The biggest problem at the time, I would say, was political interference and 
police corruption, because we all know, it's public knowledge, that case 
dockets have been requested by members of SAPS detectives division, by 
a former National Police Commissioner who requested that certain case 
dockets which were actually in the domain of the ACTT, this was really 
uncalled for… Why was this allowed? What happened to these 
investigations? The only logical reason to me was because of the high-level 
suspects involved which needed protection from her [referring to the former 
National Police Commissioner]. The inhibiting factor to investigate certain 
high priority case dockets is political interference. Now, this is one thing that 
can only be addressed by a solely independent crime combatting unit for 
the purposes of investigating grand corruption and money laundering and 
racketeering.” 
CS 11: “There’s interference in most of our cases. We don’t have the necessary 
resources to conduct our investigations properly, and even funds to appoint 
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external experts is inefficient. Investigators have to plea with National 
Treasury to obtain funding for the appointment of external experts.” 
CS 13: “From my experience, I could say the ACTT doesn’t achieve its aims and 
objectives because of the fact that we lack manpower, we don’t have 
political support. There’s interference in almost all of our cases. We don’t 
even have the necessary resources to conduct our investigations properly.” 
CS 16: “We don’t have political support and current management are politically 
motivated appointees”.  
 
A couple of participants attempted to explain the reason behind political interference 
by providing examples. The following excerpts illustrate this: 
 
CS 3: “Some are bending over and conceding to political pressure or pressure 
from management to steer investigations in a particular direction 
predominantly away from the main culprits or politically connected 
suspects.”  
CS 7: “Cases of ours that was very close to finalisation, some just needed to sign 
their affidavits, after a consultation with NPA they never came back to us 
and thus preventing us to proceed with our matter and that is very 
counterproductive to the aims of the ACTT. Where they contacted by certain 
people or did they recognise certain people at the NPA that made them 
unwilling to cooperate with us? They try to divert the attention of certain 
team members with dubious tactics, they are not obvious in the manner they 
interfere, and they always have a so-called valid reason for the delaying 
tactics. Certain suspects have more protection than other suspects and 
place more emphasis on other suspects that they wanted us to rather look 
at and prevent other people.” 
CS 8: “Interference from two senior state advocates at NPA during the 
investigation process. These prosecutors were not the new kids on the 
block, but for some or the other reason the charges were dropped by them, 
despite the fact that we had long working sessions with them and the case 
was discussed in detail and they were happy that they would be able to 
prosecute for money laundering and as I said, we later discovered that the 
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charges were dropped and the prosecutor accepted only the plea for fraud. 
Why?” 
CS 10: “You can have an experienced investigator, experienced prosecutor, but if 
there is no political will, then you’re not effective. Without naming names or 
cases, but when there’s a high-profile person involved, it’s just a normal 
corruption matter, it can be complicated, it can be huge, and it’s an 
experienced investigator and a prosecutor, it can be effective. The moment 
a highly placed government official or a person with access to influential 
government officials are involved you can accept there will be interference 
from one or the other sort during the investigation.” 
CS 12: “Another thing is also political will that also sometimes don’t give us the 
opportunity to achieve that aim or objective of the ACTT. Political will in a 
sense, especially if you're busy to investigate certain political figures or high-
profile individuals that are in the politics. Then you will not always have the 
necessary backing of your own employer. And then also when you go to the 
partners, for example, you struggle to obtain documentation from the 
partners, especially if you need that documentation from that department 
and so you don’t get that political support to obtain it. Even if it goes so far 
as Parliament, you struggle to obtain the necessary documents to conduct 
your investigation.” 
CS 15: “Interference would be when an investigator or a team is working on an 
investigation and the next thing we hear that the docket is needed… for 
example at Head Office and while the docket is never returned, it's given to 
another investigator and the prosecutor is changed so that they can start 
the matter afresh. This is done obviously behind the scenes, we all know or 
we suspect that there might be some pressure from the people who are 
investigated, because they are people who are in powerful positions or 
people who have got influence in the government structures.” 
CS 17: “We used to have, you know, a lot of interference from the politicians and 
the management which is not so good, you know. Well, with the new 
management we’re hoping things will change, but initially, when this 
organisation started, you know, it was very effective.” 
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All of the participants are in agreement that the NPA has an integral part to play in 
ensuring that the ACTT functions effectively, by ensuring that multi-faceted 
corruption cases are placed on the court roll once the investigation is finalised. The 
NPA should not just blindly accept plea bargaining for lesser charges to lighten their 
workload. The reciprocal perception of the participants was that when the ACTT 
investigators could not be influenced, the suspects pursued alternative means to 
influence the NPA’s decision on the prosecution of these cases. There is a common 
perception that the NPA will firstly prolong the investigation by giving instruction to 
the investigating officer to conduct further investigations when it is not necessary or 
required. Sometimes even the appointed prosecutor will be replaced by the NPA 
without any logical reasoning other than the conclusion that it is merely a delaying 
tactic. These type of multi-faceted investigations into corruption cases are indeed 
complicated, with volumes of facts and documentary evidence to work through. 
Thus, when any new investigator or prosecutor is appointed at the tail end of the 
investigation it could take up to a year for the newly appointed investigator or 
prosecutor to familiarise themselves with the facts. This could also be seen as a 
delaying tactic by those in power. It does not make any sense to change a 
prosecutor or investigator when the investigation is close to being wrapped up. The 
continuation of investigation and prosecutorial processes is of the utmost 
importance to be effective in the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases. 
 
5.5.2 Sub-Theme 3.2: Budget and Logistical Constraints of Resources 
As noted in Section 3.10.1, Doig et al (2006:166) elaborate that sufficient resources 
are essential to attract and preserve proficient and adequate employees in 
methodical investigations and prosecutions. In addition, the International IDEA 
(2014) states that the creation of an effective ACA is costly, however, when corrupt 
activities are unrestrained the cost is even higher (see Section 3.10.1). A broad 
mandate of an ACA may result in resource restrictions if the resources are not 
allocated appropriately to address the broad mandate. When a budget is not 
congruently revised, it may result in insufficient resources and below average 
production. As observed in Section 3.10.1, the APEC (2014) motivates that before 
commencing an investigation it is imperative to accurately evaluate the required 
resources that will be needed to conduct the investigation. The investigator must 
compile a comprehensive investigation plan consisting of human, physical, financial, 
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or material resources that will be required before the commencing of the 
investigation. Great difficulty is experienced while investigating complex corruption; 
these cases have a tendency to be extremely time-consuming and costly. The 
investigation must be organised from the start. The well-organised use of allocated 
resources and investigative tools in conjunction with proficient team members is 
precarious. This was complemented by Risktec’s (2008:6) statement, given in 
Section 3.10.1, that planning ensures that the investigation is organised and 
thorough. During this phase, the investigators need to determine the type of 
resources he/she will need, the experts that would be required, and the estimated 
timeframe of the investigation. In complex investigations, an investigative team will 
be more effective than a single investigator. Transparency International (2013) 
emphasises that in several countries around the world, ACAs lack the necessary 
personnel, technical capacity, and resources to conduct their tasks (see Section 
3.10.18).  
 
Participants identified that a lack of budget and logistical support prevent the team 
from being effective in the investigation of corruption cases. This resulted in 
unnecessary delays in the investigation. Participants specifically referred to a lack 
of administrative and technical support. The following selected excerpts illustrate 
this: 
 
CS 1: “Not enough resources are allocated to ACTT members. First of all, we face 
challenges as the ACTT members are not sufficiently equipped with 
logistical equipment and to conduct their activities. For example, some 
members do not have transport or even safe storage for evidence in these 
cases. If you need to have meetings they can’t attend, because they don’t 
have the resources, logistical resources. For example, even stupid things 
like paper, computers, or just storage facilities. In cases like this you need 
to have secure documentation and if you can’t secure your documentation, 
there’s obviously a problem in the system, because your evidential value is 
compromised and needs to rely on the evidence collected. We need to 
secure the evidence in order to, you know, present it to court and I often find 
that we do not have those essential resources.” 
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CS 2: “This multi-faceted corruption cases cannot be investigated without money, 
without logistical support and managerial backing.” 
CS 7: “I just want to say as well, case administration also takes up much time and 
leaves little time for proper investigations, case management. 
Administration is left to the investigator who needs to interview witnesses, 
compile very long and time-consuming affidavits, copy, scan, file, transcribe, 
analyses, and bank statements are all left to the investigating officer. Beside 
this, there are numerous weekly and monthly reports which are time-
consuming which put an additional burden on an investigator who is already 
under a lot of strain and pressure to effectively investigate in the time 
allocated to him.” 
CS 10: “The moment you start to investigate politicians, your budget is gone. That’s 
the way they kill you [the case], they just take away your budget or reduce 
your budget. So that’s one of the ways and then also the NPA doesn’t 
prosecute or they delay the drafting of the charge sheet, there are different 
delaying tactics…” 
CS 13: “Resources, that is the last thing, you know. Even cars now, one has to 
make sure that you will push the car every morning before coming to work 
and the mileage of the cars is very high. Imagine pushing starting your car 
after obtaining a witness statement or interview a suspect. It shows to the 
public the management is not serious about these cases.” 
CS 15: “I don’t think ACTT have enough human and physical resources currently 
to be effective.” 
CS 17: “At inception, of course, we were resourced, and the expertise was there 
and that’s what was really needed now.” 
 
Most of the participants view the budgetary constraints of the ACTT as the work of 
unscrupulous characters in the JCPS cluster who are trying to prevent the 
successful persecution of certain entities or individuals. The budget should be 
allocated to a totally independent body with public oversight if the ACTT cannot be 
moved to ensure its independence. A budget should be allocated and kept separate 
for each and every investigation to address the inadequacies of the ACTT. 
Management should not be able to control the budget after it has been allocated. 
Sufficient resources should be allocated to the ACTT so as not to unnecessarily 
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delay investigations. Blockages should be removed immediately to ensure that 
investigations are progressing swiftly.  
 
5.5.3 Sub-Theme 3.3: The need for Independence/autonomy 
Camerer (2008), as noted in Section 3.10.18, suggests that one way to achieve 
independence is through better, more formal coordination. Coordination does not 
suggest combination, centralisation, or even consolidation, as some of the talks of 
rationalisation would suggest. Rather, it recognises the reality of independent and 
complementary institutions, each of which has an important and unique role to play 
in effectively fighting corruption. This point has been made vividly by the Heath SIU 
(Camerer 2008):  
We are dealing with a multi-headed dragon and various different kinds of 
swords are required to attack the different types of heads of this dragon. 
The Unit is therefore of the view that the various organisations all have a 
role to play in the fight against corruption and maladministration.  
 
In addition, as stated in Section 3.2, Boucher et al (2007) observe that combatting 
this may involve strengthening the legal anti-corruption framework and building an 
effective criminal system, including an independent judiciary and effective law 
institutions. This is complemented by Schuchter’s (2012) statement in Section 
3.10.16 that the Public Prosecutor’s independence during investigations is critical. 
Independence should be secured in the investigation of corruption cases. This is 
supported by Quah (2009) who explains that there are many expected benefits to 
the creation of centralised anti-corruption bodies and, although they can't be 
considered a silver bullet, they are largely perceived as having the potential to 
stimulate a more successful coordination of the local fight against corrupt practices 
by focused powers in a self-contained agency and to bring specialisation, 
independence, and self-governance to the battle against corrupt practices (see 
Section 4.11). Transparency International (2014) accentuates that the lack of 
autonomy and coordination between various agencies resulted in the inefficiency of 
formed ACAs. Many countries have established a dedicated agency to coordinate 
and monitor the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy (see Section 
3.10.18). However, these agencies often lack the necessary power and authority to 
compel high-ranking officials to deliver on their responsibilities or the autonomy to 
report on any progress achieved.  
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A common theme that emerged was the autonomous functioning that directly 
impacts the team’s ability to investigate. A prerequisite for effectiveness is the 
autonomous functioning of the ACTT. This will assist the multi-disciplinary team to 
effectively carry out its mandate. The independence/autonomy of the ACTT is 
imperative for its effective functioning and freedom to identify the cases which 
should be prioritised without political interference. This is essential for the effective 
operation of an ACA such as the ACTT. The following excerpts from the 
transcriptions illustrate and substantiate this sub-theme: 
 
CS 1: “Corruption does not stop at low and intermediate and middle-level 
management. You need a total autonomous organisation to investigate 
corruption.” 
CS 2: “I do not think that the ACTT has adequate independence to investigate 
corruption. Where you have division heads, departmental heads, ministers 
and other team members which might be implicated, with their influence you 
cannot investigate. To answer the question, I do not think the ACTT had the 
required independence. The intent was there, however, later it turned out to 
be only a smokescreen. I doubt if we are effectively independent at ACTT 
when taking into consideration the interference with the investigation of our 
cases. I am sure every investigator are [sic] able to give you examples of 
interference, this is being done with the buy-in of the current management. 
So the major role player is the police and the others are for example the 
FIC, SIU, AFU and the NPA. The independence of this task team is, to me, 
lacking…” 
CS 3: “An agency, such as the ACTT, should investigate matters without any 
interference, without fear, without favour to anyone. When I say without 
interference, is it my view that some of the cases that are being investigated 
are being influenced by politicians. That is why they take so long. It is the 
result of interference and if I say… in this interference I say political 
interference.” 
CS 4: “There is not adequate independence to function effectively at ACTT… If a 
multi-disciplinary expert team is properly managed, working autonomously 
with vetted officials then it can still be effective.” 
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CS 5: “Indeed correct, as it stands because of this interference of… because most 
cases that the ACTT investigate is high-profile businessmen or government 
officials that have connections with high-profile political people in and out of 
government. It should be a unit with their own resources, the human 
resources and physical resources… Own structures so they could manage 
their own budget and they need to account for their budget, not just a CARA 
[the Criminal Assets Recovery Account] fund. SARS obviously, we don’t 
involve them, not just because of their unwillingness to partake in our 
investigations but, because at this stage, the thing with SARS is they don’t 
play ball when it comes to exchanging of information. We give… from 
ACTT’s side, we give, they don’t give back, they withhold the information for 
themselves and we need to share with them.” 
CS 6: “There should not be any interference, because you are investigating the 
public service and a lot of the public service people are involved. There’s a 
need for the ACTT to be independent and there’s a need for more 
experienced people, like for instance consultants, where you can get the 
knowledge that you are looking for. But at the moment the ACTT is not 
structured for that because again when you get new management… they 
give us a lot of administrative duties to perform weekly or like FIC, SIU, the 
principles, then that principle can stop it like it was done by the SIU or they 
can delay payments and that will result into delaying the certain 
investigations. I think autonomy is a technical word which I believe is difficult 
to apply within the space of the ACTT. Remember, we are not talking about 
one unit which reports to one boss, but it’s constituted by personnel with 
different skills and expertise. We’re talking about a task team of different 
state institutions coming together to achieve one certain goal. As a result, it 
becomes difficult to even to talk about the autonomy of that institution. I 
suppose yes it should be independent…” 
CS 7: “Independence is crucial for a unit such as the ACTT to be effective. Integrity 
is the other main thing and at this stage, I feel we are infiltrated by some… 
Political influence is killing our investigations in this country and it is just 
allowing corruption to boom. I mean, if you look at them… People are 
transferred or they get fired or dismissed or put on disciplinary sanctions 
and on suspension they are passed when it is time for promotion.” 
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CS 8: “To be most effective I think one must go back to the old DSO model. They 
were really independent and maybe once we look at the model where they 
even worked under the office of the Chief Justice. As we know the offices 
of the Chief Justice is, I would say, very independent, a very autonomous. 
It’s got its own budget and politicians could not have achieved any attempt 
to influence the office of the Chief Justice. So if you can either incorporate 
or look at a similar model, I think that would be the solution in South Africa. 
The main role player there is the police, because they are the only organ of 
state who have the mandate to investigate criminal offences.” 
CS 9: “Yes, I think they must function autonomously. I think it will be a good thing. 
I know not of any interference, so we were free to investigate as a normal 
case should be investigated. The ACTT need to be independent, everyone 
from another government department at ACTT should be seconded to the 
team, this is not happening reason being financial constraints.” 
CS 10: “The problem with or the challenge with corruption is that sometimes or 
many times you investigate them, as they say, the dog that feeds you and… 
ag, we are the dog and they feed us, the Parliament. So what they do is 
they cut your budget. So one of the big challenges. But again, in the South 
African context, it’s for me, I think it will be a good thing, that kind of model, 
but I doubt if it will ever happen in South Africa, that they will give one person 
that much power. But it may not just be one judge, it can be a panel of 
independent… like an independent board of reliable people to make that 
decision, in a sense of taking it away from the NDPP [the National Director 
of Public Prosecutions], when it comes to… not necessarily… I am not 
saying like in every case, I am saying like take the Zuma matter. Here is the 
President and now the former President, but when he was President, now 
he is one of the suspects, take away from the NPA that decision from the 
NDPP because he is a political appointee. Hawks head, political appointing. 
So take away that, that kind of cases go to this panel that… for that serious 
corruption and that can be done by that judge or then like a board or… that’s 
independent, to make the decision. First of all, to say investigate this matter, 
there’s enough proof and/or… and then also to make… decide… make a 
decision to prosecute or not. I believe we must have a totally independent 
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kind of unit to investigate that, with a head that is not linked politically, like 
an independent judge that has been… something like that…” 
CS 11: “Well, yes, there’s no question about that, because you will investigate the 
matter for an example. When you are at the final stage of, you know, 
investigating and you have to… or the matter is court ready, it’s ready to be 
placed before court, you know, there will be a request from the senior 
managers that, you know, we need to see that docket and that would be the 
end of that matter. You’ll never see it and it’s not going to be easy to go to 
the authorities and question them as to I gave you a docket on this specific 
date and what happened to that matter. There are of course cases which 
just disappeared. Yes, it is important for us to be independent. Because 
then there cannot be any political influence or this one wants to cover that 
one…” 
CS 12: “I think they should definitely be an independent agency because of the fact 
that if they function within the SAPS, the possibility of interference is so 
much more. So because of the fact that they also investigate corruption 
within government departments which also sometimes include police 
officials.” 
CS 13: “ACTT mostly investigates cases where, you know, high-profile people are 
involved. So the moving away of expertise, taking away like for an example 
vehicles and transferring people like the unit does not exist or the unit has 
just ceased to exist, that was a clear indication that it was a deliberate move 
that you know what, we have to make sure that we destroy this ACTT and 
make sure that they don’t function effectively, thereby demoralising those 
members who are still within the unit… that is of course delaying tactics and 
that is deliberate, of course… Yes, that, of course, is a way of making sure 
that you win the fight against corruption. When we start it was like that, 
because I must say that even the prosecutors were engaged at that stage, 
at an early stage.” 
CS 14: “We should work autonomously, without political interference. We should 
have the independence to approach whomever we suspect or to approach 
witnesses involved in the cases. ACTT is currently not an independent unit 
with interference, we cannot reach our targets, we cannot reach the people 
that we're supposed to go to. A few of the cases where only certain people 
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must be charged and the other people don’t have to be charged and it’s 
mostly the people that are on the ground level that must be charged. I think 
if the people on top can be charged, then the people on the ground can also 
not commit any crime because they don’t have to. I think it’s a thing of 
manipulation. If you don’t do this, then you don’t have a job.” 
CS 15: “It is very, very important, that an agency like the ACTT or any other agency 
dealing with cases of this nature should function autonomously, because 
like I said previously, you know, the issue of influence. If you are not 
autonomous, you know, we have influence from other, you know, forces 
outside the agency, you know, like the departments, we have ministers, we 
have people, you know, who are powerful and connected, you know, 
interfering in the investigation. So indeed, there should be some autonomy.” 
CS 16: “I think it should be independent, not part of the NPA because there we 
know is also political interference going on. It should operate totally 
independent, as a body on its own. Not part of SAPS, not part of the NPA 
because there’s then more chances of interference. If you cannot 
investigate corruption, money laundering, racketeering, it’s obviously some 
of it… most of it happens across borders, international and so forth. But let’s 
look at what happened in the past couple of years in South Africa. If you, for 
instance, look at the Nkandla matter, that could never have been 
investigated independently, without interference and that… we all know 
what’s currently happening and what happened in parliament with reference 
to the Nkandla matter, what happened at the SIU, who also investigated the 
Nkandla matter and the story that was told to the public. So independence 
and autonomous, it runs together… it was mentioned that they’ve been 
chained to the ground, but independence of an independent anti-corruption 
agency as was seen by United Nations Convention against Corruption and 
the African Union this moment. I don’t see it achieving the goals it really 
wants to achieve.” 
CS 17: “If it’s separate from the police it will be better managed, because now you 
see how many components does the head of the police or the head of DPCI 
running. All those components are having their own problems and then it 
depends, people are attached to certain people that are attached to certain 
people and attached to a certain component, while you’re failing the 
- 234 - 
 
others… each and every department or stakeholder got its own problem 
because people are influenced easily by politics and people belongs to other 
people, seems they are owned by other people. They don't use their own 
mind to run certain things or how to do with certain things. So I think maybe 
Justice can do better for ACTT or ACTT be on its own, only get finances 
from Treasury. The ACTT was… a weapon of mass destruction in the fight 
against fraud and corruption, more especially, you know, within the high-
ranking officials, but that is no longer the case. One should ask the question 
why there were so many changes at ACTT if we were effective. Or was it 
specifically because we were effective?” 
 
The predominant observation of the participants is that the ACTT is not functioning 
autonomously, which is having catastrophic consequences. There is no indication 
that management takes the issue of independence seriously. It seems that teams 
are merely assigned case dockets as a ploy to overburden them with high 
workloads. A common view of the participants is that they only serve as an 
intelligence unit for management with political agendas. There is a call for 
management to play a more active role during politically motivated investigations by 
means of support to the investigative team and not the assignment of additional 
cases. Often managers are not able to explain certain instructions, which is a clear 
sign that they are merely instruments of certain highly placed individuals. The 
majority of the participants are of the view that the ACTT does not have adequate 
autonomy to conduct corruption investigations. Most of the participants have 
personally encountered interference with their investigations, either through the 
NPA’s delaying tactics or through budget cuts, which include cutting out resources 
essential to conducting such investigations, such as vehicles, expert services, 
stationery, IT equipment, photocopy paper, etc. Some even experienced more direct 
meddling when criminal cases were removed by ranking officials for no logical 
reason either than to prevent the investigator from arresting the suspects. The fourth 
theme illuminates the need for change and the best practices available to improve 
the effectiveness of the unit from the participants’ perspectives. 
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5.6 THEME 4: SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS 
BASED ON LESSONS LEARNED  
 
The participants’ knowledge and experiences were pursued to determine what can 
be improved or changed at the ACTT to enhance the efficacy of the multi-disciplinary 
approach to assure the professional investigation of corruption cases. In some 
instances, the participants narrated their experiences with the implementation of 
multi-disciplinary approaches to investigate corruption in order to give the reader a 
clear picture of the environment at the ACTT. The answers to the following questions 
gave rise to this theme and its sub-themes:  
 “Have you learnt lessons as a member of the ACTT that could enhance the 
multi-disciplinary approach to investigate corruption in the public service?”  
 “Do you have any additional comments or suggestions regarding the multi-
disciplinary approach to investigate corruption in the South African public 
service that has not been discussed?” 
 
The ACTT members’ knowledge and experiences were sought to understand their 
perspectives on whether the team can be more effective during the investigation of 
corruption cases. Suggestions were made for the improvement the team’s 
effectiveness based on lessons learned and a structure that accommodates expert 
multi-disciplinary team members. The recruitment procedures and integrity testing 
of team members were suggested, as well as the ability of supportive staff to 
complement the team’s investigation duties. Participants’ suggestions for 
improvements towards effectiveness flow directly from the challenges identified in 
Theme 2 and 3. The central theme of the suggestions revolves around a relevant 
structure for a multi-disciplinary task team to investigate corruption. Some 
participants explicitly mentioned the need for appropriate structure, while others 
identified issues that implicitly point to elements that form part of such a structure. 
The following sub-themes emerged, substantiated by relevant excerpts from the 
transcripts. The statement by CS 1 in the sub-theme below summarises some of the 
requirements that participants identified, such as competent management and 
independence of the unit. 
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5.6.1 Sub-Theme 4.1: A Structure that Accommodates Expert Multi-
Disciplinary Team Members 
From the literature presented in Section 3.10.3, Pedneault et al (2012:134) 
illuminate that the forensic auditor must perform all of the actions in unity with the 
investigation plan, and gather all of the evidence required for a successful 
investigation. In addition, the APEC (2014) clarifies that the refined techniques 
needed to deal with the complexities of large-scale corruption cases and the 
utilisation of specialised experts are vital in the effective investigation of these cases 
(see Section 3.10.3). Forensic experts in electronic evidence are supplementary to 
the investigative team and will assist in tracking and analysing data, as well as 
discovering the metadata of a particular document and the author thereof. This is 
complemented by the OECD’s (2011) suggestion, as mentioned in Section 3.10.3, 
that the assessment of expert witnesses should at all times be conducted to ensure 
that the selected expert has the necessary skills to add value to a specific 
investigation. As stated in Section 3.10.9, the CMTEDD (2004) suggests that in 
complex investigations the investigators should pay specific attention to the 
following: obtaining of witness statements; the inclusion of expert witnesses; the 
formal interview of suspects; handling of physical evidence, including exhibits; and 
the preparation of prosecution reports. 
 
An effective ACA is a structure that accommodates expert multi-disciplinary team 
members, as well as coordination by expert management. All of the participants 
were of the opinion that the multi-disciplinary structure should continue and should 
be complemented by external experts on an ad hoc basis. The ACTT does not just 
need professional team members to conduct investigations, but also expert 
members of management who are steadfast and are able to make unpopular 
decisions on a regular basis. The following excerpts illustrate this:  
 
CS 1: “I’ve dealt with quite a number of very experienced police officers, but also 
there’s a number of police officers that are inexperienced. They do not 
understand the importance of cooperation between the public sector, 
forensic accounting firms, ACTT and the different team members. I think 
that is lacking at the moment where, if that can be addressed in order to 
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train staff to understand the working relationship and each one’s roles and 
responsibilities in this multi-disciplinary approach.” 
CS 2: “If you want a multi-disciplinary agency to be utilised and to work, they 
should have a structure to fall back on and they should not write new laws, 
but they should be seconded with a specific goal and a specific instruction, 
because at ACTT you can’t work independently from the other team 
members and you can’t do civil and criminal, it should be focused on the 
criminal activities.” 
CS 3: “In my view, the ACTT is an appropriate multi-disciplinary agency and 
approach. When such a unit is formed for a specific task, to investigate 
specific cases, these members should be seconded from their various 
departments for the duration of the investigation and released for the 
duration of such an investigation and work together on a daily basis. And all 
the necessary expertise, for instance, that ACTT should have people like 
accounting, forensic accounting people sitting with them to assist them with 
the investigations, specialists like that. Also, like data analytic people and 
even computer forensic people.” 
CS 4: “So if maybe there is a structure that can accommodate the administration 
of the consultants of experienced people that you want to get on board, that 
will help because then one principal cannot interfere with them. I would 
ensure the independent appointment of number one. Number two, with 
derailing and therefore the investigation shall then continue and not just be 
terminated as felt by one principal.” 
CS 5: “Expertise is probably the most important thing of all. When you have expert 
investigators that’s positive and want to investigate, they can get around all 
the insufficient support personnel and equipment that’s not available to 
conduct your investigation professionally.” 
CS 6: “The fact that we are not reporting to the same boss, somewhere along the 
lines we talk past each other. They’ve got their targets in the NPA to achieve 
certain targets, the SIU has got their own targets in terms of their mandate 
to reach certain targets. So the work of the ACTT in that instance suffer in 
terms of achieving certain targets within certain specific times. So that is on 
its own an inhibiting factor.” 
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CS 7: “We need a project manager who can manage the investigation, everything 
that comes in. That manager needs to… and that’s per investigation, that’s 
not per unit, it’s per investigation, a project manager that can properly 
manage that project, the investigators, the analysts and the admin team.” 
CS 8: “I can see that the shortcoming of having different state institutions coming 
together to achieve a particular goal. The shortcoming is that somewhere 
we talk past each other and that is caused by the fact that besides the work 
that we do for the ACTT, the institutions have got other work to do in respect 
of their mandate. I will give you an example of a case where, you know, with 
a prosecutor you couldn’t agree on something and that has affected the 
timeframes on when certain things had to be done because of this hustle 
between the prosecutor and the investigator and these two people, they 
report to different bosses. I believe if these two people, the investigator 
who’s got the investigating skills, the prosecutor whose legal skills were 
reporting to the same boss, it was going to be easy to resolve the matter. 
But now the fact that we are two different institutions, the cases suffer 
because of the differences between these two individuals. So coming from 
that background that I had with the Scorpions, I believe the ACTT strategy 
is good, but it is somehow lacking if you are to compare it to the Scorpions.” 
CS 9: “Cases here needs to be investigated by groups, not an individual because 
these are big, complex cases. We need minds in a case.” 
CS 10: “Due to inexperience, there in the ACTT what we are lacking is people to 
give guidance because of the workload, people that… senior people, 
experienced people that should be there to give guidance, they are 
themselves, investigating matters. So they don’t really have time to give 
guidance. We are overloaded with the cases, now you are all alone in a 
case and it’s in a way unfair to an inexperienced person. So it’s important 
that you know where you are going to from the start, what you need to prove, 
that you stay focus [sic] on that specific section. So everyone has a job to 
do.”  
CS 11: “We really need better management, people that can communicate with us, 
people that are there for us that we can go to for advice. At this stage, I don’t 
see that there’s anybody that can assist us if we need to consult or discuss 
a matter with them.” 
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CS 12: “The management team should be of such a calibre that they know what to 
do and they could give the instructions to the people. Yes, all the 
stakeholders of ACTT which would form part of a particular investigation, 
the thing is that the South African Police or Hawks were the leading 
stakeholders in this ACTT environment and a lot of the investigation and the 
going forward depended on the obtaining of section 205’s to be done, 
statements, etcetera and telephone conversations or new telephone data 
calls and that. So a lot depended on the Hawks to do the investigation 
whereas you have the money laundering and asset forfeiture, they had to 
go hand in hand because of the nature of the investigations, but that didn’t 
always happen.” 
CS 13: “Expertise is needed, people who know and understand this environment. I 
think going back is not a problem, the people who introduced this model of 
ACTT initially should be approach and consulted on the way forward if they 
are still approachable.” 
CS 15: “A multi-disciplinary approach to investigate corruption is the best approach. 
This is also the approach I’m currently involved in, the United Nations office 
for drugs and crimes and I’ve access to other countries and investigations 
similar to ACTT in other countries and in Namibia, in Botswana. All of these 
countries aim to go to multi-disciplinary investigations, because that is the 
best way to do it. If you have a system that works, people that trust each 
other…” 
CS 16: “You can’t do anything without manpower, but if I had the necessary 
manpower, I would actually just like to promote cooperation with each other, 
share information and also in-house training. Put inexperienced members 
with experienced members, in a team on each case to actually… so that 
less experienced members can learn from the more experienced ones and 
work as a team on a project, not individually. That is in a perfect world if we 
had the necessary resources, manpower, and vehicles.” 
CS 17: “ACTT itself needs new leaders who can go and revisit the mandate of 
ACTT during 2011 and from all stakeholders that are involved, have people 
that they go and revisit what was the purpose of ACTT when it was started… 
It seems people had forgotten what the purpose of ACTT was.” 
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The staff complement of the ACTT feels that there has been a deviation from the 
multi-disciplinary approach and that the approach should be followed, as it yielded 
prompt results. The multi-disciplinary structure is one where team members are able 
to bring their respective expertise and focus on specific roles to the team. This 
approach is one of the more successful approaches, as it limits duplication and 
allows members to put their expertise to use. The lack of adequate competent 
manpower will inadvertently hamper and unduly delay the investigation processes. 
Following these suggestions, there was a strong theme for the need to supplement 
the teams with external experts. The secondment process which is available should 
be simplified and the ACTT members should be encouraged to make use of it. This 
will assist in streamlining the reporting structures of the ACTT. A shared view of the 
participants was that of a single reporting structure. The secondment of individuals 
will assist in alleviating some of the workload pressures endured by team members, 
albeit only for the duration of a specific project/case. The private sector does not 
experience the same challenges, as they assist explicitly according to a specific 
mandate. 
 
5.6.2 Sub-Theme 4.2: Recruitment and Integrity Testing of Team Members 
From the literature presented in Section 2.6, the UNDP (2005) discusses that the 
sophistication of corruption implies that conventional law enforcement agencies do 
not always have the technical expertise and capacity to detect, investigate, and 
prosecute complex corruption cases. One of the major arguments supporting the 
creation of specialised anti-corruption bodies is that the growing complexity of 
corruption cases and related financial transactions require a high level of expertise 
and specialisation of knowledge that can be best achieved through recruitment, 
training, and centralisation of expertise in a single-issue agency. As the Government 
of the UK (2017) explains, preventing members from engaging in corrupt practices, 
including professional integrity testing, is fundamental for an ACA (see Section 
4.12.18). This is complemented by Velez (2006:71) who explains that ACA 
members are only human and are susceptible to temptation (see Section 2.5.5). 
When members lack integrity, they are more likely to act in an inappropriate manner. 
In addition, Nino (2013) concludes that combatting corruption is vital to change the 
norm of unlawfulness that reaches out all over the country without any exceptions 
(see Section 4.10). Without a versatile message from justice institutions, individuals 
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will keep on taking for granted the example of numerous public officials who exploit 
their powerful positions. 
 
The participants made it clear that additional competent members are desperately 
needed to complement investigative teams. Integrity testing is another valuable tool 
available to management to assist in ensuring that the members’ integrity is in-tact. 
There was a nearly unanimous suggestion for recruiting and integrity testing of 
selected members. The exception was participant CS 9, who said the following:  
 
“I think the people at the ACTT I can trust. It is important to vet them, but I don’t think 
there’s any problem of not trusting them. I think they are really dedicated to complete 
their task.” 
 
The statements below by participants represent the main opinion voiced: 
 
CS 2: “Dealing with this kind of cases, one has to be, you know, 100% clean. 
Integrity testing is very much important for each and every member who is 
part of the ACTT.” 
CS 4: “I think things like a polygraph testing on a regular basis will enhance the 
multi-disciplinary approach to ensure that we can trust one another or the 
team members inside. I am of the view that at some stage, you know, you 
will have to trust each other in a multi-discipline approach. The main thing 
is if you have… let’s say from management point if you recruit people that 
you trust and that have the skills, then you would eliminate a large part of 
the trust that might not exist between people. But polygraph testing can help 
and everybody and should be tested once in three months or something like 
that. By doing this everybody knows that testing is going to happen and 
that’s the way it’s going to be. Then you will have more secure information 
and your physical security with regard to the building access and the storage 
of evidence and things like that.”  
CS 5: “Well, first of all, polygraph, we can use polygraphs as an investigative tool, 
we can use polygraphs to… for our recruitment processes, so why don’t 
we?” 
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CS 6: “We are institutions of government, each with its own mandate… an element 
of mistrust will be there because we don’t know, the integrity testing or the 
integrity status of that person. So the integrity testing would certainly be 
advisable.”  
CS 7: “It’s crucial to have a top secret clearance, to have people that are 
trustworthy working here… the work that we do involves top government 
people, top people in state departments, DGs, ministers, and to have that 
kind of information, to have their bank statements available and have 
someone looking at them without having the proper integrity testing is a risk, 
it’s a major risk. That person may not even go to the minister or to the DG 
himself, but he can go and just talk nonsense outside of the ACTT and 
people will believe it and you’ll say aah, you know, that minister is getting 
this and these kinds of money and he talks amongst his friends and that is 
a serious, serious risk to the integrity.” 
CS 8: “You must have a proper recruitment process and experts from the private 
sector who sit on the panel which selects the candidates and of course, the 
very important things, and the single code of conduct and disciplinary code 
that must be enforced. The moment the guy applies, the integrity testing 
process must start immediately and unfortunately, there was a lack of 
communication.” 
CS 10: “The reasons the Scorpions were closed down is because they weren’t 
vetted properly and some of the guys were now under DPCI since 2009, it’s 
2018 and I still have the confidential… since the Scorpion days, 10 years 
and expires now and believe me, it’s still a problem. There are many people 
that don’t have integrity testing or clearance. It’s not always necessary for a 
top secret, but I would say it’s not wrong to go for a top secret, especially 
when you’re working with complicated cases or high-profile. So I would say 
yes, it’s necessary, the integrity testing, but at the moment it’s not effective. 
I understand I don’t have to proof of that, but I hear that even in the DPCI 
there are members with criminal records or are under investigation, which 
is busy with the sensitive investigation while they are under investigation… 
Testing should be done on a yearly basis, a polygraph or something, just to 
ask you simple questions. ‘Have you received a bribe?’, ‘were you offered 
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a bribe?’, ‘were you involved in anything that you shouldn’t be?’, you know, 
or ‘did you sell information?’, that kind of questions.” 
CS 11: “Before you even get involved in an ACTT matter, you should go through 
the integrity checks by this very institution that is governed by the policy 
within the ACTT. I think that could create a more conducive environment for 
all of us.” 
CS 12: “I’ve been involved here since 2011, I’ve not been vetted. I had a top secret 
clearance previously, but it expired.” 
CS 13: “Every member should, before becoming a member of the ACTT, be 
cleared, because remember, as a team, you need to know the person that 
you are working with… if you are cleared security wise, then I think, you 
know, we have more confidence, you’ll never doubt the person sitting next 
to you.” 
CS 14: “I would suggest [integrity testing] on a monthly basis. If and whenever they 
see fit, they should come and test us, if a docket gets missing, we should 
be tested immediately.” 
CS 15: “Regular integrity testing would be paramount in having, you know, the 
people’s integrity not to be questioned. I, for one, have never been vetted 
since I joined the ACTT. You know, I filled in the necessary forms for more 
than five times and nothing has happened as yet. So, even in the ACTT, we 
know of people who were, you know, compromised.” 
CS 16: “Integrity testing is definitely necessary, because I think ACTT members 
should be experienced members and then obviously their integrity must be 
above board. So, a top-secret clearance would be a necessity and also 
make sure that there are no criminal investigations pending or that everyone 
has a clean criminal record. That would definitely help… a drug test can also 
be done, because if a member has any substance abuse issue, which might 
also influence the investigation of their cases. So random tests each year 
as well a five-year top secret clearance would, I think, be of value.” 
CS 17: “I think it must be a priority, to say each and every member must start at 
ACTT having an integrity testing. We’re working with sensitive information. 
But now if you stay three years in a unit, you applied for the Integrity testing 
and that doesn’t come, you know there might be some ulterior motives. For 
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instance, some individuals working at the unit that will not pass the integrity 
testings… Even now I don’t have the integrity testing.” 
 
The greater part of the participants does not have absolute conviction in each other’s 
integrity. There seems to be some trust concerns amongst participants. However, it 
became clear that the commencement of compulsory integrity testing would 
undeniably alleviate some of these concerns. The fact that the participants deal with 
top secret information of highly placed individuals in government and the private 
sector should be reason enough to expedite this process for the ACTT. The 
perception that integrity testing instils confidence amongst members was shared by 
the participants.  
 
5.6.3 Sub-Theme 4.3: Supportive staff, Resources, and Lessons Learnt  
As presented in Section 3.10.1, Doig et al (2006:166) states that the ACA head 
should have the ability to hire and dismiss employees independently and not have 
employees imposed the ACA. In addition, the UNIDO (2012) points out that the 
relevant resources should be readily available to ensure that the investigations are 
conducted in the most efficient and effective manner and are completed in the 
shortest possible time (Section 3.10.6). As stated in Section 2.6, Brand South Africa 
(2012) states that South Africa has a robust anti-corruption structure in which the 
agencies fighting against corrupt activities have the resources, trustworthiness, and 
power to investigate corrupt activities, as well as to prosecute. This is complemented 
by the UNIDO’s (2012) statement given in Section 3.10 that lessons learned from a 
variety of organisations should be examined to discover the best possible solutions, 
as well as the generally accepted investigation standards in the UGI. The 
investigators have consequently officially implemented these guidelines for their 
work since January 2012. According to Risktec (2008:6), as revealed in Section 
3.10.17, reporting the outcome of an investigation should only commence after its 
completion. The investigation is completed when every single outstanding issue has 
been explored and the unearthing has been communicated to the complainant along 
with the goal, so that lessons can be shared. In addition, Olaniyan (2014:30) 
explains that for an effective multi-faceted corruption investigation process to occur, 
the following basics should form part of such an investigative methodology: 
impartiality and trustworthiness of detectives and prosecutors; sufficient education 
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and resources for investigative duties; and accessibility of monetary, human, and 
technical assets (see Section 4.13). The following are some of the reasons for their 
failure: a weak political will; lack of resources; and political interference and 
selectivity in investigations. As Schuchter (2012) concludes, the best practice 
against corrupt activities is the investigation of corruption cases. Surely there are 
other best practices in countries participating in good governance. The best 
practices on successful detection, investigation, and prosecution of corruption cases 
should be shared, which will cultivate strong ties of international cooperation. 
 
The participants in this study consistently agreed that effective support staff is a 
valuable resource for the ACTT which is absent, along with essential resources such 
as vehicles, stationery, office space, etc. The participants feel very strongly that 
mistakes should not be repeated every time management changes. The team 
should keep a record of what worked previously, and then it should be implemented. 
Their quotations on this matter are shared below: 
 
CS 1: “The fact that we are not reporting to the same boss, somewhere along the 
lines we talk past each other. They’ve got their targets in the NPA to achieve 
certain targets, the SIU has got their own targets in terms of their mandate 
to reach certain targets. So the work of the ACTT in that instance suffer in 
terms of achieving certain targets within certain specific times. So that is on 
its own an inhibiting factor.” 
CS 2: “An independent line of command, an independent line of accountability and 
proper selection of teams, in the multi-disciplinary approach, is essential. 
You’ve got to have your skilled investigators, you’ve got to have your cyber 
forensic guys, you’ve got to have your analysts, your charter accounts, 
you’ve got to have your corporate environment members allocated to the 
teams. Because public sector corruption is not only internally, it’s also 
externally. It goes all over the spectrum of financial business and business 
as such throughout the whole of South Africa.”  
CS 3: “A good example, an institution like the former Scorpions, it was better set 
up because the NPA took charge, there was only one boss which is not 
currently the case at ACTT. The prosecutor and the person with 
investigative skills, which is the investigator, are both reporting to the same 
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boss. It becomes easy for those persons to work together in a case and if 
now that unit is reporting to a particular institution, that is where we can talk 
about autonomy, whether there is limited control by outsiders of that unit…” 
CS 4: “I really do agree with that; we need more and internal quality control. There 
is currently inadequate support for investigative personnel.” 
CS 5: “The private model, of course, the different teams will have different 
investigations, but the main goal, at the top, at the top of the triangle, will be 
achieving the goal of a multi-disciplinary unit and that is why they have to 
have a commander or a ship captain that is properly communicating what 
the aims are and manage it, the senior and the middle management teams, 
to such an extent that no duplication happens and that they achieve goals 
and targets in time without duplication.”  
CS 6: “From the backdrop of the decommissioning of the previously DSO or 
Scorpions which was an effective unit. If you check the methodology used 
by the ACTT, it is actually walking in the footsteps of what the Scorpions 
did, their approaches are similar. It is currently the best way to deal with 
serious corruption. The cooperation from different disciplines is 
incorporated into this approach in dealing with serious corruption.” 
CS 7: “Each investigation team needs one admin assistant, at least, to assist with 
copying of files or to assist with scanning, to assist with capturing data. We 
do a lot of capturing data, data capturing and it takes up a lot of time, a lot 
of time. That is the one more or suggestion that I can make, is do that. 
Another one is just to have a pool of analysts, or not analysts, a pool of 
admin people who know their duty is to file, to scan, to copy and to capture 
data, bank statements and do it properly. There should be an admin 
manager who was taught about what is expected from such a manager. 
Excel spreadsheet should look like when they go to court and that the 
manager should manage the admin team and see to it that all the captured 
data is court ready.”  
CS 8: “The ACTT is currently understaffed and what happened, as I’ve mentioned, 
persons requested or applied for posts and applied for the promotions, they 
got the promotion, got the posts, and after a couple of months they went 
back where they came from with the promotion. Now, each and every time, 
say your reasoning… your staff complement is decreasing all the time, but 
- 247 - 
 
the workload taken up is increasing. So what is happening now, we’re sitting 
with a small number of investigators and with this massive caseload.” 
CS 9: “More resources needed, that is including the investigators.” 
CS 10: “The biggest problem is a proper structure, proper leadership, a single 
hierarchy and what I mean by a single hierarchy is that if you have the ACTT 
as a structure, you have one single structure.” 
CS 11: “I will implement better structures, I will do recruitment on a bare scale and 
I would make sure… I would do the recruiting, I mean, it’s not difficult 
recruiting and from there, with the structures put in place, you will get your 
stronger workers. You would send them on better training courses which 
obviously enhance your unit’s effectiveness.” 
CS 12: “I would say having five investigating officers, to go out and gathering the 
evidence, doing interviews, doing the affidavits in a team. Then you need 
an analyst that can look at all those affidavits, analysts, not someone sitting 
down on a computer and drawing… pulling some information from a 
database, that’s not an analyst. An analyst is someone who can read and 
understand affidavits, look at bank statements, look at cell phone 
statements, all your evidence put together and he can put a nice and 
comprehensive spider chart, put it on the wall and explain to the people and 
to the judge what is going where, who is the main culprit and how everyone 
fits in to the picture.”  
CS 13: “My comment would be, you know, we really need to go back to basics in 
terms of this multi-disciplinary approach and enhance it and make a success 
out of the investigations that we conducted.” 
CS 14: “I will definitely bring back a multi-disciplinary approach and I wouldn’t allow 
any person to interfere with the functioning of the unit.” 
CS 15: “If you have all the stakeholders, you know, participating actively in the 
organisation or in the investigations, it makes the investigation easy 
because you know, like I said the turnaround time will be shorter and 
different people come with different strategies and expertise, you know, in 
the investigation. So yes, the lesson that I learned is that the system is very 
effective, the multi-disciplinary is very effective. If we have a good leader, 
we can bring everybody together like it used to be.” 
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CS 16: “We need bigger teams to investigate. We need external expertise. We had 
the capacity, but the capacity was watered down and there’s no capacity 
currently. There is some capacity, but it holds the investigation back. If you 
look at cyber forensics within the police, they don’t provide the information 
timeously, so there’s a backlog. If you look at forensics, in the forensics 
laboratory in other fields, they just are overwhelmed with the work. I'm not 
even talking… we don’t have accountants, we need accountants. We need 
them to be in-house, but we don’t have them… So no, the government is 
not enough to investigate, we need outside help.” 
CS 17: “We’re having more workload, that is the cases are, and as complex, as 
they are, I’m alone on each case. So it’s tough, it’s tough.” 
 
The participants are of the view that professional support staff would alleviate some 
of the pressure on team members. They could fill the role of scanning, indexing, the 
filing of documents, etc. There is a concern that support personnel currently do not 
perform any quality control over their work, which means that this too is left up to 
the investigating officer. This in return places unnecessary pressure on the team to 
verify work done by support personnel. As expected in a multi-disciplinary team, 
each member should have a specific set of skills to enhance the productivity of the 
team. There does seem to be an effective retention strategy in place to retain trained 
members. This inadvertently resulted in members leaving the ACTT without 
replacements, thus the human resources are dwindling each year. Presently the 
situation makes it almost impossible to be effective in combatting corruption. All 
team members from the government should function under one umbrella with a 
clear, common goal. The mutual view of participants is that all members of the ACTT 
should have one reporting structure, as the former Scorpions did.  
 
5.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter explained the essence of the themes and categories that emerged from 
the transcribed data of the raw interviews. It consisted of descriptions of the themes 
and categories, and the verbatim quotes were presented with a clarification of the 
heading of each section. The responses of the participants clearly state that the 
ACTT is currently in a predicament. An intervention from NGOs and ethical political 
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leaders is desperately needed to turn the tide on corruption. The ACTT is a vital tool 
which must be resuscitated to save the country from this devastating path of 
corruption. There is still enough expertise and enthusiasm on ground level to turn 
the tide.  
 
Data was gathered by means of in-depth interviews with a digital voice recorder. All 
the participants were active role players in the ACTT with specific areas of expertise. 
The data obtained from the participants are also interpreted in order to obtain the 
meaning of certain terms and situations. In some instances, the participants 
narrated their experiences of the implementation of the multi-disciplinary approach 
to investigate corruption in order to give the reader a clear picture of the situation at 
the ACTT. From their responses, it is clear that the ACTT was on the right track until 
there was a change in management. The next chapter will present a summary and 
recommendations regarding the findings, as well as a conclusion. In addition, the 
research findings derived from the in-depth interviews conducted with participants 
will be discussed and interpreted. Literature applicable to each theme will be 
integrated and discussed as per the literature study presented in Chapter 2, 3 and 
4 of this study. The findings of the results will be presented and discussed in various 
identified themes. The results of the in-depth interviews will further be summarised 
and discussed in Chapter 6. In addition, the researcher’s findings from the 
responses of the participants in comparison to the literature studied drew attention 
to the significance, challenges, and best practices of a multi-disciplinary approach 
in the investigation of corruption within the public service.  
 
The following chapter summarises the study, after which recommendations and 
conclusions are made. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish whether the research aim and objectives 
which were set in Chapter 1 have been met. In order to ensure that the aim and 
objectives have been met, the research findings will be presented in the sections 
that follow and, in addition, the recommendations will be made. This chapter 
provides a summary of the thesis from Chapter 1 to Chapter 5 and the 
recommendations resulting from the findings in Chapter 5, and conclusions will be 
drawn. The subsequent recommendations are based on the main findings as 
derived from the presented themes that emerged in Chapter 5. This study is of 
importance, because corruption in public service affects all citizens. The 
recommendations made focus on the effective management of the investigation of 
corruption following a multi-disciplinary approach.  
 
6.2 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
 
Section 205(3) of the Constitution (South Africa 1996b) states the functions of the 
SAPS in sequential order as follows: (1) to prevent crime; (2) to combat crime; (3) 
to investigate crime; (3) to maintain public order; (4) to protect and secure the 
inhabitants of the Republic and their property; and (5) to uphold and enforce the law. 
The main focus of this research project was on the third function, which is the core 
function of the DPCI, which the researcher investigated by interacting with 
commanders and members whose primary responsibility is the investigation and 
prevention of crime. These are men and women who worked in or with teams in the 
ACTT environment, generally referred to as the Hawks, which deal with complex 
investigations on a national level. 
 
The DPCI, which is a division of the SAPS, formed the Serious Corruption 
Investigation (SCI) unit which is responsible for preventing, combatting, and 
investigating national priority crimes relating to serious corrupt activities and related 
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crimes within the public and private sectors. From the SCI, specific investigators 
were selected to form part of the ACTT to combat corruption. The ACTT was 
established in an attempt to have an effective, independent, and centralised anti-
corruption approach. This came about after the DSO in South Africa was dissolved. 
The ACTT was established to concentrate on individuals who involved themselves 
with serious fraud and serious corruption-related activities, with a threshold 
exceeding R5 million per individual. 
 
6.2.1 Research Aim 
The aim of this study was to assess the multi-disciplinary approach in the 
investigation of corruption cases in the South African public service. The researcher 
has achieved this aim by conducting research into the literature on multi-disciplinary 
approaches to investigate corruption internationally, as well as in South Africa (see 
Chapter 3 and 4). In addition to this, the South African implementation of the concept 
was also studied by conducting in-depth interviews with the role players at the ACTT 
who follow this approach in the fight against corruption in the public service. Their 
perceptions and observations on the approach were studied (see Chapter 5). 
 
6.2.2 First Research Question  
The first research question was: “Is the current multi-disciplinary approach to 
investigate corruption in the South African public service effective?” The researcher 
answered this research question by conducting in-depth interviews with role players 
at the ACTT to gain their understanding and perspectives of the effectiveness of the 
multi-disciplinary approach in the investigation of corruption in the public service 
(see Chapter 5 and Section 6.5). 
 
6.2.3 Second Research Question 
The second research question was: “Are there any factors experienced by DPCI 
investigators or external service providers/consultants who are attached to the 
ACTT that inhibit them from effectively investigating corruption within the public 
service?” The researcher has answered this research question by conducting 
research into the literature on the reasons why the ACTT is not as effective as 
initially intended to be in combatting corruption (see Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5), and 
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developed an effective multi-disciplinary approach for the proficient investigation of 
corruption in the public service of South Africa (see Section 6.5). 
 
6.3 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH CHAPTERS 
 
The formal structure of the research was presented in six chapters, to enable the 
reader to comprehend the chronological sequence of the research conducted. Each 
chapter of this study was written to proficiently address the research outcome. The 
chapters were composed according to relevant research conducted in the multi-
disciplinary approach in the investigation of corruption in the South African public 
service.  
 
6.3.1 Chapter 1  
This chapter commenced with an introduction along with the rationale for conducting 
the research, namely to assess the multi-disciplinary approach in the investigation 
of corruption in the South African public service. An all-encompassing problem 
statement was presented along with the resolve and significance of the research 
problem. This was followed by the formulation of the presented research aim along 
with the research questions. The research methodology applied was supplemented 
with steps taken to address the research problem. The definitions which were 
formulated by authors, legislature, and renowned experts pertaining to the relevant 
field of research on all key theoretical concepts were presented to enable the reader 
to acquire an inclusive comprehension of the respective significance of concepts in 
the research. This was supplemented with the research design and approach 
followed by the research sampling and data collection and the analysis thereof. The 
meticulously premeditated actions of the researcher to ensure the trustworthiness 
of the study were subsequently presented. This was complemented by the ethical 
considerations applied by the researcher during the collection, recording, analysing, 
and interpretation of the data presented.  
 
6.3.2 Chapter 2  
Chapter 2 presented a review of the literature to gain an understanding of corruption 
in South Africa and the international arena. The relevant legislation governing 
corruption in South Africa and abroad were briefly discussed to gain insight into 
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relevant legislation to combat corrupt practices. Specific sections of relevant 
legislation within South Africa were highlighted to illustrate the value of current laws 
in combatting corrupt activities. The common theories on the manifestation of 
corruption were succinctly discussed. A study of the relevant legislation of some 
African countries was included to gain insight into how Africa combats corrupt 
practices. 
 
6.3.3 Chapter 3  
Chapter 3 provided a holistic overview of the investigation processes into multi-
faceted corrupt activities. This was supplemented with a compilation of numerous 
renowned authors that specifically relate to the research conducted on multi-faceted 
corruption investigations. A discussion followed on the significance of evidence, 
along with the type and principles of evidence required during an effective 
investigation process. In addition, a synopsis was provided on the elements of proof 
in a corruption investigation, including the manner in which evidence is presented 
during court proceedings. The chapter concluded with five case studies, to denote 
from a practical perspective the manner in which corruption cases are investigated.  
 
6.3.4 Chapter 4  
Chapter 4 commenced with an exploration of multi-disciplinary approaches with 
specific reference to their impediments and adeptness. In addition, a discussion on 
the internationally renowned multi-disciplinary approaches was presented to the 
reader. A discussion followed on the rationale of the commencement of ACAs 
supplemented with nine practical examples for both the international arena and 
South Africa. A literature overview of the significance of ACAs in combatting 
corruption, with specific references to 18 countries and the manner the ACAs are 
being utilised, was provided. In addition, the discussion included the functional 
operations of the ACAs around the globe that were relevant to the research problem. 
These various multi-disciplinary approaches, as well as compilations, specifically 
addressed the proficiency of the investigation processes of multi-faceted corruption 
cases which could be useful for addressing the research problem. The chapter 
concluded with a number of lessons learned, as well as the relevant safeguards for 
multi-disciplinary approaches. The multi-disciplinary approaches illustrated best 
practices in order to gain insight into the importance of the topic, as well as how to 
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utilise the information obtained from the literature to assist in addressing the 
research problem. 
 
6.3.5 Chapter 5  
Chapter 5 conceptualised the perceptions and experiences of the participants 
utilising the multi-disciplinary approach to investigate corruption in the South African 
Public Service. A clear understanding was obtained of the gathered data derived 
from the in-depth, personal interviews conducted with specific experts in the 
environment. The in-depth interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed by an 
external expert. The verbatim transcribed recordings were provided to an external 
professional decoder. The decoder analysed the data gathered during the interviews 
and presented the identified themes and sub-themes that emerged from these 
interviews. The researcher adopted the “going out into the field” approach and 
engaged with participants personally who were or still are part of the ACTT. 
Elucidations for each theme as well as sub-themes were presented and the verbatim 
quotes were used to illustrate each theme and sub-theme. After the discussion of a 
theme, an interpretation of that theme and its sub-themes was provided. 
 
6.3.6 Chapter 6  
Chapter 6 will present the interpretation of the findings. The foundation of this 
chapter is based on the themes and sub-themes that emerged during the in-depth, 
personal interviews conducted, based on the research topic: The assessment of the 
multi-disciplinary approach to investigate corruption in the South African Public 
Service. Each identified theme, as discussed in Chapter 5, was presented and 
supported by the inclusion of relevant literature, found respectively in Chapter 2, 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, to assess the multi-disciplinary approach in the 
investigation of corruption cases in the South African Public Service. In Chapter 2, 
reference was made to legislation governing corruption in South Africa and abroad, 
along with a specific reference to the concept of corruption. In Chapter 3, reference 
was made to the various investigative processes utilised in multi-faceted corruption 
cases. In Chapter 4, multi-disciplinary approaches were discussed with reference to 
local and international best practices from more than 18 countries that can be 
utilised to achieve the desired outcome. 
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6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS DERIVED FROM THE FINDINGS  
 
A study on the functioning, proficiency, impediments, and lessons learnt was 
conducted on ACAs to find possible solutions for some of the challenges faced by 
the ACTT. The countries which formed part of the study are summarised as follows: 
the SADC Countries on the African continent, five prominent Asian countries, and 
various prominent countries in the West were examined during this research. After 
analysing numerous multi-disciplinary approaches utilised by ACAs during the 
investigation of multi-faceted corruption cases in the public sector, it became clear 
what makes an ACA effective or unsuccessful. In order to improve and implement 
an effective multi-disciplinary approach for the investigation of corruption cases in 
the South African Public Sector, the following recommendations are proposed by 
the researcher. The themes and sub-themes that emerged during the in-depth 
personal interviews with the participants were summarised in Table 5.1 and are 
again presented in Table 6.1 below.  
 
Table 6.1: Themes and sub-themes that emerged from the findings  
THEME 1: PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECTIVE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE ACTT 
1.3 Task team’s effectiveness  
1.4 Attaining objectives 
THEME 2: THE MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH AND CHALLENGES 
EXPERIENCED DURING INVESTIGATIONS 
2.5 Communication in the ACTT as a multi-disciplinary team  
2.6 High workloads and insufficient resources  
2.7 Competency levels of manpower  
2.8 Role of management 
THEME 3: CHALLENGES FOR INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE ACTT  
3.4 Political interference and political will  
3.5 Budget and logistical constraints of resources  
3.6 The need for independence/autonomy 
THEME 4: SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS 
BASED ON LESSONS LEARNED  
4.4 A structure that accommodates expert multi-disciplinary team members  
4.5 Recruitment and integrity testing of team members 
4.6 Supportive staff, resources, and lessons learnt 
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6.4.1 Effective Functioning of the Anti-Corruption Task Team 
The ACTT is a government structure established to effectively combat corruption. 
Since the inception of the team in 2010, there were great expectations for the team. 
The ACTT is currently experiencing a crisis, but this was not always the case; they 
were on the right track until there was a change in management during 2015. An 
intervention from NGOs and ethical political leaders is desperately needed to turn 
the tide on corruption. The ACTT is a vital tool which must be resuscitated if our 
country is to be saved from this devastating path of corruption. The team still has 
members with expertise who are motivated to turn the tide on corruption. The 
rationale for founding the ACTT in 2010 should be revisited to understand precisely 
what was envisioned. Successful agencies need to have rapid access to information 
held by a wide variety of national authorities (customs, tax departments, police, 
courts, etc.) and, as such, effective coordination mechanisms need to be in place. 
The compartmentalisation of departments (customs, tax, judiciary, etc.) is 
detrimental, and there is an absolute need for such mechanisms to be established 
at the ACTT. 
 
Even when an investigation is concluded efficaciously, the impact is limited without 
the effective continuation of the prosecution process, whereby a convicted criminal 
is sentenced. The fact is that corruption needs specialised responses for a 
successful investigation process. In addressing the structures of an effective anti-
corruption strategy, it is, therefore, crucial to focus on the prosecution stage of the 
criminal justice process. It is recommended that a specialised anti-corruption court 
be established, comprising retired magistrates and prosecutors, to increase the 
speed with which criminal matters closely related to corruption are handled. The 
above-mentioned are vital components if the ACTT is to be effective in the execution 
of its mandate. The components of an effective ACA strategy identified during the 
research conducted were summarised and a figure was generated, as illustrated in 
Figure 6.1 below. 
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Figure 6.1: Effective Anti-Corruption Agency Strategy 
 
6.4.2 The Multi-Disciplinary Approach and Challenges Experienced During 
Investigations  
The standard operating procedures for the ACTT after the allocation of a case are 
summarised in the example given below.  
 
After the lead investigator is assigned cases for further investigation, a group of 
individuals is allocated to assist with the investigative duties. Each of the members 
ordinarily allocated is from a specific discipline (e.g. electronic experts, auditors, 
financial investigators, prosecutors, NT analysis, asset forfeiture investigators, 
analyst, etc.) and is responsible for those functions within the group. They function 
under the leadership of the lead investigator, while the facts are being determined 
and evidence is being gathered. Once sufficient evidence is obtained for the 
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prosecutor to draw up a draft charge sheet, the leadership roles are shared between 
the lead investigator and prosecutor. Upon the finalisation of the investigation 
process, the prosecutor takes over the leadership role, as the case is being 
prepared for court proceedings. The most prevalent challenges during this process 
are twofold and will be discussed briefly. The first challenge is that the members 
allocated to assist with the investigation are also allocated to various other 
investigations. These members perform functions allocated to them from their 
respective departments, whilst they are assigned to a specific investigation at the 
ACTT. The second challenge is that there is not a single command structure to be 
followed, thus it is difficult to prioritise certain cases as this might not be seen as a 
priority by another department. The main reason for this is that the SAPS official is 
focussed on a criminal investigation and does not necessarily focus on asset 
recovery. The investigator allocated from asset forfeiture, for example, is not 
interested in identifying assets if the civil process to obtain restraining orders is not 
an immediate focus of the investigation. It is recommended that a selected group of 
individuals from government departments is placed at a centralised and newly-
formed ACA. This would address the first challenge that members are allocated 
various tasks other than a specific investigation, thus allowing them to focus on a 
particular investigation which will bring about a swift investigation process. As for 
the second challenge, the members should have a single reporting structure, which 
will afford them the opportunity to prioritise according to the ACA’s objectives. 
Therefore, a centralised and newly-formed ACA where all challenges of the ACTT 
can be factored in is recommended. This will result in a collaborated response to 
the challenge posed by each function and discipline, thus ensuring an efficient and 
effective anti-corruption investigation.  
 
After studying various ACAs’ strategies, locally and abroad, in the manner evidence 
is identified, acquired, handled, recorded, preserved, and presented during court 
proceedings of a criminal investigation into corrupt practices, it became clear what 
makes an ACA successful or what causes it fail in its mandate to combat corrupt 
practices. A comprehensive understanding around the basic principles of evidence, 
various types of evidence, and the collection method of evidence (which is 
complemented by the chain of evidence) that an investigator might encounter in 
preparing a case for criminal court proceedings are essential. Specific reference 
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ought to be made to what exactly is expected of the investigators and team 
members, and what they should bear in mind during the investigation process. This 
should be complemented by some of the most prevalent theories on corruption. 
Furthermore, the relevant parties in a corrupt relationship must clearly be 
understood by all team members. Moreover, the necessity of utilising special 
investigation techniques during the investigation process should be emphasised. It 
is recommended that investigators be proficiently trained and kept abreast with the 
latest developments internationally in relation to evidence.  
 
There is little doubt that resources are scarce at the ACTT; a fact which was 
confirmed by the participants during the in-depth interviews. As a result, duplication 
in any form cannot be tolerated, as it will only compound or prolong the investigative 
process. However, the recurrent theme of streamlining existing ACAs to improve 
their effectiveness and speed up prosecutions is of the utmost significance. Most 
roleplayers of the ACTT have a purely investigative mandate. Thus, it is important 
to ensure the effective coordination of intelligence, as well as the sharing of 
information between team members. It is recommended that the coordinated 
decision on which role player is more suitable to commence with a specific aspect 
of the investigation be predetermined.  
 
The effectiveness of turning the tide against corruption involves an approach on 
various levels, by using specific knowledge and skills from diverse fields (e.g. law, 
finance, economics, accounting, assets, etc.). The majority of nations, 
consequently, have experts which are dedicated to fighting corruption. These ACAs 
should have adequate human and appropriate material resources with adequate 
independence. During the process of conducting interviews, the lack of appropriate 
resource allocation to the ACTT was emphasised by all of the participants. It is 
recommended that adequate resources are allocated to the ACTT, to enable them 
to effectively investigate allegations of corrupt practices. As Olaniyan (2014:21) 
points out, one of the persistent problems of governance in multi-faceted corruption 
investigations is to determine the effect on human rights. The challenge is to find an 
all-inclusive and universal legal framework for addressing some of the root causes.  
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A criminal investigation into a multi-faceted corruption case requires the 
engagement of team members which are highly skilled and experienced in available 
techniques. They need to demonstrate a comprehension of applicable legislation 
that must be taken into account during the investigation process. The investigation 
is probably going to ultimately lead to legal proceedings against one or several 
suspects. The members of the investigative team must be comfortable with 
appearing in court to clarify how the investigation was conducted and how the 
evidence has been collected. The investigator must exude confidence in matters 
relating to the investigation process, to guarantee that their credibility and 
professionalism are confirmed amid the criminal procedure. Therefore, it is 
recommended that personnel be appointment to the ACTT with the necessary skill, 
experience, knowledge, and aptitude to investigate multi-faceted corruption in the 
public sector. 
 
The following are recommendations of essential elements for an effective multi-
disciplinary response team: 
 Identification of the scope of the problem under investigation. 
 Identification of the resources, human and physical, available to the 
investigation. 
 Establishment of clear communication guidelines for each team member. 
 Establishment of clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each team 
member according to their expertise. 
 Establishment of clearly defined criteria for the types of cases with which the 
team will become involved according to national priority or threats posed. 
 
The elements of an effective multi-disciplinary approach identified during the 
research conducted were summarised and a figure was generated out of the 
research conducted, as illustrated in Figure 6.2 below. 
 
  
- 261 - 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Effective Multi-Disciplinary Approach 
 
6.4.3 Challenges for Independency and Effective Functioning of the ACTT  
The powers available to an ACA or its members must be relatively broad and include 
the right of access to all information and files which could be of value in the fight 
against corruption. It is also essential that the organisations, institutions, and entities 
who are responsible for investigating corruption cases have the appropriate 
resources. This will assist in acquiring the legal instruments that will enable them to 
seize relevant evidence and obtain preservation orders on the proceeds of corrupt 
activities. It is recommended that a dedicated, competent analyst is appointed at the 
ACTT. This would enable investigators to have instant access to various databases 
and intelligence sources during their investigation process.  
 
All officers responsible for the fight against corruption must be shielded from 
political, economic, or personal pressures. In particular, the operational 
independence of an agency, within its specific parameters, must be guaranteed. 
However, the fact that anti-corruption structures need to be made more effective, 
both at the investigative and prosecution levels, is a reality no one can deny. The 
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threat of interference either during the investigation or the prosecution process was 
accentuated by the majority of the participants. As a consequence, it is 
recommended that the ACTT’s independence is reviewed as a matter of urgency. 
The reporting structure and the type of cases assigned to the unit for investigation 
need to be revisited and aligned to national priorities or threats posed to South 
Africa.  
 
Lenneberg and Lenneberg (2014:44) reveal that a multi-disciplinary approach 
includes drawing properly from multiple disciplines to rethink issues outside of 
ordinary limits and achieve solutions in view of looking at multi-faceted 
circumstances in a different way. Multi-disciplinary investigations are frequently 
observed as progressive by some investigators. Nevertheless, it is essential for the 
successful operation of an ACA. Some of the significant obstructions to the multi-
disciplinary approach are the lengthy investigative processes that are common to 
the cases allocated. The investigations are prolonged due to the volume of 
information and the complexity of such investigations. It is however in the interests 
of the public that these cases be investigated to bring about justice for all. The multi-
disciplinary approach has as of late encouraged more zest in accomplishing a swift 
multi-faceted investigation into corruption. 
 
Research by Katz, Halámek, Halámková, Bakshi, Agudelo and Huynh (2016:151) 
suggests that present-day improvements depend on multi-disciplinary 
methodologies and physical procedures, as well as computational strategies. 
Through incorporating different databases (e.g. fingerprints, relatives, corrupt 
activities in government, financial disclosures, SARS returns, etc.) in a computerised 
database, it will enable the ACTT to speed up the screening process by utilising 
these various databases, as well as assisting the investigating officer with 
information gathering during the criminal investigation process. Computerised facial 
recognition, for instance, is required for an automated pursuit of suspects out in 
open areas outfitted with video reconnaissance facilities. This could be vital not just 
to find criminal suspects (corrupt activities and racketeering syndicates), but also for 
crime prevention activities and security measures through identifying relationships 
of influential private individuals with highly placed government officials. This view is 
supported by a supplementary study by Katz, Halámek and HalÃ (2016:46) who 
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report that, overall, the multi-disciplinary approach is a very important component of 
a well-organised, multi-faceted corruption investigation. Thus, the collaborative work 
of experts with different backgrounds is necessary for effective investigations which 
will benefit society. The majority of the time, the corresponding mandates hamper 
the adequacy of these agencies during multi-faceted corruption investigations. 
There is likewise no ACA in South Africa with a particular mandate to teach and 
generate civic awareness about corrupt activities. It is recommended that the South 
African approaches to anti-corruption activities are streamlined, to complement the 
investigative functions of the ACTT. A centralised CCTV database needs to be 
established for the investigation of national priorities and threats. It is further 
recommended that the database consists of all footage recorded in the public and 
private sector which should be complemented by IP mapping of laptops, tablets, 
smartphones, vehicle tracking devices, etc. Such a database would be 
advantageous to investigators during the intelligence gathering process of an 
investigation. The impediments to an effective multi-disciplinary approach, identified 
during the research conducted, were summarised and a figure was generated out 
of the research conducted, as illustrated in Figure 6.3 below. 
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 Figure 6.3: Impediments to the effective functioning of ACAs  
 
6.4.4 Suggestions for the Improvement in Effectiveness  
The efficacy of an ACA depends on some key aspects as summarised below:  
 An effective complaint system to invite the reporting of corrupt practices.  
 An intelligence framework which supplements the complaint system to provide 
intelligence support to investigators.  
 Professional, dedicated, and competent investigators, with enhanced 
proficiency in interviewing techniques and financial investigation.  
 Members’ aptitude to utilise special investigative techniques, for example 
entrapment operations, covert operations, communication interception, etc. 
 A high level of confidentiality during the investigation processes, especially 
regarding the identities of the alleged suspect(s) or entities.  
 The ability to provide protection to whistle-blowers and key witnesses of multi-
faceted corruption cases.  
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 Effective international cooperation and information sharing of cross-border 
corrupt activities.  
 
Olaniyan (2014:362) clarifies that corrupt activities are not victimless. The party that 
suffers in the majority of these cases is the general public, but they are mostly not 
even conscious that this crime has been committed and therefore are seldom in a 
position to lay a complaint. Regular integrity testing of team members is valuable, 
as it takes integrity to fight corruption. Any successful ACA must be based on sound 
and credible processes for the members, as well as the operation of the agency. 
Where there is a lack of integrity in the very system that is designed to investigate 
and combat corruption, the effective investigation and prosecution of multi-faceted 
corruption cases will diminish. The type and number of cases reported to an ACA 
will likely decrease when it is perceived that by reporting a corrupt activity, they will 
be exposed by the ACA. When the information is leaked to the suspects involved in 
the report, it might lead to personal peril for the reporter as well as the demise of 
trust in the ACA. When there is a lack of trust between team members of an ACA, 
the utilisation of the multi-disciplinary approach is hampered. This will bring about 
the members of an ACA duplicating each other’s work to ensure the credibility of 
investigations conducted by a particular member. This will inadvertently 
unnecessarily prolong the investigation process. It is recommended that the trust 
between ACTT members be augmented by updating security clearances frequently. 
This process should be transparent and implemented uniformly with all members 
attached to the ACTT. The members which are not able to obtain the relevant 
security clearance through integrity testing should be removed from the ACTT 
immediately. Regular integrity testing will enhance trust between team members. 
The fact the members deal with top secret information of individuals, government 
departments, and private institutions ought to be reason enough to expedite integrity 
testing for ACTT members. The perspective that “integrity testing instils confidence 
amongst cleared members” was shared by the participants.  
 
Graycar and Prenzler (2013:75) express that each effective criminal investigation 
into multi-faceted corruption goes together with both advantages and detriments 
which ought to be well-assessed prior to completion. For instance, closing down a 
corrupt company may bring about stark hardship through unemployment and the 
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unavailability of a certain product or service. One-sided anti-corruption measures 
should be avoided, as it might inadvertently provoke resistance. The lack of 
professional support staff at an ACA places undue pressure on the investigative 
team. For example, the lead investigator attends to administrative duties such as 
scanning and photocopying documents, whilst he could have conducted his 
investigative duties. The quality of the support staff’s work should undergo quality 
control by a supervisor, and not just the requesting member. As expected in a multi-
disciplinary team, each member should have a specific set of skills to enhance the 
productivity of the team. An ACA should have an effective retention policy in place 
for their members, to ensure that expertise is not lost and the agency’s manpower 
is not depleted up to a point where they are no longer able to operate effectively. 
When manpower is dwindling, workloads will inadvertently increase as the cases 
need to be re-distributed within the ACA, to ensure its effectiveness. International 
experience of the effective combatting of corruption confirms that a single, 
specialised ACA is a prerequisite of successful agencies, for example in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Malaysia, and New South Wales in Australia. Other characteristics of 
successful models are operational, financial, and administrative independence and 
adequate resources. Thus, the functions of corruption prevention and awareness 
have been included in ACAs’ mandates to assist in controlling the threat in societies 
with endemic corruption. Hong Kong has one of the most celebrated models and 
owes its success to the functions mentioned above. It is highly recommended that 
the following changes are made to the ACTT to ensure its effectiveness: the 
independence of the ACTT must be protected in the execution of their duties; 
adequate resources must be allocated; the functions of corruption prevention and 
awareness should form part of the ACTT’s activities; South Africa should establish 
a single ACA to have a comprehensive approach to fighting corruption; and the 
three-pronged approach, namely prevention, investigation, and education, should 
be adopted to win the battle against corruption. 
 
The PSC (2011) states that the DSO was and the ACTT is committed to the fight 
against corrupt activities, both having significantly comprehensive mandates. 
Therefore, it is not attainable for South Africa to have a solo ACA that is responsible 
for the majority of the functions expected to combat corrupt activities, as the nation 
does not have the imperative institutional structure which is required. The 
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components of effective ACAs, identified during the research conducted, were 
summarised and a figure was generated out of the research conducted, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.4 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Components of Effective Anti-Corruption Agencies 
 
 
- 268 - 
 
6.5 RECOMMENDED MULTI-DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION APPROACH  
 
As stated by Graycar and Prenzler (2013:32), ACAs, political groups, media, civil 
society, and businesses are all role players in a comprehensive anti-corruption 
strategy. These role players reinforce the quality of life, the rule of law, and 
sustainable development within a country. When all of the role players work together 
in partnership, corrupt activities will be combatted effectively. However, when some 
of the role players are not committed to the fight against corruption, it could have a 
detrimental effect, which could bring about an upsurge in corrupt activities. Brand 
South Africa (2012) reveals that combatting corruption is one of the state's key 
objectives. To this end, endeavours to eradicate corrupt activities need to 
incorporate private and public sector organisations to manage the fight against 
corrupt activities on all fronts. It is against this background that a Corruption 
Intelligence Centre ought to be established in accordance with the effective multi-
disciplinary approach. It is supposed to centralise the information received in an 
information hub that receives data from every single conceivable source. The data 
can then be centrally dissected and disseminated to appropriate enforcement 
agencies, with due dates for their progress reports. Upon receiving a complaint, 
enquiry, case docket, or project-driven investigation, it is essential to compile a 
comprehensive investigation plan, especially when dealing with multi-faceted 
corruption cases. Although there are multitudes of templates and best practices 
available internationally on the subject, each department or agency needs to 
develop an investigation plan which will address their specific requirements and 
impediments as identified from commencement.  
 
6.5.1  Recommended Investigation Plan  
An investigation plan is not merely additional administration for the investigative 
team, but serves as a valuable tool during multi-faceted investigations. The 
investigation will assist the team with the following: the scope of the investigation, 
what evidence is available, what evidence is outstanding, task allocation for 
members with completion dates, the type of investigative process required, special 
investigation techniques applied, identified suspects, a witness interviewed, risks, 
etc. With the compilation and persistent update of a comprehensive investigation 
plan, the following can easily be obtained: a timeline of events as uncovered to date 
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in the investigation, evidence obtained, progress made, documents seized, special 
operations conducted, experts utilised, list of the task completed and remaining, etc.  
 
The investigation plan needs to be kept confidential, as it entails specific information 
(such as banking records, company records, suspects’ details, witness’s details, 
etc.) which could jeopardise an investigation or be used to intimidate witnesses. It 
is imperative that the investigation plan is circulated between team members and 
updated frequently by each member. This will enable the team members to make 
the plan their own and acknowledge the importance of their role during the 
investigation process. The researcher recommends the use of an index to the 
investigation plan as presented in Figure 6.5.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: Index of Investigation Plan 
PROJECT NAME: 
LEAD INVESTIGATOR: ________________________(Name) ____________________(Unit) _________________________(Contact details)
STATION: SANDTON
CAS NO: ______________/_________/_______
Charge(s) 1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
 DEPARTMENT / COMPANY INVOLVED (Victim):  
VALUE OF OFFENCE COMMITTED: R__________________ 
OFFENCE STATUS: Planned ___________ Current ___________ Past ____________
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1) CASE SUMMARY
2) TEAM MEMBERS 
3) IDENTIFIED SUSPECTS AND ENTITIES
4) EXTERNAL EXPERTS REQUIRED
5) LEGS OF INVESTIGATION
6) ASSET FORFEITURE TARGETS
7) OPPORTUNITY AND THREADS
8) INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES
9) RESOURCES AND BUDGET
CASE DOCKET INDEX
A1 All dockets reported and linked to the investigation filed in sequence 
AA1 Application i.t.o section 205 for banks, cellular phones, travel, etc.
AB1 Banking records with section 236 affidavit, e.g. ABSA, FNB, Nedbank, STD, Investec, etc. Include opening docs and contra account details
AC1 CIPC records on Individuals and Entities with section 212 affidavits
AD1 Department or Entity affidavits obtained, e.g. process affidavit, policies, bid docs, personnel files, etc.
AE1 Exhibits: search and seizure operations, whistle-blower affidavits, electronic devices, etc.
AF1 Forensic Reports, e.g. chartered accountant, cyber forensics, CRC, forensic lab, question documents,  etc.
AG1 Gratification Indentified during the investigation, e.g. bank deposits, property, vehicles, holidays, education fees, etc.
AH1 All other witness affidavits, e.g. secretary, personal assistant, drivers, E-natis on vehicles, property deeds office, etc.  
B1 All intelligences reports, e.g. FIC, SABRIC, Intellegence Agencies, Movement Contol, etc.
C1 Investigation Diary SAPS 5 of Docket
CONFIDENTIAL
ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK TEAM (ACTT)
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By utilising a Microsoft Excel worksheet for the index, the investigator will be able to 
link activities of the investigation process. The index will provide the reader with a 
brief description of the merits of the case and provide a table of contents for the 
applicable evidence and activities or tasks being recorded. The benefit of utilising 
an electronic platform to capture relevant information is that it assists in organising 
the investigation process. The simplicity of access to and control over data captured 
is an obvious benefit. The main reason for selecting the Microsoft Excel platform is 
for the user-friendly operation and integration with Microsoft Publisher, Microsoft 
PowerPoint, Microsoft Word, and Microsoft Access. A multitude of documents can 
be scanned and hyperlinked to Excel worksheets, which enables the reader to view 
a scanned version of a specific document (e.g. a contract, affidavit, bank statement, 
cell phone records, photos, etc.). During the compilation of the investigation plan, 
an Excel workbook should be utilised. The investigating team will now be in a 
position to create Excel worksheets pertinent to the planned activities of the 
investigation process within the Excel workbook. This assists all team members in 
generating a database on the progressions of a particular investigation.  
 
6.5.2 Generation of an Investigative Database  
The researcher recommends the generation of a database pertinent to all 
documents, evidence, and/or any other related items. These items should be 
recorded within the Excel workbook of a particular investigation. This allows all team 
members access to information, tasks, and evidence of the investigation. Once an 
affidavit is obtained, the investigator should scan the affidavit, with the relevant 
annexures thereto. This affidavit should then be indexed in the relevant worksheet 
of the investigation plans workbook (Excel format as illustrated in Figure 6.5). The 
scanned version of the affidavit with annexures is then hyperlinked to the specific 
entry in a worksheet within a particular investigation workbook. The investigator is 
thus able to file the affidavit obtained in a secure place which in return is consistent 
with the “chain of custody”. A copy of the investigation plan workbook should be 
provided to the appointed prosecutor. This will afford the prosecutor the opportunity 
to review the evidence collected and determine the status of the investigation 
conducted. The investigator will only access the original document (affidavit) upon 
the request of the prosecutor for authentication purposes and criminal proceedings. 
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A further advantage is that this process permits the investigator to always have 
immediate access to documents, affidavits, and evidence captured, which is 
convenient during interviews or when specific information needs to be substantiated. 
It is recommended that the same process be followed for all documents, affidavits, 
evidence, and exhibits to ensure that a complete set of all evidence is safeguarded. 
In addition, the investigator is able to obtain photos of exhibits and similarly hyperlink 
these photos to a specific entry in the relevant worksheet. The only caution is that 
the affidavit, document, and evidence should be filed in the same sequence with 
references as in the docket of the corresponding case. The references should be an 
exact copy of the actual references in the criminal case docket. This should be 
recorded in the applicable investigation plan worksheet, as well as in the 
investigation diary (SAPS 5) of the docket under investigation. This process is 
imperative for any multi-faceted corruption investigation, as great volumes of 
documents are collected during the investigation process. This will enable any team 
member to trace and point out, for example, where and when specific evidence was 
found and by whom. Furthermore, the prosecution will be in a position during the 
ensuing criminal proceeding to disclose a copy of the completed investigation 
should it be requested by the defence. This use of a database is increasingly 
advantageous during court proceedings, for example, when the team is confronted 
with the authenticity of a particular document. The document can be easily located 
within the generated database by utilising specific keywords to determine whether 
the document is known to the prosecution or not. The team is placed in a position 
to refute or confirm the existence of a particular document as presented by the 
defence. The researcher is certain that once investigators have familiarised 
themselves with this method of indexing in their criminal investigations, the benefits 
will come to the fore. Some of the more frequently used worksheets will be 
discussed briefly below to illustrate the simplicity of this method.  
 
In addition, the researcher recommends the application of a worksheet within the 
same workbook of the investigation plan as presented in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2: A-Clip of Docket: Complaints received  
 
 
6.5.3 Investigation Process  
During the investigation process of multi-faceted corruption in the public sector, the 
investigative team has to determine whether the elements of corruption were 
present. Snyman (2014:404) states that the elements of corruption in a South 
African context are when a person:  
 directly or indirectly accepts, offers, gives, receives, or solicits (the act),  
 a gratification (anything of value);  
 unlawfulness (the PRECCA prohibits corrupt activities); 
 to improperly influence (inducement) the actions of another person (intention).  
 
A simplified example of a corruption investigation case will be briefly explained. This 
is to demonstrate some of the investigation activities which need to be conducted 
during the investigation process. The example follows below.  
 
A service provider (Company A) made a financial contribution to a vacation during 
August 2018 for the CFO (Mr B) of a Government Department (Department C) in 
return for Mr B favourably awarding a tender to Company A. The investigator will 
make use of intelligence reports requested from relevant departments, agencies, 
and companies. These reports could be generated in various fields. For the purpose 
of this discussion, an intelligence report on movement control, for example, would 
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assist the investigator to verify the initial allegation of Mr B’s trip to Italy. This 
intelligence should still be converted into evidence by approaching the source of the 
information to establish whether the intelligence can be authenticated. The 
investigator needs to determine whether the CFO, Mr B, was in Italy as presented 
in the scenario above. After confirmation that Mr B was in Italy during August 2018, 
the investigator needs to establish the legitimacy and purpose of, as well as 
payments made for such a journey. This could be done in various ways, one of 
which will be briefly discussed.  
 
The relevant Department C which employs Mr B as the CFO is approached to 
confirm by means of relevant documentary evidence (e.g. an application for leave) 
that Mr B was on leave during August 2018 to be able to go to Italy. This evidence 
is obtained in an affidavit under oath from the custodian of the records. These 
records, namely his original application for leave and a printout of Mr B’s leave 
application, are captured on the database and an affidavit by Mr D, the custodian of 
leave records at Department C, is attached thereto. During the execution of certain 
tasks in the investigation process, records of activities are kept. The tasks are 
performed in relation to the investigation plan compiled by the team. The multi-
disciplinary approach can only work when members perform a task according to 
their expertise. The researcher recommends that all investigation activities are 
undertaken by the various members of the team be recorded. This will avoid any 
duplication of tasks and members are able to realise the importance of the tasks 
they are performing. This should be done by allocating tasks with completion dates 
to each member of the investigative team. An example of such an Excel worksheet 
is illustrated in Table 6.3 below.  
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Table 6.3: Task Allocation of Investigation Activities 
 
After capturing tasks or activities during the investigation process as illustrated in 
Table 6.3 above, the finalised task is highlighted for ease of reference in the 
investigation progress. A supplementary affidavit is obtained under oath from Mr E, 
the custodian of all procurement documents at Department C. The documents 
attached to the affidavit consist of the tender process followed and the subsequent 
awarding of the tender to Company A. These documents indicate that Mr B awarded 
the tender to Company A by manipulating specific tender processes. Mr B excluded 
other competitive tenders from the process by rejecting them personally during the 
screening process at Department C. A further affidavit from the office manager (Ms 
F) of tenders at Department C is obtained under oath. Ms F explicitly states that the 
CFO never formed part of any screening processes in respect of tenders, as a result 
of his position in Department C. Mr B is a senior manager and screening of tenders 
is not the function of senior managers. The screening of tenders is the function of 
the Tender Office in Department C. Ms F explained the process comprehensively in 
her affidavit and that Mr B is the CFO, and as such he usually does not take part in 
the evaluation process, even though in this instance he did. This process unfolds as 
the DG appoints senior managers to perform duties in the Bid Evaluation Committee 
or Bid Adjudication Committee at the department. After analysing the procurement 
documents, annexed to Mr E’s affidavit, the investigator discovers that Mr B has 
made an inscription on various tenders: “Rejected Incomplete Documents”. The 
researcher recommends that all affidavits are recorded in the investigation plan as 
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illustrated in Table 6.3 above. A supplementary affidavit of Ms F was obtained, in 
which she explicitly stated that Mr B made the inscriptions on the tender documents 
in her presence. She explained that she did not verify the inscription made by Mr B 
at the time, as he was her manager and well-respected within Department C. Upon 
review of the documents annexed to Ms F’s affidavit, it is confirmed that the 
inscription made by Mr B was incorrect as all the required documents were attached 
as requested in the advertised tender. An official request is then made to the FIC to 
furnish a report in terms of section 27 of the FICA (South Africa 2001). The 
intelligence report of the accounts which were identified for Mr B and Company C 
and a suspicious transaction report with additional information are used for further 
investigations. When the investigator approaches Mr G, the principal agent at Travel 
123, he indicates that he has a confidentiality clause with his clients, therefore he 
would require a court order before any information could be provided. 
 
The investigator has now uncovered sufficient evidence to warrant further 
investigation. He compiles an affidavit under oath, containing all the facts and 
evidence discovered during the investigation process to enable the prosecutor to 
present it as evidence in court. An application in terms of section 205 of the CPA 
(South Africa 1977) is made to gain access to the accounting records of Company 
A and Mr B. In addition, a further section 205 application is presented to the court in 
respect of Travel 123 that allegedly made the travel arrangements for the CFO’s 
journey to Italy. The designated magistrate is approached and the applications with 
relevant documentary evidence are presented. Upon the authorisation of the section 
205 applications (South Africa 1977) the magistrate issues a court order, which is 
served by the investigator to the respective banks as well as the travel agent to 
provide certain detailed information as per the application in court.  
 
In response to the court order issued, Mr G complies and provides the relevant 
documents in his possession. Amongst the documents, the investigator finds proof 
that Mr B made use of Travel 123’s services.  
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The investigator obtains an affidavit under oath from Mr G, the custodian of all the 
records at Travel 123, to which the following documentary evidence is annexed: 
 Mr B requested a travel package from Travel 123 via email for a vacation in 
Italy on 01 May 2018.  
 Mr G sent email correspondence regarding the available travel packages with 
dates and amounts to Mr B.  
 Mr B confirmed that he will be travelling with his wife and provided copies of 
their identification booklets and official passports to Mr G.  
 Email correspondence between Mr B and Mr G on the itinerary for Italy was 
provided.  
 Confirmation was sent via email to Mr B of their flight tickets, hotel reservation, 
and vehicle rental services. 
 The accounting records at Travel 123 reveal that an R5,000 deposit was made 
10 May 2018 by means of an EFT into an ABSA account. 
 An additional payment of R80,000 was made on 25 July 2018 by means of an 
EFT. 
 The sum of the invoice was R85,000 and it was paid in full.  
 
This affidavit is scanned and indexed accordingly as illustrated in Table 6.2. It is 
recommended that a similar process be followed throughout the investigation 
process. The investigative team is of the view that Mr B will refute that it is his 
handwriting in the declined tender documents. A decision was taken to utilise 
“Question Documents”, a section within the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), to 
determine the authenticity of the inscriptions on the tender documents. The 
signature on the application for leave and relevant documents in the procurement 
process in the awarding of the tender to Company A is provided. This includes the 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) between Company A and Department C, which was 
signed on 25 July 2018 by Mr H and Mr B as the delegated official at Department 
C. An expert affidavit in terms of section 212 of the CPA (South Africa 1977) is 
obtained under oath from Mr J at the FSL, wherein Mr J states that the specimen 
signatures provided were compared with the signatures on the documents obtained 
in the procurement process and that the signatures are that of Mr B and Mr H 
respectively.  
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6.5.4 Company Records CIPC  
The company records of Company A are obtained from the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) with a relevant section 212 (South Africa 
1977) affidavit under oath from Ms K. These records are valuable to determine when 
a company was formed and what their core business is. The records further reveal 
the directors appointed and their time served at a particular company, along with the 
details of their appointed accounting firm. The record of issued shares of a company 
may assist an investigator to determine whether gratification was given to a 
particular individual. The researcher recommends that all company, entity, closed 
corporation, and Trust records obtained be captured, scanned, indexed, and 
hyperlinked accordingly. An example of such an Excel worksheet is illustrated in 
Table 6.4 on the next page.  
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Table 6.4: CIPC Records: Entities  
 
 
 
PROJECT NAME: 
No Entity Name Registration No.
VAT 
No.
Tax No. Business Address Auditor
Holding 
Company
Name ID No. Address
Appointment 
Date
Status
1 Company A 2015/014393/07 N/A 9331444145
106 Avengers Road, 
Sandton, 1685
Mr QN of Chartered 
Forensics
N/A Mr Hand Over 7112175012083
12 Rooiels Street, 
Brits, 0157
27 June 2008 ACTIVE
CONFIDENTIAL
ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK TEAM (ACTT)
File AC: CIPC Records: Entities 
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After capturing the documents as illustrated in Table 6.4 above, a copy thereof is 
provided to the forensic accountant to commence with his analysis.  
 
6.5.5 Financial Records of Suspects and Entities  
The accounting records of Company A and Mr B are obtained from the respective 
banks. The financial records of a company are utilised to determine the flow of funds 
once corruption is identified. These records are often used by investigating officers 
to compile lifestyle audit on suspects under investigation to determine whether they 
received any illicit funds, and the origin of such funds. This is essential in a money 
laundering case, to illustrate to the court the manner in which illicit funds were 
transferred between accounts of various banks in an attempt to avoid detection and 
to introduce the money back into an entity or individuals’ account that would appear 
to be from a legitimate origin. All of the financial statements and account opening 
documents in terms of the FICA (South Africa 2001) are obtained with separate 
affidavits under oath in terms of section 236 of the CPA (South Africa 1977) from 
Ms L and Mr M from the respective banks. The researcher recommends that all 
financial and/or accounting records of entities and individuals be captured, scanned, 
indexed, and hyperlinked accordingly. An example of such an excel worksheet is 
illustrated in Table 6.5 on the following page.  
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Table 6.5: Bank/Financial Records 
 
 
 
 
No Bank documents obtained
Individual / Entity Name File No. AB
BANK: ABSA, 
FNB, 
Nedbank, 
STD, 
Investec 
Type of Account Account 
Complete of 
Bank 
Statements 
obtained 
Yes/No
Start Date End Date
Account 
Application/ 
Opening 
Documents
Signatories to Account Section 236 Comment Outstanding Statements
1 ABS AB1.1 ABSA Cheque 122548 Yes 02/01/2011 01/03/2016 Yes Yes
2 ASD AB1.2 ABSA Cheque 224558 Yes 01/01/2011 14/09/2017 Yes Yes
3 BKL AB2.1 ABSA Cheque 408954 Yes 10/05/2012 10/08/2016 Yes Yes
4 DFR AB2.2 ABSA Vehicle and Asset Finance 10256 Yes 01/08/2010 01/08/2014 Yes Yes
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
File AB: BANK Records: ABSA, FNB, Nedbank, STD, Investec 
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After capturing the documents as illustrated in Table 6.5 above, a copy is provided 
to the forensic accountant to commence with his analysis. The forensic auditor, Mr 
N, records and analyses the accounting records presented to him by the 
investigator. Mr N compiles a report on his analysis of all financial statements and 
accounting records. The following is an illustration of some of the findings in Mr N’s 
report:  
 Mr H is the sole signatory to the business account of Company A as per 
account opening records held at the bank. 
 Mr H is the sole director of Company A as per CIPC records. 
 Mr B was not in a sound financial position, as he was overdrawn to the extent 
of R20,000 on his current account.  
 Mr B’s application for a personal loan on 02 May 2018 was declined as a result 
of his financial position.  
 Mr B did not make any transfers from his account to Travel 123 for the trip 
undertaken in Italy.  
 Mr H is the individual that made payments on behalf of Mr B to Travel 123, via 
an EFT.  
 Company A’s account at Standard bank was used to generate two transfers 
by means of EFT from Bank X to Bank Y, which is the account of Travel 123. 
 The first transaction occurred on 10 May 2018 for R5,000 with the description 
“Mr B” on the ABSA bank statements. This was confirmed by ABSA bank with 
the presentation of contra account details in a section 236 affidavit by Ms L.  
 The second transaction occurred on 25 July 2018 for R80,000 with the 
description “Mr B” on the bank statements. This was confirmed by the bank 
with the presentation of contra account details in a section 236 affidavit by Ms 
L.  
 Mr N made certain findings on the analysis he had conducted on the financial 
records that show Mr H paid for Mr B (and his wife) to take a trip to Italy during 
August 2018. On the same day that the SLA was signed between Company A 
and Department C, the outstanding R80,000 was paid to Travel 123 by Mr H. 
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After providing the extract of evidence that will be used during the court proceedings, 
the following section contains information which should be kept in mind whilst 
preparing to go to court. 
 
6.5.6 Preparing for Court  
The investigative team needs to present a criminal case in court and prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the offence of corruption was committed by the parties 
involved. The evidence needed to prove a case of corruption is not contained in 
gossip and speculation. The court depends on actual evidence which needs to be 
presented during the criminal proceedings. 
 
The appointed prosecutor in the matter under investigation will be responsible for 
compiling the charge sheet. It should be noted that the prosecutor should be part of 
the team from the onset, and assist with the drafting of the investigation plan. The 
investigator should provide a copy of all evidence once obtained and filed as the 
investigation progresses. This will result in the prosecutor having an up to date draft 
charge sheet of evidence in the criminal case. By following this process, the charge 
sheet on the criminal case investigation will be finalised shortly after the 
investigation is completed. This leads to swift justice and sends a message to 
perpetrators that they will be prosecuted when found to be a party to corrupt 
activities. Currently, this is not realised as there are no dedicated prosecutors for 
corruption cases. The prosecutors and investigators report to different managers 
who might allocate different priorities to them. Therefore, it is important to establish 
a solo ACA to combat corrupt activities in South Africa.  
 
6.5.6 The Complexity in Corruption Cases 
As illustrated in the simplified scenario in Section 6.5.3 to 6.5.5, a corruption 
investigation is not as straightforward as some might expect. In relation to the 
scenario, a short list of possible witnesses which need to be approached during the 
first phase of the investigation process is presented below:  
 
 Mr D (custodian of leave records at Department C) in relation to the leave 
records of Mr B.  
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 Mr E (custodian of the procurement process at Department C) to establish the 
role of Mr B during the process.  
 Ms F (who screens all bids at Department C) to explain the process and the 
role Mr B played. 
 Investigator’s affidavit for the section 205 of the CPA (South Africa 1977) 
application to the court regarding banking records of Company A. 
 Investigator’s affidavit for the section 205 of the CPA (South Africa 1977) 
application to the court regarding banking records Mr B. 
 Investigator’s affidavit for the section 205 of the CPA (South Africa 1977) 
application to the court for Mr G of Travel 123. He is a compellable witness 
regarding the travel plans of Mr B and his wife. 
 Mr Z (custodian of accounting records at Department C with direct access to 
accounting records at Department C) regarding the payment made by 
Department C to Company A as a result of the SLA being signed between the 
parties. 
 Ms L’s section 236 affidavit (South Africa 1977) in the matter of Company A’s 
financial records. 
 Ms M’s section 236 affidavit (South Africa 1977) in the matter of Mr B’s financial 
records. 
 Ms K (custodian of CIPC records) in the matter of the official records of 
Company A. 
 Mr G (custodian of records at Travel 123) in the matter of the travel itinerary 
and correspondence with Mr B, and regarding the payments made by Mr H. 
This was the gratification that Mr B received for his assistance during the 
procurement process. 
 Mr J’s section 212 affidavit (South Africa 1977) in the matter of the handwriting 
analysis. 
 Mr N, the forensic auditor, regarding the report on finances and flow of funds.  
 
As indicated above, this is merely a sample of the investigation that needs to be 
conducted. Additional affidavits will be obtained and will serve as corroborating 
evidence. The avenues of cyber forensics, cell phone analysis, and the investigation 
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of companies that provided services for Mr B and his wife are but some of the 
activities to be performed.  
 
A common mistake is to think that evidence can present itself in court. Each piece 
of evidence must, in general, be presented in court by a person. This can be either 
by the person who found the item, or confiscated the item, or has specific knowledge 
about the item. An important measurement during the investigation process when 
witnesses are being identified is to ask oneself what the witness will testify about 
and what the prosecution will be able to prove with the evidence. The evidence 
presented should be relevant, have weight, and be and presented by a credible 
witness. The investigator should aim to authenticate and corroborate evidence.  
 
Investigators should not focus their investigation on an individual, but rather 
investigate the identified crime. Then the investigator will be in a position to correctly 
identify the perpetrator of the crime. An investigation must always be an objective 
process conducted impartially during the collection of evidence.  
 
6.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This research has suggested several possible areas for further investigation. The 
focus of this research has mostly been on the ACTT’s effectiveness in utilising the 
multi-disciplinary approach to investigate corruption in the South African Public 
Service. A further study could assess the individuals convicted of corruption, to 
ascertain their motivations and experiences of being party to the corruption process. 
Further research is essential to determine whether the independence of the DPCI, 
or lack thereof, is sufficient to fulfil its mandate as initially intended. This should be 
complemented by a specific reference to the ACTT, to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of its sovereignty during case selection and the investigation 
processes. The present study found that the independence of the ACTT has been 
severely threatened by certain political appointments since 2015.  
 
The efficacy of various ACAs globally and the best practices employed by them were 
presented in this study. The single ACA came to fore; it is fundamental that such a 
solo approach be complemented by a comprehensive mandate to prevent, 
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investigate, and educate in the fight against corruption. Therefore, further research 
is important to determine the viability of establishing a single ACA to investigate 
multi-faceted corruption with specific reference to the Hong Kong ICAC and its 
functions in effectively fighting corruption. There is an urgent need for further 
investigation into this issue, which falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
6.7 CONCLUSION  
 
The multi-disciplinary approach to the investigation of corruption is the most 
common approach by proficient ACAs internationally in the fight to curb corrupt 
practices. Although some parts of the multi-disciplinary approach were implemented 
since the commencement of the ACTT, but not the most important one. The current 
level of independence of the ACTT, and the command structure, budget, resources, 
and personnel were inadequate to deal with the multitude of cases allocated to the 
ACTT. The success of any ACA is mostly dependent upon political will to root out 
corruption. As the political leaders decided upon the reporting structure, mandate, 
and budget of an ACA it is imperative to have political backing for the efficacy of an 
ACA. It is necessary to involve NGOs, the opposition party, and government to play 
an equal role in the oversight of an ACA, to ensure that cases are dealt with on merit 
and not by political agendas.  
 
After researching numerous international countries and organisations, as well as the 
forming of ACAs, it is abundantly clear that corrupt activities are a curse that afflicts 
most countries around the world. It has turned into the predominant reason for 
concern globally, particularly in the developing and underdeveloped countries. The 
mandate, aims, objectives, structure, independence, and selection criteria for the 
ACTT’s cases should be aligned with the allocation of resources, logistical support, 
and budget. Serious thought should be given to establishing a single specialised 
ACA to combat corruption.  
 
Broad destitution and financial hardship in South Africa and several other countries 
prompted corruption. The corrupt activities of public officials have encroached upon 
each aspect of society, government, business, and military. Indeed, even legislation 
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has been futile in the battle against corruption, as in some cases even the criminal 
justice system is seen by the public as being corrupt.  
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Affiliation:  University of South Africa: Department of Police Practice, 
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Title of the Study:  An Assessment of the Multi-Disciplinary Approach to 
Investigate Corruption in the South African Public Service 
 
Researcher:    Mr CJ Smit 
Promoter:   Prof JG van Graan 
 
Cell Number:  082 373 7596 
E-mail:  38090058@Unisa.ac.za 
 
I completed my Magister Technology Degree in Policing and currently registered at 
the University of South Africa (UNISA) at the Department of Police Practice in order to 
complete my Doctoral Studies. Part of my studies includes researching and writing a 
doctoral thesis. I am conducting my research study under the supervision of Professor 
van Graan and the approved research title of the study is, An Assessment of the Multi-
Disciplinary Approach to Investigate Corruption in the South African Public Service. 
Information obtained from this research study will be reported to the College of Law 
Ethics Review Committee with my confirmation that this research study complied with 
all the relevant obligations imposed by the UNISA Ethics Policy.  
 
I am inviting you to participate in my study. Taking part in this study is voluntary. You 
may withdraw from the study at any time. The study is described below to inform you 
about the purpose of the study, procedures of the study, inconvenience and 
discomforts, potential benefits, potential conflict of interest, anonymity and 
confidentiality, data records of interviews, results and findings of the study and 
participants’ rights. As SAPS employees your performance evaluation will not be 
affected if you don't want to participate in this study. 
 
 
 Purpose of the Research  
 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the multi-disciplinary approach in 
the investigation of serious corruption in the South African public service is achieving 
its proposed aims and objectives. The Anti-Corruption Task Team (ACTT) was formed 
to perform this task. Therefore an evaluation on whether the multi-disciplinary 
approach in the investigation of serious corruption in the South African public service 
is accomplishing its proposed targets and intentions with professionalism at ACTT. It 
is, therefore, imperative to explore the opinions viewpoints and statistical data of 
individual Principals / Managers, the operational personnel at ACTT and interviews 
with contracted external expert witnesses associated with ACTT to gain their insights 
with regards to the multi-disciplinary approach in serious corruption investigation(s). 
Further, to explore how the multi-disciplinary approach is used and viewed within the 
ACTT environment and if the method could be used more proficiently to enhance the 
approach towards serious corruption investigation(s) and reduce serious corruption in 
the public service within South Africa. 
 
Procedures of the Study 
 
The study will include in-depth interviews with individual ACTT Principals / Managers, 
interviews with focus groups for ACTT operational personnel and interviews with 
contracted external expert witnesses to gain their insights and viewpoints on the value 
of the multi-disciplinary approach in the investigation of serious corruption in the South 
African public service. The principals/managers of ACTT have knowledge and skills 
pertaining to the management and monitoring of the unit performance. The operational 
personnel in the ACTT environment have the knowledge and skills in the investigation 
of serious corruption cases, whereas the external expert witnesses interact directly 
with the operational members to ensure an independent professional opinion on the 
facts of the investigation conducted. The identified participants are 
principals/managers of ACTT from the various government departments, members 
from DPCI National offices as well as operational personnel in the ACTT environment 
and external expert witnesses appointed as per the criteria of each separate 
investigation necessity. The ACTT is a multi-disciplinary team comprises of 
government departments and parastatals. The research will include, South African 
 Police Service (SAPS), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), Asset Forfeiture Unit 
(AFU), South African Revenue Service (SARS), Special Investigating Unit (SIU), 
Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and the National Treasury (NT) to fast-track 
investigations of high-priority and high-profile serious corruption cases. Interviews will 
be conducted with the help of an interview schedule. The researcher wants to probe 
deeper; therefore, the purposive sampling is identified in order to identify information-
rich individuals as participants. A tape recorder may be used to record conversations. 
The interviews will not be longer than three hours but may end sooner by natural 
process or on request of the respondent or researcher, depending on the 
circumstances. 
 
Inconvenience and Discomforts  
 
The researcher will make every effort to ensure the comfort and minimise the risks of 
for the respondents. When you feel some discomfort at responding some questions, 
please feel free to ask to skip the question. The respondent may become tired or feel 
emotional discomfort at which point a break may be requested or the interview may 
be postponed to a later date or terminated if so desired.  
 
Potential Benefits 
 
It is my hope that the respondents partaking in this study will feel the satisfaction of 
contributing to solving a social problem and facilitating in illuminating the problem. 
Participant’s information will assist in providing insights and a better understanding of 
the problem, which can stimulate future research. Successful completion of this 
research and its results could have benefits for prospective students researching 
similar information. The academic community and larger society can obtain valuable 
guidance and opinions from this study that can lead to enhance the research institution 
quantum. Successful completion of this research and its results could have benefits 
for prospective students researching similar phenomena. The academic community 
and larger society can obtain valuable guidance and opinions from this study that can 
enhance the research institution's quantum/significance. The SAPS, 
parastatal's/state-owned enterprises and the governmental department could add 
value to the development of a more effective multi-discipline approach and to 
 implement effective and efficient criteria with multi-discipline approach investigations 
in the Public Service and in line with the vision, mission and organisational strategic 
goals and priorities with the appropriate emphasis on professionalism. Furthermore, 
new skills and knowledge can be obtained in everyday approach to investigate serious 
corruption. Credit will be provided to the viewpoints of other authors. On a personal 
level, it is the hope of the researcher that the participants will obtain personal 
satisfaction once they have discussed certain issues with the researcher and thus 
gaining personal insights that were not gained prior to the interviews.  
 
Potential Conflict of Interest 
 
It is important to mention the researcher is employed by the SAPS an operational 
member at ACTT and the researcher’s work responsibility includes the investigation 
of serious corruption cases in a multi-disciplinary approach. With the researcher’s 
exposure, involvement and experience of a serious corruption investigation in a multi-
disciplinary approach, the seriousness and impact of corruption in the Public service 
became a burning issue to the researcher. This study will not evaluate any individual 
member in particular but only the overall investigation process and practices currently 
at ACTT and there is, therefore, no conflict of interest embedded in this study.  
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
Participation in this study is voluntary and can choose whether to be part of this study 
or not. If a participant volunteer to be part of this research study, they have the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time without any negative consequences or penalties. 
In the event where respondents choose not to participate in the study or to withdraw 
at any time during the interview, they have no obligation to explain the reason therefor 
and the data shall be destroyed. Based on UNISA Ethics Policy the researcher will 
respect and protect the dignity, privacy and confidentiality of participants. All 
information will be kept and treated as confidential and anonymity is assured by the 
researcher. Interview schedules will be scanned, safely stored on a computer with a 
protected password and sealed in an envelope separately to protect individual 
identities of each consent form. These envelopes will be locked in a file cabinet. The 
researcher will report back to the College of Law Ethics Review Committee to confirm 
 that she has complied with all the relevant obligations imposed by the UNISA Ethics 
Policy. 
 
Data Records of Interviews 
The data records/recordings collected will be coded using a fake name (pseudonym) 
or initial and numbers. As previously mentioned to gather information, an audio tape 
recorder may be used to record the conversations. Therefore, it is requested to 
voluntarily agrees to be audiotaped. The researcher shall transcript the audiotaped 
information and may provide a copy of the transcripts upon request. Participants have 
the right to review and edit the audiotaped information. Sentences that participants 
ask to leave out will not be used and they will be erased from all relevant records and 
documents. When the results of the research are published or discussed, no 
information will be included that will reveal your identity and will be protected or 
disguised. The data records/recordings will be stored for approximately three years 
after the study has been completed and then destroyed.  
 
Results / Findings of the Study 
 
Results/findings of this study will be shared with the participants and be presented as 
a group and no individual participant will be identified. The researcher (and her study 
leader) is the only individuals who will have access to raw data from interviews, and 
hereby ensure that data will be treated as stipulated above. The results of this study 
will be reflected in the researcher’s thesis, which will be hosted on UNISA’s library site 
and an article will be published from it. The researcher will also publish the research 
findings in the SAPS Police magazine, where the participants will have free access to 
it. 
 
Right not to be Participating and to withdraw  
 
You may also refuse to answer any questions you are reluctant to answer and still 
remain in the study. You will not be treated any differently and no penalty or 
victimisation will be involved if you decide not to participate in the study or if you stop 
once you have started.  
  
Termination of Participation  
 
The researcher may withdraw a participant from this research if circumstances arise 
which warrant doing so. Participation in this research may be terminated without the 
respondent consent if the investigator(s) believe that any part of the study may put the 
researcher at undue risk. The researcher participation may also be terminated if she 
does not adhere to the study protocol of UNISA Ethics Policy. 
 
Right of Access to Researcher  
 
Respondents are free to contact the researcher on her cell phone number or e-mail 
address as stipulated on this form, at a reasonable hour, in connection with interview 
particulars, if they so wish.  
 
Consent and Participation 
 
I, the undersigned, certify that I have read all the information in this consent form. I 
agree to be audiotaped during the interview and to participate in this study voluntarily 
without duress. 
 
 Signed at ……………………….on this…..day of ………………………2018.  
 
 
Signature: …………………………………… (Print Name…………………………) 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY. 
  
 ANNEXURE F: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
1. From your experience, does the ACTT achieve its aims and objectives to investigate 
corruption in the South African public service? 
 
2. In your opinion, is the ACTT an appropriate multi-disciplinary approach to 
investigate corruption in the South African public service? 
 
3. From your experience, is the ACTT effective in the investigation of corruption in the 
South African public service? 
 
4. From your experience, does the ACTT, comprising of governmental and non-
governmental role players, co-operate and communicate during corruption 
investigations? 
 
5. From your point of view, should an anti-corruption agency, such as the ACTT, 
function autonomously to investigate corruption in the South African public service? 
 
6. Have you learnt lessons as a member of the ACTT that could enhance the multi-
disciplinary approach to investigate corruption in the public service? 
 
7. Do you have any additional comments or suggestions regarding the multi-
disciplinary approach to investigate corruption in the South African public service that 
have not been discussed? 
  
 ANNEXURE G: TRANSCRIBER’S CERTIFICATE 
 
TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE  
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that insofar as it is audible, the foregoing 
is a true and correct verbatim transcription of the proceedings recorded by 
means of a digital recorder.  
 
 
DATE OF RECORD: 2018-02-11 
DATE COMPLETED: 2018-04-09 
 
 
 
TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES  
 
1. Transcripts are typed verbatim. 
2. In distinct words and or phrases are indicated with sound system timestamps. 
 
 
 
 
. 
  
SIGNED BY:    
SWORN TRANSCRIBER:  WILNA BRAND  DATE: 2018-11-02 
  
 ANNEXURE H: INDEPENDENT CO-CODER CERTIFICATE FOR 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
  
 ANNEXURE I: EDITOR’S STATEMENT 
 
